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Overview
The	  Arc(c	  is	  the	  most	  rapidly	  changing	  climate	  region	  on	  Earth.	  There	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  change	  that	  has	  already	  occurred	  due	  to	  emissions	  
of	  greenhouse	  gases	  and	  aerosols	  from	  human	  ac(vi(es.	  These	  aﬀect	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  Arc(c	  ecosystems	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  its	  inhabitants.	  
The	  Arc(c	  is	  a	  par(cularly	  fragile	  region	  where	  strong	  ecosystem	  feedbacks	  accelerate	  changes	  compared	  with	  other	  regions	  -­‐	  an	  eﬀect	  called	  
“Arc(c	  ampliﬁca(on”.	  Changes	  in	  the	  Arc(c	  ecosystem	  dynamics	  have	  global	  consequences
Today	  we	  see	  clear	  evidence	  of	  signiﬁcant	  changes	  in	  Arc(c	  landscapes	  and	  marine	  environments.	  Clima(c	  changes	  are	  aﬀec(ng	  the	  Arc(c	  
cryosphere	  (areas	  where	  water	  is	  in	  solid	  form,	  e.g.	  sea-­‐ice,	  glaciers,	  snow	  cover	  and	  permafrost),	  hydrology,	  habitats	  and	  species.	  Examples	  
of	   impacts	   include	   the	   forma(on	  of	  new	  wetlands	  and	   lakes	  due	   to	  melt	  water	   and	   the	   rapid	  draining	  of	   lakes	  and	   loss	  of	   freshwater	   re-­‐
sources	  due	  to	  permafrost	  degrada(on.
Changes	  in	  temperature,	  sea-­‐ice	  cover,	  snow	  cover	  and	  water	  regimes	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  important	  habitats	  for	  Arc(c	  species,	  as	  well	  as	  
shiHs	  in	  the	  species	  composi(on	  due	  to	  landscape	  transforma(ons,	  which	  in	  turn	  impact	  on	  people’s	  livelihoods	  (Figure	  1).
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Figure	  1:	  Climate	  Change	  in	  Arc2c:	  Drivers	  and	  Impacts
 
Strategic	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment	  of	  Development	  of	  the	  Arc7c
This	   factsheet	   is	   to	   s,mulate	  dialogue	  between	   stakeholders,	  Arc,c	   experts	   and	  EU	  policymakers.	   Stake-­‐
holder	  input	  informs	  the	  analysis	  of	  trends	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  shaping	  Arc,c	  develop-­‐
ments.	  It	  will	  lead	  to	  recommenda,ons	  to	  EU	  policymakers	  and	  be	  published	  as	  the	  Strategic	  Assessment	  
of	   Development	   of	   the	   Arc,c	   Report	   in	   spring	   2014.	   The	   European	   Commission-­‐funded	   project	   is	   imple-­‐
mented	  by	  a	  network	  of	  19	  ins,tu,ons	  lead	  by	  the	  Arc,c	  	  	  	  Centre	  in	  Rovaniemi	  and	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  EU	  Arc-­‐
,c	  Informa,on	  Centre	  ini,a,ve.	  
Type 
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Human-­‐induced	  drivers
-­‐	  CO2	  and	  black	  carbon	  
emissions.
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Impacts	  in	  the	  Arctic
	  
Environmental
• Marine	  ice	  connected	  ecosystem	  is	  threatened	  by
	  	  	  	  	  	  acidification	  of	  ocean	  water.
• Tundra	  is	  retreating	  and	  the	  tree	  line	  moving	  northward	  changing	  
bird	  and	  reindeer	  habitats
• Changes	  in	  water	  cycle,	  release	  of	  methane	  that	  is	  trapped	  in	  ice	  
and	  topographic	  change.
• Increasing	  local	  emission	  sources	  due	  to	  new	  human
	  	  	  	  	  	  activities,	  e.g.	  shipping	  and	  oil	  extraction.
Economic	  and	  Social
• Northern	  Sea	  Routes	  open	  to	  transit	  shipping	  and	  additional	  mari-­‐
time	  activities	  (e.g.	  tourism) 
• Increased	  access	  to	  oil	  &	  gas	  reserves	  and	  minerals	  ,	  resulting	  in	  
increased	  economic	  growth	  opportunities	  also	  for	  local	  population 
• Change	  in	  economic	  structure	  from	  small-­‐scale	  local	  activities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
towards	  more	  international	  influence,	  from	  subsistence	  activities	  
towards	  more	  wage	  labour
• Indigenous	  peoples'	  food	  sources	  are	  threatened,	  with	  poten-­‐
tially	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  health. 
• Increased	  vulnerability	  of	  existing	  infrastructure	  on	  land	  due	  to	  
sea	  level	  rise	  and	  permafrost	  melt 
• Changes	  in	  snow/ice	  dependent	  transport	  and	  food	  sources	  re-­‐
quire	  humans	  to	  adapt.
• Adverse	  impacts	  on	  human	  health.
 FACTSHEET 
Climate	  Change	  in	  the	  Arc(c
Strategic	  Assessment	  of	  Development	  of	  the	  Arc5c:	  Assessment	  Conducted	  for	  the	  EU
Overview
Fisheries	  and	  aquaculture	  make	  crucial	  contribu6ons	  to	  the	  world’s	  well-­‐being	  and	  prosperity.	  In	  addi6on	  to	  an	  important	  food	  source,	  the	  
ﬁsheries	  sector	  provides	  livelihoods	  and	  income,	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly.	  According	  to	  the	  UN	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organiza6on	  (FAO),	  
ﬁsh	  and	  ﬁshery	  products	  are	  among	  the	  most	  traded	  food	  commodi6es	  worldwide.	  While	  capture	  ﬁsheries	  produc6on	  remains	  stable,	  aqua-­‐
culture	  produc6on	  keeps	  on	  expanding.	  Aquaculture	  is	  set	  to	  remain	  one	  of	  the	  fastest-­‐growing	  animal	  food-­‐producing	  sectors.	  This	  factsheet	  
highlights	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  in	  rela6on	  to	  sub-­‐Arc6c	  capture	  ﬁsheries,	  aquaculture	  and	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  European	  Union.	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  Environmental	  Impact	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  of	  Development	  of	  the	  Arc7c
This	  factsheet	  is	  to	  stimulate	  dialogue	  between	  stakeholders,	  Arctic	  experts	  and	  EU	  policymakers.	  Stakeholder	  
input	  informs	  the	  analysis	  of	  trends	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  shaping	  Arctic	  developments.	  It	  will	  
lead	  to	  recommendations	  to	  EU	  policymakers	  and	  be	  published	  as	  the	  Strategic	  Assessment	  of	  Development	  of	  
the	  Arctic	  Report	  in	  spring	  2014.	  The	  European	  Commission-­‐funded	  project	  is	  implemented	  by	  a	  network	  of	  19	  
institutions	  lead	  by	  the	  Arctic	  Centre	  in	  Rovaniemi	  and	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  EU	  Arctic	  Information	  Centre	  initiative.	  
Type 
Figure	  1:	  	  Drivers	  and	  Impacts
Drivers
• Climate	  change.
• Global	  demand	  for	  food.
• Overﬁshing	  and	  deple6on	  of	  ﬁsh	  
stocks	  elsewhere.
• Inadequacy	  of	  management	  and	  
regula6ons.
• Fishing	  vessels	  and	  prac6ces.
• Insuﬃcient	  knowledge	  of	  species	  
and	  ecosystems	  eﬀects.
• Aquaculture.
Changing
Nature	  of
Arc1c	  Fisheries
Policy	  Responses	  (Including	  EU)
Shaping	  drivers	  and	  mi6ga6ng	  impacts
• Sector-­‐speciﬁc	  policies.
• Environmental	  policies.
• Economic	  and	  trade	  policies.
• Research	  funding.
Impacts
Environmental
• Biodiversity,	  species	  change	  and	  eﬀects	  on	  eco-­‐
systems;	  increased	  removal	  of	  ﬁsh	  biomass;	  migra-­‐
tory	  linkages,	  introduc6on	  of	  exo6c	  species.
• Physical	  changes	  in	  ocean	  climate	  and	  chemistry.
• Intensity	  of	  seabed	  disturbance	  from	  bottom	  trawling.
• Poten6al	  pollu6on	  from	  ﬁshing	  vessels.
Economic
• Diversiﬁca6on	  of	  food	  supply.
• Employment	  opportuni6es.
• Increase	  in	  export	  op6ons	  and	  value.
• Conﬂicts	  with	  other	  economic	  sectors.
	  
Socio-­‐Poli0cal
• Diminished	  local	  and	  traditional	  fishing	  and	  processing.
• Educa6on	  and	  training	  op6ons.
• Spa6al	  conﬂicts	  of	  ﬁshing	  with	  other	  ac6vi6es.
• Environmental	  and	  economic	  governance.
Website:	  www.arc;cinfo.eu
Strategic	  Assessment	  of	  Development	  of	  the	  Arc9c:	  Assessment	  Conducted	  for	  the	  EU
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Changing	  Nature	  of	  Arc9c	  Fisheries?
 
Overview
Globalisa(on	  processes	  such	  as	  greater	  mobility	  and	  economic	   integra(on	  fuel	  human	  ac(vi(es	  which	  are	  
pu9ng	  pressure	  on	  land	  use	  in	  the	  European	  Arc(c	  including	  forestry,	  hydrocarbon	  and	  mineral	  extrac(on,	  
energy	  and	  transport	  developments,	  urbanisa(on,	  tourism	  and	  nature	  conserva(on.
Land-­‐use	  changes	  may	  bring	  posi(ve	  economic	  and	  nega(ve	  environmental	  impacts	  as	  well	  as	  challenges	  to	  
social	   structures	  and	   tradi(onal	   livelihoods	   such	  as	   reindeer	  herding,	  hun(ng	  and	  ﬁshing.	  People	  are	  also	  
drawn	  to	  the	  peace,	  quiet	  and	  pris(ne	  nature	  of	   the	  Arc(c	  as	  a	  year-­‐round	   leisure	  des(na(on.	  Today,	   the	  
Arc(c	  region	  faces	  conﬂicts	  between	  various	  human	  ac(vi(es	  that	   inﬂuence	  one	  another	  and	  compete	  for	  
space.
This	   factsheet	   addresses	   issues	   related	   to	   various	   land	   uses	   in	   the	  
European	  Arc(c.	  It	  provides	  a	  generalised	  overview	  of	  economic,	  envi-­‐
ronmental	  and	  poli(cal	  impacts	  of	  the	  selected	  land-­‐use	  changes	  and	  
their	  main	  drivers	  (Table	  1).	  	  
What	  is	  Pu/ng	  Pressure	  on	  the	  European	  Arc7c	  Landscape?
Main	  Driver:	  Globalisa0on
Economic	   factors	  are	  pu9ng	  signiﬁcant	  pressure	  on	  Arc(c	   land	  use.	  
Global	   demand	   for	   resources	   is	   increasing	   the	   presence	   of	   mul(-­‐
na(onal	   business	   and	   bringing	   investment,	   trade	   and	   technological	  
innova(on.
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  EU	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holder	  input	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  of	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FACTSHEET 
Increasing	  Land-­‐Use	  Pressures  
in	  the	  European	  Arctic
“Economic	  factors	  are	  
putting	  significant	  pres-­‐
sure	  on	  Arctic	  land	  use.	  
Global	  demand	  for	  re-­‐
sources	  is	  increasing	  
the	  presence	  of	  multi-­‐
national	  business	  and	  
bringing	  investment,	  
trade	  and	  technological	  
innovation.”
Strategic	  Assessment	  of	  Development	  of	  the	  Arc(c:	  Assessment	  Conducted	  for	  the	  EU
Overview
Mari%me	   transport	   in	   the	  Arc%c	   has	   increased	   in	   recent	   years.	   The	   growing	   traﬃc	   is	  
closely	   linked	  to	   the	  development	  of	  economic	  ac%vi%es	  within	   the	  Arc%c	  and	  the	  ex-­‐
port	  of	  raw	  materials	  such	  as	  petroleum	  and	  minerals.	  Arc%c	  cruise	  tourism	  is	  also	  grow-­‐
ing.	  A	  few	  ships	  have	  made	  transit	  voyages	  between	  Europe	  and	  Asia.	  
Des%na%onal	  shipping	  in	  the	  Arc%c	  is	  expected	  to	  expand,	  as	  is	  transit	  traﬃc	  later.	  How-­‐
ever,	   there	   is	   considerable	  uncertainty	   regarding	   the	  %ming	  and	  magnitude	  of	   future	  
traﬃc	  levels.	  Opera%ons	  must	  be	  safe,	  reliable	  and	  proﬁtable	  to	  reach	  large	  volumes.	  	  
The	  outlook	  for	  expanded	  mari%me	  transport	  is	  determined	  by	  many	  factors	  and	  there	  is	  much	  inherent	  uncertainty.	  Mel%ng	  summer	  sea-­‐ice	  
expands	   the	   area	   of	   navigable	  waters	   and	   extends	   the	   sailing	   season.	  Deﬁcits	   in	   cri%cal	   infrastructure	   ranging	   from	  ports	   to	   naviga%onal	  
maps,	  communica%on	  means,	  and	  search	  and	  rescue	  capabili%es	  present	  signiﬁcant	  challenges	  that	  must	  be	  overcome.	  Safety	  of	  naviga%on	  
is	  a	  serious	  concern	  for	  ships	  opera%ng	  in	  harsh	  condi%ons	  and	  remote	  areas	  far	  from	  salvage.
There	  is	  concern	  about	  environmental	  damage	  to	  areas	  that	  so	  far	  have	  been	  eﬀec%vely	  protected	  from	  human	  inﬂuence	  by	  sea-­‐ice.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  Arc%c	  voyages	  may	  lead	  to	  lower	  costs,	  growing	  trade	  and	  economic	  beneﬁts	  to	  ship	  owners,	  ports	  and	  mari%me	  industries	  deliv-­‐
ering	  ships	  and	  equipment.	  	  
This	  factsheet	  highlights	  changes	  in	  Arc%c	  mari%me	  transport,	  its	  drivers,	  condi%ons,	  possible	  impacts	  and	  relevance	  to	  the	  European	  Union.	  
It	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  relevant	  aspects	  for	  elabora%on	  in	  the	  consulta%on	  process.	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  in	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  to	  EU	  policymakers	  and	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There	   is	   considerable	   uncer-­‐
tainty	   regarding	   the	   %ming	  
and	  magnitude	  of	  future	  	  traf-­‐
ﬁc	  levels.	  
 FACTSHEET 
Changes	  in	  Arctic	  Maritime	  Transport
Overview
The	  European	  Arc.c	  contains	  vast	  amounts	  of	  mineral	  resources.	  Mining	  ac.vity	  in	  the	  Arc.c	  is	  intensifying	  in	  response	  to	  growing	  global	  de-­‐
mand.	  Mining	  contributes	  to	  economic	  development,	  but	  not	  without	  consequences:	  mining	  can	  have	  considerable	  impacts	  on	  the	  physical	  
environment,	  land	  use	  and	  socie.es.	  
While	  mining	  is	  oBen	  signiﬁcant	  for	  na.onal	  economies,	  it	  is	  in	  local	  Arc.c	  communi.es	  that	  the	  environmental,	  economic,	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  
impacts	  are	  mostly	  felt.	   In	  these	  communi.es,	  extrac.ve	  resource	  industries	  may	  be	  viewed	  both	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  wealth	  crea.on	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  people’s	  livelihoods.	  Extrac.ng	  minerals	  in	  the	  Arc.c	  is	  both	  challenging	  and	  expensive.	  It	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  extreme	  
environment,	  remoteness,	  lack	  of	  roads	  and	  limited	  availability	  of	  skilled	  labour.	  Yet	  there	  is	  a	  boom	  underway	  as	  high	  market	  prices	  and	  im-­‐
proved	  technology	  have	  triggered	  ac.on	  by	  mining	  companies.
This	  factsheet	  deals	  with	  the	  increase	  of	  mining	  ac.vity	  in	  the	  European	  Arc.c	  (areas	  between	  Greenland	  and	  Northwest	  Russia).	  Notably,	  
this	  trend	  is	  developing	  so	  quickly	  that	  reliable	  data	  are	  hard	  to	  obtain.	  Our	  focus	  is	  mainly	  on	  tradi.onal	  metallic	  ores.
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Increase	  in	  Mining
Rise	  in	  interest,	  in-­‐
vestments	  and	  opera-­‐
3ons	  in	  the	  Barents	  
region	  and	  Green-­‐
land
Drivers
• Geologic	  Resources
• Global	  Demand	  for	  Minerals
• Technological	  Advances
• Climate	  Change
• Favourable	  Policies
Impacts
Environmental
• Changes	  in	  land,	  ecosystem,	  water	  and	  landscape.	  
• PotenBal	  polluBon	  of	  land	  and	  water.
• Wastes
• Risk	  of	  accidents
• Biodiversity,	  habitat,	  migratory	  paths,	  wildlife	  changes
• Conﬂicts	  with	  other	  acBviBes
Economic
• DiversiﬁcaBon	  of	  supply
• Local	  employment	  and	  increased	  spending
• Investments	  by	  government	  and	  company
• Revenues	  for	  public	  budget
• Increased	  local	  expenditure	  for	  public	  faciliBes
• Opportunity	  costs
• Boom	  and	  bust	  cycles
• Strong	  currency	  leading	  to	  more	  expensive	  export
Social
• Job	  opportuniBes,	  increased	  services,	  transfer	  of	  skills
• Demographic	  change
• Health	  and	  well-­‐being
• Change	  in	  other	  acBviBes	  such	  as	  reindeer	  herding,	  tourism
Policy	  Responses 
(including	  EU)
Shaping	  drivers	  and	  mi/gat-­‐
ing	  nega/ve	  impacts
• Sector-­‐speciﬁc	  policies
• Environmental	  policies
• Research	  funding
Figure	  1:	  Increase	  in	  Arc;c	  Mining	  Ac;vity:	  Drivers	  and	  Impacts
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Mining	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Overview
Exploita)on	  of	   hydrocarbons	   in	   the	  Arc)c	   region	  has	  many	   faces:	  Alaska	  holds	  most	  of	   the	   region’s	   oil	   re-­‐
serves,	  while	  reserves	   in	  Russia	  are	  dominated	  by	  natural	  gas;	  onshore	  resources	  have	  been	  producing	  for	  
decades	  while	  oﬀshore	  is	  largely	  a	  fron)er	  region.	  What	  is	  common	  is	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Arc)c’s	  
oﬀshore	  hydrocarbon	  resources	  faces	  an	  uncertain	  future.	  
Many	  parts	  of	  the	  Arc)c	  Ocean	  are	  becoming	  more	  accessible	  due	  to	   improved	  technologies,	  as	  well	  as	  di-­‐
minished	  sea-­‐ice	  due	  to	  climate	  change.	  Concurrently,	  interest	  in	  exploi)ng	  oﬀshore	  oil	  and	  gas	  in	  the	  Arc)c	  
has	  grown	  in	  recent	  years,	  while	  progress	  con)nues	  in	  development	  of	  onshore	  resources.	  Largely	  untapped	  
to	  date,	  the	  resource	  base	  is	  signiﬁcant	  yet	  the	  technical	  and	  environmental	  aspects	  and	  high	  costs	  of	  operat-­‐
ing	   in	   extreme	   condi)ons	   present	   par)cular	   challenges	   to	   developing	   the	   Arc)c’s	   oﬀshore	   oil	   and	   gas	   re-­‐
sources.	  
Investment	  in	  explora)on	  and	  development	  are	  inﬂuenced	  by	  global	  markets,	  energy	  demand	  and	  policies	  concerned	  with	  economic	  develop-­‐
ment,	  energy	  security	  and	  climate	  change,	  among	  other	  dynamic	  variables.	  So	  the	  extent	  and	  )ming	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  exploita)on	  in	  the	  Arc)c	  is	  
not	  easy	  to	  predict.	  Yet	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  those	  resources	  may	  have	  important	  inﬂuences	  on	  the	  Arc)c	  environment,	  economies	  and	  socie)es.	  
The	  prospect	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  exploita)on	  also	  has	  implica)ons	  for	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  economic,	  poli)cal	  and	  environmental	  landscape.	  
This	  factsheet	  highlights	  oﬀshore	  oil	  and	  gas	  resource	  exploita)on,	  its	  drivers,	  possible	  impacts	  and	  relevance	  in	  rela)on	  to	  the	  European	  Un-­‐
ion.	  Nevertheless	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  factors	  mo)va)ng	  oil	  and	  gas	  developments,	  impacts	  and	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  are	  also	  applica-­‐
ble	  to	  onshore	  hydrocarbon	  resources.	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“Many	  parts	  of	  the	  
Arctic	  Ocean	  are	  be-­‐
coming	  more	  accessi-­‐
ble	  owing	  to	  im-­‐
proved	  technologies,	  
as	  well	  as	  diminished	  
sea-­‐ice	  due	  to	  cli-­‐
mate	  change.“
FACTSHEET 
Developing	  Oil	  and	  Gas 
Resources	  in	  Arc)c	  Waters:	  
The	  Final	  Fron)er?	  
Strategic	  Assessment	  of	  Development	  of	  the	  Arc)c:	  Assessment	  Conducted	  for	  the	  EU
 
Overview
Arc$c	  socie$es	  –	  both	  indigenous	  and	  non-­‐indigenous	  inhabitants	  –	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  highly	  resilient	  and	  adap$ve,	  yet	  today’s	  rate	  and	  
magnitude	  of	  change	  challenges	  adap$ve	  capacity.	  Change	   is	  driven	  by	   increased	  accessibility,	  government	  policies,	  global	  cultural	  change	  
and	  recogni$on	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  rights.	  Globalisa$on	  and	  world	  markets	  are	  also	  important	  drivers	  in	  the	  Arc$c	  social	  transforma$on.
Climate	  change	  inﬂuences	  socie$es	  and	  cultures	  in	  some	  loca$ons,	  and	  its	  impacts	  are	  predicted	  to	  grow	  in	  coming	  decades.	  These	  changes	  
create	  both	  opportuni$es	  and	  challenges	  and	  occur	  along	  local,	  regional	  and	  global	  dimensions.	  
This	  factsheet	  highlights	  ﬁve	  trends	  in	  social	  and	  cultural	  change	  in	  the	  European	  Arc$c,	  their	  drivers,	  implica$ons	  and	  relevance	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐
pean	  Union	  (Figure	  1).	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This	   factsheet	   is	   to	   s,mulate	  dialogue	  between	   stakeholders,	  Arc,c	   experts	   and	  EU	  policymakers.	   Stake-­‐
holder	  input	  informs	  the	  analysis	  of	  trends	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  shaping	  Arc,c	  develop-­‐
ments.	  It	  will	  lead	  to	  recommenda,ons	  to	  EU	  policymakers	  and	  be	  published	  as	  the	  Strategic	  Assessment	  
of	   Development	   of	   the	   Arc,c	   Report	   in	   spring	   2014.	   The	   European	   Commission-­‐funded	   project	   is	   imple-­‐
mented	  by	  a	  network	  of	  19	  ins,tu,ons	  lead	  by	  the	  Arc,c	  Centre	  in	  Rovaniemi	  and	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  EU	  Arc,c	  
Informa,on	  Centre	  ini,a,ve.	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Figure	  1:	  Main	  Socio-­‐Cultural	  
Trends,	  Drivers	  and	  Impacts
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FACTSHEET 
Social	  and	  Cultural	  Changes 
in	  the	  European	  Arctic
Demographic	  shiPs	  and	  
urbanisa$on.
Changes	  in	  social	  structure,	  culture	  and
lifestyles;	  loss	  of	  human	  capital;	  pressure	  on	  
public	  services;	  environmental	  impacts.
Changes	  in	  livelihoods	  
and	  lifestyles.	  
Social	  disrup$ons;	  changing	  family	  structure;	  
physical	  and	  mental	  health	  issues;	  loss	  of
tradi$onal	  culture	  and	  language;	  rediscovery	  
of	  iden$$es.
Economic	  dependence	  on	  
primary	  sector	  and	  public	  
transfers.
Community	  vulnerability;	  pressure	  towards	  
resource	  extrac$on	  and	  development;	  lack	  of	  
autonomy;	  single	  industry	  communi$es.
Increasing	  role	  of
educa$on	  and	  research.
Posi$ve	  eﬀect	  on	  Arc$c	  human	  capital	  and	  
development;	  addi$onal	  resources	  and
employment.
Empowerment	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  commu-­‐
ni$es;	  stronger	  roles	  of	  private	  and	  non-­‐
governmental	  sectors.
Empowerment	  and
increasing	  complexity	  of	  
governance.
Strategic	  Assessment	  of	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  of	  the	  Arc5c:	  Assessment	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- xiii -
Executive Summary
THE ASSESSMENT
The ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: 
Assessment Conducted for the European Union” report 
considers the trends and developments taking place in the 
European Arctic today. That includes a view to 2030, with 
an emphasis on the uncertainties. The analysis has been 
conducted on the basis of seven themes focused on change. 
The implications of Arctic changes for the European Union 
as well as the role of EU policies and actions in the Arctic are 
examined. The European Arctic is understood here as the part 
of the circumpolar Arctic located between Greenland and 
northwest Russia (Figure ES1). 
The report is the main outcome of the ‘Strategic Environmental 
Impact Assessment of development of the Arctic’, a project 
funded by the European Commission and carried out by 
a network of 19 European research and communication 
institutions specialised in Arctic affairs, led by the Arctic 
Centre, University of Lapland. It contributes to the EU Arctic 
Information Centre initiative. All project partners participated 
in the assessment work, but the results and findings are the 
sole responsibility of the authors of this report. The full version 
of the report is available at www.arcticinfo.eu.
The objective of the assessment was to “assess the impacts 
of development in the Arctic and of EU policies affecting the 
Arctic region on the political, economic and environmental landscape of the EU and the Arctic region.” The assessment 
work, conducted between April 2013 and May 2014, proved highly challenging owing to its broad scope and the 
ambitious programme of stakeholder involvement. 
Enhancing dialogue between Arctic actors, experts and EU policy-makers was a focus. Therefore, involving Arctic 
stakeholders through workshops, an online questionnaire and direct outreach comprised a key component of the 
study. The authors developed recommendations by building on ideas proposed by stakeholders.
The summary presents key messages regarding development of the Arctic, suggestions for the further evolution of the 
EU Arctic policy, and provides an overview of the findings and recommendations of seven thematic report chapters.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC: KEY MESSAGES
1. Arctic environmental and socioeconomic changes are driven 
primarily by climate change and the global economy, with demand 
for resources remaining a key driver of economic developments. 
Nevertheless, other factors, such as regulatory frameworks, prove to 
be critical in many cases.   
This assessment shows that the global economy and climate change are key drivers 
of developments in the European Arctic. Climate change impacts should not be 
analysed independently, but always in the light of multiple activities, particularly in 
the industrial sector, and existing governance frameworks. 
In the context of the globalised world economy, the demand for the region’s 
renewable and non-renewable resources is currently the main factor affecting economic activities in the Arctic. 
Significant fluctuations of resource prices have a critical influence on development trends, especially in the case of 
extractive industries. 
The influence of markets and climate change impacts may be sometimes outmatched by the role of regulatory 
frameworks and administrative or political decisions, such as the opening of new areas for oil and gas exploration and 
legislation pertaining to reindeer herding or nature protection.
Figure ES1: European Arctic as Defined in the Strategic 
Assessment of Development of the Arctic.
Source: Arctic Portal, 2014.
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Social challenges and conflicts, environmental concerns, indigenous rights, as well as local perceptions of needs, risks 
and opportunities may facilitate, enhance or hinder particular developments or transformations. These dynamics differ 
in various parts of the Arctic, and in some instances they may prove to be critical for particular economic activities. 
The social transformation in the Arctic is also primarily driven by globalisation, including its sociocultural dimension. In 
the European Arctic, global cultural changes and information technology, next to economic developments, are of key 
importance for social and cultural change. 
2. Climate change has profound impacts on Arctic biodiversity, landscape and livelihoods, but limited 
influence on current and expected industrial, economic and social developments.
Climate change is profoundly transforming the Arctic region with impacts on biodiversity, marine and terrestrial 
ecosystems, landscape and nature-based livelihoods. The region warms two to three times faster than the global 
average and is particularly vulnerable, given the dependence of human-natural systems on the cryosphere and the 
fragility of Arctic ecosystems. Effects are evidenced in the melting of the ice sheet in Greenland, decrease in the extent 
and type of sea ice, thawing permafrost and coastal erosion. However, in Northern Fennoscandia (northern regions 
of Norway, Sweden and Finland), changes in snow cover and in lake and river ice conditions are the most pronounced 
and have a number of implications, mostly adverse, for example for the maintenance of roads or for nature-based 
livelihoods such as reindeer herding. 
Climate change affects economic activities in the Arctic both positively and negatively. Yet, regulatory frameworks and 
demand for Arctic resources constitute the pivotal factors shaping the pace and direction of economic developments 
both at present and by 2030. The current and future influence of different types of drivers cannot be thoroughly 
quantified, but the majority of the researchers and stakeholders involved in this assessment share the same general 
view of the limited role of climate change in socioeconomic development. This is particularly true for extractive 
industries, but also for tourism, forestry, fisheries and even reindeer herding. Climate change has a comparatively 
greater impact on Arctic maritime transport, but also here a number of constraints exist, including seasonality and the 
predictability of the shipping season as well as the high costs associated with Arctic shipping. 
Policy-makers also need to take into account the indirect impacts of global climate change on the Arctic. Indirect 
impacts include changes in demand for Arctic resources due to the influence of climate change on the global economy 
or the implications of climate change mitigation policies, which, for instance, facilitate the development of renewable 
energy in the region. 
Despite the often expressed claims, it is far from certain that opportunities connected with climate change – in terms 
of maritime transport, fisheries or resource extraction – will balance out or even outweigh the impacts and risks 
associated with it. While climate change already adversely impacts the Arctic, it has a restricted role in triggering Arctic 
economic development, in particular in the European part of the region. 
3. Current economic and social developments are generally moderate and expectations for the 
near-term are modest. However, even a modest increase in economic activities requires a response.
Overall, the development and transformation of Arctic regions are gradual and uneven. In the Arctic Ocean proper (in 
comparison to some of the adjacent seas) economic developments, especially in the case of hydrocarbon extraction 
and fisheries, are predicted to be either very limited or decades away. 
Policies and strategies based on notions of an “Arctic boom” risk being misguided. In particular, shifts in demand for 
resources can lead to both an increase and a decrease in the intensity of industrial activities in the Arctic. This does not 
mean that current and future developments do not require policy responses now, including enhancement of policies 
and governance systems as well as investments in knowledge-building and infrastructure. Even a moderate increase 
in economic activities may have a significant adverse impact on the Arctic environment and societies or might involve 
major risks. This is due to the vulnerable nature of the Arctic environment, the region’s unique cultures and existing 
gaps in scientific knowledge. For instance, any activities taking place in ice-covered waters are connected with high 
environmental risks.
4. Arctic developments are closely interconnected. 
Examination of the seven themes within this assessment shows that the trends, drivers and implications of each are 
closely interconnected. Many activities, such as mining, shipping and forestry, are likely to have significant environmental 
and social impacts, even if they are conducted in a responsible manner with high safety and environmental standards 
and in the bounds of an effective regulatory system. 
In decision-making the interplay between various drivers, activities and their impacts should be always taken into 
account. No development should be analysed in isolation. 
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The impacts are particularly pronounced when multiple activities result in cumulative impacts. Moreover, conflicts 
between different industries, for example hydrocarbon extraction and fisheries, are possible. Many traditional 
livelihoods, like reindeer herding or fishing, may not be able to withstand simultaneous pressures from multiple 
industrial developments. 
On the other hand, different activities may complement one another and contribute to a more diversified economic 
structure. This may occur for instance in tourism and reindeer herding in terms of protection of natural and cultural 
values, or in relation to employment opportunities in mining and tourism. Infrastructure that enables one activity may 
beneficially serve others, such as port facilities.
5. The European Union is affected by the changes in the Arctic. 
Changes in Arctic climate are of critical importance for Europe. For instance, possible methane releases from Arctic 
permafrost and loss of snow cover contribute to global warming. Direct impacts include a rise in the sea level and the 
influence on weather in Europe.
The gradual opening of Arctic sea routes will be important for European transport and shipbuilding industries. The 
region’s fisheries are a significant food source. The EU imports Arctic oil and natural gas to meet its energy needs. 
Northern Fennoscandia is one of the main regions for EU domestic production of minerals. The cultures of European 
Arctic peoples, especially the Sámi – the EU’s only recognised indigenous group – are an indispensable part of Europe’s 
cultural diversity.
THE EU ARCTIC POLICY FRAMEWORK: SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
The EU policy towards the Arctic is an evolving process. Building from previous policy 
statements, there is a prospect that a comprehensive policy framework stating EU 
interests and goals will be formulated. In that regard, this section puts forward a set 
of suggestions derived from stakeholder input, the analysis of EU policies and the 
report’s thematic recommendations. The latter, referring to specific policy areas, 
are summarised in the next section.
1. The EU is encouraged to continue and to reinforce investment in 
gaining knowledge and better understanding of Arctic changes and 
their implications.
Numerous uncertainties and the dynamic nature of the social-environmental systems in the Arctic require an in-depth 
understanding of the physical, biological and social processes at play. The findings of EU-funded research should be 
better communicated to EU decision-makers, Arctic stakeholders and the EU public at large in formats that are adjusted 
to the needs and capacities of particular audiences. In addition, integrated assessments are among the key elements of 
a more comprehensive understanding of Arctic change is to carry out, which bring together environmental, social and 
economic issues and bridge the knowledge gap between science, policy-makers and stakeholders.
2. Constructive engagement of Arctic actors in EU decision-making should be enhanced.
Specific characteristics of the Arctic region require tailored solutions to address environmental, social and governance 
challenges. Some EU policies proposed and designed for a broad EU constituency may need to be assessed also in 
the context of Arctic-specific challenges or implications. In line with the principle of “engagement” within EU Arctic 
policy, both indigenous and non-indigenous stakeholders should be included in the EU decision-making processes 
that may affect them. In the light of a more visible and long-term presence of the EU in the region, there is a need 
for creating sustained structures for consultation and engagement. Such structures would contribute to facilitating 
effective communication between Arctic stakeholders and the EU decision-makers.
In the context of consultations with indigenous peoples, it must be remembered that they are not only stakeholders but 
also rights-holders. It is therefore vital to take into account international guidelines and legal frameworks, in particular 
the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in any engagement with indigenous actors.
Engagement of non-EU Arctic actors in decision-making processes may be challenging, as EU legal and institutional 
frameworks are designed primarily for EU citizens and stakeholders. However, constructive engagement with non-
EU actors may take the form of consultations or effective, transparent and meaningful involvement in assessment 
processes. In some cases, for example indigenous communities or disadvantaged groups, engagement may need to be 
supported by capacity-building.
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3. Diversity within the Arctic region needs to be taken into account. 
The Arctic regions are varied, even if they share numerous common characteristics. Policy-making processes addressing 
Arctic issues or affecting Arctic regions have to take this diversity into account. EU competences and influence, which 
vary between sectors and geographical locations, also contribute to this heterogeneity. 
Statements that are true for the European Arctic or Fennoscandia may cause misunderstandings in other parts of 
the circumpolar North. Policy tools applicable to one part of the region may be inappropriate in the circumpolar 
context. Due to the diversity of the Arctic, it is also necessary to engage with local actors and stakeholders in order to 
understand specific conditions and values.
4. The EU should pay special attention to the European Arctic. 
The trends occurring throughout the circumpolar Arctic are also manifest in the European Arctic, including the EU’s own 
northernmost regions. It is important that policy-makers and other European actors perceive the challenges prevalent 
in the European Arctic not as remote and exotic, but as inherently European issues.
It is crucial to provide support for sustainable development and high environmental standards, and to demonstrate the 
positive imprint of such efforts in the EU’s northernmost regions and their closest neighbours. That cannot mean losing 
focus on the main global trends and pan-Arctic environmental priorities. However, in this way the EU may establish 
itself more firmly and be more broadly acknowledged as an Arctic actor, and as a consequence gain greater influence 
on Arctic affairs in general. 
Recent EU policy documents highlight EU actions in the European North. However, challenges particular to the European 
Arctic – as a region distinct in the circumpolar context – as well as clear goals and priorities specific for that region are 
not elaborated. The policy documents should state very clearly which aims and actions refer to the circumpolar Arctic, 
and which to its European and EU part.
5. An EU policy framework for the Arctic needs to adapt to the complex landscape of governance 
in the region.
Finding a balance between internal coherence and adjusting to the complexity of Arctic governance will be an ongoing 
challenge for EU policy-making. 
Effective co-ordination within the European Commission and the European External Action Service as well as the 
identification of principles to guide various EU actions in Arctic matters are highly commendable. The Arctic policy 
framework can be used to address potentially diverging policy objectives, for example simultaneously pursuing climate 
change goals and energy security or, in the context of land use conflicts, facilitating domestic extraction of minerals and 
at the same time supporting local and traditional livelihoods and cultures. 
However, a policy framework must be not only coherent, but also adapted to the complexity and institutional diversity 
that are characteristic of Arctic governance. A good understanding of local governance is necessary as many decisions 
affecting the Arctic environment, societies and economy are made locally.
While complexity and fragmentation do not have to be seen as disadvantages of Arctic governance, possibilities for 
enhancing governance frameworks exist and are highlighted in this report’s thematic recommendations. The EU 
can positively contribute to gradual integration and enhancement within some sectors of Arctic governance, such 
as shipping or biodiversity. This can be achieved primarily through the EU’s influence on the relevant international 
frameworks and participation in the venues of Arctic regional governance. 
6. Co-operation with Arctic partners within venues of Arctic regional governance remains, despite 
the challenges involved, a key priority both in the European Arctic and at the circumpolar level. 
Indispensable elements of the EU’s presence in the Arctic include substantial contributions to the work of the Arctic 
Council working groups and the active and substance-oriented participation of the European Commission in the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council. This also remains true for increasingly challenging collaboration with Russian partners. 
In terms of substantial input, the Commission should continue to build on and highlight the expertise of specialised 
EU agencies, in particular the European Maritime Safety Agency and the European Environment Agency. Financial 
or technical support for projects implemented under the auspices of Arctic co-operation forums should be further 
explored. 
Support for and participation in Arctic Council knowledge-building and standard-setting activities regarding maritime 
shipping, climate change adaptation, black carbon, oil spills and biodiversity are particularly relevant, with the focus 
on developments at the level of the Arctic Council’s working groups. In the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the further 
alignment of Barents co-operation with EU funding programmes and the Northern Dimension is needed.
- xvii -
EU POLICIES AFFECTING THE ARCTIC: KEY THEMATIC FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Climate Change in the Arctic
Due to climate change, the Arctic is the most rapidly changing region on Earth. There 
is clear evidence that change has already occurred due to emissions of greenhouse 
gases and aerosols from human activities, which affect the fundamentals of the 
Arctic ecosystems and the lives of the Northerners. Over the second half of the 
20th century, warming in the Arctic led to increased loss of snow cover in spring 
and summer and simultaneously increased snowfall during boreal autumn and 
winter. Arctic sea-ice change has been linked to changes in mid-latitude weather 
patterns that increase the probability of extreme weather events, such as droughts, 
floods and heat waves in summer and cold snaps in winter. The warming trend also 
appears to result in increased precipitation in northern Europe. The sea level rise is 
also one of the main concerns.
The EU can influence Arctic climate change by limiting its own emissions, including short-lived climate forcers, and 
championing an effective and broad global climate agreement. The EU has made progress in curbing GHG emissions, 
partly through policy measures in energy, transport and efficiency improvements, and has set targets for further gains 
in the period to 2030. The EU, as a key actor in the UNFCCC negotiations, can highlight the Arctic within international 
processes and support any potential initiatives coming from the Arctic Council. Eventually, the EU is in a good position 
to support adaptation in the region (inter alia, via the EU’s 2013 Adaptation Strategy).
The EU is encouraged to increase its efforts and contributions to enhance sustained observation activities in the Arctic 
in order to improve understanding of climate change mechanisms and effects in the region. This can be done by, for 
example, using the framework of European Research Infrastructure Consortia or Horizon 2020 infrastructure funding. 
Current satellite-based earth observation systems do not fulfil user needs for communication and monitoring. The EU 
should address this shortcoming through EU-funded satellite programmes. Both for decision-making in the near term 
and for long-term guidance for Arctic adaptation and sustainable development, climate indicators specific to the Arctic 
should be identified and corresponding data obtained. Moreover, in the European Arctic, there is a clear role for the EU 
in moving gradually from adaptation planning to implementation and undertaking concrete actions.
Changes in Arctic Maritime Transport
Arctic maritime transport is still dominated by internal and destinational traffic 
(including cruise tourism), highly interlinked with extraction of Arctic resources. 
This is likely to remain the case in the coming decades. Trans-Arctic shipping is 
slowly emerging, but there are major constraints for its rapid expansion. The EU 
may gain access to new resources and growing trade. European ship owners and 
maritime industries expect economic gains. However, the Arctic is a frontier region 
for shipping with high risks and various environmental concerns. 
The EU influences Arctic shipping by contributing to shaping international standards 
and regulations, legislating on member states’ responsibilities as port or flag 
states and building up Arctic maritime infrastructure such as through its satellite 
programmes.
The EU should contribute to improved regulation of Arctic shipping by supporting high standards in the Polar Code, 
supplemented by additional measures to address invasive species, heavy fuel oil and emissions to air. The European 
Commission should follow the current discussions on heavy fuel oil within the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment 
working group of the Arctic Council. 
The EU should also consider stronger involvement in international co-operation on maritime infrastructure and research. 
Examples of possible contributions are hydrographic mapping, better sea-ice, meteorological and oceanographic 
observations and forecasts, ship surveillance, communication systems, and search and rescue capabilities. EU support 
to the Galileo and Copernicus programmes and its SafeSeaNet and CleanSeaNet initiatives are important in this 
context. More support for monitoring is needed in order to improve the understanding of environmental conditions 
and the impacts of shipping as well as to find effective measures to reduce negative impacts. There is also wide scope 
for technological innovation in ship design, emission and waste reductions, cleaning hulls and ballast water in Arctic 
conditions.
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Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries and Aquaculture
Fishing is a vital economic activity in the Arctic. Fisheries are characterised by 
fluctuations that may be exacerbated by climate change. Arctic coastal states are 
currently exploring possibilities for establishing a fisheries management regime in 
the Arctic Ocean, even though it seems unlikely that large-scale fisheries will be 
established in the area in the future. Aquaculture production is growing fast and 
becoming a crucial part of the economy in many Northern communities.
The EU is a major consumer of Arctic fish and is keen to ensure good co-operation 
with Arctic states in the sustainable management of marine living resources. 
The EU influences Arctic fisheries via food safety standards, legislation related to 
the port state and flag state responsibilities of its members, and participation in 
international and regional regulatory frameworks.
The EU can improve management in the light of the Common Fisheries Policy reform and contribute to enhanced co-
operation, information sharing and research, with inclusion of local and traditional knowledge. EU efforts to combat 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing should be further strengthened. The EU should address the need to reduce 
fishing capacity by decreasing incentives for economically unsustainable fisheries.
Developing Oil and Gas Resources in Arctic Waters
While interest in Arctic offshore hydrocarbon exploitation has increased in recent 
years, actual developments have been slow to follow, with major differences across 
the Arctic region. Critical factors that EU decision-makers need to take into account 
are the local benefits of resource development, risks, responding to which requires 
appropriate regulations, as well as gaps in knowledge and research efforts.
Meeting the growing demand of EU citizens for energy in a safe and environmentally 
responsible manner is a key challenge for EU institutions. The EU has limited, but 
multifaceted, functional competences that enable it to play a role in promoting 
high standards for resource development including through support for developing 
technologies specific for Arctic application, efforts to address climate change and 
relations with Arctic partners.
Funding and investment frameworks can facilitate high standards for regulators and industry to ensure that Arctic 
hydrocarbon developments are environmentally and socially responsible. It is recommended that the EU increase its 
support for research on the Arctic environment and relevant technology advances. This would improve risk assessment 
related to oil and gas developments in Arctic waters and foster technology developments particular to the region such 
as oil spills in ice conditions. Cross-disciplinary research programmes are an important mechanism, such as within the 
Horizon 2020 programme. Despite numerous challenges, the EU should continue and strengthen energy dialogues 
with non-EU Arctic partners within existing forums. One option would be to include energy issues in the Northern 
Dimension Policy.
Mining in the European Arctic
The European Arctic is currently experiencing an upsurge in mining activities, but 
future developments will be highly sensitive to mineral price fluctuations. The EU 
is a major consumer and importer of Arctic raw materials. As the EU is concerned 
about the security of supply, it encourages domestic mineral extraction, among 
others, via its Raw Materials Initiative. 
Both Arctic communities and industry call for enhanced information flows, as well as 
improved and more inclusive decision-making frameworks. It is recommended that 
the EU should adopt a more integrated and transparent view and clearly articulate 
its interests related to mining in the European Arctic. Building trust and facilitating 
mechanisms to enhance dialogue with the residents of the North, including 
indigenous peoples, is an important element of such integration. Information platforms may be based, for example, 
on INSPIRE infrastructure for spatial information in Europe (designed to contribute to environmental decision-making) 
or the outcomes of projects like Promine (which mapped European mineral resources). The EU could also support the 
collection and sharing of mining data and knowledge, for example via the Horizon 2020 programme or the European 
Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials. 
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The EU regulatory framework could better contribute to harmonising environmental, economic and social assessments, 
paying special attention to local social issues and indigenous rights. This could be partly done within the current reform 
of the EU environmental impact assessment legislation. The EU, as a major global actor, can also influence international 
governance, standard-setting and co-operation to facilitate increased responsibility in mining activities.
Activities Affecting Land Use in the European Arctic
Globalisation and indirectly climate change have increased the pressures on 
developing new mining projects, transport routes and renewable energy. At the 
same time, tourism and traditional livelihoods such as reindeer husbandry require 
large areas of pristine nature, which other activities may adversely affect. 
The planning of new activities must respect the needs, culture and livelihoods of 
local and indigenous communities, including land rights. Proper assessment of 
social impacts is essential in order to mitigate conflicts between different values and 
interest groups. When European Arctic land-use issues are considered, EU policy-
makers should pay particular attention to the aspects of human well-being and 
social sustainability, public participation and indigenous rights. This is especially 
important when these elements differ from the needs and values typical of the 
more densely populated areas in the south.
There is a need for enhanced information exchange between Arctic local and regional actors and EU institutions. 
Stronger inclusion of social aspects and challenges in the EU frameworks for impact assessment as well as in dialogue 
with Arctic partners including Russia is advised.
Social and Cultural Changes in the European Arctic
This report’s overview of the region’s sociocultural landscape includes innovative 
and growing Arctic cities, thinning-out rural areas, demographic challenges, and 
dependence on extractive and primary industries. Indigenous peoples often 
experience these elements in distinct manners.
The EU has a number of programmes that support socioeconomic development and 
co-operation in the North, as well as relevant transport policies and environmental 
regulations. When designing and carrying out relevant policies, the EU decision-
makers should take into account: the region’s intra-regional and core-periphery 
connectivity; power structures, social conflicts and cultural diversity; human-nature 
interactions; as well as the state of innovation, entrepreneurship and education.
An EU focus on entrepreneurship and innovation within co-operation and cohesion programmes should be continued 
and strengthened, with greater attention to gender issues and indigenous peoples. In particular, the activism of dynamic 
indigenous youth should be supported. Intra-regional accessibility and connectivity, including challenging cross-border 
projects, must not be neglected in the light of a focus on core-periphery connections within frameworks such as 
the Trans-European Transport network. The special characteristics and needs of Arctic cities and their importance for 
regional development need to be taken into account in EU policies and programmes. 
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Preface
The ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: An assessment conducted for the European Union’ is a final 
report of an assessment conducted within the ‘Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’ project funded by the European Union. Although the whole project Network participated in the assessment 
process and contributed to the production of this report, the findings should not be understood as a common statement 
endorsed by all institutions within the network. The responsibility for the report findings and messages lies solely with 
the report authors.
The assessment process started in April 2013 with the design of a methodology and selection of the main Arctic 
developments to be examined. Project partner experts produced thematic factsheets on seven themes. These served 
as background papers for the consultation process that included thematic workshops and an online questionnaire. 
This report is a synthesis of stakeholder input and expert analysis. Stakeholders had a chance to comment on the 
draft report and their feedback has been implemented in the final stage of the assessment to the extent possible. The 
project report was finalised in May 2014. 
The recommendations proposed in this report have been developed on the basis of ideas coming from stakeholders, 
generated within workshops, via online questionnaire and through direct engagement. However, the final content and 
order of the recommendations have been drafted and chosen by the authors. Therefore, the final recommendations 
cannot be seen as a direct outcome of stakeholder consultations.
Due to time and resource constraints, this study, despite its broad objective and ambitious aims, should not be directly 
compared to major Arctic assessment projects, such as the assessments conducted by the Arctic Council. Rather, this 
work is a content-rich snapshot of the development of the Arctic, and at the same time an example how assessment 
methodologies can be used to better understand the changes occurring in the region.
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1.1 Objective
The general objective of the Strategic Assessment of 
Development of the Arctic is “to assess the impacts 
of development in the Arctic and of European Union 
policies affecting the Arctic on the political, economic, 
and environmental landscape of the EU and the Arctic 
region”.
This objective has three dimensions:
• To provide an overview of changes and developments 
occurring in the Arctic (trends), including the 
implications of these changes for the EU environment, 
economy and societies (also specifically for the EU 
Arctic regions).
• To examine the role and influence of EU policies and 
actions in the Arctic.
• To involve stakeholders in discussion on the EU-
Arctic relationship and incorporate stakeholder 
input into the assessment. A series of factsheets 
have been drafted to serve as background papers for 
the consultation process and as a starting point for 
report chapters.
Unlike typical strategic impact assessments, SADA does 
not assess a proposed policy and alternative policy 
options. Its primary aim is to provide an overview, based 
partly on input from stakeholders, of current Arctic 
development and the relationship between the EU and 
the Arctic.
SADA’s objective is to enhance knowledge of the EU 
among Arctic actors and of the Arctic within the EU by 
providing balanced, concise and up-to-date information 
both on the region and on the EU’s multifaceted roles in 
influencing Arctic trends.
1.1.1 Geographic Scope
This report covers the European Arctic, understood as 
a region extending from Greenland to northwest Russia 
(Figure 1.1), with a focus on areas where EU policies have 
the greatest leverage (Northern Fennoscandia and the 
European Economic Area). The report takes account of a 
pan-Arctic perspective where it is relevant for EU policy-
making or for better understanding of the examined 
developments. 
The Arctic region is considered according to the 
boundaries drawn by the Arctic Human Development 
Report (AHDR) (Figure 0.2).1 Taking the AHDR boundaries 
as a starting point, some chapters take into account 
issues outside of the defined area, when they are of 
significance for Arctic developments.
1. Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR), 2004, Stefansson Arctic Insti-
tute, Arctic Council.
1.1.2 Thematic Scope
Seven themes – focused on change – have been chosen 
for assessment:
1. Climate Change in the Arctic
2. Changes in Arctic Maritime Transport
3. Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries
4. Developing Oil and Gas Resources in Arctic Waters
5. Mining in the European Arctic
6. Activities Affecting Land Use in the European Arctic
7. Social and Cultural Changes in the European Arctic
Thematic chapters can be viewed as independent 
studies, which follow a similar structure, adjusted to the 
specifics of each theme: 
• Overview of current trends in the Arctic including 
main drivers, environmental, social, political and 
economic impacts, and an overview of governance
• Outlook to 2030
• Implications of Arctic changes for the EU
• EU policies relevant for identified Arctic trends
• Critical factors for EU decision-making
• Recommendations
The chapters progress from general pan-Arctic discussion 
to issues specific to the European Arctic. Chapter 3 
provides an overview of climate change in the region, 
and thereby constitutes a basis for the discussion 
presented in the other chapters, where climate change is 
examined as one of the drivers. Chapters 4 to 7 address 
specific developments occurring in the Arctic. Chapter 
8 discusses a variety of issues connected with land-
use pressures (including social conflicts or cumulative 
impacts). The multitude of terrestrial activities in the 
Arctic are discussed in an integrated manner. Mining, 
as a key terrestrial activity, is taken up separately in 
Chapter 7. Social and cultural changes in the European 
Arctic, connected partly with developments discussed 
in previous chapters, are examined in Chapter 9. 
Chapters 7-9 focus exclusively on the European Arctic 
with particular emphasis on the situation in Northern 
Fennoscandia. Chapter 10 serves as a summary 
and conclusion identifying the key messages of the 
assessment.
The assessment themes were chosen on the basis of: 
a scoping workshop (conducted among the project 
network in February 2013 in Rovaniemi, Finland), a 
review of recent Arctic assessments and debates, as 
well as initial outreach to stakeholders. Several issues 
are discussed across the report chapters, including 
indigenous peoples’ issues, biodiversity, research and 
Arctic governance. Some important topics, such as 
persistent organic pollutants, are not elaborated here 
as they have been discussed comprehensively in recent 
reports.2 
2. E.g. Cavalieri, S. et al., (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment 
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Figure 1.1: European Arctic as Defined in the Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic.
Source: Arctic Portal, 2014.
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1.1.3 Supporting EU Policy-Making
One of the aims of SADA is to assist the EU in its 
stated goal of being a more active, knowledgeable and 
responsible Arctic actor. The report offers guidance for 
EU decision-making regarding: 
• Process of formulating an overarching Arctic policy. 
• Decision-making regarding issues that are specifically 
Arctic.
• Policies that are designed for the general EU 
constituency, but have specific implications for the 
Arctic.
The guidance is composed of several elements: 
• An overview of Arctic trends.
• Identification of the implications of Arctic 
developments for the EU.
• Identification of EU policies relevant for the Arctic.
• Critical factors for EU decision-making.
• Recommendations.
• Overview of the diverse opinions, interests and 
values among Arctic stakeholders (mainly in Annex 
1).
The process has been also designed to contribute to 
forging a lasting partnership between Arctic stakeholders, 
EU policy-makers and Arctic experts.
Report, Ecologic Institute. http://arctic-footprint.eu/. Accessed 20 November 
2013.
1.2 Methodology and 
Assessment Process 
SADA builds on two interlinked parallel processes: (i) 
internal expert-led assessment and (ii) stakeholder 
consultations (Figure 1.2). Thus, the study combines 
expert knowledge with stakeholders’ input. 
1. SADA experts provided an overview of Arctic trends 
and developments, including their key drivers and 
important implications. 
2. Based on this overview, implications of Arctic 
changes for the EU are identified (by identifying the 
EU’s interests and related policy areas affected by 
Arctic changes). 
3. EU policies that affect or are relevant for Arctic 
changes are identified and assessed in general terms.
4. The information collected in the first phase of 
the assessment was presented in factsheets (www.
arcticinfo.eu), which served as background papers for 
stakeholder consultations. 
5. Stakeholder consultations were conducted 
through workshops (focused on interaction between 
stakeholders) and online questionnaires (collecting 
individual perspectives). 
6. Assessment teams combined expert analysis with 
stakeholder input to develop a draft report, which was 
then submitted to stakeholders for further feedback.
Figure 1.2: Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic Process
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1.2.1 Arctic Trends and Their Implications
The overview of Arctic trends and their implications as 
well as an understanding of the role of EU policies in 
shaping/responding to them is based on the significantly 
simplified DPSIR framework (driving force, pressures, 
state, impact and response). The framework, developed 
by the European Environment Agency, presents causal 
linkages between drivers and the pressures they exert 
on the environment/society, and the state of the 
environment/society under these stresses.3 Instead 
of pressure and a static notion of state in DPSIR, the 
assessment team adopted a dynamic approach (trends 
and developments). The assessment takes into account 
the diversity of the Arctic, characteristics of particular 
regions and the diverse values or viewpoints of different 
groups.
Trends are understood as changes occurring in the 
region in the recent past, currently and expected in the 
near future, as well as their general direction and pace. 
Discussing “Arctic trends” is a major simplification, as 
they are in fact a bundle of various, temporarily and 
spatially diverse changes. 
The concept of a driver has been applied in SADA more 
broadly than in DPSIR (primarily human needs), and is 
understood as all elements that cause or shape certain 
activities, synonymous with driving factors, shaping 
elements or conditions of developments. Impacts or 
implications are understood as effects of changes on the 
environment, society, economy, culture and politics.
The report does not propose scenarios for Arctic 
developments. Nevertheless, as it identifies the drivers 
and critical factors for decision-making, it provides tools 
to consider Arctic futures. Each chapter features a brief 
assessment of likely developments to 2030 with an 
emphasis on uncertainties.
1.2.2 Identifying and Assessing EU Policies
The authors identified five dimensions of Arctic-relevant 
EU policies/actions:
• Those directly relevant for the EU Arctic (Finland 
and Sweden) and the European Economic Area (EEA, 
including Norway and Iceland, where significant 
parts of EU regulatory frameworks apply), including 
cohesion and co-operation programmes.
• Indirect impacts via policies and actions shaping the 
EU’s environmental and economic footprint in the 
region.
• Co-operation programmes in Greenland and 
northwest Russia.
• EU-funded research.
• EU influence on Arctic-relevant international 
3. European Environment Agency (2011). Europe’s environment: An Assess-
ment of Assessments. EEA, Copenhagen.
developments (e.g. United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Arctic Council).
The focus in SADA is on the policies and actions of the 
EU and not its individual member states, although 
often these cannot be clearly separated. Moreover, the 
majority of EU policies and actions affecting the Arctic 
are not designed specifically with the Arctic in mind, or if 
Arctic issues are considered, they constitute only a minor 
element within a multiplicity of policy considerations 
(see Chapter 2).
1.2.3 Critical Factors for Decision-Making
Each chapter includes a list of three to four critical factors 
for decision-making. The SADA team applied the concept 
of “critical factors for decision-making” – developed by 
Partidário4 – in a simplified manner, due to the broad 
scope/objective of the assessment and the needs of 
stakeholder engagement. 
Critical factors for decision-making include:
• Most important and most uncertain issues. 
• Key challenges that need to be taken into account in 
policy-making.
• Issues where significant differences between 
actors’ values occur, and which require stakeholder 
engagement.
Thus, critical factors refer to a broad array of issues, 
including drivers, values and significant impacts (e.g. 
biodiversity or employment), or main aspects or tools of 
governance (such as spatial planning). 
Discussion and presentation of critical factors served 
several purposes:
• Identification of issues on which experts needed to 
focus in the final stage of assessment work.
• Discussions of critical factors revealed stakeholder 
opinions and values.
• Critical factors help to create a basis for future 
development of scenarios and alternatives for EU 
policies and decisions relevant for the Arctic.
• When policies refer to broad European constituency, 
the critical factors are those issues that must be taken 
into account with regard to the Arctic implications of 
EU policy choices.
1.2.4 Recommendations
Recommendations in SADA aim to suggest policy areas 
and actions that authors see as important for the EU 
4. Partidário, M. d R., (2007). Strategic Environmental Assessment Good 
Practices Guide. Methodological Guidance. Amador: Portuguese Environment 
Agency; Partidário, M. d R. (2008), “Strategic-based model for SEA based 
on Critical Factors for Decision Making”. Paper presented at the 28th Annu-
al Conference of the International Association for Impact Assessment, Perth, 
3-10 May 2008.
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policy-makers to consider. The recommendations have 
been developed by the experts, building on the ideas 
proposed by stakeholders in the thematic workshops 
and online questionnaire, as well as on the analysis of 
Arctic trends and relevant EU policies. Therefore, the 
recommendations should not be seen as coming directly 
from stakeholders. Both the specific content and order 
of recommendations in each chapter is the choice of the 
authors.
The proposed ideas have been analysed in the light 
of EU competences, in terms of their feasibility and 
realism, and alignment with EU Arctic policy guiding 
principles (knowledge, responsibility, engagement). 
The recommendations are the outcome of analysis 
conducted by the report authors, and they have not 
been drafted and agreed as a common position of the 
whole project network. 
1.2.5 Stakeholder Consultations 
The consultation process was one of the most important 
elements of SADA, creating a space for dialogue and 
contributing to long-term participatory partnerships. 
Stakeholders (in workshops and via an online 
questionnaire) scrutinised the approach of experts and 
were a crucial source of information. They provided 
guidance on the further focus of assessment work and 
proposed initial ideas for recommendations. 
The team followed the principles of expert humility 
(to criticism and limitations of expert knowledge), 
openness (to other viewpoints), critical approach (to 
information coming from different sources), and long-
term engagement. 
Stakeholders were seen as representing certain 
viewpoints and sensitivities rather than specific 
institutions, organisations or groups. A broad 
understanding of Arctic stakeholders has been applied, 
including:5 
• Primary stakeholders – those likely to be positively or 
negatively affected.
• Secondary stakeholders – intermediaries in the 
policy-making process and its implementation – 
those who have critical interests, knowledge and 
expertise.
• Key stakeholders – those able to significantly 
influence the policy-making processes. 
As a means of communication with stakeholders, a series 
of background papers (factsheets) were written in lay 
terms and based on existing studies (factsheets can be 
downloaded from www.arcticinfo.eu). The chapters in 
this report build from those factsheets. 
Consultations were composed of several elements:
5. Based on: UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2009). Inte-
grated Assessment: Mainstreaming Sustainability into Policymaking. A guid-
ance manual. UNEP.
• Consultation meetings (in Rovaniemi in October 
2013 and Tromsø in January 2014)
• Online questionnaire
• Interactive website
• Feedback process, where workshop participants 
and questionnaire respondents commented on the 
results of consultations and assessment
• Direct outreach to stakeholders by the report authors
1.3 Overview of Stakeholder 
Consultations
Tina Schoolmeester (GRID-Arendal) and Adam Stępień 
(Arctic Centre)
1.3.1 Stakeholder Consultation Meetings
Consultation meetings in Rovaniemi and Tromsø 
consisted of plenary sessions and content-focused 
workshops. During the general meetings, an overview of 
the project was presented and experts gave presentations 
to stimulate discussion on important trends and issues. 
A total of nine workshops addressed seven assessment 
themes. More than 1100 individual invitations were sent 
and about 200 participants attended the consultation 
meetings (including 30 members of the EUAIC network 
in each meeting), 120 of whom actively participated in 
the workshops.
The workshops proved a good way to communicate 
between the Arctic stakeholders and experts conducting 
the study. Participants gave generally positive feedback 
on both the format and the content of the consultation 
meetings and appreciated having the chance to 
express their own views and hear the opinions of other 
stakeholders. 
Stakeholders in general agreed that common drivers 
for many Arctic developments are global demand for 
resources and a main natural physical driver – climate 
change. Broad public participation, especially of the 
local Arctic communities, has been identified in several 
workshops as a need, critical factor and a corresponding 
area for recommendations for EU policy-making. The 
importance of supporting research, education and 
technological development was also emphasised very 
extensively across the themes. Entrepreneurship and 
international co-operation (in particular with Russia) 
proved to rate highly, too, as did good governance 
and the need for clear regulations. It was also pointed 
out that the EU should be more actively involved in 
international negotiations (e.g. Polar Code, climate 
change negotiations). Respecting the local Arctic 
communities and ensuring that revenues from resources 
in the Arctic reach the local communities as well were 
also recurrent issues. Safety, security and preparedness 
1
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measures were deemed particularly important for 
offshore business development (shipping and oil and 
gas) due to the harsh and remote environment. Health 
and environmental concerns were among the frequently 
highlighted issues. 
The report from the stakeholder consultation workshops 
in Rovaniemi and Tromsø can be found in Annex 1.1 
(available online at www.arcticinfo.eu).
1.3.2 Online Questionnaires
The online questionnaires, which in general followed 
similar steps to those used in the workshops, aimed to 
provide concrete, individual inputs. Respondents were 
able to freely choose the questions they were interested 
in answering. The online questionnaire gathered 260 
responses, around half of which were fairly substantial 
or extensive.
Often, the greatest criticism regarding the content of 
the factsheets was expressed by the representatives 
of the industry, clearly showing the need to engage 
practitioners in assessment work. Each comment from 
the stakeholders was considered and addressed as 
extensively as possible, taking into account stakeholders’ 
background.
Stakeholders highlighted the importance of 
communication, participation and dialogue, in light of a 
number of misrepresentations of particular topics or of 
industries within the society. There is interest among the 
respondents in what the EU could do regarding various 
issues in the Arctic, but correspondingly little knowledge 
of the Union’s competences, policies and regulatory 
framework. Differences of opinion between various 
groups are evident.
The summary report from the online questionnaire is 
attached to this report as Annex 1.2 (available online at 
www.arcticinfo.eu).
1
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2.1 European Union’s 
Presence in the Arctic
Discussions on the role of the European Union in the 
Arctic often emphasise the fact that the EU has no 
Arctic Ocean shoreline. Indeed, Greenland, which 
acceded to the European Economic Community (EEC, 
the EU’s predecessor) as a part of Denmark, withdrew 
from the EEC in 1985 after obtaining Home Rule and 
holding a referendum. However, in reality the EU (as 
we know it today) has been present in the Arctic since 
the establishment of the European Communities in the 
1950s. This is a natural consequence of European states 
– and thus the EU – being close neighbours of the region, 
and influencing the region via factors such as its resource 
demand, pollution produced in the EU or funding 
dedicated for Arctic research. Moreover, since the 1990s 
the EU institutions have been involved in international 
co-operation in the North, including via the Northern 
Dimension framework and membership in the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council.
Today’s EU-28 has many competences to act in various 
policy spheres, which also extend to the Arctic.1 In 
lay terms, EU competences mean that the Union can 
legislate and enact directives/regulations or develop 
policy in certain areas. To decide in which policy 
areas the EU has competence is an act with clear 
consequences. First of all, the competence can be 
exclusive to the EU, meaning that the member states do 
not have competence to legislate and develop policy in 
this field (e.g. management of marine living resources). 
The competence can also be shared between member 
states and the EU (e.g. environmental policies), and that 
is why in many policy areas it is the EU and the member 
states that become parties to international treaties. In 
some cases, the competence still falls under the member 
states, but the EU has complementary competence (e.g. 
in tourism). 
Most of these EU policies – in one way or another – 
influence all regions where the EU is present. This is true 
also for the Arctic, even if a particular policy was designed 
with the general European constituency rather than the 
Arctic in mind. The 2010 EU Arctic Footprint and Policy 
Assessment Report2 showed, for example, that PCB-153 
emissions from Europe constitute 57% of all emissions 
reaching the Arctic. Similarly, the EU’s share of mercury 
emissions in the Arctic is about 24% – although the EU 
contributes only 5.5% to global mercury emissions. In 
2012, the EU contributed 11.3% to global carbon dioxide 
emissions.3 The EU accounted for 39% of fish imports 
1. Koivurova, T., Kokko, K., Duyck, S., Sellheim, N. & Stepien, A. (2012), 
The present and future competence of the European Union in the Arctic, Polar 
Record 48(4), 361-371.
2. Cavalieri, S. et al. (2010).
3. International Energy Agency (2013), CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Com-
bustion Highlights 2013, OECD/IEA, Paris.
from Arctic countries, and 24% of final demand for 
products from the Arctic oil and gas industry.4 Europeans 
account for 27% of Arctic tourists. 
EU regulations and actions have importance especially in 
the European Arctic. It can be broadly said that the EU’s 
direct influence is clearest in the northern territories of 
its member states (Finland and Sweden) and the parties 
to the EEA agreement (mainland Norway and Iceland), 
but its fairly strong indirect influence extends to the area 
from Greenland to northwest Russia, which is the focus 
of this report. 
A small part of the territories of EU member states 
(Finland and Sweden) belong to the Arctic region (as 
defined by the AHDR or Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme). In Norway and Iceland, 
due to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, a 
significant number of EU regulations are applicable. The 
EU has a special relationship with Greenland based on 
the 1985 Greenland Treaty; Fisheries Agreement (2013-
2015); a Partnership Agreement (a new agreement 
being finalised at the time of completing this report); 
and Greenland’s status within the Overseas Countries 
and Territories Association. Although Denmark is an EU 
member state, the Kingdom of Denmark is comprised 
of three territories: Denmark and the self-governing 
Faroe Islands and Greenland. Thus, the government of 
Denmark, itself member of the EU, represents the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland as non-EU territories. 
The EU is also involved in developments in northwest 
Russia via its regional and cross-border funding (e.g. 
Kolarctic ENPI [European Neighbourhood Partnership 
Instrument] programme) and various financial 
instruments, including the Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights. 
Despite the presence discussed above, the EU has found 
it challenging to be acknowledged as an Arctic actor by 
the key regional players. This is partly due to the ban 
on placing seal products on the EU market, adopted in 
2009.5 This caused outrage especially in Canada among 
commercial sealers and indigenous peoples (despite an 
exemption for products originating from subsistence 
hunting). More recently, at the Arctic Council’s Kiruna 
Ministerial Meeting in May 2013, the Arctic Council 
“received the application of the EU for observer status 
affirmatively”,6 with a final decision on observer status 
awaiting “implementation”, but with the EU being invited 
to observe Council proceedings on an equal basis to 
other observers. Thus, in this report the EU is considered 
4. Cavalieri, S. et al. (2010).
5. Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products.
6. “The Arctic Council receives the application of the EU for observer status 
affirmatively, but defers a final decision on implementation until the Council 
ministers are agreed by consensus that the concerns of Council members, ad-
dressed by the President of the European Commission in his letter of 8 May are 
resolved, with the understanding that the EU may observe Council proceedings 
until such time as the Council acts on the letter’s proposal.” Arctic Council (15 
May 2013). Kiruna Declaration. 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.
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an “observer in principle” in the Arctic Council. Notably, 
representatives of the Commission in the Arctic Council’s 
working groups have proven to be active both before 
and after May 2013.
2.2 The Process of 
Formulating EU Arctic Policy
Numerous EU actors are involved in the elaboration 
of a possible future overarching and comprehensive 
policy framework for a variety of EU actions relevant 
for the Arctic. Starting from 2006/2007, the process 
had been partly initiated within the EU’s Integrated 
Maritime Policy (with the European Commission’s DG 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in a key role) and partly 
due to rising interest in Arctic affairs within the European 
Parliament. The latter had already earlier participated 
in the Conferences of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region, although not very visibly. The actual formulation 
of Arctic policy, where a number of the Commission’s 
DGs have been involved, has been led by the DG 
External Relations (DG RELEX), which established the 
Arctic inter-service group bringing together officers from 
various DGs. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) has come to the fore. 
The European Parliament has a prominent role in this 
process by way of its resolutions and the activities of its 
members, as the Parliament provides political incentives 
for policy developments. The Council of the European 
Union (which gathers representatives of member states’ 
ministries, or the European Council, composed of heads 
of states or of the governments) would be the key formal 
decision-maker in terms of a strategic framework for the 
Arctic. The Council has already taken a stance on Arctic 
policy in its 2009 Conclusions.7  
Outside of the process of formulating strategic policy for 
the Arctic, when the EU adopts specific legislation that is 
Arctic-relevant, its institutions act within the legislative 
procedures based on the EU founding treaties (Treaty on 
the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union), which means in most cases a 
co-decision procedure of the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union. 
In contrast to its presence in the Barents region, the EU’s 
conscious engagement with the whole Arctic region is of 
fairly recent origin. As mentioned above, EU institutions 
started to take a more proactive approach to Arctic 
affairs only in 2006/2007, following the evolution of 
the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy and the approach 
of the International Polar Year. With the global surge 
of interest in the Arctic in 2007/2008, especially due 
to concerns related to alleged geopolitical manoeuvres 
7. Council of the European Union. (2009). Council conclusions on Arctic is-
sues. (2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 December 2009).
in the region, the EU expressed its concern, identifying 
Arctic developments as possibly affecting its security 
interests.8 A treaty for the Arctic was proposed in the 
2008 resolution of the European Parliament, with a 
controversial reference to the Antarctic Treaty as an 
inspiration.9 Even though the European Parliament’s 
resolution did not represent the official standpoint of 
the EU, the concerns rose among Arctic actors regarding 
the EU’s possible actions as an active participant in Arctic 
affairs.
These initial responses to the changes in Arctic governance 
rapidly became more nuanced following the publication 
of the European Commission’s Communication on EU 
Arctic policy (2008).10 This communication, followed 
by 2009 Council Conclusions, started a process of 
formulating the basis for an active EU presence in the 
entire Arctic, not just the European portion of the 
region.11 Numerous autonomous EU activities are to be 
brought under the umbrella of “Arctic policy”.
More recently, the European Parliament has focused on 
the EU’s role in ensuring the sustainable development 
of the region, affirmed the EU’s Arctic interests, and 
stressed a need for a co-ordinated EU policy.12 The 2012 
Joint Communication of the European Commission 
and High Representative underlined the notions of 
knowledge (connected with a further focus on Arctic 
research), responsibility (understanding the EU’s 
environmental and social impact and acting responsibly 
in shaping EU footprints and Arctic developments) 
and engagement (co-operation with various Arctic 
8. The High Representative and the European Commission expressed their 
concern: “The rapid melting of the polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, 
is opening up new waterways and international trade routes. In addition, the 
increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic 
region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential 
consequences for international stability and European security interests. The 
resulting new strategic interests are illustrated by the recent planting of the 
Russian flag under the North Pole. There is an increasing need to address the 
growing debate over territorial claims and access to new trade routes by dif-
ferent countries which challenge Europe’s ability to effectively secure its trade 
and resource interests in the region and may put pressure on its relations with 
key partners”. See: Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the 
High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council 
S113/08, 14 March 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressdata/EN/reports/99387.pdf. Accessed 5 March 2014.
9. The European Parliament advocates in a 2008 resolution, “Suggests that the 
Commission should be prepared to pursue the opening of international nego-
tiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for the pro-
tection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supple-
mented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental 
difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and the consequent 
rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region; believes, how-
ever, that as a minimum starting point such a treaty could at least cover the 
unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the Arctic Ocean”. European 
Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance, 2010/C 9 E/07.
para. 15, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&refere 
nce=P6-TA-2008-0474&language=EN. Accessed 5 March 2014.
10. Koivurova, T. “Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council in a rapidly 
changing scene of Arctic governance”. vol 46: 237 Polar Record (2010) pp. 
146-156, also in Hønneland, G. (Ed.) The Politics of the Arctic, Edward Elgar, 
2013.
11. Council of the European Union. (2009).
12. European Parliament. 2011. Resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable 
EU policy for the high North, A7-0377/2010.
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partners).13 This is somewhat in contrast with the 2008 
Communication,14 which emphasised the need for 
improvement of the Arctic governance framework,15 a 
statement received with apprehension by some Arctic 
actors. A similar more balanced approach is also evident 
in the most recent European Parliament Resolution from 
March 2014.16 While the Parliament has emphasised 
ambitious environmental goals (e.g. precautionary 
approach regarding fisheries), it has also acknowledged 
the existing situation in the region and shown great 
sensitivity regarding problematic issues (seal ban or 
hydrocarbon extraction).
13. Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress 
since 2008 and next steps. Joint Communication of the European Commission 
and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels, 26.6.2012. 
JOIN(2012) 19 final.
14. European Commission (2008), ‘The European Union and the Arctic Re-
gion’, Communication COM(2008)763final.
15. The 2008 Commission Communication reads: “The main problems relating 
to Arctic governance include the fragmentation of the legal framework, the 
lack of effective instruments, the absence of an overall policy-setting process 
and gaps in participation, implementation and geographic scope.”
16. European Parliament. (2014). Joint Motion for a Resolution on the EU strat-
egy for the Arctic (2013/2595(RSP)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get-
Doc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P7-RC-2014-0229+0+DOC+XM-
L+V0//EN. Accessed 15 March 2014. The Council issued its Conclusions in 
May 2014. See, Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on de-
veloping a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region, Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014.
One can observe that the approach of EU institutions to 
the Arctic has become more nuanced and cautious over 
the fairly short time that it has been formulating its Arctic 
policy, manifested in the 2012 Joint Communication. 
Compared with the 2008 Commission communication, 
the new Joint Communication is no longer critical of 
Arctic governance and expresses the EU’s willingness 
to engage responsibly to meet the challenges the Arctic 
region faces with its prime actors, namely the region’s 
nation-states and indigenous peoples. Various modes 
in which that is attempted, and ideas for how this 
engagement can be enhanced, are discussed throughout 
this report.
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CLIMATE CHANGE 
IN THE ARCTIC 
Authors and contributors:
Mikko Strahlendorff (1), with Sébastien Duyck (2). Johan Gille (3), 
Anastasia Leonenko (4), Timo Koivurova (2), Marie-Theres von Schickfuss 
(3), Adam Stępień (2) and Jennie Thomas (5)* 
(1) Finnish Meteorological Institute
(2) Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland
(3) Ecorys, the Netherlands
(4) Tromsø Centre for Remote Technologies, University of Tromsø, Norway
(5) LATMOS, Pierre Simon Laplace Institute, France
Key Messages:
•	 In the Arctic, the rate of climate warming is two to three times faster than the global 
average. The resulting changes have already had notable impacts on biodiversity and 
livelihoods. More profound implications for Arctic economies and societies are expected 
in the future. 
•	 For the European Arctic, changes in snow cover are likely to be more significant than 
sea ice loss.
•	 Arctic change can have consequences for weather patterns in Europe, but forecasting 
Arctic weather remains challenging, as observations in the Arctic are sparse. 
•	 The EU influences Arctic climate change by its actions that are relevant for climate 
change globally, primarily by contributing to international negotiations and via its own 
energy and climate policies. Arctic-specific policy areas include research, supporting 
observation and adaptation.
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Sustaining systematic observation activities.
•	 Contributing to international co-operation and acting via own energy policy: primary 
policy areas for EU action regarding climate change.
•	 Supporting regional and local adaptation.
* The authors would like to thank the stakeholders participating in the workshop and online questionnaire. 
Moreover, they would like to acknowledge Jouni Pulliainen, Ari Laaksonen, Heikki Lihavainen, Adriaan Perrels, 
Hilppa Gregow (Finnish Meteorological Institute) and Agneta Fransson (Norwegian Polar Institute) for their 
comments, suggestions and input.
The main threat is the warm and unstable weather during the snowy period.
[…] Our herding and way of living will die out if these changes get worse.
Reindeer herder, Sweden
The main threats are related to lack of international commitment to reduce 
GHG. It needs global engagement. EU efforts alone are not enough. To 
reach the 2 degrees centigrade target, all fossil fuels in the Arctic should 
remain in the ground. Another global threat is the increased population 
growth and global energy demand, that will be affecting the Arctic directly 
through extraction of Arctic natural resources as well as indirectly through 
the use of energy (fossil fuels) elsewhere on the planet.
There is an inconsistence in the sense that not all EU policies are aligned, 
meaning that EU policies are not as ambitious as desirable (e.g. energy); 
some should be further strengthened (aviation + marine transport), while 
others are more focussed on growth and global trade rather than on 
sustainability.
International organization, Denmark
The most important issue is methane because so little is known about it.
Climate change in the Arctic is occurring faster than elsewhere in Europe, so 
the majority of Europeans do not experience the changes.
Professor, Norway
There will be severe loss of biodiversity through local and regional level 
extinction. There will also be a radical influx of new species, both species 
native to more southern areas and invasive species. 
I have witnessed serious measured changes in temperatures, rainfall, 
hydrology, temporal extent of ice in freshwaters, loss of species, decline of 
plant, insect and fish populations. Landscape changes are also abundantly 
visible with greening of the Arctic and tree level creeping up on high 
altitudes. 
Researcher, Finland
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
Chapter cover image: Snowmobile travelling over melting sea ice in Uummannaq, 
Greenland.
Photo: Lawrence Hislop, 2010, GRID-Arendal, www.grida.no
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers climate change in the Arctic 
from a European perspective. Due to climate change, 
the Arctic is the most rapidly changing region on Earth. 
There is clear evidence that change has already occurred 
due to emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols 
from human activities, which affect the fundamentals 
of the ecosystems of the Arctic and the lives of its 
inhabitants. The Arctic is a particularly fragile region 
where strong feedback linkages accelerate changes at a 
faster pace than in other regions – an effect called “Arctic 
amplification”. Shifts in Arctic ecosystem dynamics have 
global consequences.
Today we see clear evidence of significant changes in 
Arctic landscapes and marine environments. Climatic 
changes are affecting the Arctic cryosphere, hydrology, 
habitats and species. In northern Fennoscandia, the 
changes in snow cover are particularly important for 
biodiversity, livelihoods and economy. Changes in 
temperature, sea ice cover, snow cover and water 
regimes are linked to the loss of important habitats for 
Arctic species, as well as shifts in species composition 
due to landscape transformations, which in turn impact 
on people’s livelihoods (Figure 3.1).
Uncertainties regarding various driving mechanisms, 
evolution and specific impacts of Arctic climate change 
remain. More long-term observations are needed 
to improve climate-related predictions in the Arctic. 
Existing climate prediction models must be improved. 
Because of limitations in representing the cryosphere, 
climate model predictions for the Arctic have a lower 
confidence level than for other regions. Nevertheless, 
the outlook for change in the Arctic is alarming and must 
be taken into account despite prevalent uncertainties 
and limitations in the current models.
This chapter looks at potential impacts in the Arctic 
based on the most recent Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and region-specific 
information coming from the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP), assessments such as 
Sea, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) and 
the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). The 
IPCC reviews and assesses the recent available scientific, 
technical and socioeconomic information relevant for 
the understanding of human-induced climate change 
and issues its reviews every four to six years. IPCC’s 
most recent assessments – which together comprise 
its Fifth Assessment Report – are being released in the 
period from September 2013 to October 2014. The IPCC 
Physical Science Basis report was the first to be released 
and the climate change trends and impacts discussed in 
this chapter are largely based on its findings.1 
1. IPCC (2013), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribu-
tion of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., 
Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. & Midgley, P.M. (eds.)].
Figure 3.1: Climate Change in the Arctic: Drivers and Impacts
Impacts in the Arctic
Environmental
• Marine ice-connected ecosystems are threatened by acidification 
of ocean water.
• Tundra is retreating and the tree line moving northward changing 
bird and reindeer habitats.
• Changes in water cycle, release of methane that is trapped in ice 
and topographic change.
• Increasing local emission sources due to new human activities, e.g. 
shipping and oil extraction.
Economic and Social
• Northern Sea Routes open to transit shipping and additional 
maritime activities (e.g. tourism)
• Increased access to oil & gas reserves and minerals, resulting in 
increased economic growth opportunities also for local population.
• Change in economic structure from small-scale local activities 
towards more international influence, from subsistence activities 
towards more wage labour.
• Indigenous peoples’ food sources are threatened, with potentially 
adverse impacts on health.
• Increased vulnerability of existing infrastructure on land due to sea 
level rise and permafrost melt.
• Changes in snow/ice dependent transport and food sources require 
humans to adapt.
• Adverse impacts on human health. 
Observed changes
Warming of land and sea
Reduced sea-ice
Melting glaciers
Shrinking snow cover
Permafrost degradation
Policy Responses (including EU) 
Mitigation and Adaption
Climate policies
Energy policies
Environmental policies
Sectoral policies
Arctic 
Feedback 
Effects
Human-induced drivers
-CO2 and black carbon 
emmissions.
-Land-cover changes.
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3.2 Trends and 2030 Outlook 
Globally the most significant increase in temperature is in 
the Arctic. Models foresee an almost threefold increase 
in warming compared to the global average. Climate 
prediction models agree that the most pronounced 
warming (between 4 degrees Celsius (°C) and 10 °C) 
would likely occur over land surfaces, particularly during 
the boreal winter. The Arctic amplification effect results 
in projected temperature anomalies of more than 10 °C 
in the Arctic region.2
3.2.1 Arctic Sea Ice Cover is Rapidly 
Shrinking
The summer extent of sea ice has declined notably in 
recent years (Figure 3.2). The difference in the extent of 
sea ice in September 2012 compared with the median 
over the last three decades is striking (Figure 3.3). In 
addition, the ice that remains has less multi-year ice, 
which means it is weaker and thinner. The outlook is that 
the extent of the sea ice will continue to decline and that 
there will be less multi-year ice. If the current trends in 
global warming hold, the Arctic Ocean could be nearly 
ice-free in late summer by the mid-2030s.3
2. ACIA (2004). Impacts of the warming Arctic. Arctic Climate Impact Assess-
ment. Arctic Council.
3. Wang, M. & Overland, J. (2012), A sea ice free summer Arctic within 30 
years: An update from CMIP5 models, Geophysical research letters.
3.2.2 Melting Ice Is Raising Sea Levels
Since 1993, the world average sea level has been rising 
by 3.2 millimetres (mm) per year, compared with the 
1901-2010 average of 1.7 mm per year. As this rise is 
not uniform, the western North Pacific has risen by even 
more than 10 mm per year. The melting of glaciers in the 
Arctic accounts for almost 80% of total ice loss in the last 
decade. 
Glaciers in Greenland are losing ice mass at a pace over 
six times greater than in the previous decade (2002-
2012 average in comparison to 1992-2002) (Figure 
3.4). Moreover, the speed at which the melting occurs 
has accelerated. Glacier melt predictions involve 
considerable uncertainties, but the IPCC estimates that 
melting ice and thermal expansion would result in a sea-
level rise of about 15 centimetres in 2030 compared to 
2000 levels.
3.2.3 Snow Cover Is Shrinking Faster than 
the Sea Ice Extent
Both the duration and spring/summer extent of snow 
cover are diminishing. Snow observations in recent 
years show a more rapid change than in sea ice. Over 
the period 1967–2012, the extent of the northern 
hemisphere snow cover decreased most in June, by 
53%. Models indicate a future where winters will likely 
have more precipitation in the European Arctic, while 
summers show only modest increases. Hence, the Arctic 
could see a shorter period of snow cover, while having 
more snow during winter. In this case, snow cover in the 
summer would continue to shrink.
Figure 3.2: Arctic Sea-Ice Extent, 2008-2013. Note: Area of ocean with at least 15% sea-ice. The dark grey shows the average for 
1981 – 2010; light grey shading represents standard deviations. 
Source: US National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2013.
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Figure 3.3: Arctic Sea-Ice Extent, September 2012, and Median September Sea-Ice Extent, 1981-2010
Note: Sea-ice extent on 16 September 2012 is shown in blue (all-time minimum). The extent was larger in 2013 (the smallest sea-ice 
extent occurs annually in mid-September). Median September extent for 1981-2010 is shown with an orange contour.
Source: Arctic Portal, based on data from US National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2013.
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3.3 Drivers
The main drivers of Arctic climate change are the same 
as the drivers of global climate change. The complex 
interactions governing our atmosphere are simplified 
in Figure 3.5. Human activities cause emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHG) and aerosols. These 
emissions increase the natural greenhouse effect of the 
atmosphere, forcing it to warm and thereby changing 
many other conditions on Earth.
Aerosols have more complicated processes than long-
lived greenhouse gases that impact the climate, such 
as by changing the location and properties of clouds or 
by darkening snow or ice surfaces. Aerosols, including 
soot (black carbon particles), sulfate and co-emitted 
substances are estimated to contribute to Arctic 
amplification.4 Black carbon on snow/ice absorbs more 
sunlight than clean snow. Soot in the air warms the 
atmosphere directly and sulfate cools it. Short-lived 
climate forcers (SLCFs), including methane and ozone, 
also have complicated feedback effects and, taking into 
consideration changing anthropogenic emissions, SLCFs 
might either accelerate or mitigate the warming. 
4. Shindell, D. & Faluvegi, G. (2009). Climate response to regional radiative 
forcing during the twentieth century, Nature Geoscience, 2, 294 - 300; AMAP 
(Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme) (2011). The Impact of Black 
Carbon on Arctic Climate. Quinn, P.K., Stohl, A., Arneth, A., Berntsen, T., 
Burkhart, J. F., Christensen, J., Flanner, M., Kupiainen, K., Lihavainen, H., 
Shepherd, M., Shevchenko, V., Skov, H. & Vestreng, V.
The Arctic has a specific amplification mechanism 
associated with the changing Arctic sea ice extent. 
Warmer air and water enhance the melting of Arctic 
sea ice in summer. Ice reflects most sunlight back, but 
the open ocean absorbs the sunlight energy, resulting in 
additional warming.
3.4 Climate Change Impacts 
in the Arctic
Today’s global-scale climate prediction models lack the 
precision and complexity for detailed regional and local 
impact analysis. Nonetheless, predicted changes can be 
related to concrete challenges for life in the Arctic.
Oceans absorb some CO2 from the atmosphere in natural 
processes. Additional CO2 in the atmosphere results 
in ocean acidification. In the Arctic and high latitudes, 
acidification is stronger than in regions closer to the 
equator because CO2 is more soluble in cold water. In 
addition, melting of the cryosphere adds freshwater to 
the Arctic Ocean, which has the potential to alter ocean 
circulation patterns.
Arctic biodiversity is facing challenges due to multiple 
stressors on natural habitats, including human 
activities, land-use changes, pollution and invasive 
species. However, according to the Arctic Biodiversity 
Figure 3.4: Greenland: Cumulative Ice Mass Loss and Sea Level Equivalent
Note: Derived as annual averages from 18 recent studies. 
Source: IPCC 2013.
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Assessment, human-caused climate change is by far 
the most serious threat.5 Northward range expansion of 
many species is already occurring and further shifts are 
predicted. Thus, the overall reduction of the geographical 
extent of terrestrial Arctic habitats is expected. Warmer 
temperatures and more precipitation may result 
in increased plant growth and expansion of animal 
populations, but in the long term the changes might 
destroy large tracts of specifically Arctic ecosystems and 
populations. Habitat changes include earlier and more 
variable snow melt, increased frequency of winter thaw-
freeze events and ice crust formation, disappearance of 
perennial snow beds, coastal erosion and flooding of 
low coasts, as well as more frequent and severe extreme 
events. The risk is particularly high for rare species and 
for freshwater ecosystems, although the changes are 
expected to be non-linear.
Ocean acidification is one of the most concrete habitat 
changes for marine flora and fauna: some populations of 
traditional species are already growing at a slower rate 
and invading species are spreading.6 The substantial loss 
in multi-year sea ice threatens the biology in and under 
the ice. Effects along the whole food chain are not yet 
5. CAFF (2013). Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. Synthesis. Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna. Arctic Council, pp. 89-101.
6. AMAP (2013). AMAP Arctic Ocean Acidification Assessment: Summary for 
Policy-makers. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Arctic Coun-
cil.
clearly visible, but marine wildlife is already migrating 
and habitat changes will be more extreme in the future.
Reduced sea ice, ocean acidification and changes 
in landscape increase the vulnerability of Arctic 
inhabitants, especially indigenous peoples and their 
cultures.7 Traditional food sources may decline, leading 
7. ACIA (2004). Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Impacts of a Warming 
Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.
Figure 3.5: Earth Climate System and Main Forcing Mechanisms on Our Atmosphere
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, 2001. (Downloaded from www.windows2universe.org).
Picture 3.1: Polar Bears Depend on Sea Ice
Photo: NOAA National Ocean Service.
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to disruption in hunting and food-sharing practices. 
Changes in ice, snow cover and permafrost can make 
traditional transport and hunting routes more dangerous 
or inaccessible. Changing landscapes can disrupt forage 
availability, migration routes of reindeer, as well as 
community infrastructure, water supply and connectivity 
with population centres. Traditional harvesting and 
other nature-based activities as well as landscapes 
endowed with cultural and spiritual values are intimately 
connected with Arctic cultures and identities, both 
indigenous and non-indigenous, with implications 
for well-being. Vulnerability and adaptive capacity as 
properties of human societies are not straightforward 
concepts. Climate change vulnerability varies with time 
and is dependent on complex social, economic and 
cultural structures and interactions.8  
The climate change impacts that have already been 
experienced in the European Arctic, especially in 
Northern Fennoscandia, are connected primarily to 
changing weather patterns and snow conditions. These 
may affect winter tourism – the main economic activity 
for many local communities – and may also complicate 
reindeer herding due to scarcity of winter pastures 
as well as increase flood risk. There are also concerns 
regarding human health due to more active vector-
borne diseases. Issues of concern outside the EU Arctic 
are the thawing of the permafrost and coastal erosion. 
Conversely, climate change is often perceived as an 
opportunity for economic and social development, with 
better conditions for agriculture depending on location, 
lower costs of infrastructure maintenance, higher 
attractiveness of winter tourism and greater economic 
opportunities for more resource exports along Arctic sea 
routes.9
Reduced sea ice can increase access for harvesting marine 
resources (e.g. fish or oil and gas), although that itself 
may not constitute the main trigger for the occurrence 
of actual activities, as other factors need to be taken 
into account. Expanding human activities in fragile Arctic 
ecosystems may lead to more pollution. For instance, 
increased maritime traffic leads to bigger emissions of 
black carbon and other pollutants that can negatively 
impact Arctic air and water quality and amplify climate 
change (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6).10
8. Stepien, A., Koivurova, T., Gremsperger A. & Niemi, H. (2014). Arctic In-
digenous Peoples and the Challenge of Climate Change, in Tedsen, E., Cava-
lieri, S. & Kraemer, R., Arctic Marine Governance: Opportunities for Transat-
lantic Cooperation. Dordrecht: Springer. Also the concept of well-being may 
have multiple meanings, including cultural, social and economic, not necessar-
ily directly connected to income.
9. See, e.g., Mettiäinen, I. (2013). Climate Change Turn in the Regional De-
velopment Strategies of an Arctic Region, Case Finnish Lapland, Yearbook of 
Polar Law, 5, 143 –183; Tennberg, M. (ed.) (2012), Governing the Uncertain. 
Adaptation and Climate in Russia and Finland. Dordrecht: Springer; Evengård, 
B. & Sauerborn R. (2009). Climate change influences infectious diseases both 
in the Arctic and the tropics: joining the dots, Global Health Action 2.
10. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014). Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Summary for Poli-
cy-makers. Fifth Assessment Report. See http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/
3.5 Governance 
As a global problem, climate change needs to be tackled 
by the world community. The 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
lays down general obligations to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and to adapt to consequences of climate 
change. Currently it has 196 parties (including the 
European Union).
The treaty, which only establishes general GHG 
emissions commitments for industrialised countries, 
provides a framework for negotiating specific treaties, 
i.e. protocols, that may set binding limits on greenhouse 
gases. The Kyoto Protocol, concluded in 1997, established 
legally binding obligations for developed countries to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, though not all 
developed states adopted the Protocol and others have 
since withdrawn from it.
As part of the 2010 Cancun Agreements, 91 countries 
representing nearly 80% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions have adopted and submitted targets for 
international registration or pledged other actions for 
reductions. These pledges, however, are not legally 
binding (although they may be considered politically 
binding) and fall well short of what is necessary to deliver 
the 2 degree Celsius goal according to UNEP.11 
A new phase in the international climate change 
negotiations resulted from the COP in 2011. The focus 
is on the negotiation of “a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties,” to be negotiated 
by 2015 and to enter into force by 2020. It would be the 
first global climate agreement extending to all countries, 
establishing binding reduction targets for both developed 
and emerging economies.
uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2014.
11. UNEP (2012), The Emissions Gap Report 2012. United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi.
Picture 3.2: Ice Road and Skiing Trails on Kemijoki River in Ro-
vaniemi, Finland. Ice and winter roads are an element of the 
transport network. Due to mild winters and changes in hydro-
power systems, it has not been possible to establish ice roads 
in some locations in Lapland during the past decade. 
Photo: Ilona Mettiäinen, Arctic Centre.
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Governments Agree on a Target of 2 degrees Celsius and 450 ppm CO
2
At the 2010 UNFCCC Conference of Parties, governments agreed that the average global temperature increase, 
compared with pre-industrial levels, must be held below 2 °C. Therefore, GHG emissions must be reduced 
(Cancun Agreements), because an increase of 0.8 °C has already occurred.
There is broad international acceptance that stabilising the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases 
at below 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon-dioxide equivalent gives a 50% chance to curb global warming 
below 2 °C. This threshold is drawing close. Carbon dioxide levels reached 400 ppm in May 2013, having jumped 
by 2.7 ppm in 2012 – the second-highest rise since record-keeping began.
In 2012, 38 countries, representing 13% of global GHG 
emissions, extended the Kyoto Protocol to 2020, taking 
on binding targets. Major GHG emitters either do not 
have binding emission reduction targets, such as China, 
or are outside of the Kyoto Protocol, such as the United 
States, the second-largest emitter. Canada has also 
withdrawn from the Protocol, while Russia, Japan and 
New Zealand have refused a post-2012 Kyoto target. 
The Inuit, under the auspices of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, initiated legal proceedings against the United 
States (in the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights [IACHR]) on the basis of climate change having 
adverse effect on the human rights of the Inuit. The 
petition was unsuccessful in legal terms but highlighted 
the plight of Arctic indigenous peoples. More recently, 
the Arctic Athabaskan Council initiated proceedings 
against Canada for its failure to address black carbon 
pollution, due to its effects on increased warming and 
melting.
Climate change is also being addressed at the regional, 
Arctic level. Since countries in the Arctic can directly 
influence some effects by reducing the sources of short-
lived climate forcers, they agreed recently within the 
Arctic Council to pursue actions to establish national 
black carbon emission inventories. 
Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the 
Arctic has been the main climate change adaptation 
programme under the auspices of the Arctic Council. 
Ongoing work is carried out via the Adaptation Actions 
for a Changing Arctic project. The aim is to enhance the 
capacity of decision-makers to manage climate risks via 
an information portal and through improved predictions 
of multivariate impacts. 
Local and regional authorities in the European Arctic are 
taking measures to address climate adaptation in the 
development of strategies where both relevant risks and 
opportunities are considered.12 In Russia, even though 
the mainstream discourse on climate change diverges 
from that prevalent in the West, the Barents regions 
are also taking up strategic work with regard to climate 
change.13
12. Mettiäinen (2013).
13. Forbes, B. & Stammler, F. (2009), Arctic climate change discourse: the 
contrasting politics of research agendas in the West and Russia, 2 Polar Re-
search, 28–42.
3.6 How Climate Change in 
the Arctic May Affect the 
European Union
Climate change is evident in the Arctic areas of European 
Union (EU) member states and the impacts are felt all 
over the world. The Arctic, as an important part of the 
global climate system, plays a crucial role in how Europe 
is affected by climate change. 
The European Environment Agency (EEA) highlighted the 
main impacts of climate change in Europe,14 including: 
increased mean temperature and longer heat waves, 
increase in precipitation in northern and north-western 
Europe and decrease in southern Europe, warmer rivers 
and lakes, changes in river flows depending on the 
region, earlier spring and later autumn, and changes in 
conditions for agriculture. The contribution of climate 
change to the costs of damage caused by natural 
disasters is expected to increase in the future. Specific 
impacts vary to a great extent across the continent. 
The melting of the Greenland ice sheet is a significant 
cause of the rise in the sea level. The impact will affect 
coastal areas in central and southern Europe.15 The 
Netherlands is already commercialising adaptation 
measures against coastal flooding.
Arctic amplification has implications for the weather and 
climate of Europe.16 A warmer Arctic led to increased loss 
of snow cover in spring and summer over the second 
half of the last century. In contrast, the snow cover in 
the boreal autumn and winter increased over the 20th 
century, since a warmer atmosphere produces greater 
snowfall in autumn (especially in October). This trend 
seems to be accelerating.17
Arctic sea ice change has also been linked to changes 
in mid-latitude weather patterns that increase the 
14. See, e.g. European Environment Agency (2012). Climate change, impacts 
and vulnerability in Europe 2012. EEA Report No 12/2012.
15. European Environment Agency (2012). Climate change, impacts and vul-
nerability in Europe 2012. EEA Report No 12/2012.
16. Francis, J. A. & Vavrus S. J. (2012). Evidence linking Arctic amplifica-
tion to extreme weather in mid-latitudes. Geophysical Research Letters, 39. 
L06801, doi:10.1029/2012GL051000.
17. IPCC (2013).
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probability of persistent extreme weather events, such 
as droughts, floods and heat waves in summer and cold 
snaps in winter.18 Loss of Arctic sea ice appears to result 
in increased precipitation in northern Europe.19 The very 
low extent of sea ice in summer and autumn enhances 
the probability of a colder following winter in Europe.
Decreased winter sea ice coverage, accompanied by 
a higher surface temperature over the Arctic Ocean, 
results in a less maritime, more continental climate in 
Europe. Anomalously low sea ice coverage in the Barents 
and Kara Seas in winter increases variability in European 
winter temperatures.
The Arctic environment will be under stress from rapid 
changes. This will also affect EU territory, thus exerting 
pressure on EU regulatory frameworks. The most 
imminent area is biodiversity, as many Arctic species 
will be threatened in Europe. Arctic species today enjoy 
large areas of habitat that support a range of ecological 
processes and interactions.20 However, climate change, 
industrial development, pollution, local disturbances 
and invasive alien species are affecting the Arctic, and 
their impacts are increasing. Nature conservation goals 
(like stopping biodiversity loss) may be hard to achieve.
EU policy areas likely affected by Arctic change include 
transport, energy, fisheries, climate change and the 
environment. Therefore, it would be useful to prepare 
the next Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU 
(2021-2027) with the relevant predicted climate impacts 
in mind.
18. Tang, Q., Zhang, X. & Francis, J. A. (2014). Extreme summer weather 
in northern mid-latitudes linked to a vanishing cryosphere. Nature Climate 
Change, 4, 45–50, doi:10.1038/nclimate2065.
19. Screen, J.A. (2013). Influence of Arctic sea ice on European summer 
precipitation. Environmental Research Letters 8(4), doi:10.1088/1748-
9326/8/4/044015.
20. CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna) (2013). Arctic Biodiversi-
ty Assessment: Report for Policy Makers. CAFF, Akureyri, Iceland.
3.7 EU Policies Relevant for 
Arctic Climate Change
The EU has the most significant influence on Arctic 
climate change via its transport, energy, trade and 
climate policies, and particularly in its role in helping to 
shape a global climate regime. A significant portion of 
the black carbon reaching the Arctic originates in Europe. 
The EU accounts for about 11% of global GHG emissions 
(2011).21
The EU’s share of global emissions has been declining. 
In part this reflects positive results from mitigation and 
efficiency gains, as well as shifts in economic structure 
with less manufacturing and more services as well as 
the economic slowdown since 2008. It is also due to 
the increase in GHG emissions from large emerging 
economies such as China and India, whose production 
supplies European markets.
The most visible components of the EU’s climate change-
related policies have been its 20-20-20 targets — 20% 
cut in GHG emissions, 20% share of renewables in energy 
consumption and 20% increase in energy efficiency — by 
2020. The EU is well on the way to meeting the emissions 
goal, with a 27% reduction expected by 2020. 
New climate and energy goals for 2030 were launched 
in January 2014. The target is to reduce domestic GHG 
emissions by 40% from the 1990 levels (and towards the 
target of an 80% cut by 2050) and increase the share 
of renewables to at least 27% by 2030.22 The role of 
energy efficiency in the 2030 framework will be further 
considered in a review of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
due to be concluded later in 2014. In the context of the 
UNFCCC and international negotiations, the EU has a 
joint reduction target, which is internally shared among 
member states. 
EU policies in many areas affect energy production, the 
largest contributor to CO2 emissions. In the transport 
sector, curbing emissions remains challenging, even 
though the EU has fuel-economy standards, supports 
public and rail transport and has made attempts to 
21. European Environment Agency.
22. European Commission (2013). 2030 climate and energy goals for a com-
petitive, secure and low-carbon EU economy. europa.eu, Accessed 10 January 
2014.
Why Does the Arctic Warm Faster than Lower Latitudes? – Arctic Feedbacks2
• As snow and ice melt, darker land and ocean surfaces absorb more solar energy and the additional trapped 
energy directly increases the warming of the atmosphere.
• The Arctic atmosphere is shallower than in lower latitudes (thus, the same amount of absorbed energy 
warms the atmosphere more) and less effective in transporting energy away.
• Black carbon (soot) increases energy absorption both in the atmosphere and on snow and ice cover.
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Figure 3.6: EU-27 Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector, 1990 – 2011
Notes: in million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. EU-27 does not include Croatia (data before 2013). 
Sources: European Environment Agency; Arctic Portal.
introduce a carbon tax for aviation. The EU established 
the world’s first GHG emissions trading system (EU ETS). 
It covers about 45% of EU GHG emissions and is a key 
instrument to reach the emission reduction targets. 
However, the carbon price in the EU ETS declined by 
more than 80% from 2008 to 2013, partly due to the 
economic slowdown. To make the EU ETS more robust 
and effective in promoting low-carbon investment 
at least cost to society, the Commission proposes to 
establish a market stability reserve at the beginning of 
the next ETS trading period in 2021. The reserve would 
both address the emission allowances surplus that 
has built up in recent years and improve the system’s 
resilience to major shocks by automatically adjusting the 
supply of allowances to be auctioned.23 
The EU Clean Air policy package adopted in December 
2013 includes short-lived climate forcers (including black 
carbon). The EU is also active in addressing black carbon 
23. European Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/
index_en.htm. Accessed 5 March 2014.
emissions from ships within the International Maritime 
Organization. The European Commission is a leader in 
the UNEP-led Climate and Clean Air Coalition.
The EU is increasingly active in climate adaptation within 
Europe, including its northernmost regions, on the 
basis of the 2013 Climate Adaptation Strategy package. 
Adaptation is to be taken into account, with Arctic regions 
perceived as particularly vulnerable, across various 
EU policies including: transport, health, migration, 
cohesion, agriculture, disaster insurance, fisheries, and 
maritime and coastal issues. The EU climate adaptation 
platform, CLIMATE-Adapt, is intended to support 
informed decision-making at all governance levels and 
to include a toolset for adaptation planning. The strategy 
also encourages member states to prepare national 
adaptation strategies. Swedish and Finnish strategies 
have already been adopted. In addition, EU funding 
programmes have supported development of regional 
and local climate change strategies (e.g. European 
Regional Development Fund in Finnish Lapland).
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The EU will provide EUR 12 billion for space technologies 
in the 2014-2020 financial framework, including the 
Copernicus and Galileo programmes. Copernicus, the 
EU’s Earth Observation Programme, will significantly 
contribute to the regular observation and monitoring 
of the atmosphere, oceans and land surfaces, and will 
provide information in support of a broad range of 
environmental and security applications and decisions.24 
The data provided will also enable progress in improving 
maritime security, climate change monitoring and 
providing support in emergency and crisis situations.
Good quality Arctic analysis that combines satellite 
(areal) and point measurements (reanalysis25) and 
quality multi-parameter data in 3D would help to 
improve climate predictions in the Arctic. Such analysis 
for the Arctic should be facilitated following the launch 
of the Copernicus programme’s climate change service 
(due to start in 2015).26 Full quality in reanalysis can 
mainly be achieved by comparing to other reanalyses, so 
conducting several is necessary. For example, Ohio State 
University in the United States is currently completing 
the first Arctic reanalysis that covers the period 2000-
2012.
3.8 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-Making
Stakeholder consultations included strong representation 
from researchers, among a variety of other interests. The 
following issues were raised as particularly relevant and 
challenging when considering actions related to Arctic 
climate change. 
3.8.1 Energy
The topic encompasses global energy production as 
well as hydrocarbon exploitation in Arctic territories. 
Combustion of carbon fuels is the primary contributor to 
human-induced CO2 emissions worldwide. While climate 
change is opening access to unexploited resources in the 
Arctic, their potential development would expand the 
fuel supply and exacerbate the climate change effects. 
Investments in Arctic hydrocarbon extraction would lock 
in emissions for decades to come. The contradictions 
around Arctic reserves of fossil fuels have become a focus 
of many environmental NGOs, some of which advocate 
a ban on Arctic exploration and development activities. 
24. European Commission. Press Release: EP adopts European Earth Observa-
tion programme Copernicus, 12 March 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-14-257_en.htm. Accessed 18 March 2014.
25. Reanalysis is a scientific method for developing a comprehensive record 
of how weather and climate are changing over time using observations and 
numerical models. (See http://reanalyses.org/.)
26. European Union (2014). Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the Copernicus Programme and repealing Regulation 
(EU) N° 911/2010.
Other parties consider these reserves to be a key driver 
of new economic activities in the Arctic, helping to 
address the region’s varied challenges and problems. 
3.8.2 Holistic Governance Frameworks for 
Economic and Climate Sustainability 
To find a balance between economic, environmental and 
social interests and to pursue sustainable development, 
it is necessary to connect all types of governance and 
economic frameworks. Ideally this contributes to 
sustainable development (low-carbon green economy, 
land/marine spatial planning, ecosystem-based 
management). In order to move closer to holistic 
governance, such frameworks need to include all three 
dimensions of sustainability, following the outcomes of 
Rio+20.27 The structure of governance plays a key role in 
addressing the challenge of climate change, in terms of 
both mitigation and adaptation.
3.8.3 Monitoring of Arctic Change
Arctic observations have many operators with different 
requirements, but few stations for achieving good spatial 
coverage. Satellites give good spatial coverage except 
over the pole, but the resulting data represents an areal 
average rather than point measurements (like stations). 
Combining both sets is desirable to produce consistent 
data sets for understanding the whole situation. 
Particularly climate change modelling requires data with 
both full coverage and station precision.
Reanalysis is an approach that uses numerical models 
to calculate from all available observations (ground 
stations and satellite areal coverage) a consistent state 
of all variables of the atmosphere and its boundaries 
over land, ocean, lakes and ice surfaces. For the Arctic, 
past records at this level are strongly needed. Many 
current climate change models have difficulties with 
reproducing the past sea ice correctly, which results in 
higher uncertainty. Currently it is wise to use trends from 
recent observations rather than rely solely on model 
predictions.
3.8.4 Communication
Communication is important to better understand the role 
of the Arctic in climate change, to grasp the challenges it 
poses to society and to broaden participation in climate 
action. In the EU context, one of the key issues is linking 
Arctic change to feedback in Europe. Europeans need to 
pay attention to Arctic changes, as these affect their own 
lives as well.
27. RIO+20 conference outcome (2010). The Future We Want: Outcome doc-
ument adopted at Rio+20.
3
.
- 31 -
3.9 Recommendations
The following recommendations have been developed 
by the report authors, taking the ideas proposed by 
stakeholders as a starting point.
The EU aims to build flexible legislation frameworks that 
can adapt to new information. In association with the 
member states, the EU needs to establish an effective 
policy monitoring system to produce this guiding 
information. The framework model for this is already 
accepted in the EU and many monitoring activities 
have been launched to enable policy evaluation, but 
the monitoring and information production are not 
developed yet – at least not for the Arctic.28 
Science-based policy-making and continuous 
performance evaluation of policy actions should become 
a common practice. This requires availability of accurate 
and updated data as well as proper communication of 
the current state of knowledge so that the information 
and its implications are understood and can be used by 
decision-makers. Current monitoring is not sufficient 
for this; it is necessary to both extend and sustain 
observations in the Arctic. In addition, the chain from 
observations to decision-making needs to be organised in 
an effective manner. Several key areas for improvements 
have been identified:
• Sustain support for monitoring infrastructure (i.e. 
stations, networks, data platforms, etc.).
• Station operations need to evolve from research 
campaigns to continuous measuring.
• Extend the observation station networks on sea ice 
and in the sea.
• Prioritise Arctic user requirements for Earth 
Observation satellite missions.
Co-ordination and communication of EU Arctic research 
needs to be improved. This implies increasing support 
for actions that enable Arctic information to more 
effectively inform and influence EU policy-making. 
3.9.1 Support Sustaining Systematic 
Observation Activities
As a member of Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks 
(SAON), the EU should effectively support SAON’s 
actions. So far, SAON has had limited success as tasks are 
performed on a voluntary basis, usually within projects 
with little funding. Arctic countries have not yet pooled 
any meaningful resources for sustaining observation 
infrastructure in the Arctic, so offering a European top-
up could encourage them to do more.
EU research infrastructure development can add to the 
Arctic Observing System: examples include soon-to-be 
established legal entities such as the European Research 
28. European Commission (2014), Regulatory Fitness and Performance Pro-
gramme (REFIT).
Infrastructure Consortia (ERIC), like:
• Euro-Argo for marine profiling floats.29  
• Integrated Carbon Observing System for carbon flux 
stations.30 
• EuroFleets for co-ordinating marine research vessel 
sharing.31 
• Svalbard Integrated Observation System (SIOS) 
for connecting and sharing infrastructure around 
Spitsbergen.32  
Two of these consortia will begin operations in 2014. 
EuroFleets2 has secured project funding through 2017. 
SIOS is trying to secure member countries for establishing 
a legal entity. Other research infrastructure initiatives 
(INTERACT, PanEurasian EXperiment) make significant 
contributions to Arctic monitoring, but the ERIC groups 
have made the greatest progress in stepping up their 
operations from pure research campaigns to continuous 
operational observations. The cryosphere is poorly 
addressed on the current ESFRI (European Strategy 
Forum for Research Infrastructures) roadmap, although 
it would have the potential to warrant specific actions.
To have a stronger impact, a research infrastructure 
project should prepare a more robust planning and 
implementation mechanism for Arctic observation 
activities. This action could effectively be arranged 
with Horizon 2020 infrastructure funding, but it would 
need to include partners from all Arctic countries to 
produce a full Arctic Observing System. For example, 
continuous observations on the ice and in the sea should 
be extended and sustained. This project could also set 
up continuous information production processes for EU 
Arctic policy needs.
As current satellite-based earth observation (EO) systems 
are not fulfilling user needs for communication and 
monitoring, the EU should take remedial measures. EO is 
crucial for Arctic monitoring, as the ground-based station 
networks are sparse and lined up on the edges of the 
Arctic area. Current development of the third-generation 
geostationary (GEO) satellites will provide an image of 
the whole earth every 15 minutes, from 60° south to 60° 
north at 0.5-2.0 km spatial resolution, which is standard 
in modern state-of-the-art meteorology. However, the 
spatial resolution degrades above 60° due to the earth’s 
curvature, leaving the Polar Regions without coverage.33 
On polar orbiting satellites most Arctic-specific data is 
gathered as a secondary target as the prime targets are 
over populated areas.34  
29. See Euro-Argo: http://www.euro-argo.eu/. Accessed 13 February 2014.
30. See ICOS: http://www.icos-infrastructure.eu/. Accessed 13 February 2014.
31. See Eurofleets: http://www.eurofleets.eu/. Accessed 13 February 2014.
32. See SIOS: http://www.sios-svalbard.org/. Accessed 13 February 2014.
33. See Polar Communication and Weather Mission: http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/
eng/satellites/pcw/. Accessed 18 March 2014.
34. There are plans for Canadian and Russian satellites in highly elliptical or-
bits that would have a major impact on monitoring in the Arctic. Unfortunately 
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Both for decision-making in the next few years and for 
long-term guidance for Arctic adaptation and sustainable 
development, climate indicators should be identified 
and corresponding data obtained. The indicators should 
be derived for both recent monitoring and predicted 
futures. This is a clear goal in the Copernicus climate 
change service plans and should be a priority reflecting 
the strong nature of change in the Arctic. 
3.9.2 Highlighting the Arctic in 
International Co-operation and Acting via 
EU Energy Policy
The stakeholders agreed that the EU should promote a 
precautionary approach regarding Arctic climate change. 
The EU should work together with Arctic countries to 
address Arctic concerns within the UNFCCC process. 
In practical terms, the EU could call for the Arctic 
perspective to be taken up in the UNFCCC process by 
inviting information related to “dangerous climate 
change” thresholds in the region and highlight such 
information in the context of the ongoing 2013-2015 
review of the global long-term goal. 
The EU could reiterate its willingness, as an Arctic 
Council observer in principle, to “support the work of 
the Arctic Council, including through partnerships with 
member states and Permanent Participants bringing 
Arctic concerns to global decision making bodies” (in 
accordance to the Arctic Council Observer Manual).35 
Moreover, the EU should ensure that the outcomes 
of EU-funded Arctic research are fed into the UNFCCC 
process. In more ambitious terms, “Arctic interests” 
within the UNFCCC could be facilitated by the Arctic 
Council becoming an observer at the UNFCCC. If such a 
proposal comes from the Arctic states, the EU could play 
a supportive role.
The EU’s own actions need to accelerate progress to a 
competitive low-carbon future. This includes increasing 
support to alternative energy sources and showing 
leadership in technology innovation and uptake to 
make energy use more efficient. The Arctic could be the 
showcase for intelligent carbon neutral solutions that 
are not dependent on resource extraction. 
3.9.3 Support Regional and Local 
Adaptation
As the rate of warming in the Arctic is two to three times 
faster than the global average, the European Arctic 
is among the first parts of the EU where widespread 
neither the Canadian Polar Communication & Weather (PCW) mission nor the 
Russian ARKTIKA missions are close to launch, as their funding remains un-
certain. By 2030, a multilateral Joint Arctic Weather Satellite system could be 
envisaged. Such a system would provide near real-time weather and ice data 
for ensuring safe maritime transport and other human activities in the Arctic.
35. Arctic Council, Arctic Council Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, 
www.arctic-council.org. Accessed 10 March 2014.
climate change adaptation is needed. The EU should 
promote regional adaptation, including appropriate early 
planning and reliable risk analysis, in order to decrease 
the possible costs of adaptation.
National-level adaptation plans are common practice for 
EU member states, while regional and local plans are only 
starting to emerge. The EU should strengthen its efforts 
to build local capacities and facilitate local and regional 
strategic planning and actions. Local governance levels 
face challenges in applying current climate change data. 
Current prediction information is generally too broad in 
terms of spatial and temporal resolution. Downscaling 
and extracting target data should be improved. Many 
elements of adaptive actions need expert guidance for 
reaching optimal efficiency. Tracking local adaptation 
plans would be useful to the EU both for ensuring that 
decisions are based on knowledge and for identifying 
information gaps. Analysis of the first adaptation 
activities should discover effective means for making 
efficient decisions. For example, the Arctic Council 
is currently implementing the Adaptation Actions in 
Changing Arctic project, which the EU could support. 
Scientific dialogue with local authorities, inhabitants and 
indigenous peoples is needed. Arctic adaptation-related 
education in schools and universities would lead to wider 
public dissemination of information. 
Flora and fauna are affected by ecosystem changes 
triggered by climate change. This requires effective 
EU policy responses, including the need to adjust 
conservation policies to the paradigm of “habitats in 
change” and to support the monitoring and reporting of 
species on a more frequent and detailed basis.
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(1) Fram Centre, Norway
(2) Ecorys, the Netherlands
(3) Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland
(4) LATMOS, Pierre Simon Laplace Institute, France
(5) Université Pierre et Marie Curie, France
Key Messages:
•	 Shipping in the Arctic is increasing, mostly due to destinational traffic linked to extraction 
of resources. This is expected to be the major factor for future traffic growth. 
•	 Trans-Arctic shipping is emerging slowly. There are major constraints to its rapid 
expansion.
•	 Harsh natural conditions and serious lack of adequate infrastructure pose substantial 
risks. 
•	 Major environmental issues are accidental oil spills, introduction of alien species, 
emissions to air and disturbance to wildlife. 
•	 The EU may gain access to new resources, growing trade and economic benefits to ship 
owners and maritime industries.
•	 Measures must be taken before traffic builds up and as a prerequisite for harvesting the 
gains. 
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Improve the governance of Arctic shipping by supporting a Polar Code with high safety 
and environmental standards and additional measures to supplement it.
•	 Support the development of critical maritime infrastructure.
•	 Improve the knowledge needed for safer and environmentally responsible maritime 
activities.
* The authors would like to thank Stig Dalsøren, Anastasia Leonenko, Lawson Brigham and Marie-Theres von 
Schickfus – and stakeholders at the workshop in Tromsø – for contributing with their input, discussions and reviews.
“The Polar Code has no provisions related to Heavy Fuel Oil use or carriage 
regulation, mandatory ballast water or hull fouling requirements (concerning 
invasive species introduction) or black carbon restrictions. These are three of 
the most pressing and important matters concerning Arctic shipping, and 
the Code is severely wanting in all three areas.” 
Environmental NGO, US
“There is a lack of sufficient infrastructure on communication, navigation 
and search and rescue, among others.”
Respondent from the shipping industry, Norway
“The most significant policy issues are to develop uniform shipping regulation 
that will be applied equitably throughout the Arctic Ocean.”
Academic, US
“The Arctic is a common natural heritage area, not the property of an 
individual country. It is the responsibility of the EU to take an active role 
in ensuring its protection to secure the ecosystem services that the Arctic 
provides.”
Environmental NGO, Russia
Chapter cover image:  Polar sea icebreaker. Bottenviken, Norrbotten, Sweden.
Photo: GettyImages
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
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4.1 Introduction
 
The recent melting of the sea-ice and several highly 
publicised ship voyages in the Arctic have sparked 
greater interest in Arctic maritime transport. This chapter 
provides an overview of current traffic development, its 
drivers, impacts and relevance to the European Union.
 
4.2 Where Are the Ships   
Going?
There are two main sea routes in the Arctic Ocean today. 
The Northeast Passage (NEP) follows the coasts of 
Norway, Russia and Alaska. The major part of its Russian 
section is called the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The 
other traditional route is the Northwest Passage (NWP), 
which runs along the northern coast of North America. 
The Central Arctic Ocean Route in international waters 
is sparking interest as a future trans-Arctic transport 
corridor (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Arctic Maritime Transport Routes.
Source: G. Sander/A. Skoglund, Norwegian Polar Institute, 2014.
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Maritime transport along these routes can be: 
• Internal for shipping between ports in the Arctic 
region, or for transport activities in the ocean area 
such as cruise tourism, research and transport 
related to fisheries, offshore oil and gas, etc. 
• Destinational for all types of ships sailing to and from 
the Arctic.
• Trans-Arctic for traffic that uses the Arctic as a 
transport corridor between the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans. 
For the sake of simplicity, internal and destinational 
traffic are discussed jointly, with an emphasis on freight 
transport. 
Today the Northeast Passage/Northern Sea Route is the 
most attractive option due to the more favourable ice 
conditions and infrastructure available, including nuclear-
powered icebreakers. The Russian government has high 
ambitions for the NSR both as a means of developing its 
northern regions and as an international trade route. In 
the NWP, the narrow sounds are more frequently clogged 
by sea-ice, the infrastructure for shipping is scant and 
there is no clear political commitment to develop the 
route. This chapter therefore focuses on the NEP/NSR. 
4.3 What Changes Are 
Observed?
4.3.1 Growth in Both Destinational and 
Internal Traffic in the Arctic
The Northern Sea Route was developed as part of the 
Soviet industrialisation of Siberia and was closely linked 
to an internal transport system that included inland 
waterways and the Trans-Siberian railway. Shipping 
activity peaked in 1987 and declined sharply with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The route was opened 
for non-Russian flagged ships in 1991.
In recent years, the volume of cargo transported along 
the route has risen, though traffic has not reached the 
levels seen in the Soviet era (Figure 4.2). An emerging 
pattern is that Russian raw materials such as gas 
condensate and iron ore from the northwest are being 
exported eastwards directly to Asia. 
Activity in the Northwest Passage is mostly linked to 
services for remote communities and a few mining 
projects. Most of the growth in traffic is accounted for 
by non-commercial craft such as yachts and Canadian 
government ships, not freight vessels.
Figure 4.2: Total Annual Cargo Volumes on the Northern Sea Route. Data include intra, destinational and transit traffic. 
Source: NSR Information Centre, 2013.
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4.3.2 Trans-Arctic Shipping is Emerging 
The number of ships using the Northeast Passage as a 
transport corridor between Europe and Asia is on the 
upswing, though the numbers are still small (Table 4.1). 
In the Northwest Passage, the first bulk carrier transited 
the whole route in September 2013. Compared with the 
18 000-20 000 ships that pass through the Suez Canal 
each year, Arctic shipping today holds minor global 
significance. Yet, recent developments represent a major 
shift in the Arctic that signals future development and 
requires attention and action prior to the build-up of 
activities.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Transits of NSR 4 5 33 44 40
Transits of NEP 2 1 10 4 18
Transits of NWP 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.1: Number of Arctic Transit Voyages by Freight Car-
riers, 2009-2012. Note that the numbers for NEP transits are 
lower than for NSR since NEP is a longer voyage (Figure 2.1). 
Sources: Midgard M, et al. (2009 - 2011); NSR Information Centre 
(2012, 2013). Numbers of NSR transits are lower than in original 
source because destinational voyages have been excluded.
4.3.3 Uneven Regional Developments of 
Cruise Tourism
Worldwide, the number of passengers carried by cruise 
ships has grown about 7% per year since 1990, and 
continued growth is expected1.  However, the passenger 
volumes in the Arctic vary from region to region, with 
Svalbard and Greenland having the largest number of 
cruise tourists (Figure 4.3). Cruise ships have become 
larger; the biggest vessels in Svalbard can carry 3 300 
passengers. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
region is frequented by smaller expedition cruises using 
vessels carrying anywhere from five to 300 passengers. 
In Svalbard, this segment accounts for approximately 20 
– 25% of the total number of visitors. In Franz Josef Land 
and Canada, the cruise market is significantly smaller 
and dominated by the smaller vessels.
1. Cruise Market Watch website at www.cruisemarketwatch.com
Figure 4.3: Cruise Tourism in Some Arctic Areas by Number of Passengers 
Source: Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators based on data from the Governor in Svalbard, Visit Greenland, National Park Russian 
Arctic and NORREG
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4.4 What Is Shaping Change 
in Arctic Maritime Transport?
Commercial ship operations in the Arctic will expand if 
they are safe, reliable and profitable. This is influenced 
by a number of framing conditions and drivers, some of 
them general for all operations, some of them specific, 
as summarised in Figure 4.4.
4.4.1 Drivers for Destinational Shipping
The rich natural resources of the Arctic, particularly 
energy and minerals, are increasingly being seen as 
a new source for meeting growing global demand. 
Shipments are needed to deliver goods and equipment 
for exploration and production, and to export the 
products. 
Turmoil in some resource-producing regions such as 
the Middle East increases the relative attractiveness of 
the Arctic as a secure source region. On the other hand, 
the costs of exploiting Arctic resources are often higher 
than elsewhere. At least in the near term, this may leave 
Arctic resources largely unexploited (see other chapters). 
Though quantitative estimates of resource exploitation 
and their timing are uncertain, increased activity is 
expected, thereby leading to growth in destinational 
traffic. 
4.4.2 Shaping Elements Common for 
Destinational and Transit Shipping
Melting sea-ice
The extent of the summer sea-ice in the Arctic Ocean 
has decreased by about 40% on average since 1979, 
when satellite measurements started. The decrease in 
winter is only about 8% (Figure 4.5). Sea-ice has also 
become younger and thinner. There is large variation 
between years since the thinning makes the sea-ice 
more vulnerable to weather events. 
In light of the current global warming trend, the Arctic 
Ocean is likely to become nearly ice-free in summer. It is 
uncertain when this will happen. The IPCC has estimated 
before mid-century for a scenario of comparatively high 
greenhouse gas concentrations (RCP 8.5), but states 
Figure 4.4: Trends and Shaping Factors for Arctic Shipping
Destinational shipping
Demand for Arctic resources: 
Fish, timber, minerals, oil and 
gas.
Environmental
• Emissions to atmosphere
• Operational discharges
• Pollution from accidents
• Introduction of alien species
• Wildlife disturbance
Destinational + Transit
• Sea-ice
• Infrastructure deficit
• Ship technology
• Safety and environmental 
standards
Transit shipping
• World trade development
Ability to reduce transport 
costs:
• Alternatives: pipelines, rail, 
other sea routes
• Cost factors: Ship costs, 
bunker use, time, tariffs, etc.
• Predictability vs. “just in 
time”
• Seasonality of operations
Socioeconomic
For the Arctic
• Development of infrastructure
• Economic stimulation
• Job opportunities
• Demographic change
For the EU
• Access to new resources
• New trade routes
• New markets for ship owners 
and maritime industry
Policy Response
• Strategic responses: Arctic policies
• International negotiations: Polar Code etc.
• National Initiatives: Russia, EU and others
Drivers and conditions Impacts
Trends
Destinational and Arctic internal shipping is growing
Inter-continental transits are slowly starting
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that it is not possible to make such projections with 
confidence for other scenarios.2  
The large variations in sea-ice conditions between 
summer and winter, and between years, and the 
uncertainty in predicting sea-ice on all time scales, 
complicate the planning of shipping operations.
Reduction of summer sea-ice will expand the navigable 
area and extend the season. Both the Northwest Passage 
and the Central Arctic Ocean route could become 
navigable under summer conditions by mid-century, 
or even earlier (Figure 4.6). Winter sea-ice will remain, 
but will gradually be replaced by first-year ice, which is 
thinner and easier to penetrate for a reinforced ship hull 
than multi-year ice. The occurrence of winter ice and 
2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013). “Summary for Policy-
makers”, in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Stocker, T., Qin, 
D., Plattner, G., Tignor, M., Allen, S., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. 
and Midgley, P. (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United King-
dom and New York, NY, US.
drifting ice from glaciers in addition to icing from sea 
spray means that ships will need to always be prepared 
for ice, even in summer.
Overcoming the infrastructure deficit
There are severe shortcomings to the Arctic marine 
infrastructure. Hydrographic surveys are needed to 
improve nautical charts. Better navigational aids, 
communication systems, ship surveillance and reporting 
together with better meteorological and ice services are 
also needed to improve safety of navigation. Search and 
rescue services capable of serving huge areas must be 
developed. Protection of the environment requires oil-
spill combating equipment that works in ice-infested 
waters, designation of “places of refuge” and port 
reception facilities for ship waste. There is also a need to 
improve services along the routes for bunkering, repair 
and maintenance. A significant dilemma is who should 
finance the necessary infrastructure.
Figure 4.5: Average Monthly Arctic Sea-Ice Extent in September and March, 1979 – 2013
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Centre.
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The Russian government wants to upgrade the services 
along the NSR, which decayed after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. Investments are being made in ports, 
search and rescue centres have been designated and a 
programme for investments in new icebreakers has been 
approved. Changes have also been made to legislation, 
tariffs and application procedures for foreign ships.
Ship technology
Shipping technology for ice conditions has evolved, 
with advances in areas such as new propulsion systems, 
winterisation of equipment and workplaces, and concepts 
for oblique icebreakers. For example, the double-acting 
container vessel shown in picture 4.2 can traverse ice 
that is up to 1.5 m thick, and moves stern-first in ice and 
bow-first in open waters. Further technology advances 
are expected and may increase Arctic accessibility and 
safety margins. Investments in new ice-class vessels 
with modern technology are necessary to accommodate 
more Arctic maritime transport.
Availability of competent crew
Sailing in harsh Arctic waters puts the competence and 
endurance of marine crews to the test and increases 
the risks of fatigue, injuries and lower decision-making 
capacity. Today there is a shortage of qualified sailors. 
Special skills must be achieved through education and 
training and will be more formalised in new international 
standards. 
Interlinkages and competition with other 
modes of transport
Maritime freight transport competes with – and interacts 
with – other modes of transport. For transporting Arctic 
oil and gas, ships or pipelines are the main alternatives. 
However, railways, waterways and trunk pipelines are 
used internally in Russia for transport to the coast, 
where oil is loaded onto ships for export.3  Similar chains 
of transport ending up in ships are common in Arctic 
mining, whereas fish may be exported via ship, train, 
trucks or planes. 
3. Bambulyak, A. and Frantzen, B. (2011). Oil transport from the Russian part 
of the Barents Region. Status per January 2011. The Norwegian Barents Secre-
tariat and Akvaplan-niva, Norway.
Picture 4.1: Double-acting Cargo Vessel Used for Shuttle 
Transport between Murmansk and Dudinka
Photo: Aker Arctic.
Figure 4.6: Modelled Routes Physically Accessible for Ships Sailing in September Between the Bering Strait and St. Croix in Canada 
or Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Current conditions are on the left, mid-century conditions under a modest climate scenario (RCP 
4.5) on the right. Red routes are for moderately ice-strengthened ships, blue routes for ordinary vessels. The lines do not indicate 
traffic levels, just physical accessibility. 
Source: Smith and Stephenson, 2013.
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The Trans-Siberian Railway and a few other rail 
connections are alternatives to shipments between Asia 
and Europe, particularly from inland areas. Trains seem 
to offer faster connections for containers, but at higher 
costs, making railways an appealing alternative for high-
value commodities.4
4.4.3 Shaping Elements for Transit Shipping 
Volume and direction of global trade flows
Macroeconomic factors will shape the size and direction 
of trade flows globally and hence the demand for 
transport.
Reducing maritime transport costs
Cutting transport costs is a primary driver. The 
competitiveness of the Arctic routes is assessed against 
other modes of transport and other shipping routes, 
primarily the Suez Canal. Important factors include:
• Size and draft restrictions: Larger ships reduce 
costs per unit of cargo transported. Today’s Arctic 
sea routes accommodate only limited ship sizes as 
they follow the shallow continental shelf and must 
pass through narrow straits. Reduced sea-ice will 
gradually allow greater access to deep-water routes 
(ref. Figure 4.6).
• Combining multiple hubs and destinations en 
route: Operational patterns, particularly for 
container shipping, use hub ports and intermediate 
stops to load/unload and redistribute cargo. These 
are dispersed along the traditional sea routes. Since 
there are no such services in the Arctic, even a full-
year accessible Arctic route would face disadvantages 
compared to current shipping networks. 
• Predictability: Container ships in particular are part 
of integrated logistical chains where goods must 
arrive “just-in-time”. Variable sea-ice and weather 
conditions and navigational challenges pose risks of 
delays in the Arctic. This will limit the attractiveness 
of Arctic routes until more reliable services can be 
established. 
• Seasonality: Thus far, the Arctic sailing season is 
limited to late summer. This makes the route less 
attractive for ships operating on fixed routes, as is the 
case with much of the container market, since they 
would have to change logistics twice a year as long as 
the Arctic winter is not navigable. Most ship owners 
so far have considered this an unattractive business 
proposition.5 Operations where route flexibility is 
4. Tavasszy, L., Minderhoud, M., Perrin, J. and Notteboom, T. (2011). A strate-
gic network choice model for global container flows: Specification estimation 
and application. Journal of Transport Geography, 19(6), 1163-1172.
5. Lasserre, F. and Pelletier, S. (2011). Polar super seaways? Maritime trans-
port in the Arctic: an analysis of ship owners’ intentions. Journal of Transport 
Geography 01/2011; 19(6):1465-1473.
an option, for example spot market transports, may 
be able to take advantage of the late summer Arctic 
routes.
• Distance and time: For transits between ports in 
northern Asia and northern Europe, the distances 
through the Arctic are shorter than via the Suez 
Canal; further south, the Suez route is shorter (Figure 
4.7). Nonetheless, speed is reduced when sailing in 
ice, so savings in distance may not deliver the same 
time savings. Sailing times in the Arctic also depend 
on weather conditions, regulatory approvals and 
waiting times for convoys or icebreakers. 
• Fuel consumption: Sailing shorter distances saves 
fuel. Breaking ice, however, requires extra energy. So 
does moving a heavy, ice-reinforced vessel with a hull 
and propulsion system optimised for ice when sailing 
in open water. This is a disadvantage, particularly 
for Polar class vessels, whereas the design of 
ships with a lower ice class strikes a compromise 
between ice and open water requirements. 
“Slow steaming” has become increasingly accepted 
as a way of reducing the energy costs of individual 
vessels, though not necessarily for a whole fleet. 
One implication is that delays in the Arctic may not 
pose the same disadvantage compared to the Suez 
route as under normal modes of sailing. 
• Costs of ice-classified vessels: Ice-classified ships 
are more expensive to build, particularly Polar class 
vessels. The extra fuel consumption also adds to the 
operational costs. Since vessels that are specialised 
for operations in heavy ice will not be competitive 
in worldwide trade, the outcome might be that they 
would only be in seasonal use unless combinations 
are found, such as operating in the Baltic in winter 
and the Arctic in summer. Suspending operations for 
a season adds negatively to the costs.
• Tariffs: Ships using the Northern Sea Route pay tariffs 
based on the use of services such as ice pilotage and 
icebreakers. Ship owners must also pay tariffs in the 
Suez and Panama Canals.
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4.5 Outlook to 2030 
Many Arctic voyages are still trial shipments to test the 
viability of new routes and destinations, types of ships 
and technology, and safety schemes. The Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment in 2009 projected that the main 
increase in maritime transport in the next decade would 
be destinational rather than trans-Arctic.6 This still seems 
to be a sound outlook. Within this broad picture, what 
types of shipping will grow and when, where and to 
what extent, will depend on the activities in different 
6. Arctic Council (2009). Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. 
Protection of Arctic Marine Environment working group, Akureyri.
industries: mining, offshore oil and gas, tourism and 
scientific research, among others (see outlooks in other 
chapters). 
Future Arctic transit traffic crucially depends on its 
attractiveness to container ships, which account for 
the largest share of global marine shipments. The few 
models used to project Arctic transits involve a high 
degree of uncertainty, but generally indicate that the 
number of ships will be rather modest. For example, 
DNV has estimated that the number of transit voyages 
with container ships will amount to 450 in 2030 and 850 
in 2050.7 
7. Det Norske Veritas (DNV), 2010: Shipping across the Arctic Ocean. A feasi-
Figure 4.7: Distance Savings for Voyages along the Northeast Passage Compared with the Suez Canal
Source: Arctic Portal, based on DNV GL.
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4.6 Impacts
4.6.1 Environment
Ship emissions affecting the environment and 
human health8
Ship emissions contain many gases and particles with 
multiple effects caused by their original components and 
subsequent chemical and physical reactions (Figure 4.8). 
Both nitrogen and sulphur components cause 
acidification that damages vegetation, freshwater 
fish and materials. Nitrogen also adds to the problem 
of excessive enrichment of nutrients in ecosystems, 
whereas surface ozone affects crop yields. These 
gases and soot (black carbon) have negative effects on 
health, too. Several estimates have demonstrated that 
ship emissions significantly contribute to diseases and 
increased mortality globally.9
ble option in 2030 - 2050 as a result of global warming? Research and Innova-
tion, Position Paper 04 – 2010, DNV, Oslo.
8. Buhaug, Ø., Corbett, J., Endresen, Ø., Eyring, V., Faber, J., Hanayama, 
S., Lee, D., Lee, D., Lindstad, H., Markowska, A.., Mjelde, A., Nelissen, D., 
Nilsen, J., Pålsson, C., Winebrake, J., Wu, W. and Yoshida, K. (2009). Second 
IMO GHG Study 2009, International Maritime Organization, London, April 
2009.
9. Corbett, J., Winebrake, J., Green, E., Kasibhatla, P., Eyring, V. and Lauer, 
A. (2007). Mortality from Ship Emissions: A Global Assessment. Environ. Sci. 
Technol., 41, pp. 8512–8518.
Ship emissions and climate change
Carbon dioxide (CO
2
), nitrous oxides (NOx) and methane 
(CH
4
) are greenhouse gases that result from ship 
emissions and contribute to global warming. Soot has a 
warming effect both in the atmosphere and when it is 
deposited onto white snow and ice surfaces. On the other 
hand, other shipping emissions have a cooling effect 
(e.g. sulphur dioxide that forms aerosols). The net global 
effect of shipping emissions has been shown to be an 
initial cooling on timescales of decades to centuries and 
thereafter a warming due to accumulation of long-lived 
greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide.10 Calculating 
the net climate effect of growth in Arctic shipping is not 
easy and depends on the scenarios envisaged, the time 
horizon and location of emissions. However, emissions 
of short-lived climate pollutants in the Arctic have a 
stronger effect than at more southern latitudes, meaning 
that the warming effect of moving traffic may increase 
despite the shorter routes.11
10. Eide, M., Dalsøren, S., Endresen, Ø., Samset, B., Myhre, G., Fuglestvedt, J. 
and Berntsen, T. (2013). “Reducing CO2 from shipping – do non-CO2 effects 
matter?”, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 13, 4183-4201.
11. Ødemark, K. et al. (2012). Short-lived climate forcers from current ship-
ping and petroleum activities in the Arctic. Atmos. Chem. Phys. 12, 1979-1993; 
Dalsøren, S. B., Samset, B. H., Myhre, G., Corbett, J. J., Minjares, R., Lack, D. 
and Fuglestvedt, J. S. (2013). Environmental impacts of shipping in 2030 with 
a particular focus on the Arctic region, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 13, 1941-1955.
Figure 4.8: Shipping Emissions and Climate Change
Source: Second IMO GHG Study.8
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
le
va
nc
e 
&
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
Engine fuel 
combustion
Direct 
emissions
Atmospheric 
processes
Climate change
Changes in 
radiative forcing 
components
Impacts
Damages
CO
2
ΔCO
2
ΔO
3
ΔCH
4
ΔAerosol
Δclouds
Shipping Emissions and Climate Change
ship 
tracks
Changes in temperatures, sea level, ice/snow 
cover, precipitation etc.
Agriculture and forestry, ecosystems, energy production and 
consumption, human health, social effects etc.
Social welfare and costs
NO
x
SO
x
Combustion Products 
CO
2
+H
2
0+N
2
+O
2
+NO
x 
+CO+HC+soot+SO
x
Soot
Ocean 
uptake
Chemical 
reactions Microphysical processes
Organics
4
.
- 46 -
Operational discharges
The Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) restricts emissions from ships. Nevertheless, 
oil residues, garbage, sewage and cargo may be legally 
discharged when diluted and away from shore.
Pollution from accidents
Common pollution resulting from an accident is the 
discharge of bunker oil. Tankers loaded with petroleum 
products may cause much larger discharges, whereas 
other toxic goods on board may also pollute. Cleaning up 
oil spills in ice-covered waters is even less effective than 
in open waters. 
Introduced alien species
Ships are the most common vector for introducing alien 
marine species to other ecosystems, not only from 
ballast water tanks and hulls, but also from the cargo. 
Alien species may alter marine ecosystems and cause 
economic losses. Transports from the relatively species-
rich Pacific to the Atlantic along the same latitudes and 
hence temperature gradients may pose a particular risk. 
Warming of the Arctic Ocean reduces the temperature 
barriers that have prevented species survival en route.12  
Wildlife
Noise, collisions and the mere presence of humans 
may disturb Arctic wildlife, e.g. birds and whales at 
chokepoints and in sensitive areas.
4.6.2 Economic and Social Impacts in the 
Arctic
• Upgrading of existing ports and construction of new 
ones will stimulate economic activity, but entail 
substantial costs. Public investments in maritime 
transport infrastructure, and search and rescue 
capabilities will require long-term government 
commitments even if done in partnership with the 
private sector.
• Increased demand for supply services for ships 
like bunkering and repairs. This will favour service 
operators currently active in the region, whereas 
others may enter the Arctic market.
• Increased accessibility and lower transport costs 
could increase goods availability and decrease prices 
in remote settlements. This would directly benefit 
local communities and raise welfare levels.
• Improved transport could also lower the costs of 
export and import, thereby facilitating more trade 
with other (non-Arctic) partners. Manufacturing 
centres in the region might see an improvement in 
their competitive position if transport costs were 
lower.
12. Ware, C., Kirkpatrick, J., Sundet, J., Jelmert, A., Berge, J., Coutts, A., Flo-
erl, O., Pellissier, L., Wisz, M. and Alsos, I. (2014). “Climate change, non-in-
digenous species and shipping: assessing the risk of species introduction to a 
high-Arctic archipelago”. Diversity and Distributions, 20, 10-19.
• Whether or not Arctic regions will benefit from 
employment growth depends on the type of 
demand/skills needed and the available skill base. 
As the current Arctic population is small, the specific 
skills needed may not be present. Importing skilled 
labour from elsewhere (short term) or raising 
education levels/tailoring skills to the new needs 
(long term) would be necessary.
• More economic and social opportunities in Arctic 
port communities could stimulate migration from 
rural areas, causing shifts in local economies. This 
may have negative impacts both on the rural side 
(reduced population, possibly below levels that 
allow sustainable maintenance of public services like 
schools and healthcare) and in urban areas (lack of 
housing facilities, pressures on local infrastructure).
• The fact that the Arctic sea routes will remain 
seasonal for some time may mean that impacts are 
seasonal. This poses issues about seasonal labour 
migration and off-season economic activities.
4.7 Governance 
The United Nations Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention 
provides a fundamental framework for the governance 
of navigation, also in the Arctic.13 A coastal state has 
full rights to set the conditions for ships in its ports and 
internal waters, but has less authority in its territorial sea 
where ships enjoy the right to innocent passage (Figure 
4.9). In the exclusive economic zones (EEZ), navigation 
can mostly take place under the principle of freedom of 
navigation, as on the high seas. Under this sailing regime, 
the main rule is that only the flag state has authority over 
a vessel, with the duty to enforce customary laws and all 
international conventions to which it is a party. 
When the EEZ is ice-covered, Article 234 of the LOS 
Convention makes an exception to this general division 
of responsibilities. Then coastal states have the right 
to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of 
marine pollution. Canada and Russia have developed the 
most comprehensive regulations based on this article 
and their drawing of baselines whereby parts of their 
maritime areas are designated as internal waters.14 Until 
ships can sail on the high seas along the Central Arctic 
Route (Figure 4.7), Canadian and Russian rules to a large 
degree set the standards for ships operating in the high 
Arctic.
13. See e.g. VanderZwaag, D. et al. (2008). Governance of Arctic Marine 
Shipping, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University, and 
Molenaar, E. 2009: “Arctic marine shipping: Overview of the international le-
gal framework, gaps and options”, Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, 18 
289-325.
14. See Brubaker, D. (2001). Straits in the Russian Arctic, Ocean Develop-
ment and International Law, 32:263-287, Kraska, J. (2007). The Law of the Sea 
Convention and the Northwest Passage, International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, Vol 22, No 2, 257 – 282 and VanderZwaag, D. et al. (2008) op.cit.
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The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the 
specialised United Nations agency responsible for 
important regulations related to maritime safety and 
environmentally sound and efficient shipping. The 
MARPOL Convention and the Convention on the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) are prominent results of its work. 
The IMO has been proactive in developing voluntary 
guidelines, initially for ships operating in Arctic waters, 
later adjusted for ships in polar waters (Arctic and 
Antarctica). These will be replaced by a mandatory Polar 
Code that is being negotiated in the IMO and is expected 
to enter into force in 2016. The goal is to provide for safe 
ship operation and prevention of pollution from ships by 
addressing risks in polar waters that are not adequately 
mitigated by other IMO instruments.  
For the global shipping industry, the preferred option is 
to have uniform Arctic standards. This could be achieved 
through the Polar Code, but also by means of a harmonised 
set of national standards from the Arctic coastal states. 
Uniform regulations can also be strengthened by adding 
to current relevant port state agreements – the Paris and 
Tokyo Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) – or creating 
a new one for the Arctic region.15
The Arctic Council influences Arctic shipping through 
assessments such as the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment with follow-up activities and non-
binding guidance for its member states.16 Moreover, 
under the auspices of the Arctic Council, eight Arctic 
15. Molenaar, E. (2007). Port state jurisdiction: Towards comprehensive, man-
datory and global coverage. Ocean Development and International Law, 38, 
225-257.
16. Arctic Council (2009). Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. 
PAME working group, Akureyri, Iceland, April 2009.
states negotiated the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.
4.8 How Changes in Arctic 
Maritime Transport May 
Affect the European Union
Changes in Arctic maritime transport may affect the 
economic, political and environmental interests of the 
European Union (EU). Their implications and magnitude 
will depend on the pace and extent of the changes and 
may differ for destinational and transit shipping. Some 
potential effects are:
• Access to trade routes.
• Access to new sources of energy and other natural 
resources at relatively close distances from politically 
stable countries, serving to enhance security of 
supply in line with EU policies regarding raw materials 
and energy security.
• Potential cost savings related to shorter shipping 
routes, contributing to lower logistics costs for the 
European economy.
• Greater demand for ice-class ships, icebreakers 
and related technology. This is a market in which 
the EU already has a significant position, primarily 
companies and shipyards in Finland. Estimates of the 
Figure 4.9: Maritime Zones. The right to regulate navigation of ships varies between the maritime zones, as defined in the UN Law 
of the Sea Convention.
Source: Norwegian Polar Institute.
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annual potential for this market amount to EUR 500 
million.17
• European ship owners who want to operate in the 
Arctic may be expected to have a share of the market 
to be served as well as substantial shares of the 
required investments in ice-strengthened vessels.
• Within Europe, the availability of a trans-Arctic 
shipping route may affect competition between 
ports. 
4.9 How the European Union 
Influences Arctic Maritime 
Transport 
4.9.1 European Union International 
Activities
Competence in maritime transport is shared by the EU 
and its member states. Member states cannot act in a 
manner that is detrimental to EU competence or interests, 
or adversely affect the effective implementation of 
EU policies. In areas where the EU internally regulates 
maritime transport, the EU also acquires external 
competence. This means that member states cannot act 
internationally without taking into account established 
EU policies and common positions. 
This is relevant for instance in the IMO, where the EU 
is not a member, but its member states are. Due to 
extensive EU regulations on shipping-related issues, the 
European Commission and the European Maritime Safety 
Agency co-ordinate with the member states in the IMO 
committees, for example with regard to the Polar Code. 
As the co-ordination involves 28 out of 170 members of 
the IMO and represents considerable tonnage, the EU 
has significant influence. It is thus a potentially strong 
mechanism for EU influence to co-ordinate positions in 
the IMO and other international organisations that can 
set conditions relevant for Arctic shipping. The EU clearly 
supports the development of a strong mandatory code, 
but attempts to balance the interests of ship operators 
with concerns for the environment and safety.18
Within the Arctic Council, the EU has been active 
in the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
(PAME) Working Group, contributing substantial input 
to a number of topics particularly from the European 
Commission’s DG Mobility and Transport. The European 
Maritime Safety Agency and PAME are currently 
exploring possible areas of co-operation. 
17. Ecorys (2012). Green Growth Opportunities in the EU Shipbuilding Sector. 
Final Report. Commissioned by the European Commission, DG Enterprise and 
Industry,  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sec tors/maritime/files/green_growth_
shipbuildingfinal_report_en.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2014.
18. See e.g. answer to the Member of European Parliament question (17 
June 2010), Kallas on behalf of the Commission. E-2863/2010, OJ C 138 
E, 07/05/2011, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?refer-
ence=E-2010-2863&language=EN. Accessed 20 February 2014.
The EU has also developed an Integrated Maritime Policy 
that includes the Arctic Ocean. It is one of the sea basins 
for which a separate policy is to be developed.
4.9.2 EU Regulations Affecting Flag State 
and Port State Measures 
Many ships traversing Arctic sea lanes are either owned 
by companies based in Europe or have European ports 
of departure or destination. The EU member states 
therefore can influence Arctic shipping via requirements 
on vessels flying their flags and through port state 
control. The European Union affects this when setting 
common standards that the member states must follow. 
The EU has developed a comprehensive regulatory 
framework regarding shipping safety and environmental 
standards, in particular in the aftermath of major 
accidents.19 Relevant EU regulations include maritime 
safety and pollution prevention, ship inspection, 
improved flag state performance, liability of carriers and 
training of seafarers. Selected examples that may be 
relevant for the Arctic are:
• The directive on vessel traffic monitoring and 
information system20 is one of few EU regulations 
referring directly to sea-ice. Member states are 
required to provide information on ice conditions, 
recommend routes and icebreaking services, and 
request certification documents commensurate with 
the ice conditions.
• The directive on sulphur in marine fuels limits 
the maximum content according to MARPOL 
requirements.21 Additional legislation affects 
maritime emissions that contribute to acidification, 
eutrophication and the formation of ground-level 
ozone.22
• The EU framework for port state control is mainly the 
2009 directive, which builds on the Paris MoU.23  The 
Paris MoU includes a new inspection regime for all 
ships calling at MoU ports seen as a whole instead of 
the previous goal of controlling 25% of ships calling 
at the ports of an individual state. The European 
Maritime Safety Agency hosts an information system 
for selecting which ships should be inspected in 
Europe.24   
19. See: DG Transport, www.ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/safety/
third_maritime_safety_package_en.htm. Accessed 24 February 2014.
20. Directive 2002/59/EC, 27 June 2002 establishing a Community vessel 
traffic monitoring and information system, amended by Directive 2009/17/EC.
21. Directive 2012/33/EU, 21 November 2012 amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC regarding sulphur content of marine fuels.
22. Directive 2001/81/EC, 23 October 2001 on national emission ceilings for 
certain atmospheric pollutants, Official Journal L 309, 27.11.2001. The direc-
tive had required the Commission to prepare reports, inter alia, on ship emis-
sions.
23. Directive 2009/16/EC of 23 April 2009 on port state control.
24. THETIS, a new targeting system for selecting ships for inspections set up 
by European Commission regulation. See also http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
modes/maritime/safety/actions_en.htm. Accessed 25 February 2014.
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4.9.3 Supporting Improved Infrastructure 
and Services for Arctic Maritime Transport
EU policy documents express interest in supporting 
Arctic-relevant maritime infrastructure. For instance, 
the Galileo satellite system, whose first services are 
expected to be introduced in 2014, will increase the 
accuracy of satellite-based positioning in the Arctic, 
thereby making Arctic navigation safer. Galileo also has 
a dedicated search and rescue function that will locate 
ships in distress more efficiently. 
The Copernicus earth observation programme is soon 
to enter the operational phase.25 This will increase 
observation capabilities in the Arctic and could provide 
a wide array of improved services like more accurate 
meteorological data, better ice forecasts, detection of oil 
spills and increased understanding of many climatic and 
environmental issues. 
Surveillance is useful in tracking ships and has multiple 
applications in preventing collisions and monitoring 
whether ships discharge oil or engage in illegal fishing, 
for example. The EU has developed SafeSeaNet and 
CleanSeaNet26 and given practical support to IMO 
25. Copernicus website at http://www.copernicus.eu/. COPERNICUS was for-
merly known as Global Monitoring for Environment and Security. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-257_en.htm. Accessed 25 Febru-
ary 2014.
26. See http://emsa.europa.eu/operations/cleanseanet.html and http://emsa.
initiatives such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
and Long-Range Identification and Tracking. Satellite-
based AIS is necessary for the Arctic marine areas where 
terrestrial AIS cannot cover vast ocean areas.27
4.9.4 Research 
EU-funded research projects inter alia help to support the 
safety and environmental performance of Arctic shipping 
and improve the understanding of its driving forces and 
implications. Annex 2 contains several relevant examples 
of projects.
4.9.5 Indirect Effects of EU Regulations and 
Policies
The EU can have indirect effects on the volume and 
pattern of maritime transport in Arctic waters via other 
policies and actions. Examples include general transport 
policies, engagement in Arctic resource development 
and trade or consumer-related actions that affect the 
demand for Arctic resources. 
europa.eu/operations/safeseanet.html.
27. Polar View (2012). The contribution of space technologies to Arctic policy 
priorities. Report for the European Space Agency.
Picture 4.2: Vladimir Tikhonov (160 000 DW tons) is the largest vessel so far to transverse the NSR. It established a new sea lane 
outside the New Siberian Islands in 2011.
Photo: Maritime Executive.
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4.10 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-making
Stakeholders were asked during consultations about the 
most important factors for EU policy- making related to 
Arctic maritime transport. The responses show strong 
interest in issues that can be clustered into three areas 
that constitute key challenges. 
4.10.1 Minimising Risks in Arctic Shipping
The Arctic is a frontier region for shipping. Sea-ice 
and environmental conditions such as polar lows, 
temperatures and darkness are challenging. There 
is scant infrastructure to service maritime transport. 
Vast areas must be covered by search and rescue 
capacities and preparedness to cope with accidents and 
incidents. Seafarers with sufficient training are scarce. 
Discharges of oil and the introduction of alien species 
are environmental risks of particular concern. These 
additional risks must be overcome for Arctic shipping to 
become safe and secure.
4.10.2 Insufficient Governance System 
The governance of Arctic shipping should be improved. 
There is a clear recommendation from stakeholders to 
focus on international regulations, highlighting the Polar 
Code in particular. Concerns have been expressed about 
whether its standards will be sufficient to safeguard the 
Arctic and whether the full suite of environmental issues 
will be addressed. Another concern was the need to 
ensure uniform regulations and harmonised standards 
(“level playing field”). 
4.10.3 Need for Supporting Research, Data 
Collection and Technology Improvements
Stakeholders emphasised many outstanding science 
questions that need to be addressed to underpin safe and 
efficient shipping and better governance. The key topics 
they identified are better mapping and understanding 
of environmental conditions, better predictions of ice 
and weather conditions, better knowledge about the 
impacts of Arctic shipping and how to address them, and 
technological developments to boost safety and reduce 
the environmental footprint of ships. 
4.11 Recommendations
The following recommendations are built on analyses 
carried out by the report authors, taking input from 
stakeholders as a starting point. Though structured 
under three headings, there are overlaps and inter-
linkages. It is emphasised that measures to improve 
the regulation of Arctic shipping and develop maritime 
infrastructure must be taken before the traffic increases 
to levels that may pose unacceptable risks to safety and 
the environment. That is also a prerequisite for taking 
advantage of the economic gains that Arctic shipping 
may bring. 
4.11.1 EU Contribution to Good Maritime 
Governance
The EU could use its influence in the IMO to show 
leadership in Arctic maritime transport. The Polar Code 
is by far the most important current process. The EU 
should develop unified positions to support high safety 
standards and effective measures against pollution. 
The EU should also address issues that are not taken care 
of adequately in the Polar Code:
• Invasive species are an increasing risk to Arctic 
ecosystems as traffic grows and the Arctic Ocean 
becomes warmer. The global Ballast Water 
Convention needs additional ratifications to enter 
into force. The EU should urge all its member states 
to become parties and to implement it.28 Urgent 
28. See IMO status of ratifications, http://www.imo.org/About/Con ventions/
Picture 4.3: Icing of Vessels Due to Sea Spray is a Serious 
Challenge. 
Photo: William Mowitt, NOAA.
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action is also needed on measures to prevent the 
introduction of invasive species via ship hulls.29 
Another option is to support regional measures in the 
Arctic, by means of either the early implementation 
of the convention in a similar way as for European 
seas or co-ordinated measures based on port and 
coastal state jurisdiction.30 
• The IMO addresses emissions from ships to air as 
a global issue through MARPOL annex VI, partly 
motivated by its Arctic impacts. However, the Arctic 
states and the EU should also consider a regional 
approach by establishing an IMO Emission Control 
Area within the Arctic Ocean. Research so far 
indicates that short-lived climate forcers emitted in 
the Arctic atmosphere have a stronger impact than 
elsewhere, which could justify a regional approach.
• Measures pertaining to heavy fuel oil are currently 
discussed in PAME in the Arctic Council. The EU 
should follow these discussions and be active in 
finding solutions that could reduce this risk to the 
marine environment.
The Polar Code and other IMO instruments will be 
important for ensuring a level playing field for all 
operators. The EU should also support recommendations 
from the Arctic Council with a view to harmonising Arctic 
coastal state regulations.31 This will be an emerging issue 
when the Polar Code is adopted and its standards can be 
compared to the existing coastal state regulations. The 
EU could also strengthen joint Arctic regulations, both 
by IMO and the Arctic coastal states, by supporting their 
inclusion in the Paris MoU. 
The EU and the Arctic Council share the goal of basing 
their ocean policies on ecosystem-based management. 
Themes for collaboration could include exchange of 
experience in this field and marine spatial planning 
including marine protected areas. Designation of 
ecologically sensitive sea areas and marine protected 
areas for the Arctic are also brought up in OSPAR and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, where the EU could 
support relevant developments. 
Stakeholders also highlighted the need for fostering 
effective cross-border co-operation on Arctic maritime 
transport, particularly stepping up collaboration with 
Russia and Nordic countries.
StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx. Accessed March 2014.
29. Ref IMO 2011: 2011 Guidelines for the control and management of 
ships’ biofouling to minimize the transfer of aquatic species. Resolution ME-
PC.207(62),http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=30766. 
Accessed March 2014
30. See: “Joint Notice to Shipping from the Contracting Parties of the Barcelo-
na Convention, OSPAR and HELCOM on: General Guidance on the Voluntary 
Interim Application of the D1 Ballast Water Exchange Standard by Vessels 
Operating between the Mediterranean Sea and the North-East Atlantic and/or 
the Baltic Sea. (Agreement 2012-04)”. Such regional arrangements are encour-
aged by the Ballast Water Convention. However, these guidelines are volun-
tary, which seems to have limited their application.
31. Recommendation I C in Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (ibid).
4.11.2 Minimising Risks by Developing 
Improved Maritime Infrastructure
Ship accidents in the Arctic may have severe 
consequences for humans, ships and the fragile 
environment. Prevention of accidents and incidents 
therefore should have the highest priority. At the same 
time, response capabilities for search and rescue and oil 
spills must be improved. However, such systems cannot 
be realistically expected to deliver the same level of 
protection as in more densely trafficked seas. A ship’s 
readiness in the Arctic will therefore depend largely 
on its own resources; ship operators must carefully 
assess the risks of operations and select the equipment 
and procedures necessary for avoiding problems and 
handling them on their own if they should occur. Large 
cruise ships are probably the most prominent example.   
Reducing risks will require better maritime infrastructure. 
The Arctic coastal states are responsible for 
improvements in their ports and many services in their 
waters. They have also taken on major responsibilities for 
search and rescue operations in the whole Arctic marine 
area, including the high seas.32 This responsibility entails 
a high financial burden. The European Commission 
has signalled its willingness to collaborate with the 
Arctic countries in this respect.33 Possible mechanisms 
include bilateral collaboration, partnership agreements 
with Greenland and the Northern Dimension. Such EU 
contributions to improved infrastructure and services 
gained strong support from stakeholders involved in the 
SADA dialogue. 
There will be a need for international collaboration on 
much of the maritime infrastructure. It is suggested that 
the EU and its member states may contribute with: 
• The Galileo and Copernicus programmes: The 
challenge for the EU is to develop better services for 
32. The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement divides the responsibility be-
tween six coastal states.
33. EU (2012). Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Re-
gion.
Picture 4.4: High class cruise tourism, Magdalenefjord, Spitz-
bergen, Svalbard.
Photo: Peter Prokosh, GRID-Arendal, 2012.
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the maritime community based on these satellite 
platforms and find ways of sharing the information 
with other systems. 
• A common monitoring system for ships in the Arctic 
providing an overview of ships and cargo transport 
en route would improve safety. SafeSeaNet could be 
one model for such collaboration. 
• Supporting wider operational networks of 
meteorological and oceanographic observations and 
communication of weather, ice and wave forecasts. 
• Supporting the coastal states in their hydrographic 
mapping by using merchant vessels as observational 
platforms. Ships can also collect and share data on 
meteorology and ice, for instance. 
• Supporting targeted technology innovation to 
advance ship design and operation to improve 
efficiency and safety, and to reduce emissions.
• Supporting training on Arctic conditions for seafarers 
within the EU.
• Working with industry to disseminate best practices 
in Arctic marine shipping and transport. 
• Pooling of resources for search and rescue and oil spill 
prevention with European states and agreements 
in areas bordering the Arctic. CleanSeaNet is an 
example of a European system that could be used as 
a model.
4.11.3 Better Knowledge Through 
Research, Monitoring and Assessment
The EU and its member states have long-standing 
engagement in Arctic research. There is a need for a 
better understanding of the region’s environmental 
conditions: 
• Observational data should be shared in the scientific 
community and be made easily available for ships. 
The EU countries have practical solutions that 
could be useful for Arctic collaboration.34 Research 
is needed to advance predictive capabilities and 
develop forecasting services. 
• EU mapping and research could also contribute to 
identifying valuable and vulnerable areas as a basis 
for establishing marine protected areas. 
• Improve knowledge about the Arctic-specific 
environ¬mental impacts of shipping and what may 
be done to address them efficiently. Steps should be 
taken to determine which species are actually being 
carried by ships and how they survive en route. This 
information should then be used in risk assessments, 
supplemented by targeted baseline inventorying. 
Better technologies for cleaning hulls and ballast 
water under low temperatures are also needed. 
Impacts of ship emissions on the Arctic atmosphere 
need more attention. There is also a need to 
improve knowledge of the Arctic-specific impacts of 
discharges of oil and other harmful substances, and 
improvements in abatement technologies.  
34. One example is the European Environment Information and Observation 
Network (EIONET) of the European Environment Agency, https://www.eionet.
europa.eu/
Maksim Gorkij Accident in 1989
The cruise ship Maksim Gorkij hit an ice floe SW of Svalbard in perfect weather 19 June 1989 and sprang a leak. 
A Norwegian coast guard vessel happened to be just 4 hours away. When arriving, almost 400 passengers had 
been evacuated, some of them waiting for rescue on ice floes. Due to a series of fortunate circumstances, all 954 
passengers, the crew and the ship were salvaged.
Picture 4.5: Sinking Maksim Gorkij, 1989. 
Photo: Scanpix, STT Lehtikuva.
Picture 4.6: Maskim Gorkij passengers waiting for the 
rescue on an ice floe. 
Photo: Odd Mydland.
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There are also needs for many technological 
developments. Stakeholders have suggested working 
with states and the maritime industry towards achieving 
zero-waste and zero-emissions targets. Shipping 
technologies could be improved on issues like hull 
design, energy efficiency, new fuels and winterisation. 
Ships should be supported with better systems for 
communication under high Arctic conditions, tracking 
and assistance in voyage planning. 
Stakeholders agreed that there is a need to follow the 
drivers behind Arctic shipping, such as developments 
in extractive industries and competition with other sea 
routes. While this could be a task for strategic collection 
of information, it also involves research questions of 
understanding the importance of different drivers and 
using this information to predict future developments in 
Arctic marine transport.
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Key Messages:
•	 Fisheries continue to be a key industry across the Arctic. They are based on relatively 
few fish species located in rich marine ecosystems in the low and sub-Arctic and 
characterised by major fluctuations.  
•	 Aquaculture production is growing fast and becoming a crucial part of the economy in 
many Northern communities.
•	 Climate change increases the uncertainties faced by Arctic fisheries. Adjusting to 
possible changes in the migration patterns of stocks poses a major challenge. 
•	 Arctic countries have well-established resource management regimes, including 
production of knowledge required for management.
•	 The Central Arctic Ocean is only partly covered by regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs). Arctic coastal states are considering the establishment of 
RFMOs, even though future fisheries in the area seem unlikely.
•	 The EU influences Arctic fisheries and aquaculture as a significant consumer and 
important participant in international and regional regulatory frameworks. 
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Improve management, co-operation and research.
•	 Continue to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fisheries.
•	 Reduce fishing capacity.
•	 Secure inflow of Arctic seafood into EU markets.
* The authors would like to thank stakeholders who participated in the consultations and key contributors, 
particularly Arne Eide (UiT), Øystein Hermansen (Nofima), John Isaksen (Nofima) and Timo Koivurova (Arctic 
Centre, University of Lapland).
Chapter cover image: Fish drying outside of the house in Norway.
Photo: GettyImages
“Important fish stocks currently harvested and regulated might change their 
distribution to cover areas outside current regulatory areas due to warming 
and more hospitable conditions further north. This can lead to challenges 
to continued good fisheries management involving such stocks. Clearly, 
disagreement on management between parties and the threat of IUU 
activities are of concern.” 
Representative of large-scale commercial fisheries, Iceland
“Preventing new or speculative fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean is in 
the interest of Arctic and non-Arctic states interested in co-operation. A 
new international Arctic fisheries agreement would prevent unregulated 
commercial fisheries, simplify enforcement, and allow time for scientific 
research to establish what is there and how the ecosystem is changing.”
Charitable Trust, US
“A well-managed fishery (fishing in line with scientific advice, no discards 
and minimum illegal landings) should be able to respond to changing 
environmental conditions, reducing or increasing catch as the conditions 
dictate. A poorly managed fishery (fishing above scientific advice through 
high quotas, unrestricted discarding or black landings) combined with 
environmental pressures could be disastrous ... support in research and 
restricting markets for illegal fish would be most helpful ...”
Representative of a state agency, Norway
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
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5.1 Introduction
Fisheries and aquaculture make crucial contributions 
to the world’s well-being and prosperity. In addition 
to serving as an important food source, the fisheries 
sector provides livelihoods and income, both directly 
and indirectly. According to the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), fish and fishery products are among 
the most traded food commodities worldwide. While 
the production of capture fisheries remains stable, 
aquaculture production is expanding.1 Arctic fisheries 
represent more than 10% of the global marine fish 
catch by weight and 5.3% of the crustacean catch.2 In 
the North Atlantic, Arctic fisheries represent about 4% 
of the global catch.3  The marine Arctic, as defined by 
the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) and the 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), extends 
south of the Faroe Islands, and includes all of Hudson 
Bay and Alaska.4 
5.2 Arctic Fisheries Sector
Fisheries have been and still are a key industry and 
employer across the Arctic. In fact, the economies of 
some communities and countries are almost wholly 
reliant on the sector.5 For instance, fisheries and related 
activities are the single most important component of the 
economy in Iceland, accounting for 27% of GDP in 2011.6 
In Norway, fish and fish farming accounted for 0.7% of 
GDP in 2010 with production of about 3.5 million tonnes 
of seafood, of which 25% was from aquaculture. The 
regional impact is significant as the majority of fisheries 
are located in northern Norway. On a regional basis, 
the fisheries sector around the Barents Sea is estimated 
to contribute about 8% of GDP in the Murmansk area 
and 0.3% in Russia. Fisheries generated more than 90% 
of export earnings in Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 
around 40% in Iceland and about 6% in Norway in 2010. 
In Canada, Russia and the United States, countries with 
larger and more diversified economies, fish account for 
less than 1% of export earnings. That said, the sector is 
an important source of employment and food in many 
rural communities in northern Canada, Arctic Russia and 
Alaska.7 
1. FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012.
2. Christiansen and Reist, “Fishes.” in Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. Status 
and Trends in Arctic Biodiversity, Akureyri, Iceland, Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 2013.
3. Rudloff, The EU as Fishing Actor in the Arctic: Stocktaking of Institutional 
Involvement and Existing Conflicts.
4. Arctic Human Development Report, 2004, Stefansson Arctic Institute.
5. AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2013: Arctic Ocean Acidification; Duhaime, 
AHDR.
6. Sigfússon, Þ. and Gestsson, H. (2012). Iceland’s Ocean Economy: The Eco-
nomic Impact and Performance of the Ocean Cluster in Iceland in 2011. Ice-
land Ocean Cluster. http://www.sjavarklasinn.is/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
IcelandsOceanEconomy2011.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2014.
7. FAO, “Fisheries and Aquaculture Topics. Geographic Profiles.”
5.3 Arctic Fisheries 
Ecosystems
Arctic fisheries are mostly located in the low and sub-
Arctic – the marine ecosystems and the shelf areas off 
the coasts of Labrador, Greenland and Iceland, and the 
Bering and Barents Seas below the central Arctic Ocean 
(Figure 5.1).8 These areas are part of the Arctic region 
in social, economic and political terms as defined by the 
AHDR and have also been identified as “Arctic gateways” 
– the seas that connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 
with the Arctic Ocean and the continental shelves 
along Arctic Eurasia, Siberia and North America.9 The 
ecosystems, including the Central Arctic Ocean, are 
characterised by large annual and seasonal fluctuations. 
The seas above the continental shelves in the sub-Arctic 
are rich marine ecosystems, whereas the Central Arctic 
Ocean has low biological production.
The marine species in the Arctic are highly specialised to 
cope with long- and short-term environmental variations. 
Annual migration patterns and slight changes in spatial 
distributions10 as well as recruitment and growth 
variations are natural responses enabling these species 
to adapt to such changes. As an example, Figure 5.3 
shows the variability of three-year-old cod recruitment 
in the Northeast Atlantic (Norwegian and Barents 
Sea).11 Distribution areas of benthic (bottom dwelling) 
species such as cod and pollock are limited to the shelf 
areas. Pelagic (dwelling above the benthos) species 
are in principle not limited. Yet the pelagic species are 
constrained by food availability, which is richer in the 
shelf areas.12
In the Bering Sea fisheries, pollock is the dominant 
species, while the Barents Sea is dominated by a cod-
capelin system occasionally disturbed by inflow of 
herring from the Norwegian Sea. Groundfish dominate 
in Icelandic and Faroese fisheries, with the addition of 
pelagic species such as capelin, herring and mackerel. 
In the colder Greenlandic waters, crustaceans are of 
most importance, along with Greenland halibut. Cod is 
the most highly prized species for human consumption 
caught in the Arctic.13 Fisheries’ catch abundance and 
biological productivity are illustrated in Figure 5.2.14 
8. Arctic Portal, Interactive Data Map.
9. Sigfússon, Þ. and Gestsson, H. (2012). Iceland’s Ocean Economy: The Eco-
nomic Impact and Performance of the Ocean Cluster in Iceland in 2011. Ice-
land Ocean Cluster. http://www.sjavarklasinn.is/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
IcelandsOceanEconomy2011.pdf. Accessed 5 February 2014.
10. Christiansen and Reist (ABA) (2013).
11. ICES, Report of the Arctic Fisheries Working Group 2012.
12. Large Marine Ecosystems of the World (LME).
13. Christiansen and Reist (2013); Vilhjálmsson, H., Hoel, A., Agnarsson, S., 
Árnason, R., Carscadden, J., Eide, A. and Fluharthy, D. (2005). “Chapter 13: 
Fisheries and Aquaculture” in Arctic Climate Impact Assessment: Scientific 
Report, 691–780. Fairbanks, Alaska: Cambridge University Press.
14. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2013.
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Figure 5.1: Arctic Characterisation: High, Low and Sub-Arctic and Ocean Currents
Sources: Arctic Portal: Based on Arctic Human Development Report; AMAP Assessment: Arctic Ocean Acidification, 2013.
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Figure 5.2: Large Marine Ecosystems – Catch Abundance
Source: Arctic Portal 2014.
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5.4 Aquaculture
Aquaculture is a fast-growing food production sector, 
with an average annual growth rate of almost 9% over 
the last decade.15 It is an economic activity that uses and 
transforms natural aquatic resources into commodities 
valued by society and in so doing may generate 
environmental impacts. Aquaculture, along with 
fisheries, provides important employment opportunities 
as they are often in remote areas where few other 
livelihood options are available.
The vast majority of aquaculture in the Arctic region is 
made up of salmon culture in Norway. This represents 
93% of the total value of aquaculture in the Arctic 
region. Norway is also home to the second- and third-
largest species, trout and cod, bringing the Norwegian 
share of Arctic (in AHDR definition) aquaculture to 98%. 
Aquaculture in Finland and Sweden produces small 
volumes of freshwater species. In 2012, the Faroe Islands 
produced almost 63 000 tonnes, which is significant for 
a small country. Iceland produces Arctic char, cod and 
salmon in small volumes, but there is increased interest 
in expanding production. Aquaculture in the Russian 
Arctic is also on the upswing with production in the 
Murmansk and Karelia regions amounting to about 34 
000 tonnes and plans are to more than double that by 
2020.16  
Climate change-induced variations in water temperature 
are a key challenge for aquaculture as they impact on 
the overall aquatic environment, which is fundamental 
to the performance of farming operations. Models 
indicate that aquaculture in the Arctic will be enhanced 
by warming waters. Other direct effects such as losses 
15. FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012.
16. Hermansen, Ø. and Troell, M. (2012). Aquaculture in the Arctic; Salmon 
Faroe Islands, “Salmon Production Hits Record High in 2012”; Staalesen, “Big 
Bounce for Arctic Aquaculture”; Vigfússon, Gestsson and Sigfússon, Econom-
ic activity and performance 2012.
due to increases in storm frequency and intensity 
can be relatively well anticipated, but the uncertainty 
regarding how these parameters will change is high. The 
resilience of the aquaculture industry to climate change 
is higher than that of capture fisheries thanks to the 
control of production, location, population density and 
food availability.17 Impacts will depend on the industry’s 
capacity to adapt to new circumstances, accessibility to 
new production areas, existing regulations and markets. 
Significant environmental changes may lead to spatial 
displacement of aquaculture production, thereby posing 
other challenges and opening up new opportunities. 
Increased temperatures could lead to more activity 
in peripheral areas, such as in Arctic Russia, but could 
also lead to increased disease risk related to higher 
temperatures in the southern periphery of aquaculture 
in the Arctic, along with lower growth rates for cold and 
temperate water species like salmon.
17. This finding is based on recent analysis by the Arctic Climate Change, 
Economy and Society (ACCESS) project.
Figure 5.3: Variability of Northeast Atlantic Cod Recruitment (three-year-old cod), 1946-2010
Source: ICES, 2012.
Picture 5.1: Aquaculture Site for Salmon in Troms County, 
Norway
Photo: Sigmar Arnarsson.
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5.5 Fisheries Resource 
Management
All Arctic countries with significant fisheries have 
well-established resource management regimes with 
comprehensive systems for producing the knowledge 
base required for fisheries management, promulgation 
of relevant regulations and compliance measures. They 
are based on societal goals and objectives – usually 
sustainable use – through appropriate policies and 
regulatory instruments. The regimes vary with regard to 
the design of resource management policies, as harvest 
control rules differ (Table 5.1).18 Most regimes have 
imposed a discard ban or measures to hinder discarding 
and by-catch.
Most systems provide for a certain degree of flexibility in 
transferable quotas within the set total allowable catch 
(TAC). Challenges in fisheries management are to reduce 
the overcapacity of the fishing fleet, as this hinders the 
sustainable use of resources, and to establish broad 
consensus and legitimacy for the regimes in the light of 
conflicting biological, social, economic and cultural goals 
inherent in most fisheries.19
5.6 Governance
Governance of fisheries has local, national, regional and 
international dimensions. It is complex, covering long-
term strategic planning as well as short-term operational 
management. Its scope ranges from local fisheries, such as 
inlets or fjords to whole ecosystems, such as the Barents 
Sea. Good governance and monitoring is vital for the 
optimal and sustained use of marine fisheries resources. 
In the case of aquaculture, effective governance – the 
18. Valtýsson, Sævaldsson and Björnsson, (2014), Arctic Fisheries Manage-
ment Systems.
19. Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems; Garcia and Rosenberg, “Food Secu-
rity and Marine Capture Fisheries: Characteristics, Trends, Drivers and Future 
Perspectives”; Vilhjálmsson et al. (2005).
sector’s use of natural resources to ensure long-term 
sustainability and employ best husbandry practices – is 
essential for its continued growth.
Various international frameworks for managing fisheries 
have been adopted. The most significant are the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the Fish Stocks Agreement, the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Compliance Agreement, 
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and 
some UN General Assembly resolutions, such as on 
driftnets and destructive fishing practices. 
UNCLOS enshrines the right of coastal nations to extend 
their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical 
miles and thus decide on how fishing is governed and 
how TAC is determined. Moreover, UNCLOS made the 
freedom to fish in high seas conditional on each state’s 
willingness to co-operate with other states to ensure the 
conservation and good management of the fish stocks 
concerned.
The United States has enacted proactive regulation 
regarding Arctic fisheries. The North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council (NPFMC) plays a crucial role in 
federal regulation with regard to the maritime zones 
of the United States in the north Pacific. In 2009, the 
Council approved a Fishery Management Plan for Fish 
Resources of the Arctic Management Area (Arctic FMP), 
Uniform 
system
Quota Restricted # of 
licences
Transferrable Community/ 
Co-operative 
quotas
Fishing 
licenses
US +/- +/- + +/- +/- +/-
Faroe Islands + + (Effort) + + - -
Greenland - + + +/- - +/-
Iceland + + - + - +
Canada - +/- + +/- +/- +/-
Norway - + + +/- +/- -
Russia - + +/- +/-
Table 5.1: Fisheries Management Systems in the Arctic (+ = yes; - = no)
Source: Valtýsson, Sævaldsson and Björnsson, 2014.
UN Fish Stocks Agreement
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 
which came into force in 2001, aims to improve 
international and domestic management of 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. That 
is done through regional fisheries management 
organisations and also includes conservation 
obligations for the waters within the exclusive 
economic zones for those stocks. The Arctic states 
are among the 166 countries that have become 
parties to this Agreement. 
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Figure 5.4: North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission Convention (Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast 
Atlantic Fisheries) (dark blue) and Regulatory Area (orange, international waters beyond EEZs).
Source: NEAFC, www.neafc.org and Arctic Portal, www.arcticportal.org.
which closes commercial fishing in US waters off the 
Arctic coast.2021   
The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 
is the regional fisheries management organisation for 
the northeast Atlantic, one of the most abundant fishing 
areas in the world. The aim is to manage the high seas, 
and straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The 
regulatory area of NEAFC is outside of the 200-mile 
EEZs (Figure 5.4). It is the only fisheries convention 
that extends to the North Pole and covers about 8% of 
the high seas in the central Arctic Ocean. Its aim is to 
ensure the long-term conservation and optimum use 
of the regional fishery resources to provide sustainable 
economic, environmental and social benefits. It adopts 
management measures for various fish stocks and 
control measures to ensure that they are properly 
20. Cavalieri et al., (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment: Mole-
naar, E. Status and Reform of International Arctic Fisheries Law.
21. Vilhjálmsson et al., ACIA (2005).
implemented, along with other measures to protect the 
marine ecosystems. In addition, NEAFC is a venue for 
dispute settlement. 
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES), the world’s oldest inter-governmental science 
organisation, is the leading forum for the exchange 
of scientific information, stock assessment and 
management advice for the north Atlantic fisheries. ICES 
provides member states (as well as NEAFC) with advice 
based on an ecosystem management approach. This 
implies a higher focus on uncertainty than in the former 
single species management scheme. Harvest control 
rules have been developed for the fish stocks assessed 
by ICES, which incorporate an ecosystem perspective 
even though full knowledge of the dynamics of these 
systems is lacking.22
22. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).
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5.7 Drivers
Commercial fisheries in Arctic regions are based on 
the use of relatively few fish species. The dynamics of 
many of the ecosystems are not well understood. The 
impacts of climate change on these ecosystems add to 
the already significant uncertainty.
Physical changes are perhaps easier to predict, but 
significant uncertainties remain. Climate change shifts 
warmer Atlantic water into the Arctic region. But at the 
same time, the influx of Atlantic water may be reduced, 
moderating an overall warming effect. The picture is 
different in the Bering Sea, which may experience slightly 
more warming than the Barents Sea. With sea-ice cover 
also expected to decline, marginal fishing grounds will 
become more accessible. Invasive species may increase 
and compete for habitat with resident species.23  
There is increasing worldwide demand for fish and fish 
products that provide important food supply. Over the 
last fifty years, the world fish food supply has outpaced 
global population growth. The sector also provides 
livelihoods and income. Fish and fishery products are 
among the most traded food commodities worldwide, 
with trade volumes and values reaching new highs in 
recent years. This trend is expected to continue. While 
capture fisheries production has remained stable over 
the last decades, aquaculture production has expanded 
to meet growing demand. It is not possible to accurately 
predict how climate change may affect supply and 
demand of fish products globally, given all the dynamic 
factors at play.24 
23. Christiansen and Reist (ABA) (2013); Vilhjálmsson et al., ACIA (2005).
24. FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012.
Aquaculture production in the Arctic is different than 
that of capture fisheries because its location, population 
density and food availability are controlled. Variations 
in the physical environment, however, are essentially 
not controlled, although aquaculture production may 
be moved to alternative sites. Significant long-lasting 
shifts in environmental conditions may therefore lead 
to changes in the spatial distribution of aquaculture 
activities.25  
Effects of climate change are evident in Arctic regions. 
However, it is not easy to predict how ongoing climate 
change will affect marine ecosystems and hence the 
fisheries. Some outlooks foresee greater abundance and 
limited northward shift of commercial Arctic fish stocks 
(e.g. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment).26 Or it could 
be that climate-driven changes in other parts of the 
world will result in a shift in global fish supply markets 
with consequent implications for Arctic fisheries. 
The challenge for fisheries management remains the 
same: to use the natural resources in a sustainable 
manner according to the expressed objectives and due 
consideration of the inherent uncertainty. There is an 
indication that the choice of management regimes 
may have a greater impact on Arctic fisheries than the 
potential environmental changes caused by climate 
change.27 A crucial factor for resource management 
under conditions of climate change is therefore the 
development of robust and precautionary approaches 
and institutions.28
25. Hermansen and Troell (2012).
26. Vilhjálmsson et al., ACIA (2005).
27. Eide, A. (2007), Economic Impacts of Global Warming.: The case of the 
Barents Sea Fisheries. Natural Resource Modelling 20(2), 199-221.
28. Vilhjálmsson et al., ACIA (2005)
Gap at the Top
That the centre of the Arctic Ocean was unregulated was hardly a concern when it was an ice-bound backwater. 
This is changing. In summer 2012, 40% of the central Arctic Ocean ice cover melted. Only 8% of the Central Arctic 
Ocean is within the area under fisheries regulation overseen by NEAFC. 
Five national governments with coastline on the Arctic believe that the future establishment of a regional 
fisheries management organisation for the Central Arctic Ocean could be considered because enough of the 
polar ice cap now melts regularly. 
There is consensus among officials from Norway, Denmark, Canada, United States and Russia (who met in February 
2014) to acknowledge the desirability to improve scientific understanding of the Arctic marine environment 
in part to determine whether fish stocks of commercial interest may in the future occur in the Central Arctic 
Ocean and assess their potential ecosystem impacts. The unique opportunity to protect the Central Arctic Ocean 
from unregulated fishing was recognised, as there are currently no fisheries management regulations in place 
in this high seas area outside of national EEZs. It was recognised that there is a need for (and agreement to 
commence work towards) interim precautionary measures to prevent future commercial fisheries in the absence 
of appropriate regulatory mechanisms. 
Based on available scientific information, it is generally understood that commercial fishing in the high seas area 
of the Central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur in the near future, due to physical constraints such as depth, 
cold water and habitat loss for species currently present in the area. Nevertheless, even the possibility of future 
commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean triggers the need for more research and better understanding.
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5.8 Impacts of Fisheries
Fisheries impact ecosystems as they can alter species 
composition and abundance. Sudden stock changes 
can be related to fish harvesting. Unfavourable natural 
conditions can multiply the impact of such changes 
and result in a stock collapse. Fishing has cumulative 
effects on whole ecosystems and economic systems, 
as it provides income, food security and livelihood for 
people and communities. Climate change and resource 
management will have unknown impacts on both. In 
the Arctic, communities are highly specialised in dealing 
with environmental changes due to the interdependence 
of their socio-economic systems and the biophysical 
environment. Changes in the marine environment affect 
the socio-economic systems and in some cases also 
vice versa.29 In addition to reliance on unpredictable 
natural systems, the fishing communities also depend 
on unpredictable global markets, which can again affect 
the natural system.30
5.9 Outlook to 2030
The Arctic is vibrant and constantly changing. However, 
it does not appear likely that the changes in Arctic 
fisheries will be significant in the period to 2030 if the 
current management schemes are maintained with 
a precautionary approach as a guiding principle and 
consensus in distribution of catch quotas of highly 
migratory species. Minor temperature increases in sub-
Arctic areas could lead to increased productivity and 
access to peripheral fishing grounds, while any major 
climatic change could have negative impacts.
29. Perry and Ommer (2010), “Introduction: Coping with Global Change in 
Marine Social-Ecological Systems.”
30. Daw et al., (2009). “Climate Change and Capture Fisheries: Potential Im-
pacts, Adaptation and Mitigation”; Hovelsrud et al., “Adaptation in Fisheries 
and Municipalities: Three Communities in Northern Norway.”
With growing markets for fish, aquaculture production 
could expand further into peripheral areas. That may 
underpin high prices of fishmeal products and provide 
incentives to exploit fish that are lower in the food chain. 
It is not evident that fisheries in the Arctic Ocean, beyond 
national exclusive economic zones, will be significant 
in the coming years, due to physical, biological and 
economic constraints. Deep and cold water conditions 
in the Central Arctic Ocean pose a barrier to sub-Arctic 
species northern migration.
Increased utilisation of high Arctic species in the Arctic 
Ocean and surrounding waters, such as polar cod, is also 
unlikely since sea-ice reduction and warming will bring 
habitat loss. In addition, the capital-intensive nature of 
such fisheries and the fact that the majority of the catch 
would go into reduction, e.g. fishmeal, would probably 
render it economically unattractive. Aquaculture could 
create increased incentives in the long term.
5.10 Implications of Arctic 
Fisheries Developments for 
the European Union
Both fish consumption and dependence on imports 
are growing in the European Union, which is one of 
the world’s top three importers of fish and aquaculture 
products. Two of its three biggest suppliers (exporters 
into the EU) are in the Arctic: Norway with 22% of the 
share and Iceland with 6%. It is further estimated that 
more than one-third of fish caught in the Arctic are 
sold on the European market. Across the EU, average 
annual fish consumption is more than 23 kg per person 
compared with a global average of about 17 kg per 
person.31  
31. Cavalieri et al., (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment; FAO, 
The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012; Rudloff, B. (2010). The 
Conflicts
A major challenge for a fisheries management regime is to adjust to possible changes in migration patterns of 
stocks. Changes in fish stock migration patterns in the past have disrupted established resource management 
arrangements and triggered conflicts between countries.21 A recent example is the northwest expansion of 
mackerel, which has led to conflict between the EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and most recently Greenland. 
The migration and feeding patterns of mackerel changed in recent years, shifting further northwest into Faroese, 
Greenlandic and Icelandic waters. Iceland started fishing mackerel and the Faroese increased their catch, which 
was objected to by the EU and Norway. Some mackerel fishing has been carried out in the Greenlandic EEZ 
and its volume is expected to increase. Negotiations have been ongoing and the Faroe Islands, EU and Norway 
have reached an agreement on the quota shares. Greenland and Iceland have not agreed on shares, leaving the 
total distribution of the quota share unresolved. These coastal states are members of the North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission and have the obligation to co-operate on fisheries conservation and management, and to 
find solutions to conflicts. 
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Picture 5.2: Pelagic Trawlers in Iceland
Photo: Sigmar Arnarsson.
The EU is keen to ensure good co-operation with 
Arctic states in the sustainable management of marine 
biological resources. Fisheries conservation is a priority, 
in addition to access and supply. Agreements based on 
the exchange of fishing opportunities dominate the EU’s 
relations with its neighbours to the north, particularly 
Norway, Iceland and Greenland. The EU has a long 
history of mutually overlapping fisheries with these 
nations. Since the creation of the Common Fisheries 
Policy, the EU has negotiated the annual exchange of 
quotas on behalf of its member states, wherein the 
quotas are shared on the basis of relative stability. These 
agreements play a vital role in preserving the continuity of 
traditional fisheries following the establishment of 200-
mile EEZs. They enable each fleet to continue to fish in 
other parties’ waters. Indeed, one of the main purposes 
of these annual negotiations is to enable mutual access 
to stocks that straddle territorial boundaries, and which 
shift back and forth between EU waters and those of 
northern partners according to the time of the year. 
These agreements are extremely important to a large 
section of the EU fleet, especially the agreement with 
Norway, which covers quotas worth more than EUR 2 
billion.32 Good co-operation in international fisheries 
resource management is therefore important for the EU.
5.11 How Does the European 
Union Influence Arctic 
Fisheries? 
The European Union influences the development of Arctic 
fisheries directly and indirectly through a wide variety of 
policies, practices, market mechanisms, collaborative 
EU as Fishing Actor in the Arctic: Stocktaking of Institutional Involvement 
and Existing Conflicts.
32. EU, “Northern Agreements”; Rudloff (2010).
engagements and research. For example, marine 
pollution originating in the EU and EU-flagged vessels 
fishing in Arctic waters can affect fish stocks. The EU 
may influence Arctic fisheries by way of its participation 
in regional fisheries management organisations and 
international developments such as the FAO and NEAFC. 
Its support for scientific research in the Arctic to underpin 
improved fisheries management may have implications 
for Arctic fisheries.33 The EU has significant influence 
through its role in resource management, the size of its 
market, and its trade and regulatory elements – which 
are highlighted briefly here. 
5.11.1 Regulatory Framework
The European Union has extensive experience in setting 
regulatory standards for fishing with both environmental 
and socio-economic criteria at a supra-national level 
through its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), launched 
in 1970. Notably, however, no current EU members are 
coastal states to oceans in the Arctic, which constrains 
EU policy. The European Economic Area Agreement 
(EEA, which includes Iceland and Norway) does not 
cover CFP, although it includes trade in fisheries products 
and regulates state aid and competition in the sector. 
EU member states can still act in a wide range of other 
capacities, e.g. as flag states, port states, market states, 
or with respect to their natural and legal persons. In 
a flag state capacity, the EU and its members are able 
to exercise their rights and discharge their obligations 
with respect to the Arctic Ocean and adjacent areas, 
most notably freedom of the high seas, such as marine 
scientific research, freedoms in the maritime zones of 
Arctic Ocean coastal states; and obligations relating to 
the marine environment and living resources connected 
to these rights and freedoms.34 
33. Cavalieri et al., (2010).
34. Ibid.; European Commission, “Fisheries.”
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5.11.2 Resource Management
Fish move across borders and seas, and fishing fleets 
have done the same for centuries. Since the activities 
of each fishing fleet affect the opportunities of other 
fleets, the EU countries chose to manage their fisheries 
collaboratively through the CFP. The CFP may impact on 
the health of some of the fish stocks that extend into the 
Arctic, such as Atlantic mackerel and herring.
The EU is revamping the CFP to make it more efficient 
in ensuring the economic viability of European fleets, 
conserving fish stocks and providing good quality food 
to consumers.v35 Substantial efforts are being made to 
integrate the objectives of its Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive within the new CFP as part of an ecosystem-
based management approach.36 Fisheries ecosystem 
plans have been developed for three major European 
marine regions (North Sea, north-western waters and 
south-western waters).37  
  The EU supports the exploitation of Arctic 
fisheries resources at sustainable levels based on sound 
scientific advice, while respecting the rights of local 
coastal communities, as stated in its Arctic communication 
in 2008. The EU continues to advocate a precautionary 
approach whereby, prior to the exploitation of any new 
fishing opportunities, a regulatory framework for the 
conservation and management of fish stocks should 
be established for those parts of the Arctic high seas 
not yet covered by an international conservation and 
management system.38 This is in line with the conclusions 
of officials from the coastal states surrounding the 
Central Arctic Ocean that it should be protected from 
unregulated fishing since there are no management 
regulations in place for high seas outside of national 
EEZs, except for the regulatory area of NEAFC (see Box: 
Gap at the Top). The need for joint management of 
high seas fish stocks has been raised by the European 
Commission at meetings of the North Atlantic Fisheries 
Ministers Conference. Regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs) could in principle extend their 
geographical scope for this purpose.
5.11.3 Market Size and Proximity
The European Union accounts for about 26% of global 
fish imports, making it the largest market in the world, 
with a value of about EUR 36 billion in 2011. The EU’s 
dependence on imports for fish consumption is growing. 
This is a result of the rising trend in consumption, but 
also illustrates the constraints within the EU on further 
35. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Common Fisheries Policy (2011).
36. Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of 
marine environmental policy.
37. European Commission, “Fisheries.”
38. European Commission, “JOIN (2012) 19 Final.”
expansion of supply. In this respect, the current reform 
of its CFP aims to rebuild its fish stocks, as well as boost 
aquaculture production. The results of the reform and 
the effects on supply and trade will only be felt in the 
medium-to-long term. Today the EU is an important 
market for Arctic fisheries, especially those in the North 
Atlantic. Faroese, Greenlandic, Icelandic and Norwegian 
fisheries in particular are highly dependent on exports 
to the EU.39  
5.11.4 Trading Fish in a Globalised World
In the early days of the CFP, the EU decided on its own 
trade policy on fish. Since the launch of the GATT/WTO 
process, trade policy and tariffs are strongly influenced by 
international developments. The common organisation 
of the EU market includes measures to ensure a stable 
and predictable supply of fish as a vital raw material. A 
relevant tool is the autonomous tariff quotas (ATQs). The 
aim of ATQs is to enhance access for EU processors to 
fish from third countries by granting reduced tariff rates 
on the import of specific products for which domestic 
production is in deficit. These preferential tariffs are 
intended to provide balanced incentives, which give 
priority to EU production where it exists, while ensuring 
that the European processing industry is not unfairly 
penalised when it has to compete in the world market.40 
5.11.5 Combating Illegal Fishing
EU rules to deter illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing came into force in 2010 and include: 
• Only marine products validated as legal by the 
relevant flag state or exporting state can be imported 
to or exported from the EU.
• A black list has been established covering both IUU 
vessels and states that turn a blind eye to illegal 
fishing activities.
• EU operators who fish illegally anywhere in the 
world, under any flag, face substantial penalties 
proportionate to the economic value of their catch.41 
There is an increasing need for international co-operation 
among fishing and seafood-importing countries to 
improve fisheries management of shared marine 
resources and to preserve the associated employment 
and other economic benefits of sustainable fisheries. 
In line with a commitment to prevent IUU fishing, the 
EU issued a catch certification scheme to ensure full 
traceability of all marine fishery products traded from 
and into the EU. The regulation also seeks to ensure 
that no European Union citizens engage in IUU activities, 
no matter where they take place. In addition to the 
39. Hagstova Føroya, Faroe Islands in Figures 2013; Rudloff (2010); Statistics 
Greenland, Greenland in Figures 2013.
40. European Commission, “Fisheries.”
41. “Illegal Fishing (IUU).”
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certification scheme, the regulation also addresses issues 
of port state control and mutual assistance. Moreover, it 
introduces an EU alert system to detect the most suspect 
cases of illegal practices, the vessels involved and any 
non-co-operating third countries. Proper enforcement 
is supported by a harmonised system of proportionate 
and deterrent sanctions for serious infringements. An 
agreement between Norway and the EU is an example 
wherein Norway will issue a catch certificate for all 
Norwegian landings and exports to the EU.42  
5.11.6 Food Safety Standards
EU legislation harmonises food safety control across 
the member countries. A key aspect is that all food and 
feed business operators, from farmers and processors 
to retailers and caterers, have principal responsibility 
for ensuring that food placed on the EU market meets 
the required food safety standards. The regulations 
apply at every stage in the food chain, including primary 
production, i.e. fishing, aquaculture and farming, in 
line with a “farm to fork” approach to food safety.43 
Traceability is an important factor in implementing such 
standards. 
5.12 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-making
Three critical factors for EU decision-making were 
identified in stakeholder consultations.44 The inter-
linkages of the socio-economic system in relation to the 
biophysical marine environment are at the forefront of 
where human decisions and actions face the natural 
system and vice versa. Sustainable use of renewable 
resources such as fish is highly dependent on the drivers 
for their use and management.
5.12.1 Governance and Management
More research is needed to address the uncertainties 
faced in fisheries management, along with increased 
co-operation, especially regarding quota setting and 
distribution. Increased co-operation would also help to 
control overfishing and fight IUU fisheries. In addition it 
can help mitigate conflicts with other economic activities, 
such as aquaculture, oil and gas extraction, shipping and 
tourism. Creating a more stable system through active 
co-operation could help establish better inflow of safe 
and sustainably caught seafood into the EU market. 
42. Cavalieri et al., (2010); European Commission, “Fisheries.”
43. European Commission, EUROPA - Food Safety: From the Farm to the 
Fork.
44. See Annex 1.1. and 1.2.
5.12.2 Climate Change and Species 
Distribution and Composition
Another issue is species distribution due to natural 
changes, whether climate-induced or not. Distribution 
change challenges current management agreements, 
rules and regulations, both now and in the future, and 
that could lead to the possibility of overfishing since 
there is no control over the fisheries. Distribution change 
could also lead to conflict with other economic sectors, 
such as oil and gas extraction and aquaculture, as 
fisheries and other sectors might become more spatially 
integrated. 
5.12.3 Global Demand for Fish
Fisheries in the Arctic are facing changes and uncertainties 
that might affect the sector in both the short and long 
term. Global demand for fish products is one of the main 
drivers of Arctic fisheries, as increasing demand provides 
a greater incentive for fishing. This affects the EU market 
as global demand influences market value. 
5.13 Recommendations
Recommended steps for the EU in facing challenges and 
issues in Arctic fisheries include improved management 
and quota setting, decrease capacity, ensure that IUU 
measures are effective and secure inflow of Arctic 
seafood into EU markets. These recommendations are 
formulated in association with stakeholder input and 
rankings. They refer the period to 2030. 
5.13.1 Improve Management, Co-operation 
and Research
Improved management and quota setting is an 
important issue as it helps to create a sustainable system 
for Arctic fisheries and ensures equitable sharing and 
avoids over fishing. A well-managed system can help 
to mitigate climatic impacts. This includes participation 
in international agreements on quota setting and the 
development of a mechanism for setting fishing targets 
in a sustainable manner. The EU could help ensure that 
Arctic fisheries resources are sustainably managed 
through a common Arctic regional fisheries agreement in 
close co-operation with Arctic nations, especially in the 
north Atlantic. Effective co-operation, discussions and a 
formal venue could help to mitigate potential conflicts. 
Wide co-operation and information sharing in applicable 
areas could benefit Arctic fisheries research to underpin 
improved management approaches and practices. There 
is a need for more scientific research, including local 
and traditional knowledge, of issues relevant to future 
fisheries in the Arctic, especially the Central Arctic Ocean.
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5.13.2 Continue to Combat IUU Fisheries
Improved management could also ensure the 
effectiveness of measures to combat illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing. The EU holds sway as a large 
market force to continue to combat IUU through best 
practice measures, such as port state control, document 
catches, catch certificates, traceability and promotion 
of sustainable use of fisheries resources. The EU could 
establish better port monitoring in co-operation with 
Arctic states and continue efforts to register fish catches. 
Combating IUU fisheries benefits all Arctic states and 
the EU by enhancing sustainability and stable markets. 
In principle, there should be no economic incentives to 
partake in IUU fisheries. Strengthened IUU measures 
would boost consumer confidence and give a more 
positive image to fisheries. 
 
5.13.3 Reduce Fishing Capacity
Measures should be taken to reduce fishing capacity. 
Abolishing distortionary subsidies, such as those that 
mask the true costs of operation, could be key as they 
cloud market signals and can lead to overcapacity. 
Capacity is already at a high level: more capacity could 
lead to unsustainable fisheries and spur IUU fishing. A 
profit-driven market should create ample incentives. 
This could be encouraged through an improved 
market-driven and co-operative management system. 
Distortionary subsidies should be eliminated in order 
to provide economic and social incentives in fisheries 
and management.45 As the EU CFP is being reformed, 
the phasing out or elimination of subsidies could be 
implemented in the short term. 
5.13.4 Securing Inflow of Arctic Seafood 
into EU Markets
The EU’s enormous seafood market is dependent 
on imports to meet demand and Arctic fisheries are 
dependent on this market. Conflicting issues can have 
negative consequences for both. Trade sanctions have 
already had drastic effects on the livelihoods of Arctic 
nations along with limiting the inflow of goods to the 
EU. Co-operation and open dialogue need to be effective 
to avoid such developments. Open communication and 
co-operation in trade could be implemented in the short 
term for long-term benefits. While EU members are not 
Arctic coastal states, the scale of its market, where the EU 
has numerous policy and regulatory influence, provides 
it with significant opportunity to exercise an influence.
45. Garcia, S. and Rosenberg, A. (2010), “Food Security and Marine Capture 
Fisheries: Characteristics, Trends, Drivers and Future Perspectives.”
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Michał Łuszczuk (1), Debra Justus (2), Jennie Thomas (3), Chris Klok (4) 
and Federica Gerber (5)* 
(1) Committee on Polar Research, Polish Academy of Sciences 
(2) Université Pierre et Marie Curie, France 
(3) LATMOS, Pierre Simon Laplace Institute, France 
(4) IMARES, the Netherlands 
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Key Messages:
•	 Advances in offshore technology and maritime transport as well as global markets are 
major drivers of Arctic oil and gas developments, while climate change plays a secondary 
role.
•	 On-the-ground developments in exploitation have been so far limited throughout the 
Arctic, though there is diversity in this respect between different Arctic regions, with 
greater intensity of activities in the Barents Region.
•	 Risk of long-lasting negative impacts from catastrophic events, huge distances and gaps 
in existing capabilities and infrastructure are among the key concerns.
•	 The EU has limited but multifaceted competencies regarding Arctic offshore hydrocarbon 
developments, such as through contacts with energy partners, climate and energy 
policies and research programmes. 
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Support innovative research and education in the areas of Arctic technology and the 
Arctic environment.
•	 Continue and strengthen energy dialogue with non-EU Arctic partners.
•	 Enhance funding and investment frameworks for environmentally and socially 
responsible Arctic hydrocarbon projects.
*   With support from Timo Koivurova (Arctic Centre), Adam Stępień (Arctic Centre), Johan Gille (Ecorys) and 
Narangerel Davaasuren (IMARES)
“The continued growth in Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration, coupled 
with the lack of consideration of environmental impacts (both local and 
global) defies rational explanation other than simple but blind human greed. 
(…) What rights do the Arctic coastal states and the oil companies have to 
destroy the future of millions of people, species and ecosystems, for short-
term profit? This region has long been identified as highly vulnerable to 
damage by the hydrocarbon industry, is victim also to the dramatic impacts 
of climate change. (…) To allow even more extraction of oil and gas from the 
Arctic is little more than stupidity, rather than ignorance.”
Respondent from an international environmental NGO
“We recognise the environmental challenges of working in the Arctic, as 
we recognise the challenges of hydrocarbon development in other parts 
of the world. Our approach to Arctic exploitation is a step-wise one; we will 
not enter an area before the necessary technology has been developed and 
tested, and the necessary organisational capabilities are in place. (…). In all 
global hydrocarbon operations there is an element of risk. However such 
risks, which are carefully weighed and planned for, should not overshadow 
the potential economic and social benefits to the local communities, 
particularly in a region with few opportunities for economic advancement.”
Representative of the hydrocarbon industry, Norway
“I don’t think anyone or any institution should be excluded from the debates 
about the developments of energy resources in the Arctic, or across the 
globe. The responsibilities here lie with everyone – not just the eight Arctic 
states. Of course, this does not mean breaching sovereignty, but that the 
discussions are open and accessible. I think the main institution to play a role 
is the Arctic Council with which the EU needs to find a working relationship 
as a non-primary player (which is still an important role).”
Researcher, Norway
Chapter cover image: LNG plant in Norway.
Photo: GettyImages
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
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6.1 Introduction
Production of hydrocarbons in the Arctic region has 
many faces. Most of the region’s oil reserves are in Alaska 
while reserves in Russia are dominated by natural gas. 
Onshore resources have been produced for decades, 
while in terms of offshore extraction the Arctic is largely 
a frontier region (Figure 6.1).1 The common thread is that 
prospects for hydrocarbon exploitation in the Arctic are 
uncertain, particularly offshore.2
Some parts of the Arctic waters are becoming more 
accessible due to improved technologies and changes in 
sea ice related to climate change.3 Concurrently, interest 
in offshore hydrocarbons in the Arctic has increased in 
recent years. Largely untapped to date, the estimated 
offshore resource base is significant. Yet the technical 
and environmental aspects and high costs of operating in 
severe conditions present many challenges.4 Investments 
1. Crandall, R. & Thurston, D. et al. (2010). Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic. 
In Arctic Council: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic – Effects and Potential 
Effects, vol. I; International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (2013). Envi-
ronmental management in Arctic oil and gas operations: Good practice guide. 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers. www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/449.
pdf. Accessed 15 February 2014.
2. Koivurova, T. & Hossain, K. (2008). Offshore Hydrocarbon: Current Policy 
Context in the Marine Arctic. Arctic TRANSFORM. www.arctic-transform.
org/download/OffHydBP.pdf. Accessed 10 March 2013.
3. Harsem, Ø. et al. (2013). Oil exploration and sea-ice projections in the Arc-
tic. Polar Record, DOI: 10.1017/S0032247413000624
4. Arctic Council, (2009). Sustainable Development Working Group Report 
in exploration and production are influenced by 
dynamic variables including global markets and prices, 
energy demand and policies concerned with economic 
development, energy security and environmental 
protection.5 The timing and extent of Arctic hydrocarbon 
developments is not easy to predict.6 Extraction 
may influence the Arctic environment, economies, 
geopolitics and societies. Arctic oil and gas exploitation 
also has implications for the economic, political and 
environmental landscape of the European Union (EU). 
The main focus in this chapter is offshore oil and gas 
hydrocarbon exploitation in a broadly defined European 
part of the Arctic region. It looks at recent trends, their 
drivers and possible economic, environmental and social 
impacts with relevance to the EU. Further, it highlights EU 
policies and actions relevant for oil and gas developments 
in the Arctic. Drawing on previous research and input 
from stakeholders, the chapter discusses critical issues 
for EU decision-making and proposes recommendations 
for EU action.
on Arctic Energy. Arctic Portal. www.library.arcticportal.org/1531/1/SDWG_
ArcticEnergyReport_2009.pdf. Accessed 21 April 2013.
5. Harsem, Ø., Eide, A. & Heen, K. (2011). Factors influencing future oil and 
gas prospects in the Arctic. Energy Policy. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.058
6. Hong, N. (2012). The energy factor in the Arctic dispute: a pathway to con-
flict or cooperation? Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 5 (1), 13-26.
Picture 6.1: Exploration Platform ‘Polar Pioneer’ in Tromsø, Norway.
Credit: ©Robert Greiner.
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6.2 Overview of Offshore Oil 
and Gas Trends – Hopes and 
Doubts
While there has been a surge in interest in exploiting 
Arctic hydrocarbon resources in recent years, actual 
developments have been slow to follow. Arctic oil and 
natural gas have been explored and developed for 
decades – with onshore production dating back to the 
1920s and offshore starting in the 1970s.7 A decade 
ago, the Arctic accounted for about 25% of the world’s 
natural gas and 10% of oil production.8 Yet most parts of 
the Arctic remain largely untapped. These undiscovered 
resources could amount to 90 billion barrels of oil, up 
to 50 trillion cubic metres of natural gas and 44 billion 
barrels of natural gas liquids (NGLs), according to the 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).9 That is about 13% of the 
world’s undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and 
up to 30% of global gas reserves, and some 84% of it is 
offshore. Undiscovered natural gas is likely to be three 
times more abundant than oil in the Arctic and is largely 
concentrated in Russia (Figure 6.2).10  
In recent years there has been increased business 
interest in the hydrocarbon potential of the Arctic 
even in the face of a complex mosaic of challenges and 
constraints.11 According to some estimates, investments 
in the circumpolar north will amount to EUR 75 billion 
over the next decade.12 Yet, so far, the intensity of recent 
discussions concerning hydrocarbon development in 
Arctic regions has not been matched by a commensurate 
7. Ernst and Young, 2013, Arctic Oil and Gas, www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/Arctic_oil_and_gas/$FILE/Arctic_oil_and_gas.pdf More details 
at: Bishop, A. et al. (2010). Petroleum Potential of the Arctic: Challenges and 
Solutions. Oilfield Review, 22(4), 36-49; Arctic Council, (2009).
8. Lindholt, L. (2006). Arctic natural resources in a global perspective, in S. 
Glomsrød and I. Aslaksen (eds.), The Economy of the North. Oslo, Statis-
tics Norway, p. 27. “From 1990–2004, Arctic oil production was dominated 
by west Russia (79%) followed by Alaska (18%), Norway (3%), and small 
amounts in the other regions. Gas production was also dominated by west 
Russia (96%) followed by Alaska (3%) and small amounts from the other re-
gions. (…) Around one-half of cumulative Arctic production is oil (51%), with 
large regional differences: Canada (59% oil), Alaska (87%), east Russia (9%), 
west Russia (46%), and Norway (84%)”. See: Peters, G. P. et.al. (2011). Future 
emissions from oil, gas, and shipping activities in the Arctic, Atmos. Chem. 
Phys. Discuss., DOI: 10.5194/acpd-11-4913-2011, p. 4917.
9. USGS (United States Geological Survey), (2008). Circum-Arctic Resources 
Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, 
Fact Sheet 2008-3049, USGS, Boulder, United States.
10. Another appraisal focused only on the Russian Arctic oil and gas potential 
suggests that collectively the Arctic regions constitute one of the world’s larg-
est petroleum superbasins that could provide markets with energy resources 
corresponding to those of the Persian Gulf or West Siberian petroleum basins. 
Bishop, A. et al. (2010), p. 41.
11. Arctic Council (2009).
12. Emersson, C. & Lahn, G. (2013). Arctic opening: Opportunity and Risk in 
the High North. Chatham House-Lloyd’s Risk Insight Report. Potential Arctic 
hydrocarbon production is ultimately determined by a cumulative factor—
profitability. Bishop, A. et al. (2010), p. 41; Nakhle, C. & Shamsutdinova, I. 
(2012). Arctic Oil and Gas Resources: Evaluating Investment Opportunities. 
Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence.
Figure 6.1: Main Oil and Gas Areas, Mining Sites and Sea-Ice 
Extent in the Arctic
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Figure 6.1: Main Oil and Gas Areas, Mining Sites and Sea-Ice Extent in the Arctic
Source: Arctic Portal, based on Nordregio; Johanna Roto and José Sterling, 2011, www.nordregio.se/Maps--Graphs/05-Environment-and-energy
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surge in on-the-ground activities.13 
Optimistic outlooks for further hydrocarbon 
development in the Arctic arose following the 2008 
USGS estimates of resource potential. It is important 
to consider the complex multitude of areas, geology, 
economics, levels of development, governance, multiple 
interests, etc., that span the region rather than to view 
potential resource development as homogeneous across 
the circumpolar Arctic.14 It is also vital to view Arctic 
prospects in a worldwide context. The global oil market 
is dynamic, the best example being the unconventional 
oil revolution in the United States in the last few years.15 
It is also fundamental to assess possible developments 
in the context that the Arctic offshore is a frontier region 
with challenging conditions and fragile ecosystems.  
A number of companies are pursuing exploration 
projects, for example, Shell in the Chukchi and Beaufort 
13. Arctic Council (2009). In the report released by Marsh Risk Management 
it is claimed that “only 22 of the 174 fields discovered (in the Arctic) have 
produced hydrocarbons, with an average lag time of 13 years. Just 38 new 
fields are expected to come into production between 2012 and 2018”. Marsh 
Risk Management Research (2013). Managing Risk on the New Frontiers of 
Energy Exploration, p. 4. Marsh. https://uk.marsh.com/Portals/18/Documents/
MRMR%20New%20Frontiers%20of%20Energy%20Expl%202013_A4.pdf. 
Accessed 18 December 2013. “The actual ongoing and planned development 
in the Arctic offshore is then still quite limited in extent. It means that the 
Arctic’s designation as a new energy province is built more on anticipated po-
tentials than on significant proven reserves of oil and natural gas and other 
energy resources”. Arctic Council, (2009); cf. Lindholt, L. & Glomsrød, S. 
(2012). No big bonanza for the global petroleum industry. Energy Economics, 
34(5), 1465–1474.
14. See: Østhagen, A. (2013). Arctic oil and gas. The role of regions. IFS In-
sights 2/2013, Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, p. 22.
15. International Energy Agency (IEA), 2013, World Energy Outlook-2013, 
IEA/OECD, Paris.
Seas; Cairn in offshore Greenland; Rosneft/ExxonMobil 
in the Kara Sea; and Rosneft/ENI in the Russian Barents 
Sea. However, the costs are high and the environmental 
risks substantial, both of which influence companies’ 
plans and activities. Recent developments in different 
parts of the region illustrate this clearly.16    
Fourteen test wells have been drilled in Baffin Bay, off 
Greenland’s west coast, though no drilling has been 
conducted since 2011. A licencing round in 2012-13 for 
fifteen blocks attracted some interest, but exploration 
activities are likely to remain on stand-by in 2014. 
Licences for four blocks have been granted also in the 
Greenland Sea area in Northeast Greenland. Oil and gas 
development in Greenland is not viewed as a near-term 
prospect.17 
Two areas on Iceland’s continental shelf have potential 
for commercial oil and gas development: Dreki (east 
and northeast) and Gammur (north). Three licences 
for Icelandic, Chinese and Norwegian companies have 
been awarded in 2013-2014, paving the way for the first 
cases of drilling off Iceland’s coast.18 “Arctic Services” – 
an initiative of more than 50 companies and institutions 
in Iceland’s north – was launched in 2013 to provide 
16. Cf. Ermida, G. (2014). Strategic decisions of international oil companies: 
Arctic versus other regions. Energy Strategy Reviews, 2(3-4), 265–272.
17. As Runi M. Hansen, Statoil country manager for Greenland and the Faroes 
explains: “Being in a frontier area, this licence (Avinngaq) is a long-term proj-
ect for Statoil and the company will follow its stepwise approach, not going 
faster than technology allows (…)”. Statoil News (2013). http://www.statoil.
com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/Pages/Dec20Greenland.aspx., Accessed 
19 February 2014.
18. National Energy Authority, 2014.
Figure 6.2: Potential Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. Total assessed resources: 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). NGLs – 
Natural Gas Liquids.
Source: Arctic Gas and Oil, EY Arctic Oil and Gas Report, May 2013 (based on data from USGS and the US Department of Energy).
Per cent of assessed total
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improved service levels and infrastructure for oil and gas 
exploration.19  
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate estimates that 
the undiscovered resources in the Barents Sea amount 
to 6 billion barrels of oil equivalent, most of it in the 
form of natural gas.20 While Norway is a leading country 
in Arctic hydrocarbon production, the outlook for its 
oil and gas sector faces challenges in terms of rising 
operating costs; lower gas prices (depending on region); 
adjustments to the fiscal regime, which inter alia reduces 
the attractiveness of future projects that require new 
infrastructure; and availability of qualified workers.21 
Costs in Norway’s petroleum sector have roughly 
doubled between 2005 and 2012, and a tax hike in 2013 
put several projects at financial risk.22  
New developments could help to revive Norway’s output, 
which is at a 25-year low. Both oil and gas production in 
northern Norwegian fields dropped significantly in 2013. 
There are also delays in the construction of the floating 
production unit for the Goliat field (when in production, 
it will be the northernmost on the Norwegian shelf 
and the first in the Norwegian Barents sea), where 
oil production is planned to start in late 2014.23 In the 
western part of the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea, 
exploration drilling around the Johan Castberg field has 
been vital in providing knowledge of the area, but so far 
it has not delivered the expected oil volumes. Statoil as 
operator has recommended that the investment decision 
concerning the Johan Castberg field be deleyed.
Nevertheless, there remains considerable interest with 
40 energy companies nominating 160 desired blocks 
in northern Norwegian waters for the licence round 
expected in the first half of 2014.24 The northernmost 
blocks are located 73˚north (the furtherst north to 
date25). About 75% of Russia’s estimated offshore 
hydrocarbon resources are located in Arctic regions, 
accounting for 22-27% of global offshore resources.26 
Major international oil and gas companies have shown 
19. IceNews (2014). http://www.icenews.is/2014/02/26/joint-initiative-in-ice 
land-offers-services-for-arctic-operations/. Accessed 26 February 2014.
20. The Arctic Journal. http://arcticjournal.com/oil-minerals/oil-discov-
ered-barents-sea. Accessed 15 February 2014.
21. Stolen, H. et al. (2014). Norway’s rising oil costs hit Arctic output 
hopes. Reuter. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/oil-norway-de-
lays-idUSL3N0KP4BB20140116. Accessed 18 February 2014.
22. Stolen, H. et al. (2014).
23. Staalesen, A. (2014c). Chaos at Goliat. BarentsObserver.com. http://bar 
entsobserver.com/en/energy/2014/02/chaos-goliat-12-02. Accessed 18 Febru-
ary 2014.
24. In the 22nd Norwegian Licence Round in 2013, 29 companies got licence 
rights in Arctic waters, for the first time including two Russian companies - 
Lukoil and Rosneft. Staalesen, A. (2014a).
25. Staalesen, A. (2014d). Drilling further north, farther east. BarentsObserver.
com. http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2014/02/drilling-further-north-far 
ther-east-18-02. Accessed 18 February 2014.
26. Kobzev, A. (2012). Oil exploration in Russia beyond 2025. Performance 
Journal, 4(2), p. 54-61. EY Performance. http://performance.ey.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Performance-4.2-January-2012-Journal-
v13-oil-russia.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2013.
interest in Russia’s expansion into the Arctic offshore.27 
Yet, the Ministry of Energy estimates that only 5% of 
Russia’s oil production and 10% of gas will come from 
the Arctic shelf by 2035.28  This reflects that there is no 
current shortage of supply possibilities in Russia before 
moving into the more expensive resource areas in the 
Arctic over the longer term.29 It also reflects shifts in 
global markets such as the impacts of unconventional 
resources lowering prices and putting the economic 
viability of liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects like 
Shtokman in Russia under scrutiny. The supply outlook 
in the near term is based on modest growth in domestic 
demand and weak growth in exports to Europe, and is 
significantly influenced by the constraints on the pace of 
securing a meaningful position in Asia-Pacific markets.30 
Russian authorities are taking steps to provide fiscal 
incentives related to export duties and reduced mineral 
taxes for projects in the Arctic offshore.
6.3 Primary Drivers of Arctic 
Oil and Gas Exploitation 
Arctic resource development is unique, complex, high 
cost and high risk. Key determinants can be considered 
in four clusters that illustrate opportunities and 
constraints.31   
1) Scope and pace of climate change in the Arctic
• Changes in sea ice coverage. 
• Expanding access and transport routes. 
• More difficult weather conditions.
• Increased coastal erosion.
• New and additional pollution sources contributing to 
climate change, e.g. ozone, black carbon, aerosols. 
2) Economic conditions and global markets
• State of national and regional economies. 
• Economic potential of hydrocarbon development. 
27. Henderson, J. (2012).  Joint Ventures in the Russian Offshore – Positive 
News but only for the Long Term. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. http://
www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Joint-Ventures-
in-the-Russian-Offshore-%E2%80%93-Positive-News-but-only-for-the-Long-
Term-.pdf. Accessed 28 January 2014; Locatelli, C., Rossiaud, S. & Lo-
skot-Strachota A. (2012). POLINARES working paper n. 45 Case 1: Russia, 
institutionalism and the effect on oil and gas investments. Polinares. http://
www.polinares.eu/docs/d3-1/polinares_wp3_case1.pdf. Accessed 18 October 
2013.
28. Arctic-info. http://www.arctic-info.ru/News/Page/dola-nefti-s-arkticesko 
go-sel_fa-k-2035-gody-sostavit-do-5-?id=7090. Accessed 26 February 2014.
29. It should be also mentioned that after having lain idle in the Pechora Sea 
since August 2011, the “Prirazlomnaya” platform in late December 2013 start-
ed pumping oil in Russia’s first oil producing offshore field in the Arctic. Sta-
alesen, A. (2014a). Delayed Arctic breakthrough. BarentsObserver.com. http://
barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2014/01/delayed-arctic-breakthrough-02-01. 
Accessed 15 February 2014.
30. IEA, 2013.
31. Harsem Ø., Eide A. & Heen K. (2011).
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• Dynamic global energy supply and demand landscape, 
intensifying interactions between different fuels, 
technologies, markets and prices.32  
3) Advances in offshore technology and maritime 
transport 
• Improved technology for offshore oil and 
gas exploration and development to reduce 
environmental impacts and enhance safety. 
• Infrastructure for production and transport. 
• Co-operative approaches and technical capacity to 
address pollution, oil spill and rescue operations.33  
4) Policy developments
• Government policies and granting new licences.
• International governance frameworks, regional and 
national oil and gas regulations. 
• Global and regional climate-change agreements. 
• Stakeholder influence. 
6.4 Overview of the 
Implications of Arctic 
Offshore Exploitation
Experience with exploration and extraction of 
hydrocarbons has shown that they have considerable 
effects on the vulnerable Arctic environment, as well 
as regional economy and society, including traditional 
livelihoods of indigenous people.34,35  Impacts usually 
vary depending on the spatial scale of a given 
offshore development, type of specific activity, stage 
of development and the required technology and 
infrastructure.36 Generalised impacts associated with 
hydrocarbon development in the Arctic include:
32. Two major shifts in global energy markets in the last decade have impacts 
on the prospects and timing of Arctic offshore oil and gas developments. The 
first is the rise in energy demand in emerging Asian economies that now ac-
counts for more than half of global demand. The second comprises the market 
shifts in response to unconventional resource production in the United States 
and global LNG markets leading to a significant drop in natural gas prices in 
North America while energy prices have remained high in Europe. Solanko, 
L. & Vilmi, L. (2013). The transformation of global energy markets, BOFIT 
Online 2013 No. 6, http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusju 
lkaisut/online/Documents/2013/bon0613.pdf. Accessed 10 January 2014.
33. Martin, A.S. (2012). Deeper and Colder. The Impacts and Risks of Deep-
water and Arctic Hydrocarbon Development. Sustainalytics.  http://www.
sustainalytics.com/sites/default/files/unconventional-oil-and-gas-arctic-drill 
ing_0.pdf. Accessed 22 October 2013.
34. Koivurova, T. & Hossain, K. (2008).
35. International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry, (2009). Reindeer Husband-
ry and Barents 2030: Impacts of Future Petroleum Development on Reindeer 
Husbandry in the Barents Region, GRIDA. http://www.grida.no/files/publica-
tions/reindeer-husbandry-barents_lores.pdf. Accessed 15 March 2012.
36. Arctic Council (2010).
Environmental 
• Physical impacts on marine and terrestrial 
ecosystems, including air pollution and noise. 
• Risk of long-lasting negative impacts from 
catastrophic events, e.g. oil spill. 
• Effects on terrestrial and marine biodiversity and 
habitats: directly on species confronted with pollution 
and disturbance; indirect effects of pollution that 
disrupt food chains. 
• Production and consumption of additional 
hydrocarbon resources adding to greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
• Increased concentration of climate forcers, e.g. 
ozone, black carbon. 
• Damage to important ecosystem services of value to 
humans, e.g. fisheries. 
Social 
• Demographic trends, e.g. influx of workers, migration 
patterns. 
• Increased economic and employment opportunities. 
• Social relations and health. 
• Education and training patterns, e.g. new 
opportunities. 
• Increased urbanisation. 
• Cultural and economic factors, e.g. indigenous 
livelihoods, traditional practices, contact with nature. 
 
Economic 
• Macroeconomic effects, e.g. projected increase in 
national and regional GDP. 
• Microeconomic effects, e.g. expected increase 
in economic opportunities, incomes, growth of 
businesses, increased employment and stimulation 
of overall economic activity. 
• Multiplier effect and improved services. 
• Increased public revenues from royalties and other 
payments or production sharing approaches to fund 
services and support sovereign wealth funds. 
• Risks to traditional livelihoods.
Governance/political 
• New geopolitical roles and economic potential. 
• New regional and global relations, e.g. energy 
security. 
• Further development of environmental and 
economic governance for regulation, fiscal regimes, 
resource management, e.g. development of oil spill 
preparedness and response regimes. 
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Economic and Social Benefits: Snøhvit Case
The first offshore gas development in the Barents Sea is a milestone in developing the hydrocarbon province. 
About 2 500 people were employed in the five-year construction phase. Operation, maintenance and support 
services now provide about 400 jobs and 75% of the employees have been recruited from north Norway. 
Nearly EUR 380 million of the overall deliveries to the field came from companies registered in north Norway. 
Assessments show that the development of Snøhvit reversed declining population and employment trends 
in the Hammerfest area. New companies were established in the area, housing construction expanded and 
municipal revenues increased substantially. Significant investments have been made in upgrading schools and 
infrastructure and in developing cultural facilities.37  
Picture 6.2: State-of-Art Technology in Arctic Conditions: Melkøya LNG  Production. 
Credit: Helge Hansen, Statoil.
• Strengthen comprehensive and long-term monitoring 
and research capabilities. 
• Improved stakeholder engagement stemming from 
regulatory and NGO pressures. 
It is important to keep in mind that the impacts and 
consequences:37
 ͳ cannot be considered in isolation from one another 
as they are usually closely interlinked; 
 ͳ are unevenly distributed, e.g. physical disturbance of 
the environment from offshore oil and gas activities 
and onshore infrastructure has a larger impact on 
people in the specific areas compared to those more 
distant, whereas financial benefits can extend far 
beyond the region;
 ͳ some impacts may lead to dissimilar outcomes 
depending on the particular situation or location; 
 ͳ impacts must be considered in terms of long-term 
effects on the environment and society. 
37. Government of Norway, (2011). The High North: Visions and Strategies. 
Meld.St. 7 (2011-2012), Report to the Storting.
While climate change is presented as increasing access 
to offshore oil and gas deposits in the Arctic in the long 
term, the burning of fossil fuels and resulting greenhouse 
gas emissions are largely responsible for human-induced 
climate change. Two-thirds of all proven fossil fuel 
reserves must stay in the ground if the world is to avoid 
dangerous climate change (above 2˚ C), according to the 
International Energy Agency.38 Building infrastructure for 
hydrocarbon development in the Arctic is expensive and 
once in place there is a strong incentive to make the most 
of such investments during their economic lifespan. This 
presents a dilemma as climate change triggers Arctic 
opening options that can exacerbate further climate 
change. 
There are many concerns about the environmental 
impact of resource developments both onshore and 
offshore in the Arctic.39 On the other hand, investment and 
development of hydrocarbon resources can have positive 
social and economic effects in remote communities. 
38. International Energy Agency (2012), World Energy Outlook – 2012, IEA/
OECD, Paris.
39. Oil spills were indicated as the number one uncertainty regarding offshore 
oil and gas developments in the Arctic in the Strategic Assessment of Develop-
ment of the Arctic online stakeholder questionnaire.
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Responsible, knowledge-based governance is key to 
effectively and successfully responding to the challenges 
and opportunities presented by further development of 
Arctic oil and gas resources.40
It should be emphasised that the resilience of Arctic 
ecosystems to withstand adverse events, such as 
incidents during offshore activities, is weak. While 
particular risk events – such as an oil spill – are not 
necessarily more likely in the Arctic than in other 
extreme environments, the potential environmental 
consequences and costs of clean-up may be significantly 
greater. These risks have significant implications for 
governments, businesses and the insurance industry.41 
Given that most Arctic hydrocarbon reserves are located 
offshore, it is of particular concern that there is little 
knowledge concerning the suitability of existing methods 
for oil clean-up in ice-covered waters or in areas of 
broken sea ice.42  
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
launched a four-year, USD 20 million research programme 
in 2013 to address issues specific to Arctic oil and gas 
exploitation, including spill trajectory modelling and 
remote sensing, and oil recovery techniques in sea ice 
areas.43 
40. Hasle, J. R., Kjellén, U. & Haugerud, O. (2009). Decision on oil and gas 
exploration in an Arctic area: Case study from the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
Safety Science. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2008.10.019
41. Sydnes, A. K. & Sydnes, M. (2013). Norwegian–Russian co-operation 
on oil-spill response in the Barents Sea. Marine Policy. DOI: 10.1016/j.mar 
pol.2012.12.001.
42. Potter, S. et al. (2012). Spill Response in the Arctic Offshore. American 
Petroleum Institute and the Joint Industry Programme on Oil Spill Recovery 
in Ice. http://.api.org/~/media/Files/EHS/Clean_Water/Oil_Spill_Prevention/
Spill-Response-in-the-Arctic-Offshore.pdf. Accessed 27 February 2014.
43. Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology Joint Industry Programme (JIP): 
http://www.arcticresponsetechnology.org. Accessed 20 January 2014.
6.5 Governance and Best 
Practice for Arctic Offshore 
Oil and Gas Extraction
Effective governance, regulations, international 
standards and best practices are crucial factors to reduce 
the risks of negative environmental and socioeconomic 
effects of oil and gas activities.44 Many international 
conventions and agreements relevant to hydrocarbon 
extraction are applicable in the Arctic (Table 6.1). They 
address the following key areas: 
• Nature conservation and environmental protection, 
including environmental impact assessments.
• Rights of indigenous peoples.
• Oil spill preparedness, response and co-operation for 
ships and offshore facilities.
• Occupational safety and health requirements.
• Marine pollution from ships.
• Liability and compensation for damage from 
pollution incidents.
• Minimum standards for the construction and 
operation of ships; training and certification of 
seafarers. 
• Rules to prevent collisions at sea relevant to the 
transport of oil.
A study of the current international framework at global 
level related to offshore oil exploitation highlights both its 
fragmented and incomplete nature.45 To some extent, the 
44. Koivurova, T. & Hossain, K. (2008); Barry-Pheby, E.A. (2014). The in-
ternational law and governance of the Arctic’s offshore oil industry: Inert or 
altered? OGEL 1 (2014) Special: Offshore Petroleum Exploration and Pro-
duction: Challenges and Responses, https://www.academia.edu/5632614/
Ov12-1-article03. Accessed 20 February 2014.
45. Rochette, J. (2012). Towards an international regulation of offshore oil ex-
ploitation. IDDRI. http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-
le-debat/WP1512_JR_workshop%20offshore.pdf. Accessed 17 June 2013; 
Humrich, C. (2013). Fragmented International Governance of Arctic Offshore 
Oil: Governance Challenges and Institutional Improvement. Global Environ-
mental Politics, 13(3), 79–99.
Conventions, Agreements, Standards and Guidelines Year
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 1973/78
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974
Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 2013
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic (OSPAR) 1992
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) 1990
Protection of the Marine Environment (PAME) Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 2009
PAME Guidelines for Transfer of Refined Oil and Oil Products in Arctic Waters 2004
International standards for safe exploration, production and transportation of oil and gas, e.g. ISO 
19906 – Petroleum and natural gas industries – Arctic offshore structures.
2010
Table 6.1: Selected International Instruments Relevant to Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Activities
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lack of adequate international and regional governance 
contributes to a shortage of current, comprehensive 
and effective enforcement of rules covering the Arctic 
marine area. Part of the solution could be to combine 
governance norms – both national and international – 
with the corporate social responsibility standards of 
operating companies.46 
There are major differences between regulatory regimes, 
standards and governance capacity across the Arctic 
states.47 The challenges of Arctic development call for co-
ordinated responses where viable, common standards 
are possible, along with an ecosystems-based approach, 
transparency and best practice. The Arctic Council 
continues its efforts to facilitate fundamental regional 
solutions that could become a framework supporting 
sustainable development and uphold the public trust. 
The Arctic coastal states have signed two agreements 
with particular relevance to oil and gas development. 
The 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement, a legally 
binding instrument that is now in force, establishes a 
framework for co-ordination of international maritime 
and aeronautical coverage and response across an area 
of about 34 million km2.48 In May 2013, the Arctic states 
concluded a legally binding Agreement on Co-operation 
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in 
the Arctic to improve oil spill management.49
46. Koivurova, T. (2013). Resource exploitation in the Arctic: incorrect diag-
noses, misinterpretations and wrong solutions – how to avoid these? Baltic 
Rim Economies, Special Issue On The Future Of The Arctic, Issue No. 2
47. Dagg, J. et al. (2011). Comparing the Offshore Drilling Regulatory Re-
gimes of the Canadian Arctic, the U.S., the U.K., Greenland and Norway. 
Pembina Institute. http://www.pubs.pembina.org/reports/comparing-off-
shore-oil-and-gas-regulations-final.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2013.
48. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Res-
cue in the Arctic. See: Kao, S., Pearre, N.S. & Firestone, J. (2012). Adoption of 
the Arctic search and rescue agreement: A shift of the Arctic regime toward a 
hard law basis? Marine Policy. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2011.12.001; Łuszczuk, 
M. (2014, forthcoming). The Regional Significance of the Arctic Search and 
Rescue Agreement. Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego.
49. Boyd, A. (2013). Binding oil spill agreement signed. BarentsObserver.com. 
http://www.barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/05/binding-oil-spill-agree 
ment-signed-15-05. Accessed 15 June 2013.
6.6 How Oil and Gas 
Development in the Arctic 
May Affect the European 
Union?
The European Union is a major energy market with a 
variety of producers and consumers. In 2012, the EU’s oil 
and gas imports amounted to more than EUR 400 billion 
or approximately 3.1% of the Union’s GDP.50 EU policies 
relevant to, inter alia, economy and trade, energy and 
the environment alongside national policies of its 
member states make for a complex policy landscape.51 
For example, the growing demand for transport fuels, 
now largely based on oil, versus EU policy approaches 
to reduce greenhouse gas and other emissions, and to 
curb the use of fossil fuels. The EU energy market is 
increasingly relying on imports to meet energy demand.
Energy imports increased from less than 40% (of energy 
consumption) in the 1980s to 54% in 2010. In that year, 
the highest dependency rates were for crude oil (85%) 
and natural gas (63%). Russia is the main supplier, 
accounting for 35% of the EU’s crude oil imports in 
2010. Almost 65% of EU imports of natural gas in 2009 
came from Russia and Norway. The International Energy 
Agency projects a big increase: net gas imports into the 
EU will rise from 302 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2011 
to 525 bcm in 2035, with the share of imports in total 
consumption jumping from 63% to 85%. EU policy aims 
50. European Commission (2014). A policy framework for climate and energy 
in the period from 2020 to 2030. p. 2.
51. Cavalieri, S. et al. (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment. 
Final Report. Berlin: Ecologic Institute. http://arctic-footprint.eu/sites/default/
files/AFPA_Final_Report.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2013; Airoldi, A. (2008). 
The European Union and the Arctic: Policies and actions. Nordic Council of 
Ministers. http://www.norden.org/fi/julkaisut/julkaisut/2008-729. Accessed 15 
June 2013; Airoldi, A. (2010). EU and the Arctic. Main developments 2008-
2010. Nordic Council of Ministers. http://www.norden.org/fi/julkaisut/julkai-
sut/2010-763. Accessed 15 June 2013.
Health, Safety and Environmental Protection Industry Standards
Recognised technical standards are used worldwide by the oil and gas industry. Accumulated experience over 
many years and from all parts of the world influence the standards through systematic updating and issuance of 
new standards. The standards represent best international practices for achieving an acceptable level of safety. 
Yet, updating standards is a time-consuming process requiring consensus from many parties.
Existing regulations and technical standards generally have not been developed to address the Arctic’s harsh 
offshore conditions. Existing technical standards need to be supplemented for the Arctic challenges with:
• Definition of societal and company safety objectives.
• Risk assessment from concept to execution, operation and decommissioning.
• Acquisition and analysis of site-specific environmental data and loads.
• Definition of additional or modified functional requirements.
• Adaptation for site-specific and project-specific conditions.
Adapted from Barents 2020, Det Norske Veritas, 2012.
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to improve energy security, while delivering a low-carbon 
and competitive energy system, through common action, 
integrated markets, import diversification, sustainable 
development of indigenous energy sources, investment 
in the necessary infrastructure, end-use energy savings 
and supporting research and innovation.52 
Meeting the growing demand of EU citizens for energy in 
a safe and environmentally responsible manner is a key 
challenge for EU institutions.53 The Arctic region has the 
potential to play an important role. As security of supply 
becomes a concern when a high proportion of imports 
are concentrated among relatively few partners, the EU 
has begun to look to the Arctic as a potential source of 
hydrocarbons. In March 2014 European leaders called 
on the European Commission to conduct an extensive 
study of EU energy security and to submit by June 2014 
a comprehensive plan for the limitation of EU energy 
dependence. An increased focus on EU energy security 
in the coming decades will also have an effect on energy 
trade relationships with Russia and Norway.54,55 
52. European Commission (2014), p. 4.
53. See the Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport, which 
supports the development and implementation of offshore safety legislation 
analysing past accidents in order to identify the existing conditions related to 
sharing of information, transparency and lessons learned. It contains also use-
ful statistical information on the frequency and severity of accidents. Christou, 
M. & Konstantinidou, M. (2012). Safety of offshore oil and gas operations: 
Lessons from past accident analysis. Ensuring EU hydrocarbon supply through 
better control of major hazards. European Commission JRC IET.
54. Boussena, S., Locatelli, C. (2013). Energy institutional and organisation-
al changes in EU and Russia: Revisiting gas relations. Energy Policy. DOI: 
10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.052; Harsem, Ø. & Claes, D. (2013). The interdepen-
dence of European - Russian energy relations. Energy Policy. DOI: 10.1016/j.
enpol.2013.04.035.
55. European Commission (2011). Energy Roadmap 2050 [COM/2011/885]
The development of hydrocarbons in the Arctic 
influences a broad scope of policy fields within the EU. 
Selected issues, which are highly correlated, are shown 
in Figure 6.3.
6.7 Outlook to 2030
Continued interest in the opportunities to exploit oil and 
gas resources in the Arctic, particularly the “lower Arctic”, 
are expected to be driven by growing global demand, 
shifting market conditions, increased physical access 
and geopolitics. Effective governance and infrastructure, 
including search and rescue, are required framework 
conditions. A step-wise approach is expected as resources 
are defined through exploration techniques, experience 
is gained in the extreme conditions, environmental and 
social protections are put in place and companies assess 
their investment strategies.  
It is likely that the Arctic states will be able to delineate 
and delimit their continental shelves in the foreseeable 
future in an orderly manner, on the basis of the law of 
the sea and UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 
the context of expected gradual improvement of the 
governance framework for Arctic resource exploitation, 
this may enable gradual development of resources in 
these areas.
Hydrocarbon development in the Arctic will depend 
on technological and economic feasibility, as well as 
environmental protection and social acceptance, even 
if new technologies will help to reduce current risks. 
Stricter regulations for safety standards for development, 
transport and shipping activities, and more attention 
Figure 6.3: Arctic Oil and Gas Development: Significance for the EU 
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to local benefits, social and corporate responsibility 
are also expected. More worldwide attention to the 
environmental aspects of potential development 
is anticipated. The importance of Arctic oil and gas 
resources for European countries will be important, 
although not vital.
6.8 Relevant EU Policies
The EU has numerous, albeit limited, functional 
competencies that enable it to play an important role in 
supporting effective co-operation and to help meet the 
challenges that confront the Arctic region. It has earned 
broad recognition for its strong international efforts 
to address climate change, expand renewable energy 
sources, promote energy efficiency and support polar 
research in order to contribute to addressing global 
challenges. The EU’s most important Arctic energy 
partners are Russia and Norway. The EU conducts regular 
energy dialogues with both partners. Because the EU’s 
dependence on energy imports is expected to continue 
to grow, these dialogues will become increasingly 
important for the EU in influencing the environmental 
footprint of its energy consumption.56,57
About 24% of Arctic oil and gas output went to the EU-
27 in recent years.58 Market influence and co-operation 
with Arctic partners such as through the European 
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement enable the EU to 
influence hydrocarbon exploration and development.59 
Existing EU policies, particularly related to energy and 
the environment, affect oil and gas developments in the 
Arctic in direct and indirect ways.60 Selected mechanisms 
are highlighted below.
• Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Operations,61 adopted in June 2013, calls for special 
attention to ensure environmental protection taking 
into account the risk of major accidents and the 
need for effective responses. The directive contains 
provisions for licencing, monitoring, reporting and risk 
management for oil and gas extraction in EU waters. 
The EU considers the directive to be applicable to the 
56. See:  Roadmap EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, March 2013, 
p. 10 and 17.
57. European Parliament and Council, (2010). Regulations concerning mea-
sures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 
2004/67/EC.
58. Cavalieri, S. et al. (2010).
59. The EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee, (2013). Resolution on Arctic Pol-
icy. Adopted during 41st Meeting 28-29 October 2013, Vaduz, Liechtenstein.
60. Koivurova, T. et al. (2010). EU Competencies Affecting the Arctic. Re-
port completed for the European Parliament. www.europarl.europa.eu/activi-
ties/committees/studies/download.do?language=sv&file=33381. Accessed 23 
March 2013; Cf. Neumann, A. (2012). European Interests as Regards Resource 
Exploitation in the Arctic: How Sustainable Are European Efforts in This Re-
gard? The Yearbook of Polar Law, 619–645.
61. Directive 2013/30/EU of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations.
EEA, but this position has been challenged by Norway 
(as of March 2014). The new legislation encourages 
EU members of the Arctic Council to actively promote 
the highest environmental safety standards, such as 
through the creation of international instruments 
on prevention, preparedness and response to Arctic 
marine oil pollution (currently in the process of 
development in the Arctic Council). The directive 
obliges the Commission to promote high safety 
standards for hydrocarbon operations taking place 
across the world, in relevant global and regional fora, 
including those relating to Arctic waters as well as 
to facilitate exchange of information with countries 
adjacent to EU waters. 
• EU Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group, 
established in 2012, is a forum for national authorities 
and the EU to exchange experiences and expertise 
relevant to major accident prevention and response 
for offshore oil and gas operations within EU waters 
and beyond its borders, where appropriate.62 
• Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) framework 
provides minimum standards for assessments based 
on several directives. Energy installations and related 
infrastructure subject to EIAs include oil refineries, 
road construction, extraction of petroleum and 
natural gas, and petroleum storage facilities. The EIA 
Directive is EEA relevant.63 
• Fuel Quality Directive64 seeks to reduce life-cycle 
emissions from transport fuels by 10% by 2020. 
Petroleum products must meet quality requirements 
concerning sulphur and lead content.
• Measures to safeguard security of natural gas 
supply.65 This Directive establishes a common 
framework within which member states define 
general, transparent and non-discriminatory security 
of supply policies compatible with the requirements 
of a competitive internal gas market; it also clarifies 
the general roles and responsibilities of the different 
market players and implements specific non-
discriminatory procedures to safeguard security of 
gas supply.
• Limits on air pollutants from large combustion 
facilities66 aims to reduce acidification, ground level 
62. European Commission (2012). Decision of 19 January 2012 on setting 
up of the European Union Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group (2012/C 
18/07).
63. Council Directive (2011). On the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment. Directive 2011/92/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Operations (2013/30/EU).
64. Directive 2009/30/EC of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 98/70/EC as 
regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing  a mech-
anism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
65. Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to 
safeguard security of natural gas supply.
66. Directive 2001/80/EC of 23 October 2001 on the limitation of emissions of 
certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants.
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ozone and particles by controlling emissions of 
pollutants (sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust) 
from large combustion plants, e.g. power stations, 
petroleum refineries, other industrial processes 
running on solid, liquid or gaseous fuels.
• Renewable Energy Directive67 sets a goal of 
renewable energy comprising 20% of total EU energy 
consumption by 2020 and is EEA relevant. 
• Energy Efficiency Action Plan68 aims to increase total 
energy savings by 20% in 2020. 
• Research projects and facilities that increase 
knowledge of the Arctic and are very important 
for oil and gas developments include CryoSat-2, an 
environmental research satellite launched in 2010 
to measure sea ice thickness, and the Copernicus 
European Earth Observation Programme, which 
offers marine monitoring services and studies land 
and sea ice in the Arctic using data from European 
and Russian satellites.
6.9 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-making 
An integral part of this project is stakeholder consultation. 
Through a dedicated workshop and an online 
questionnaire, stakeholders identified and discussed 
critical factors for the EU to take into account in decision-
making processes relating to oil and gas developments in 
the Arctic. The top three are summarised here.
6.9.1 Local Benefits of Hydrocarbon 
Extraction
As was highlighted during stakeholder consultation, all 
offshore activities are undertaken with essential onshore 
support. Moreover, they generate huge changes in 
and challenges for the socioeconomic landscape of 
neighbouring communities. Therefore adequate facilities 
and competent capacity building in the communities 
should be addressed as a significant issue. In addition, 
social licence and corporate social responsibility should 
be considered as the basis upon which to build a 
responsible approach for any kind of planned oil and gas 
activities. It is also a question of ensuring the appropriate 
sharing of benefits on a broadly understood perspective 
and not just in economic terms. For instance, investment 
in technology advancement, research/education and 
healthcare services are important, since they can 
strengthen local communities facing opportunities and 
threats arising from the development of oil and gas 
offshore activities.
67. Directive 2009/28/EC of 23  April 2009 on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources.
68. European Commission (2011). Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2011. Com-
munication. COM(2011) 109 final.
6.9.2 Risks and Corresponding Regulations
Oil and gas exploration and development are considered 
high-risk activities (especially in terms of oil spills), 
so there is a clear need for effective legal frameworks 
and operational solutions (e.g. search and rescue 
capabilities). One of the responses to these challenges is 
the development of adequate and effective regulations 
targeted at the appropriate aspects of exploration, 
development and production of offshore oil and 
gas and its transportation to markets. Adopting and 
strengthening of cross-border regulations as well as 
sharing best practices and knowledge are recognised 
as opportunities to secure the interests, rights and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders.
6.9.3 Research and Gaps in Knowledge
Since the Arctic is largely a frontier region for 
hydrocarbons, there is a clear need to gain more 
comprehensive knowledge that is required in all 
dimensions or phases of extraction activities. Research 
should be comprehensive and cover various dimensions 
of human activity in the Arctic, and not only those 
connected with oil and gas extraction. 
6.10 Recommendations
Taking into consideration the specificity, diversity and 
scope of the oil and gas offshore developments in the 
Arctic, as well as their implications for Europe, there are 
several opportunities for new or enhanced forms of EU 
activities that correspond with the interests of the EU 
and its role in hydrocarbon developments. The following 
propositions have been developed by the authors, 
taking the ideas proposed by stakeholders as a point of 
departure.  
6.10.1 Support innovative research and 
education in the areas of Arctic technology 
and the Arctic environment
While further development of oil and gas offshore 
exploration and development should be focused on multi-
dimensional risk reduction, broader and more advanced 
knowledge about the Arctic environment is required as 
are advances in offshore technologies. In this respect 
the key actions for EU support include ensuring long-
term cross-disciplinary research programmes (e.g. 2020 
Horizon), development of the relevant capacities and 
infrastructure, as well as supporting more educational 
projects. 
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6.10.2 Continue and strengthen energy 
dialogue with non-EU Arctic partners
Developments over the last three years on global energy 
markets underscore that the EU should continue to 
encourage transparent and competitive relations with 
energy suppliers, including those in the Arctic region. 
These dialogues could promote expanding the Northern 
Dimension to energy fields and new forms of co-operation 
with Norway. However, previous EU experiences in the 
nexus of energy security indicate that this could be a 
challenging task. Nevertheless, these efforts should be 
continued.
6.10.3 Enhance funding and investment 
frameworks for environmentally and 
socially responsible Arctic hydrocarbon 
projects
Successful offshore oil and gas developments (including 
construction of pipelines and transport of resources) 
can be achieved with improved funding and investment 
opportunities. Development of offshore oil and gas 
resources entails the obligation to pay strong attention 
to environmental and social risks, for instance by 
developing and experimenting with new technological 
solutions and environmentally and socially responsible 
business models. International co-operation in this field 
would combine both political partnerships and long-
term financial relationships. The EU has a potentially 
strong position to participate in such initiatives. One 
idea would be to establish – in close collaboration with 
major partners, including bilateral, multilateral and local 
financial institutions – an international finance institution 
or financing framework to provide loans and make capital 
investments, and which would incorporate a strong 
emphasis on environmental and social responsibility in 
Arctic hydrocarbon-related projects.
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Key Messages:
•	 The upsurge in mining activity is a clear trend in the region but developments are highly 
dependent on the fluctuating prices of minerals on the world market.
•	 The European Arctic is seen as a politically and economically stable region, characterised 
by high-quality regulation.
•	 Both industry and (indigenous) Arctic communities ask for better and improved 
communication and decision-making processes throughout the entire mining life cycle.
•	 The EU is a major consumer of Arctic raw materials and is promoting domestic mineral 
extraction to increase security of supply.
•	 Mining activities take place within a framework of EU regulations, including mitigation 
of environmental impacts. 
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Facilitate the collection and sharing of data, knowledge and information.
•	 Develop an integrated view on the mining sector and transparent policies.
•	 Harmonise environmental, economic and social assessments.
•	 Improve dialogue and meaningful consultation, particularly with indigenous and local 
people.
•	 Support international governance and cooperation to enhance responsible mining.
*   The authors would like to thank Kirsi Latola, Mikko Jokinen, Outi Paadar, Marie-Theres von Schickfus and 
Federica Gerber for their comments and input. 
Mining’s role is crucial in creating employment in areas of high unemployment. 
Industrial activities always have some impact on their close surroundings, 
but the footprint of mining operations is relatively small comparing to many 
other activities, and modern mining can be done in a way that is causing 
minimal impact on the environment.
Representative of the mining industry, Finland
The environmental impact assessments are sufficient, but there is need for 
developing social impact assessments that mirror the land use needs by 
indigenous people. Their land use and the conditions for reindeer herding 
are threatened by different interests and exploitation activities (not only 
mining).
State agency, Sweden
Mining lasts only some tens of years but the nature forever, and that is why 
the nature and the local inhabitants must be respected.
State agency, Finland
In the case of indigenous peoples and their livelihood, they are seen as local 
people and the matters such as local/regional employment is rated higher 
than traditional indigenous economy. [on the consideration of social and 
cultural issues in decision-making regarding mining activities]
Reindeer herder and a member of Sami Parliament, Sweden
Chapter cover image: Mine in Kirovsk, Russia.
Photo: GettyImages
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
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7.1 Introduction
The European Arctic contains vast amounts of mineral 
resources. Extracting minerals in the Arctic appears to 
be both challenging and expensive. Yet today the region 
is experiencing an upsurge in mining activity as high 
market prices and improved technology have triggered 
interest and action by mining companies. Mining may be 
viewed as not only an opportunity for wealth creation, 
but also a threat to people’s livelihoods.
This chapter deals with the current increase in mining 
activity – with a focus on traditional metallic ores and 
rare earth elements – in the European Arctic, including 
Greenland and to a lesser extent Northwest Russia.1 It 
provides a general overview of mining and its impacts on 
the environment, economy and society. In addition, the 
implications for the European Union (EU) are discussed 
through the identification of EU interests regarding 
extraction of minerals and by assessing relevant EU 
policies.
1. The focus here is mainly on traditional metallic ores (base and precious) and 
rare earth elements (REEs). Industrial minerals and gemstone mines are gen-
erally excluded. The geographical coverage is the broad Arctic area as defined 
by the Arctic Human Development Report (2004). However, some examples 
and data from the Barents region are used. Some statistics refer to entire Nordic 
states.
7.2 Current Upsurge in 
Mining Activity 
The upsurge in mining activity is a clear trend in most 
Euro-Arctic regions.2 The states of physical infrastructure, 
regulatory and administrative frameworks, human 
resources and the societal awareness of mining vary 
from one country to another. There is a long history of 
mining in regions such as Fennoscandia, Svalbard and 
Northwest Russia. These regions have well-established 
social and physical infrastructure accompanied by 
regulatory frameworks to ensure that mining is a well-
integrated part of the economy. In contrast, large-scale 
mining in Greenland is a relatively new activity, where 
there is little infrastructure and the technical challenges 
are sizable.3  
Until recently, mining in Fennoscandia was thought to 
be in decline or stable at best. Today, greater private 
sector interest and government attention are giving 
clear signs of a rapid increase in mining activity. At the 
end of 2013, there were more than 40 active mines in 
Sweden, Finland and Norway, including mines that were 
reopened in the last decade and projects in the early 
phases of development (see Figure 7.2.)
2. The mining activities are developing so quickly that reliable and comparable 
data are hard to obtain.
3. Haley, S., Klick, M., Szymoniak, N. & Crow, A. (2011), ‘Observing trends 
and assessing data for Arctic mining’, Polar Geography, 34:1-2, 37-61.
Figure 7.1: Increase in Arctic Mining Activities: Drivers and Impacts
Environmental Impacts
• Changes in land, ecosystem, water and landscape.
• Potentioal pollution of land and water
• Waters
• Risk of accidents
• Biodiversity, habitat, migratory paths, wildlife changes
• Conflicts with other activities
Economic Impacts
• Diversification of supply
• Local employment and increased spending
• Investments by governments and companies
• Revenues for public budget
• Increased local expenditure for public facilities
• Opportunity costs
• Boom and bust cycles
• Strong currency leading to more expensive export
Social Impacts
• Job opportunities, increased services, transfer of skills
• Demographic change
• Health and well-being
• Change in other activities such as reindeer herding, tourism
Increase in Mining
Rise in interest, 
investments and 
operations in the 
Barents region and 
Greenland
Policy Responses 
(including EU) 
Shaping drivers and mitigating 
negative impacts.
• Sector-specific policies
• Environmental policies
• Research funding
Drivers
• Geologic Resources
• Global Demand for 
Minerals
• Technological Advances
• Climate Change
• Favourable Policies
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Many Nordic communities are both excited and 
concerned by the planned developments, particularly in 
areas where traditional activities such as Sámi reindeer 
herding take place. Most Nordic countries recently 
revised their mining legislation or adopted strategies to 
stimulate mining development by focusing on economic 
opportunities. Moreover, in response to social concerns, 
there are numerous regulatory and research efforts 
(both by public authorities and the industry) to ensure 
responsibility in mining activities. For example, Sweden 
is investing considerably in infrastructure projects and 
in research and development. In 2011, the Finnish 
government issued a new Mining Act explicitly aimed 
at promoting mining in a socially, economically and 
ecologically sustainable manner.4 Nordic governments 
and agencies have also started initiatives focused on 
research and co-operation, such as the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation’s Green Mining 
programme5; the Norwegian state programme for 
gathering geophysical data; and the establishment of a 
Nordic network on mining expertise – NordMin (with the 
participation of Greenland).6
Russia is among the world leaders in mineral production. 
In northwest Russia, the mining industry has a significant 
presence on the Kola Peninsula, the Komi Republic and 
the Republic of Karelia. However, the Russian mining 
industry has several obsolete plants, a comparatively 
slow rate of innovation and low labour productivity. 
Nevertheless, Russia is expected to invest in new 
4. Koivurova, T. & Stepien, A. (eds.) (2008), Reforming Mining Law in a 
Changing World, with Special Reference to Finland, University of Lapland, 
Rovaniemi, Finland.
5. Green Mining Programme, TEKES, www.tekes.fi/en/programmes-and-ser 
vices/tekes-programmes/green-mining/. Accessed 5 November 2013.
6. See: Nordic Council of Ministers, www.norden.org/en/nordic-coun-
cil-of-ministers/council-of-ministers/nordic-council-of-ministers-for-busi-
ness-energy-regional-policy-mr-ner/nordmin/project-description-nordmin. 
Accessed 13 February 2014.
exploration activities and strengthen business relations 
with neighbouring countries.7  
Greenland has major potential for mining in the known 
geological occurrences along the coast.8 In this typical 
frontier region with limited mining infrastructure and 
challenging physical circumstances, the number of 
mining licences issued increased from 39 in 2000 to 115 
in 2013.9 In 2013, Greenland had one operating gold 
mine (Nalunaq Angel Mining) and a number of projects 
in advanced stages of development.10 This includes the 
rare earth oxides deposit at Kvanefjed, which is second 
in size only to rare earth element (REE) deposits in China. 
As mining is not yet well integrated into the overall 
economy, Greenland will be particularly sensitive to the 
boom and bust character of the industry and the risks 
of economic decoupling, that is, a situation in which 
economic benefits are exported to other regions.11 
Recent policy and regulatory changes instituted by the 
Greenland government favour mining development, 
expecting that revenues will help finance expansion of 
its autonomy and possible independence. However, it 
has been estimated that Greenland would require 24 
large-scale and profitable mines in order to cover the 
current budget transfer from Denmark.12 In the final 
quarter of 2013, amid much controversy domestically, 
the Greenland government lifted its ban on uranium 
mining.13
7.3 Drivers
Having the appropriate geology is a condition for 
development. The European Arctic has significant 
mineral occurrences: the Fennoscandian Shield14 contains 
minerals that are found in limited locations around the 
world and Greenland holds great potential for many 
minerals, including REEs and uranium. A number of 
drivers can be identified to explain the present trend. 
7. Safirova, E. (2012), US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook 2010 – Rus-
sia, advance release. U.S Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 
http://minerals.usgs.gov. Accessed 10 July 2013.
8. What is under the ice sheet is largely unknown.
9. This includes both active prospecting and exploration licences. BMP, List of 
Mineral and Petroleum Licences, http://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/miner 
als/list_of_licences/list_of_licences.pdf . Accessed 16 March 2014.
10. See: Geological Map http://www.geus.dk/minex/green-min-2010.pdf. Ac-
cessed 9 December 2013. The Nalunaq Mine is expected to close in 2014.
11. Duhaime, G. (2004), in Haley et al. (2011).
12. Committee for Greenlandic mineral resources to the benefit of society 
(2014). To the Benefit of Greenland. 
http://nyheder.ku.dk/groenlands-naturressourcer/rapportogbaggrundspapir/
To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. Accessed 3 November 2013.
13. McGwin, K. (24 October 2013). Uranium ban overturned. Arctic Journal at 
http://arcticjournal.com/oil-minerals/uranium-ban-overturned. Accessed 20 
November 2013.
14. Geologically, the Fennoscandian Shield is an exposed portion of the Baltic 
Shield and includes territories of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russian Kola 
Peninsula and Karelia.
Picture 7.1: Testing prior to the possible reopening of the 
Hannukainen mine, Finland.
Photo: YLE, yle.fi
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The main driver of the current upsurge is growing global 
demand for mineral resources, pushed by modernisation 
in emerging economies such as China and India, as well 
as by the deployment of advanced technologies such as 
wind turbine generators, mobile phones and hybrid cars, 
which require REEs and other critical minerals. 
Advances in technologies that serve exploration, 
operation and transportation in mining are making Arctic 
resources more accessible and less expensive.15 Examples 
include improved seismic exploration and mapping 
technologies and methods to mine in permafrost. 
Further, the legal, administrative and political landscape 
supports development, although there is resistance 
from some stakeholders such as reindeer herders and 
tourism organisations. Of relevance is also the role of 
consulting companies conducting environmental impact 
assessments or economic feasibility analyses in terms of 
their competence and interaction with mining companies 
and administrations. The investments of states and the 
private sector, including junior companies, determine 
the extent of geological knowledge and new discoveries.
To a modest degree, physical changes due to climate 
change influence mining activities through easier 
(or cheaper) sea access to resources (in particular in 
Greenland), longer operating seasons, and possibly 
via lower transportation costs due to shorter shipping 
routes.16 However, climate change also ushers in new 
challenges and hazards for the industry.
15. Haley, S. et al. (2011), p. 55.
16. Rasmussen, R. et al. (2011). Megatrends. Nordic Council of Ministers, Co-
penhagen, p. 73. See Chapter 2 Changes in Arctic Maritime Transport.
7.4 Impacts
The impacts of mining activities differ depending on the 
stage of mine development, the type of mining activity 
and the existing infrastructure. The decision on whether 
or not to explore and mine should ideally be based on an 
integrated assessment of the inter-related environmental, 
economic and social impacts. Importantly, exploration 
and exploitation result in different impacts and are 
usually regulated differently, also in terms of taxation or 
impact assessment requirements. Exploration, even if 
successful, is not always followed by extraction activities. 
7.4.1 Environmental Impacts
Besides visible changes in the landscape, the 
environmental effects of mining can include the pollution 
of water, air and land. These impacts may continue 
long after the operative phase of the mine. Mining may 
alter the landscape, destroy reindeer grazing grounds, 
migratory routes and jeopardise fishing in rivers, lakes 
and seas. Sensitive Arctic ecosystems require long 
recovery times after environmental degradation. The 
nature of impacts varies depending on local conditions, 
type of resource and applied technology. 
In particular, many communities have long-term concerns 
about what will happen after mine closure. As the boom-
and-bust cycles of mining can turn active mines idle, 
there is concern about environmental management 
during periods of inactivity. A critical question is how 
to manage waste, decommissioning and rehabilitation 
when a mine ceases operation.17 Nowadays, operators 
are legally required to have a mine closure and 
17. MMSD (2002), Breaking new ground: the report of the Mining, Minerals, 
and Sustainable Development Project, International Institute for Environment 
and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
London.
Figure 7.3: Mineral Licences in Greenland, 2000-2013.
Note: A prospecting licence is non-exclusive permission to explore in a given area, and thus permits more than one company to conduct exploration 
activities. An exploration licence has an exclusive character. 
Source: Arctic Portal, based on Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, Government of Greenland, www.bmp.gl
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environmental restoration plan in place, but this is the 
most difficult phase to monitor.18 Environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) are intended to identify impacts 
and mitigation measures for the likely environmental 
and social impacts of the proposed mining activity, but 
they may not adequately address all the concerns of 
local and indigenous communities, tourist operators 
and environmental NGOs. Many stakeholders express 
particular apprehension regarding hazards and accidents 
during mine operations. For example, at the Talvivaara 
nickel mine in Finland, large quantities of contaminated 
water leaked into surrounding rivers and lakes in 2012 
and 2013. 
Assessments of ecosystems and socioeconomic impacts 
must take account of other activities, such as wind 
power, infrastructure and other mine developments, 
and measure the cumulative impacts. Importantly, 
environmental performance is more and more connected 
to the economic feasibility of mining operations. 
Companies are required to uphold high environmental 
standards. These standards are increasingly an important 
factor in investment decisions as major environmental 
accidents put companies in a difficult financial situation 
and adversely affect the perception of the whole industry 
(as is the case with the Talvivaara mine).
7.4.2 Economic Impacts
Developing a mine involves investment flows, 
employment opportunities, trade and transport 
spending. Local employment can have positive impacts 
also at the national level. It generates multiplier effects 
as local consumption increases and demand for goods 
and services boosts economic activity. Several mining 
companies now have stringent local content requirements, 
which may improve local employment.19 These benefits 
18. Kauppila, P., Räisänen, M. L. & Myllyoja, S. (Eds) (May 2013), (Best en-
vironmental practices in metal mining operations). The Finnish Environment 
29en/2011 Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE).
19. Mining Association of British Columbia (October 2011). Economic Im-
pact Analysis, http://www.mining.bc.ca/sites/default/files/resources/pwcmin 
ing-economicimpactanalysis_1.pdf. Accessed  1 July 2013.
should continue after a mine closes, in particular with 
regard to minimising the impact of job losses. Many 
mining companies have adopted a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) agenda as part of their strategy to 
acquire their social licence to operate (trust, acceptance 
and support of communities). In addition, there are also 
general company and government investments, such as 
education, infrastructure and healthcare.20 Royalties, fees 
or taxes can generate significant revenue for regional 
and national budgets. Royalties as such have not been 
introduced in Nordic countries and mining-specific fees 
or taxes are comparatively low. As a result, the main 
budget income is from general tax systems or (e.g. in 
the case of LKAB) profits generated by state-owned 
companies. However, the economic benefits from tax 
revenues depend on associated increases in government 
expenditure. 
In order to be economically sustainable in the long term, 
some negative economic impacts must be mitigated. The 
costs and benefits of mining may be unfairly distributed 
between stakeholders, in particular where regulatory 
frameworks for equitable benefit, tax sharing and 
social and economic impact assessment provisions are 
insufficient. For some municipalities the costs of the 
increased needs for public services, such as health care, 
are not compensated by the local tax gains associated 
with mining. In addition, mining may contribute to an 
overall strategy of economic diversification in some 
regions and thereby complement the employment 
structure, with family members being able to work in 
various industries. However, it may also take away jobs 
from other local economic activities, such as reindeer 
herding or tourism.21
20. International Council on Mining and Metals (2003), 10 Principles, http://
www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-development-framework/10-principles. 
Accessed 1 July 2013.
21. European Commission (May 2009), All that Glitters is not Gold, http://
ec.europa.eu/research/sd/conference/2009/presentations/20/jakub_kronen-
berg_-_opportunity_costs_of_gold_mining.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2013.
Picture 7.2: Abandoned mine in Pyramiden, Svalbard. 
Photo: Frits Steenhuisen, Arctic Centre, University of Groningen.
7
.
- 94 -
7.4.3 Social Impacts
Social impacts are both the positive and negative changes 
to many aspects of the culture and livelihoods of local and 
regional populations and communities, and are closely 
related to the economic and environmental impacts. The 
social effects of new and existing mining activities occur 
mostly at the community level, potentially transforming 
the local economy, society and cultures, both indigenous 
and non-indigenous.22  
Mining activity potentially creates local jobs, 
infrastructure, services and businesses, and thus helps 
to address various social problems typically faced by 
remote small Arctic communities (see Chapter 7). The 
associated development of transport infrastructure 
improves the accessibility of places that can benefit the 
local population and other economic sectors. In addition, 
local infrastructure and community services may be built 
or expanded to meet additional demand such as schools, 
administration, law enforcement, health care and 
emergency response. This includes the transfer of skills 
and technology to the local population. Some regions 
have adopted an active policy for local capacity building. 
The universities of Luleå (Sweden) and Oulu (Finland) 
have initiated a Nordic Mining School,23 and Greenland 
has opened a mining school in Sisimiut. 
In many communities, mining and associated activities 
interfere with other human activities and land uses such 
as reindeer herding, tourism, fishing and transport (see 
Chapter 8). Regions such as Lapland have had a history of 
out-migration and are now experiencing a localised influx 
of workers. While this may bring new life to villages,24 
evidence indicates that many temporary newcomers 
develop only a utilitarian relation to the area.25 This is 
often in sharp contrast to the relation that indigenous 
peoples have with their ecosystem. Mining can also 
impact the well-being and health of local populations. 
Impacts on leisure activities may be experienced directly, 
for example through noise, dust, vibrations, gaseous 
emissions, water effluents, or indirectly through the 
appearance of excavations and processing sites. Long-
term impacts on the environment may also lead to 
health problems.
22. cf Van Schooten, M., Vanclay, F. & Slootweg, R. (2003), “Conceptualizing 
social change processes and social impacts”, in Becker, H.A. & Vanclay, F. 
(eds), The International Handbook of Social Impact Assessment. Conceptual 
and Methodological Advances, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 74-91; SDWG, 
Circumpolar Information Guide: 6
23. Nordic Mining School, http://nordicminingschool.eu/.
24. Smit, C.A. (2012), Governance of oil, gas and mining development in 
Greenland and the Arctic, Master thesis WUR, Netherlands; AFPA (2010).
25. Arctic Portal at http://portlets.arcticportal.org/mining-projects. Accessed 
12 June 2013.
7.5 Implications of Arctic 
Mining for the European 
Union
The EU is a major consumer and importer of Arctic raw 
materials. The EU consumes about one-fifth of global 
metallic metals production, while its own production 
amounts to roughly 3%, and due to the limited number 
of new discoveries this reliance on imports is expected 
to rise in the coming decades.26 Import dependence 
has made the security of the supply of raw materials a 
top policy priority, particularly for critical raw materials 
with deposits in the Arctic.27 The European Commission 
26. European Commission (2008, November 4). The raw materials initiative 
— meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe. Commission 
Communication. COM(2008)699final; European Commission (2008), Staff 
Working Document accompanying Communication: “The Raw Materials Ini-
tiative” SEC(2008) 2741. Weihed, P. (2012) The domestic metallic and mineral 
resources in Europe, Is the lack geological or political?, Presentation. Lulea 
University of Technology, http://www.industrialtechnologies2012.eu/sites/de-
fault/files/presentations_session/Par_Weihed.ppt. Accessed 10 February 2014.
27. Critical raw materials are important in the value chain but subject to high 
risk of supply interruption. The EU is fully dependent on imports of REEs 
from China, which are essential in manufacturing many modern technologies. 
In 2009 China accounted for 95% of the world’s supply of REEs. See: Report 
of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining critical raw materials (European 
Commission) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/critical/
index_en.htm. Accessed 16 March 2014.
Picture 7.3: Kiruna town centre with the LKAB iron ore mine 
in the background, Sweden. As mining activities are planned 
to be extended under the town’s centre, the decision has been 
made to construct a new centre in a different location.
Photo: Adam Stępień, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
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expects that the mining industry will account for as much 
as 20% of the EU’s GDP (directly and indirectly) by 2020.28 
In general, it is estimated that over 30 million jobs in the 
EU are dependent on a stable supply of raw materials.29 
A major (and potentially growing) part of the EU’s 
domestic hard mineral supply comes from the Barents 
region. Further exploitation of European Arctic minerals 
may significantly influence EU supply by enhancing 
diversification and decreasing import dependence, 
especially from regions considered potentially unstable. 
Prospects for developing important REEs and raw 
materials further highlight the strategic significance of 
the Arctic in mineral policy and diplomacy. The European 
Arctic can therefore be seen as a fairly safe and stable 
supply region. A survey among mining companies 
conducted in 2013 by the Fraser Institute pointed to 
Finland and Sweden as the most promising mining 
territories in terms of public policies and potential.30 
Mining is important for the EU’s labour market. Notably, 
mining industries are international in terms of both 
their ownership structure and workforce. In the Barents 
region and Greenland, construction and operation of 
mines involves foreign labour, a noticeable portion 
of which comes from EU member states, e.g. Poland. 
Greenland, with its small population of 56 000, is unable 
to provide the 4 000 to 8 000 skilled workers that are 
required during the construction phase. 
Environmental protection is another key interest of the 
EU. Mines have significant local environmental impacts. 
Particular operations are noteworthy for the EU with 
regard to greenhouse gas emission targets (e.g. nickel) 
and mercury pollution (e.g. gold). 
Sustainable development of the northern sparsely 
populated regions is an EU interest as defined in treaties 
and demonstrated by funding programmes.31 Mining 
28. European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials, https://ec.europa.eu/
eip/raw-materials/en. Accessed 15 December 2013.
29. European Commission (2008). Communication ‘The raw materials initia-
tive — meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe’, COM(2008) 
699 final, 4 November 2008.
30. Wilson, A., McMahon, F. & Cervantes, M. (2013). Survey of Mining Com-
panies 2012/2013. Frasier Institute: Canada.  http://www.fraserinstitute.org/
research-news/display.aspx?id=19401. Accessed 10 March 2014.
31. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 174 “particular at-
developments would add to economic diversity of these 
areas, but also increase their dependence on primary 
resource production. Moreover, the EU emphasises its 
commitment to the principles of cultural diversity and 
indigenous rights.32
7.6 Outlook to 203033,34
The global demand for mineral resources, in particular 
REEs, is likely to rise.35 Albeit with regional differences, 
mining in the Arctic is generally challenging, costly and 
uncertain, and the ongoing expansion of mining activity 
depends on the feasibility and willingness of investors 
to risk long-term investments. Technological advances 
will facilitate mining itself and contribute to increasing 
demand for certain minerals. The trend is expected to 
continue, including maintaining the boom-and-bust 
characteristics and uncertainty. Stricter regulations, for 
example on shipping, health and safety, and local and 
indigenous populations, are also expected. This should 
result in more attention being paid to social issues and 
social responsibility, and increase the importance of 
complying with international standards. The importance 
of Fennoscandia for European industry could potentially 
be growing due to EU and state policies that are 
favourable to domestic supply.
tention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and 
regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic hand-
icaps such as the northernmost regions with very low population density”; See 
the Northern Periphery Programme 2007-2013, http://www.northernperiphery.
eu/en/home/ and Chapter 7 Social and Cultural Changes in the European Arc-
tic.
32. See: e.g. European Agenda for Culture, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-pol-
icy-development/european-agenda-for-culture_en.htm and EU External Ac-
tion service, http://eeas.europa.eu/_human_rights/ip/index_en.htm. Accessed 
13 November 2013.
33. British Geological Survey (2012). European Mineral Statistics 2007-2011. 
https://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/europeanStatistics.html. Accessed 
12 July 2013. See also ÅF-Infrastructure AB (2010). Supply of Raw Materials, 
Transport Needs and Economic Potential in Northern Europe. Final Report.
34. Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum Greenland website at http://www.gov 
min.gl/index.php/minerals/geology-of-greenland/mineral-occurrences. Ac-
cessed 15 July 2013.
35. See: e.g. Keramidas, K., Kitous, A.  & Griffin, B. (2012). Future availabil-
ity and demand for oil gas and key minerals. POLINARES working paper nr. 
30.
Importance of Minerals Production in Fennoscandia and the Russian North for the EU
In general, a significant share of EU minerals production takes place in Arctic regions, though data for all 
minerals is not available. Sweden and Finland together are the principal mining and processing regions for 
the “EU35” – EU member states, EEA, EFTA and candidate countries including Turkey. In 2011, they accounted 
for 17.5% of EU35 silver production, 28% of gold, 10.5% of copper and 27% of zinc. In addition, the Russian 
North has significant mineral deposits and production, with the Murmansk Oblast (over 200 deposits of 40 
types of minerals) contributing 80% of rare metals, and the Arkhangelsk Oblast housing the largest bauxite 
mine in Europe. With regard to the critical raw materials, Finland contributes 62% and Norway 18% of EU35 
cobalt production.33 Surveys in Greenland (primarily in west Greenland) indicate deposits of niobium, tantalum, 
graphite, platinum and other REEs.34 
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7.7 EU Influence on Arctic 
Mining: Assessing EU Policies 
The EU influences the mining sector directly and indirectly 
through legislation and various policy measures. EU policy 
aims to create favourable conditions for mining in the 
European north. The Raw Materials Initiative, launched 
in 2008, identified measures to secure supplies of raw 
materials for the EU from domestic and international 
sources.36 In addition, the EU published a communication 
aiming to tackle the challenges in commodity markets, 
specifically concerning raw materials.37 Raw material 
supply (current and future) from EU domestic sources is 
fostered by promoting investment in extractive industries 
and enhancing knowledge. An EU working group 
produced a compendium of best practices, including 
social issues, stakeholder engagement and transparency, 
as well as considering the societal benefits of minerals 
extraction.38 The Commission has encouraged member 
states to develop national minerals policies, set up 
comprehensive land-use planning policies for minerals, 
and to streamline permitting processes.39 As the focus 
of the Raw Materials Initiative and its measures is on 
facilitating mining developments in Europe, surprisingly 
little attention is given to establishing a comprehensive 
environmental framework, participatory processes or 
the broader social dimension of mining. 
The Barents region and Greenland can be viewed as 
secure source areas for minerals. So far, however, EU 
policy-makers have not given particular attention to 
the potential of the Barents region – the region with 
the most recent exploration discoveries. The European 
Innovation Partnership (EIP) for Raw Materials can be 
an important element in this respect, as it is intended to 
support the high-quality performance of the European 
mining industry. Nordic states already have a strong 
position – the Finnish Green Mining programme is a 
good example.40 However, the EIP membership, which 
primarily consists of parties from the broader mining 
industry and academia, is limiting participation in the 
process.
Various EU regulations, many of which apply to European 
Economic Area (EEA) countries, contribute to mitigating 
36. European Commission COM(2008)699 final.
37. European Commission, Communication ‘Tackling The Challenges In 
Commodity Markets And On Raw Materials’, COM(2011)25 final, 2 February 
2011.
38. This report was produced by the working group on the exchange of best 
practices in land use planning, permits and geological knowledge sharing, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/files/best-practices/sust-
full-report_en.pdf. Accessed 4 March 2014.
39. See: European Commission Report on the implementation of the Raw 
Materials Initiative, COM(2013)442 final, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2011876%202013%20
INIT. Accessed 16 February 2014.
40. Green Mining Programme, TEKES, www.tekes.fi/en/programmes-and-ser-
vices/tekes-programmes/green-mining/. Accessed 5 February 2014.
the environmental impacts of mining and setting 
limits to resource extraction. Examples include: Water 
Framework Directive and Groundwater Directive;41 
Mining Waste Directive and Landfill Waste Directive;42 
and more broadly, the Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control43 and Seveso-III Directives.44 The Mineral-
Extracting Industries – Drilling Directive establishes the 
minimum requirements for improving the safety and 
health protection of workers related to drilling.45 
REACH Regulation 1907/2006/EC (Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals)46 
applies to the mining industry both as a user of 
chemicals (mines have to report the use of chemicals 
to the supplier) as well as to mining products (ores and 
concentrates in the case of chemical alteration). While 
materials occurring in nature are exempted from REACH, 
they have to be registered under Classification, Labelling 
and Packaging Regulation.47 An important framework is 
created by the Habitats and Birds Directives48 and the 
Natura 2000 network of protected areas. The European 
Commission issued guidance49 dedicated to reconciling 
the environmental objectives with the desire to promote 
mineral extraction. The Commission has also encouraged 
the mining sector to undertake non-obligatory actions to 
enhance sustainable development and safe operations.
Since EIAs are critically important for mining projects, the 
minimum requirements established by the EIA Directive 
(EEA relevant, revision currently underway) are of major 
significance for how mining projects are developed.50  
EU policies regarding transport also influence mining 
activities in the Arctic. EU initiatives such as the trans-
European transport network (TEN-T) play a vital role in 
41. Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy (extended later to the EEA) and 
Directive 2006/118/EC of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater 
against pollution and deterioration.
42. Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from the extractive 
industries and Directive 99/31EC
43. Directive 2008/1/EC of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control (Codified version).
44. Directive 2012/18/EU on the control of major-accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances.
45. Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the mini-
mum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers 
in the mineral-extracting industries through drilling.
46. Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 concerning the Reg-
istration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH).
47. Kauppila et al. (2013); Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 on classification, 
labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures.
48. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natu-
ral habitats and of wild fauna and flora; Directive 2009/147/EC of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of 
wild birds. Also; Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 on the voluntary participation 
by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS 
III) may be of relevance: although extractive industries are not identified as a 
priority sector; the directive deals also with waste management.
49. European Commission (July 2010). Guidance on undertaking non-energy 
extractive activities in accordance with Natura 2000 requirements.
50. Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the ef-
fects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification).
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enhancing capacity and multi-modality transport. The 
network has been recently updated in line with a new 
financial perspective. As the core EU transport network 
does not extend to the Barents region apart from the 
“Bothnian corridor” and Kiruna connection, the EU 
funding available for transport projects of importance 
for the Barents mining industry may be limited (see 
Chapter 9).
The recent amendment to the EU Sulphur Directive51 
(following MARPOL convention52 amendments) limits the 
sulphur content in marine fuels after 2015, especially in 
the specified Emissions Control Areas such as the Baltic 
Sea. Some industry stakeholders fear that increased fuel 
costs could influence the economic conditions of mining 
operations in northern Sweden and Finland, thereby 
affecting their competitiveness. For example, Finnish 
industry estimated that the total increase in transport 
costs would amount to up to EUR 500 million per year.53 
On the other hand, the environmental gains, especially 
in the Baltic Sea, are appreciated by other stakeholders.
Through its research policies and actions, EU policy has 
supported Arctic research on innovation and sustainability 
in mining in the Framework Programme 7 (FP7) and EU 
regional funds.54 Mining research projects (dealing with 
mining technologies, resources and sustainability) are 
also to be expected (first calls already published) in the 
Horizon 2020, where raw materials are identified as 
one of the key societal challenges.55 The need for a rise 
in research and development funding for exploration 
technology will become evident over the coming decade. 
EIP is currently gathering “commitments” from industry 
partners that may constitute bases for networking and 
joint projects, and could support identification of specific 
research and development needs under Horizon 2020.
The EU has a special relationship with Greenland, 
which is underlined in the 2007-2013 EU-Greenland 
Partnership Agreement. Mineral resources were 
included as one of the six areas for co-operation, 
although the actual focus was rather limited. Recently, 
a Letter of Intent between the European Commission 
and the Government of Greenland enlisted co-operation 
in: geological knowledge; analysis of infrastructure and 
investment needs; capacity building; environmental 
impacts and social impacts.56 There are expectations that 
51. Directive 2012/33/EU of 21 November 2012 amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur content of marine fuels.
52. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and 
1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78), 1340 UNTS 184, 12 ILM 1319 (1973).
53. Nordström, K. (May 2013). Sulfur directive impact on terminals in Bal-
tic sea region, Some current reflections, presentation, http://www.centrumbalti 
cum.org/. Accessed 5 March 2014; European Commission, http://ec.europa.
eu/environment/air/transport/ships.htm. Accessed 5 March 2014
54. See examples in Annex 2.
55. Horizon 2020, Work programme 2014-2015.  12. Climate action, environ-
ment, resource efficiency and raw materials. European Commission Decision 
C (2013) 8631 of 10 December 2013
56. European Commission - MEMO/12/428   13/06/2012 Greenland’s raw ma-
terials potential and the EU’s strategic needs. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
minerals may be one of the key themes of the currently 
finalised partnership agreement for 2014-2020.57 
Greenland is seen as a potentially significant partner 
with the EU for REEs. Apart from Greenland, the EU 
conducts raw materials dialogues and expert workshops 
with the United States and Russia, but so far with few 
specific outcomes, especially regarding Arctic issues. 
Free trade area agreements, e.g. with the United States 
and Canada, may come into effect in the near term, 
which may also influence the operations of international 
mining companies in the EU.
7.8 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-making
Critical factors for EU decision-making include 
uncertainties that should be taken fully into account. 
Drawing on stakeholder input in the consultation process, 
several of the critical factors are highlighted below. 
Land-use conflicts, ranked high by the stakeholders, are 
covered in Chapter 8. 
7.8.1 Global and European Demand for 
Resources
Mining activity remains highly sensitive to global demand 
for resources and commodity prices on the global market. 
This is particularly relevant in the Arctic, where mining 
is a comparatively highly capital-intensive activity. This 
causes a high degree of uncertainty, not only for the 
industry itself, but also for national economies and local 
communities that can be affected by the boom-and-bust 
character of mining. 
7.8.2 Environmental Concerns and 
Uncertainty
Stakeholders highlighted the importance of ecosystem 
services and land-use conflicts in relation to mining, in 
particular with reference to Sámi reindeer herding and 
nature-based tourism. EIAs are usually in place, but the 
effectiveness and degree of influence of EIAs varies in 
different countries and is generally not straightforward, 
since decisions are weighed in the context of other 
considerations. There is also concern over the increased 
risks of environmental disasters and the effects of 
permanent or temporary closures of mines. 
lease_MEMO-12-428_en.htm. Accessed 4 March 2014
57. The European Commission has commissioned a study on the significance 
of the mineral potential of Greenland for the EU economy and possible ideas 
for projects and co-operation.
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7.8.3 Local Communities and 
Socioeconomic Impacts
At the local level, there is often uncertainty and 
concern about the socioeconomic effects of new mine 
developments, in particular in relation to effects on 
the workforce and composition of the population. 
Social issues are usually considered as a part of an 
environmental assessment procedure (or a separate, 
albeit connected process, as in Greenland) or within the 
process leading to benefit agreements. Multinational 
companies are expected to adhere to the principles 
of Corporate Social Responsibility and to acquire an 
informal social licence to operate. Nevertheless, there 
are many unresolved issues, for instance in relation to 
land ownership and use.
 
7.8.4 Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and 
Livelihoods
Mining activities and their impacts on traditional 
livelihoods (especially reindeer herding) are of major 
concern for Arctic indigenous peoples. Reindeer herding 
requires vast areas for winter and summer pastures. 
Mining may lead to the reduction of reindeer grazing 
areas, resulting in land-use conflicts. There are various 
resource governance systems and arrangements 
connected with the distribution of benefits in the Arctic, 
and there are also a variety of co-management regimes. 
Issues of control over resources and property rights will 
evolve in the near future, partly due to international 
recognition and increasing awareness of the rights of 
indigenous peoples, manifested by the 2007 United 
Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
which includes the concept of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC).58  
7.8.5 Existing Decision-Making Structures 
and Policy
This principle of using Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
for mining projects is related to the more general notion 
that there is a need for better and more inclusive decision-
making structures and policies, where people are not 
only heard, but can also clearly influence decisions. 
On the one hand, many communities and stakeholders 
feel that the processes leading to decisions and the 
decision-making processes and structures themselves 
are inadequate for responding to challenges arising from 
mining projects. On the other hand, the industry finds 
itself faced with long permitting processes, administrative 
uncertainty and complex bureaucracy. Better and more 
inclusive processes are called for, including improved 
dialogue, communication and consultation throughout 
the entire project life-cycle. The existing decision-making 
58. Hanna, F. & Vanclay, F. (2013), “Human Rights, Indigenous peoples and 
the concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent”, Impact Assessment and 
Project Appraisal, 31:2, 146-157.
structures need to be taken into account when policies 
are made at the EU level.
7.9 Recommendations
So far the EU’s role and interest in the European Arctic 
as a resource region has been limited. The EU does not 
have direct authority regarding some of the main critical 
issues (e.g. land use), but there are a number of key 
policy areas in which the EU plays a relevant role. The 
following recommendations, which the report authors 
developed by taking ideas from stakeholders as a starting 
point, should be considered. 
7.9.1 Facilitate the Collection and Sharing 
of Data, Knowledge and Information 
In order to ensure integrated assessments, monitoring 
and informed decisions, reliable and comparable data 
and information on mining activity in the European Arctic 
should be collected and updated frequently. Acquiring 
and sharing accurate information and best practices will 
benefit governments, businesses and communities. The 
EU also has a role to play in stimulating high standard 
research, education and capacity building. The possible 
tools include communication and data platforms or 
research projects built on the needs of industry, national 
permitting authorities and communities. Information 
platforms may be based on INSPIRE infrastructure and 
the outcome of projects like Promine (which maps 
European mineral resources).59 This process has already 
started within the European Innovation Partnership 
(EIP) on Raw Materials, which aims to identify research 
needs and potentials. However, the present initiative 
lacks significant input from those both positively and 
negatively affected by mining activities, such as local 
communities or other land users.
7.9.2 Develop an Integrated View on the 
Mining Sector and Transparent Policies
Although there are many EU policies and regulations that 
have a connection with mining, there is no integrated 
comprehensive policy overview for the mining sector 
in the European Arctic. This policy should be robust 
and flexible as stakeholders emphasise that current EU 
directives are detailed and prescriptive, whereas local 
conditions in the Arctic vary substantially. Therefore, 
more flexibility and local-level variation are required. At 
the same time, businesses need more transparency in 
regulations and policies to enhance the competiveness 
of the sector. The 2008 Raw Materials Initiative and the 
process that followed comprise an appropriate initial 
framework, as it integrates production, import and 
59. Promine project, http://promine.gtk.fi/. Accessed 18 February 2014.
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recycling. However, there is a need for greater focus 
on mining within the EU and the Arctic as an area with 
major potential, attention to social impacts, as well as 
more comprehensive and structured exchange of best 
practices between member states.60 Refinement of 
minerals within the Arctic regions could be supported, 
so that the regional economy gains greater benefits from 
the minerals extracted in the North.
7.9.3 Harmonise Environmental, Economic 
and Social Assessments 
EU policy should be directed towards ensuring that 
the current level of good practice in EIAs is maintained 
and improved where necessary. Improvements include 
addressing issues related to mine closure and safety, 
emergencies and hazards. Social and economic issues 
should be effectively addressed in assessment processes. 
For that, the EU needs a clear vision and policy to 
address the social and economic impacts in all phases of 
the lifecycle of mining. In this respect, EU policy should 
be in line with international human rights developments 
(e.g. the principle of Free Prior and Informed Consent), 
and the current practice of the social responsibility of 
businesses (CSR). There is a need for the inclusion of 
the general principles connected with social licence 
to operate into the EU regulatory framework covering 
mining activities, including EIAs. Harmonisation, basic 
standards (including the assessment of social impacts) 
and procedures may enable companies operating across 
national boundaries to perform more effectively. 
7.9.4 Improving Dialogue and Meaningful 
Consultation, in Particular with Indigenous 
and Local People
For the EU in general, more efforts should be made to 
involve communities and indigenous populations in 
remote regions in relevant EU policies and directives. 
Particularly for mining activities, these efforts should be 
directed towards improving dialogue with and between 
stakeholders in order to allow meaningful consultation. 
Many stakeholders feel that the awareness among EU 
decision-makers of northern livelihoods, in particular 
traditional livelihoods and cultural identity of indigenous 
peoples, should be improved. Overall consultation 
procedures conducted by the European Commission may 
prove insufficient for stakeholders in remote regions such 
as Lapland and those who experience specific challenges 
(such as indigenous communities). Constraints include: 
understanding of the influence of EU policies, capacity 
to participate in a meaningful way and human resources. 
60. European Commission Report on the implementation of the Raw Mate-
rials Initiative, COM(2013)442 final, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2011876%202013%20INIT. 
Accessed 16 February 2014.
7.9.5 Support International Governance 
and Cooperation Enhancing Responsible 
Mining
Various international environmental instruments may 
be relevant to mining operations, for example the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. However, international 
regulation and guidelines specific to Arctic mining 
can be considered to be fairly weak. For example, the 
Arctic EIA Guidelines adopted in 1997 under the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy remain largely 
unknown to both regulators and companies.61 The 
Commission, in the development of its Arctic policy and 
its activities within the Arctic Council as an observer 
in principle, should focus attention on promoting and 
facilitating past and future Arctic Council work on 
environmental and social impact assessments. The 
Commission should strengthen its activities regarding 
various international developments such as international 
transport, International Maritime Organization 
negotiations on environmental performance of Arctic 
shipping in the Polar Code and sulphur regulation as 
well as international EIA standards. Co-operation within 
and across the mining industry may also influence 
mine operation norms and corporate standard setting. 
This can be done, for example, via the European 
Innovation Partnership or co-operation with the 
European Association for mining industries, metal ores 
and industrial minerals (euromine). Also, EU dialogues 
on minerals with Arctic partners and suppliers of the 
EU market such as the United States, Russia, Canada, 
Norway and Greenland, may in the long term be used as a 
tool for promoting high standards in responsible mining. 
However, it is important to engage a broad spectrum 
of stakeholders, going beyond the sole involvement of 
industry. 
61. Koivurova, T. (2007). Implementing Guidelines for Environmental Impact 
Assessment in the Arctic. In Theory and Practise of Transboundary Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (eds. Bastmeijer and Koivurova), Martinus Nijhoff, 
pp. 151-173.
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Key Messages:
•	 Globalisation, demand for resources and the indirect effects of climate change trigger a 
multiplicity of developments in the European Arctic.
•	 Conflicts with activities requiring vast areas and pristine nature, such as reindeer herding, 
tourism or nature conservation, are possible. 
•	 Impact assessments, participation and dialogue are key to avoiding conflicts.
•	 EU regulations affect all land use activities as well as contribute to frameworks governing 
interactions between these activities.
•	 Critical factors for EU decision-making are human well-being and social sustainability, 
public participation and indigenous rights.
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Increase knowledge generation and sharing
•	 Include social impact assessment more effectively in the environmental impact 
assessment process.
* Acknowledgments for input and comments: Timo Koivurova, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland; May-Britt 
Öhman, University of Uppsala, Sweden; Svein Lund, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature; Jenni Laiti, 
student at University of Umeå, Sweden; Jonas Vannar, Sirges Sámi Community, Sweden; and Satu Luiro, Regional 
Council of Lapland, Finland. 
“Human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights to both land and culture must 
come first. Having these core issues respected will without doubt be the best 
way to avoid and resolve conflicts…”
Local Government, Norway
“Environmental factors must define limits to natural resource use. To stay 
within ecologically defined frames is an imperative for future sustainability. 
Social and cultural values must define societies’ development, and the 
economy must be developed and managed in order to achieve social 
objectives…”
Environmental NGO, Sweden
“Respect for the existing international legal regime, as well as the 
establishment of mechanisms that enhance the full and effective participation 
of indigenous peoples in decision making. Resource mechanisms should be 
available in cases of rights violations due to land use conflicts…”
NGO, Denmark
Chapter cover image: Hiker passing by Suorva Dam close to the Sarek National Park 
in Swedish Lapland.
Photo: Adam Stępień, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland.
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
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8.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on various activities affecting land 
use in the European Arctic and especially in Fennoscandia, 
where European Union (EU) policies have the greatest 
influence. The European Arctic is a resource-rich region 
with minerals, forests and hydrocarbons that attract 
domestic and international interest and investment. 
Northern communities often view large-scale activities 
as a basis for economic sustainability.1 Yet they may 
also have consequences such as losses of biodiversity, 
ecotourism and reindeer pastures. The culture and 
livelihoods of Arctic peoples – such as the Sámi – are 
tightly connected to the land they have occupied and 
used for centuries. 
Based on the case of Finnish Lapland, Suopajärvi defines 
three distinct perspectives on the relationship between 
humans and nature: 1) traditional livelihoods such as 
reindeer husbandry and agriculture define nature as lived 
space; 2) industries such as mining, large-scale forestry 
and hydroelectric power generation see nature as a 
resource; and 3) tourism in the postmodern society sees 
nature as a place of experience.2 The interactions among 
these three perspectives provide the key elements to 
understanding land-use conflicts in the European Arctic.
1. Economic sustainability is the term used to identify various strategies that 
make it possible to use available resources to their best advantage. The idea 
is to promote the use of those resources in a way that is both efficient and 
responsible, and likely to provide long-term benefits. In the case of a business 
operation, it calls for using resources so that the business continues to function 
over a number of years, while consistently returning a profit.
2. Suopajärvi, L. (2003). Competing industries and contested nature in Finnish 
Lapland after World War II, in S. Moller, and S. Phonon (eds.), Encountering 
the North. Cultural Geography, International Relations and Northern Land-
scapes. (pp. 203-220). Ashgate, Aldershot.
8.2 Key Drivers of Land-use 
Pressures
8.2.1 Globalisation
The most important factor putting significant pressure on 
Arctic land use is economic globalisation. Global demand 
for resources is increasing the presence of multinational 
companies, bringing with it investment, trade and 
technological innovation. For example, new Arctic 
mining developments and the reopening of old mines 
have been stimulated primarily by global demand and 
attractive prices for minerals and metals (see Chapter 7). 
8.2.2 Climate Change
Climate change is a critical driver of overall change in 
Arctic biodiversity (see Chapter 3), but it also has indirect 
effects on land-use activities. Climate change is also 
a political driver as international climate agreements 
and climate policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions potentially increase the demand for renewable 
energy production.3 
An example of an indirect effect is the opening of the 
Northern Sea Route through which cargo would be 
transported to world markets. This would require new 
transportation infrastructure, such as roads, putting 
pressure on land previously used for tourism, reindeer 
herding, agriculture and other forms of livelihood, as 
well as for nature conservation. New roads and railways 
also provide new pathways for invasive species, which 
can affect species diversity and distribution. These 
additional impacts are often felt cumulatively, including 
other effects of climate change.
3. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, 
Kyoto Protocol.
Picture 8.1: Arctic Landscape – “Empty” at first sight, but full of human activities. 
Photo: Paula Kankaanpää, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland.
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8.2.3 Increasing Role of Environmental 
Values
Preservation of the natural environment in order to 
protect biodiversity and avoid habitat fragmentation is 
an important driver affecting land use in the Arctic. The 
environment has an intrinsic value and is important for 
human well-being. A term often used in this context 
is “environmental / ecosystem services”, which can be 
understood as benefits that the natural environment 
provides expressed in economic terms. 
8.3 Main Land-use Activities 
and their Interconnections 
The land-use activities discussed here include mining, 
tourism, forestry, reindeer husbandry, renewable energy, 
transport, nature conservation and subsistence use of 
forests. Mining has a variety of impacts and interrelations 
with other human activities and is presented in Chapter 7. 
Therefore, it is only discussed here from the perspective 
of its relationship (e.g. conflicts and synergies) with 
other land-use activities (Figure 8.1).
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Kallak/Gállok - planned mine 
conflicting with Sámi reindeer 
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(some of the proposed routes)
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Planned upgrade of 
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Main land-use activities in Northern Fennoscandia
Examples of land use tensions
Inari - forestry conflicting with 
reindeer herding (resolved) Sources: Geological Survey of Finland; Nordic Center for Spacial Development, 2009; The Barents Euro-Arctic Region, 
Joints Barents Transport Plan, 2013; Barentsinfo.org
RICCARDO PRAVETTONI-GRID ARENDAL 2014
Figure 8.1: Main Land-Use Activities Causing Pressures in Northern Fennoscandia (southern boundary – Barents region). 
Source: R. Pravettoni, GRID-Arendal.
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8.3.1 Tourism
Tourism is one of the largest sources of income in 
many northern areas; for example, in Finland some 
municipalities receive almost half of their revenue 
from tourism.4 Tourism areas (e.g. ski resorts) are 
often connected to nature conservation areas. Nature 
conversation areas are also attractive for ecotourism. 
In some cases, parks have obtained sustainable tourism 
certifications, e.g. PAN Parks Certification.5
Mining development and operations are among the 
greatest threats to eco-tourism and have considerable 
impacts on the landscape. Open-pit mines adjacent to 
recreational areas such as national parks and ski resorts 
may decrease the number of visitors. A survey conducted 
in Finnish Lapland at the Ylläs ski resort next to the 
Hannukainen mining project (see textbox) and at the 
4. Satokangas, P. (2013). Matkailulla maakunta menestyy - Matkailun tulo- ja 
työllisyysvaikutukset 12 lappilaisessa kunnassa vuonna 2011. Lapin korkeak-
oulukonserni. Rovaniemi, p. 44. [County’s profits come from tourism – the 
impacts of tourism on income and employment in 12 municipalities in Lapland 
in 2011].
5. The PAN Parks certificate is awarded to extensive wilderness-like protect-
ed areas that successfully combine nature conservation and sustainable nature 
tourism. www.panparks.org
Levi ski resort next to Kittilä mine indicated that visitors 
come to Lapland for the pristine natural landscape and 
silence. Tourists envisioned that mining would have 
more negative impacts on tourism than local people did.6
8.3.2 Forestry
Forestry has traditionally been a large employer in 
Nordic countries, especially in Sweden and Finland (14% 
of EU/European Economic Area’s [EEA] total forest area 
is located in northern Sweden, Norway and Finland). 
More recently the number of jobs has decreased due to 
heavy mechanisation and globalisation, for example as 
companies relocate pulp mills.7,8 Forestry is still one of the 
key land-use forms in the Arctic, but the benefits from 
forestry are no longer distributed to local and regional 
actors as widely as before, and hence the position of 
6. Jokinen, M. & Tyrväinen, L. (2013). Can We Predict with Tourist Opinions? 
http://www.metla.fi/hanke/7451/pdf/13052013-jokin en-ja-tyrvainen.pdf. Ac-
cessed 20 February 2014.
7. For example in Finland, this has led to the closing of the Kemijärvi pulp mill 
- a very important employer in the local area
8. Sarkki, S. & Rönkä, A. R. (2012). Neoliberalisations in Finnish Forestry. 
Forest Policy and Economics 15, 152–159
Can Mining Co-exist with Tourism? – Case of Hannukainen
Studies are underway for the proposed Hannukainen project in northern Finland to exploit iron ore deposits 
with re-opening of an open pit mine (Picture 8.2.). The area has developed infrastructure with paved roads, rail 
and high voltage power lines. The mining site is located 10 kilometres from the Ylläs ski resort and the Pallas-
Ylläs National Park, Finland’s most popular park. 
The main concern arising from the Hannukainen mine development is that it may impair the image of the area 
as attractive for nature-based recreation. One problem is the plan to pipe treated process water from the mine 
to the Muonio River, one of the last major free salmon rivers in Finland and an EU Natura 2000 protected area. 
Secondly the municipality of Kolari relies on tourism for 50% of its revenue and thirdly, reindeer herders are 
concerned about disruption from mining noise and activities, and the loss or fragmentation of grazing areas.
Picture 8.2: Hannukainen Mine Site and Near-by Ylläs Ski Resort. 
Photo: Northland Mine Ltd.
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forestry as self-evidently the most profitable form of land 
use is changing. Over the past two decades, both the 
number of tourists and the economic benefits of tourism 
have risen, while at the same time reindeer herding and 
nature conservation have gained more attention from 
policy-makers and the public. Sometimes this leads to 
conflicts between forestry and other activities, with 
forestry losing its earlier dominant position (e.g. the 
case of Inari, Figure 8.1.). In Finland many forest disputes 
in the period 2000-2010 were resolved in favour of 
nature conservationists, reindeer herders and tourism 
entrepreneurs, resulting in a decline in the area of forest 
that can be used for industrialised forestry.9,10 
8.3.3 Renewable Energy
Demand for wind power is anticipated to rise in the 
European Arctic due to the EU targets for renewable 
energy.11 Wind power development plans often encounter 
resistance among local people due to the resulting 
changes in the landscape and possible effects on eco-
tourism. Wind power installations also disturb reindeer 
herding. The construction of hydroelectric power plants 
has changed the landscape and affected land use in 
the European Arctic. However, environmental policies 
(including Natura 2000) and a shift in public attitudes 
concerning hydropower (due to better understanding 
of the impacts in the 1970s and 1980s) have prevented 
construction of new hydropower plants and may even 
lead to a reduction in the current hydropower capacity.12 
The situation is different in Greenland where hydropower 
investments are key development priorities: as a way to 
provide power for isolated Greenlandic communities and 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from diesel-fired power 
stations, but possibly also to encourage development of 
energy-intensive industries (as is for example the case 
with existing or planned aluminium smelters in Iceland 
and Greenland). 
8.3.4 Reindeer Husbandry
Reindeer herding is believed to be a flexible activity that 
can co-exist with other land-use activities. In practice, 
however, this has usually meant that reindeer herders 
have had to move to other grazing sites. The landscape of 
northern Fennoscandia might appear to be empty at first 
glance, but in fact the land is divided between reindeer 
9. Sarkki, S. & Heikkinen, H. (2010). Social Movements’ Pressure Strategies 
during Forest Disputes in Finland. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Re-
search 2(3), 281–296.
10. Sarkki, S. & Karjalainen, T.P. (2012). Science and Issue Advocacy in a 
Forest Debate in Finland. The Polar Journal 2(1), 125 – 138
11. In the European Arctic, especially in Finland and Norway, the amount of 
wind power produced annually is very low (Finland: 447 megawatts (MW) in 
2013, Norway: 703 MW in 2012) compared to Sweden and Denmark (over 4 
000 MW in 2013).
12. Energiateollisuus, http://energia.fi/energia-ja-ymparisto/energiala hteet/
vesivoima, Accessed 12 March 2014.
herding districts where the animals graze and migrate 
between winter and summer pastures. Mining, oil and 
gas extraction and large-scale forestry have reduced the 
size of available pasturelands for reindeer husbandry. 
In Sweden and Norway reindeer herding is strongly 
connected to Sámi culture and practiced exclusively by 
the Sámi (in Finland it is practised by both Finns and the 
Sámi). Reindeer herders use traditional summer and 
(critically important) winter pastures that the family/
village have used for generations (Picture 8.3.). Land-
use changes can result in the fragmentation of pastures 
or disturbance to calving and culling areas and reindeer 
migration corridors.
One commonly debated issue in all Nordic countries 
is predator management, regulatory protection and 
reindeer killed by wolves, wolverines, lynxes, golden 
eagles and brown bears. Reindeer herders have adapted 
to climate change and EU policies (e.g. regulations on 
reindeer meat production and slaughtering), but they 
cannot adapt to the increasing numbers of reindeer 
killed by predators (in Finland, the number grew 2.5-fold 
between 1995 and 2007, with some cooperatives losing 
60-70% of calves).13 The government pays compensation 
for the killed reindeer, but that does not cover benefits 
for clothing and handicrafts and the additional time 
and costs incurred by herders when searching for 
reindeer carcasses. Overall, the reduced freedom of 
action resulting from loss of habitat, predation and legal 
constraints is having a more negative impact on reindeer 
herding than climate change.14
13. Vuojala-Magga, T. (2012). Adaptation of Sàmi Reindeer Herding: EU 
Regulation and Climate Change. In Tennberg, M. (Ed.), Governing the Uncer-
tain: Adaptation and Climate in Russia and Finland (101-122), Springer Sci-
ence+Business Media B.V.2012.
14. Tyler, N. J. C., Turi, J. M., Sundset, M. A., Strom Bull, K., Sara, M. N., 
Reinert, E., Oskal, N., Nellemann, C., McCarthy, J. J., Mathiesen, S. D., Mar-
tello, M. L., Magga, O. H., Hovelsrud, G. K., Hanssen-Bauer, I., Eira, N. I., 
Eira, I. M. G. & Corell, R. W. (2007). Sámi reindeer pastoralism under cli-
mate change: Applying a generalized framework for vulnerability studies to a 
Picture 8.3: Traditional Sámi Reindeer Herder Summer Camp, 
Skuolla, Sweden 
Photo: Carl-Johan Utsi.
8
.
- 107 -
8.3.5 Nature Conservation 
Nature conservation does not as such put pressure 
on land use, but it significantly affects land use and all 
the activities discussed above. Arctic biodiversity is an 
irreplaceable cultural, scientific, ecological, economic 
and spiritual asset. However, climate change, industrial 
development, pollution, local disturbances and invasive 
species already affect the Arctic, and it is anticipated that 
the impacts from these stressors will be even greater in 
the future.15  
The challenges for biodiversity are substantial, including 
habitat fragmentation and degradation. Construction 
of roads, railroads, pipelines, drilling and mine sites, 
and dams cause fragmentation of the landscapes and 
habitat losses, with major effects on biodiversity and 
hydrology. Habitat fragmentation can adversely affect 
sub-arctic socio-ecological system. Global Environmental Change 17, 191-206
15. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). 2013. Arctic Biodiversity 
Assessment: Report for Policy Makers. CAFF, Akureyri, Iceland.
species distribution and abundance, as well as nature-
based livelihoods. 
The expansion of industrial activity in the Arctic may also 
increase the local sources of pollution, waste, sewage 
and black carbon.16 These risks to the environment 
affect human health as well as food and water security.17 
People (both indigenous and non-indigenous) in the 
Arctic have a unique relationship with nature, including 
the subsistence use of forests (e.g. berry and mushroom 
picking) and terrestrial and fresh water resources (e.g. 
hunting and fishing). A significant proportion of the local 
diet is derived from these traditional sources; thus, if 
land and water were to be contaminated, food safety 
would be at risk. 
16. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). 2013.
17. Nilsson, L. M., Berner, J., Dudarev, A. A., Mulvad, G., Odland, J. O., Par-
kinson, A., Rautio, A., Tikhonov, C. & Evengård, B. (2013). Indicators of food 
and water security in an Arctic Health context – results from an internation-
al workshop discussion. Int. J Circumpolar Health 72: 21530 – http://dx.doi.
org/10.3402/ijch.v72i0.21530.
Sámi Perspective on Mining – Case of Gállok
A key political issue regarding the interaction between mining and land use in the Nordic countries concerns 
the rights of the Sámi. Gállok (Kallak), an area in Jokkmok municipality in northern Sweden, became globally 
known in 2013 when Sámi and environmental activists demonstrated against iron ore mining (Picture 8.4.). 
The case of Gállok demonstrates the challenges of balancing mining, nature-based livelihoods and the rights 
of indigenous peoples. In Gállok, the environmental concerns include pollution caused by mining to ground 
and fresh water. The main issue, however, is Sámi reindeer herding. The mining site is not vast, but combined 
with the infrastructure, transport vehicles, dust and noise it could have serious negative impacts on reindeer 
herding and Sámi culture. If the mine is opened, the migration route and utilisation of winter pastures will be 
endangered for three Sámi reindeer co-operatives (Sameby) and hundreds of families and households. 
Even when consultation among the local people and Sámi has been conducted, there have been differences in 
opinion on how open the dialogue has been and whether Sami and their culture and livelihood have been taken 
into account by the municipality and other stakeholders in question. Open dialogue, collaborative learning 
and transparent governance are cornerstones of environmental conflict management and the reconciliation 
of mining and other land uses. Sometimes these procedures do not work and there is no true sustainable way 
to integrate different interests and land-use activities. Ore deposits and winter pastures are not transferable. 
In the case of Gállok, the socially and culturally sustainable co-existence of mining and reindeer herding might 
not be possible.
Picture 8.4: Local People and Sámi Demonstrating against the Planned Mining Activities at Gállok in Summer 2013. 
Photo: Carl-Johan Utsi.
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Table 8.1. Land-Use Pressures, Drivers and Impacts in the European Arctic1
Land-Use Pressure Main Drivers Environmental Impacts Social Impacts Economic Impacts
Forestry and wood-based 
small and medium-sized 
industries 
A major land-use activity 
in the north.
Demand for timber, which 
is expected to increase in 
step with the demand for 
green energy. Northern 
regions of Finland, 
Sweden and Norway have 
20 million hectares of 
forest.
Changes in landscape, 
decreased biodiversity, 
habitat destruction and 
fragmentation. Reduced 
nature values and 
impacts on water quality. 
Increased monocultures.
Importance for local 
livelihoods and multi-use 
of wood. Decrease in 
reindeer pasture areas 
and potential effects 
on reindeer husbandry 
culture. Decrease in 
ecotourism areas and 
subsistence use of forests. 
Negative impacts from 
clear-cutting on the 
mental well-being of local 
inhabitants.
More employment 
opportunities (including 
renewable wood-based 
products and handicrafts). 
increased spending. 
Increased tax revenues. 
Increased infrastructure 
(e.g. roads). 
This also has negative 
impacts, as a decrease 
in reindeer grazing lands 
leads to lower production 
in reindeer herding. 
Also has negative impacts 
on ecotourism.
Nature Conservation 
Expansion of protected 
areas. Species protection.
Increased environmental 
awareness and NGO 
actions. Local, national 
and international policies 
and agreements.
Sustain biodiversity 
and habitats. Increase 
populations of big 
predators.
Increased human well-
being of local people 
(cultural significance of 
land, subsistence use of 
forests such as berry and 
mushroom picking, which 
are “everyman’s rights” 
in Finland and can be 
performed in protected 
areas as well). Increased 
nature-based tourism and 
recreational use of lands. 
Also has negative impacts, 
e.g. in Finland where the 
number of predators has 
increased so much that 
wolves and bears come to 
settlements and people 
are afraid to go outside 
of their homes. (The 
problem is not so great 
in other European Arctic 
countries.)
Loss of reindeer to 
predators, leading to 
lower economic growth. 
Decrease in areas used for 
forestry and wood-based 
industry. 
Increase in cultural 
ecosystem services (e.g. 
tourism) and economic 
ecosystem services.18 
Renewable Energy 
Development of wind and 
hydropower plants.
Environmental 
regulations. Local, 
national and international 
policies. Demand for 
sustainable energy.
Decreased biodiversity, 
habitat destruction and 
fragmentation. 
Disruption of migration 
paths.
Negative effects on 
reindeer husbandry and 
nature-based tourism.
Public costs of 
infrastructure. 
More employment 
opportunities. 
Increased tax revenues.
Tourism Expansion of 
tourism: more people, 
more places, more 
infrastructure.
Demand for winter and 
ecotourism in particular. 
Local economies are 
dependent on tourism 
(in some regions in 
Finland almost 50% of 
local income comes from 
tourism).
Increased air and land 
traffic and tracks (e.g. 
snowmobiles, mountain 
bikes), noise, land 
erosion, wastes, pollution. 
Disturbance to reindeer 
and wildlife. 
Demographic change: 
seasonal workers; shifts 
in social structure in 
rural communities, 
potentially leading to 
social problems. Job 
opportunities, increased 
services.
Decelerated migration of 
local people.
Increase in local 
employment and 
economy. Increased use 
of public services (e.g. 
health care, airports). 
Investments by the 
government and private 
sector. 
Increased tax revenues. 
Increase in demand for 
local food products and 
wellness products.
18. Definition of ecosystem services by the United Nations 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA): ecosystem services are grouped into four broad cate-
gories: provisioning, such as the production of food and water; regulating, such as the control of climate and disease; supporting, such as nutrient cycles and crop 
pollination; and cultural, such as spiritual and recreational benefits.
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Land-Use Pressure Main Drivers Environmental Impacts Social Impacts Economic Impacts
Mining: Expansion of 
mining activities.
Global market demand for 
minerals. 
Economic development 
policies. 
Changes in the landscape, 
water and ecosystem. 
Potential pollution. 
Biodiversity, habitat, 
migratory route changes. 
Reduced nature values 
and possible biodiversity 
losses.
Severe negative effects 
on reindeer herding 
and Sámi culture with 
loss of employment 
opportunities, especially 
in Sweden and Norway. 
Potential negative effects 
on tourism.
Demographic change: 
influx of foreign workers; 
shifts in social structure in 
rural communities.
Job opportunities, skills 
transfer, increased 
services. Big differences 
between the regions.
Local employment and 
increased spending. 
Investments by the 
government and private 
sector. 
Increased tax revenues 
(note: this varies 
considerably among areas 
and mines). Boom and 
bust cycles. Decreased 
tourism and reindeer 
husbandry and other 
traditional livelihoods, 
leading to economic 
losses.
Reindeer Husbandry: In 
Sámi regions in Sweden 
and Norway, only Sámi 
people can practice 
reindeer herding. In 
Finland, Finnish people 
can also practice reindeer 
herding.
Sustaining culture and 
traditional livelihoods in 
herding in Sámi areas as 
well in other areas where 
reindeer husbandry is 
practiced.
Changes in grazing 
areas, habitat losses and 
fragmentation.
Increased land erosion 
via overgrazing and 
damage to land from all-
terrain vehicles. Loss of 
biodiversity. 
Traditional livelihoods 
support local, cultural 
and ethnic identity and 
keep remote communities 
alive. Threat of loss of 
traditional lifestyles 
affects cultural identity 
and peoples’ well-being, 
especially in Sámi areas.
Household dependence 
on traditional livelihoods. 
Supports tourism.
Subsistence costs of 
predator losses.
Transport: Development 
of new infrastructures 
and transport routes, 
railways (e.g. growth in 
land-based transportation 
due to increased cargo 
shipping on the Northern 
sea route).
Demand for new 
transport infrastructure 
for mining, tourism and 
other activities.
Biodiversity losses and 
habitat fragmentation. 
Increased noise. Increased 
accessibility to remote 
places. Reduced nature 
values. Search and rescue 
and disaster prevention 
in coastal and harbour 
areas.
Supports new settlements 
and migration, which 
affects needs for schools, 
housing, jobs, social life 
and well-being.
Economic stimulation. 
Public costs of 
infrastructure. 
More employment 
opportunities. Increased 
tax revenues. 
Agriculture (excluding 
reindeer husbandry), 
sheep husbandry 
(especially in Iceland)
Maintaining the national 
heritage of sheep farming 
in Iceland.
Land and water pollution 
due to use of fertilisers, 
herbicides and pesticides. 
Land erosion and loss of 
biodiversity and habitat 
fragmentation caused by 
overgrazing by sheep.
Income from exporting 
lamb meat and other 
agricultural products.
Freshwater fishing and 
fish farming (in lakes 
in Finland and fjords in 
Norway)
Demand for fish due 
to overfishing of wild 
fisheries.
Nutrient pollution 
increased by fish farms, 
decreases in wild fish 
stocks (for example, 
salmon in Norway).
Mental well-being 
(recreational fishing and 
livelihood).
Increased economy and 
employment, but can also 
have the opposite effect, 
as fish farming can cause 
losses of wild fish stocks.
Subsistence use of forests 
(e.g. berry and mushroom 
picking)
Tradition. Hunting and fishing 
may disturb population 
dynamics.
Increased health and 
well-being, both mental 
health and healthy food 
consumption.
Increased income for 
local people and foreign 
workers (companies 
import workforce from 
countries with “cheap 
labour”) and local 
companies producing 
berry products and 
exporting mushrooms 
(For instance, Boletus 
edulis mushrooms are 
exported from Finland to 
Italy).
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8.4 Governance of Land Use 
in the European Arctic18
Governance affecting land-use activities and their 
interactions is very broad, and only the most important 
aspects in relation to conflicts and cumulative impacts 
are discussed here. 
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are one of 
the key tools for understanding and communicating 
the implications of new developments, and may create 
a basis for dialogue between various land users. They 
include formal procedures for examining the impacts of a 
project as well as identifying alternatives and mitigation 
measures. However, the effectiveness of EIAs varies in 
different countries. Ideally, an EIA should examine social 
aspects (as in Finland) or be accompanied by a separate 
social impact assessment (as in Greenland).
While various activities may be manageable individually, 
considered together they may result in substantial 
environmental, social and economic changes or 
disruption, especially in the fragile and slowly recovering 
Arctic environment. It is important to take into account 
the cumulative impacts from historical, ongoing and 
planned activities, as well as global factors such as 
climate change. 
Social impacts are also cumulative and should be assessed 
for each new project, both within EIAs and in spatial and 
land-use planning. Strategic environmental or integrated 
(including social and economic aspects) assessments 
serve this purpose. Broader frameworks for impact 
assessments include instruments such as the Espoo 
Convention19 (for transboundary impact assessment) or 
the much less known Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy’s (AEPS) Arctic EIA Guidelines.20 
Recently, voluntary governance mechanisms exceeding 
legal requirements have emerged. In the mining 
industry, much attention has been given to the notion of 
a “social licence”, which is often acquired by companies 
exceeding the legal requirements regarding matters 
such as stakeholder participation. Tourism and forestry 
companies develop industry standards or eco-labels. 
Governance tools for interaction between the various 
land-use forms include local land-use planning, 
participatory resource planning and compensation 
schemes. International mechanisms for protection of 
Arctic biodiversity include the Barents Protected Areas 
Network (BPAN) project21, an ongoing process under 
19. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context (Espoo, 1991) – the “Espoo Convention”.
20. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS, predecessor of Arc-
tic Council), Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic. 
Finnish Ministry of Environment, 1997.
21. Barents Protected Areas Network project, http://www.bpan.fi/. Accessed 23 
February 2014.
the Convention on Biological Diversity to facilitate the 
description of ecologically and biologically significant 
areas in the Arctic.
8.5 Outlook to 2030 
Given that mining activities are expected to increase in 
the Arctic region (see Chapter 7), it is anticipated that 
new conflicts will emerge and eventually policymakers 
will be forced to comprehensively address these 
challenges. Incidents like the Gállok mine conflict (see 
textbox) have highlighted the issue of Sámi land rights 
and indigenous rights. This may lead to a decrease in 
mining activities in Sámi areas in the future. If not, the 
future of Sámi reindeer herding is uncertain, especially 
in Sweden. In the light of the multiplicity of pressures 
from other activities and policies, reindeer pastures, the 
subsistence use of forests and water supplies, as well as 
associated aspects of local culture could be degraded or 
lost. Another key uncertainty for reindeer husbandry is 
the impact of future policies regarding predators. 
Tourism is expected to either stay stable or increase due 
to globalisation. However, there might even be adverse 
effects due to economic recession and climate change. 
The types of tourism activities are difficult to predict, 
whether they will be mass tourism, e.g. in ski resorts, 
or more expensive and specifically tailored nature-based 
tourism, or both. As Arctic tourism is heavily dependent 
on snow and ice conditions, the unpredictable conditions 
caused by climate change may adversely affect the 
industry’s growth potential. On the other hand, however, 
climate change impacts on competitive locations in 
Europe may be higher than in the North. 
The forestry sector will face uncertainties in the future. 
These are related to increasing pressures to protect 
nature, an increased demand for renewable energy 
and biofuels, the relocation of pulp production, the 
development of certification systems for forestry, and 
the views of local and regional actors concerning the 
benefits gained from the sector.
Conflicts due to numerous land-use pressures are 
expected to continue and may become increasingly 
difficult to resolve if indigenous rights are not 
acknowledged and participatory processes are not 
implemented.
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8.6 EU Policies Relevant to 
Arctic Land Use
The EU has no direct authority regarding land-use 
planning in the Arctic. However, EU policies and 
regulations have influence on the discussed activities 
relevant for Arctic land use.
8.6.1 Tourism
A variety of EU measures to facilitate transport 
connections and mobility, particularly for air transport 
(e.g., low-cost airlines benefit from the liberalisation 
of EU air space and common EU rules for air passenger 
rights), have had a positive impact on the expansion of 
tourism in remote European Arctic locations.22 As the 
current rapid growth of the tourism industry is to a 
great extent due to Russian travellers,23  the increasingly 
remote possibility of a visa-free regime between the EU/
Schengen countries and Russia could lead to a significant 
growth in the number of Russian tourists in Fennoscandia 
and the development of the tourism infrastructure. 
8.6.2 Forestry
Despite the absence of a common forest policy, the EU has 
attempted to facilitate sustainable forest management 
through policies or funding mechanisms focused on rural 
development, employment, climate change, energy, 
water and biodiversity.24 In the latest EU Forest Strategy 
released in 2013,25 the European Commission underlines 
the need for securing wood supplies, managing forests 
in a sustainable way and ensuring that forest-based 
ecosystem services are not adversely affected by 
climate change impacts. If implemented, this approach 
may be of importance for livelihoods dependent on 
forests, in particular, reindeer herding.26 The European 
Commission has made efforts to advance negotiations 
on legally binding agreements on the management of 
forests in Europe, including on issues such as ecosystem 
22. The number of European tourists has been rising since the 1990s with tour-
ists primarily from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and the Neth-
erlands. (Figures for Finnish Lapland).
23. See: e.g. the Tourism Strategy of Lapland, Regional Council of Lapland 
website http://www.lappi.fi/lapinliitto/c/document_library/get_file?folde-
rId=349619&name=DLFE-9598.pdf. Accessed 15 January 2014. Statistics of 
tourism in Finnish Lapland available at http://www.lappi.fi/lapinliitto/julkai-
sut_ja_tilastot/matkailu. Accessed 5 February 2014.
24. European Commission (2013). Staff Working Document, SWD (2013) 342 
final (for the document COM(2013) 659 final: A new EU Forest Strategy), 
Brussels, 20.9.2013. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/forest/strategy/staff-work 
ing-doc_en.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2014.
25. European Commission (2013). A new EU Forest Strategy: for forests and 
the forest-based sector. Commission Communication. COM(2013) 659 final. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0659:FI
N:en:PDF. Accessed 7 February 2014.
26. This is the primary example, including the conflict over logging in Inari 
before 2010/2011. See the Sami Council’s position on the issue at: http://www.
saamicouncil.net/files/20051116181056.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2014.
services provided by forests, illegal logging, monitoring 
and reporting.27 This agreement, especially if adopted 
by Russia, would be of major relevance to the forestry 
industry in the European Arctic.
8.6.3 Renewable Energy
The EU has set the target of obtaining 20% of its energy 
from renewable sources by 2020 (Directive 2009/28/
EC, which has EEA relevance) and 27% by 2030.28 This 
goal facilitates renewable energy development as 
well as research. Given that Nordic states are close to 
reaching their national goals29 and the 2030 EU target 
may not be translated into binding national targets,30 
the development of renewables could be facilitated by a 
variety of existing measures, established or encouraged 
by EU legislation,31 rather than the EU targets as such.32 
Due to the importance of forestry in Fennoscandia, 
regulations related to biomass energy are relevant for 
the European Arctic. Here, EU policies encourage the 
development of biofuels and biomass for primary energy 
consumption, heating and transport.33  
8.6.4 Transport
EU transport policy promotes inter-modality and 
accessibility. By supporting the interconnectedness 
of remote regions with economic centres, the EU may 
influence infrastructure developments resulting in direct 
impacts of supported projects as well as long-term trends 
in changes in land use driven by improved accessibility. 
27. Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe, http://www.
foresteurope.org/en/LBA. Accessed 7 February 2014.
28. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_
en.htm. Accessed 29 January 2014.
29. Renewable energy in 2011 accounted for 31.8% of energy produced in Fin-
land (90% of energy produced regionally in Lapland), Finland’s 2020 national 
target is 38%; 46.8% in Sweden (2020 target - 49%); 65% in Norway (2020 
target - 67.5%). See: Eurostat data on the share of energy from renewable re-
sources, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/data-
base; International Energy Agency (2013), Key World Energy Statistics 2012, 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/kwes.pdf
30. A final decision had not been taken as of time of publication of this report. 
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm. 
Accessed 29 January 2014.
31. Such measures include: EU funding for research and development of re-
newable energy technologies and energy transport, investment in trans-Euro-
pean energy networks, energy market integration, instruments such as targeted 
private equity funds supported by the European Investment Bank, as well as 
projects (within cohesion policies) on renewable energy generation in remote 
communities or sharing experiences in wind power development with Russia. 
Northern Periphery Programme, http://www.northernperiphery.eu/en/projects/
show/&tid=71. Accessed 27 January 2014. The project involves partners from 
Finland, Sweden, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Projects Polar Wind and Po-
laris. Partnership Northwest Service Centre, http://www.fsc.net.ru/content4. 
Accessed 2 February 2014.
32. European Commission, Renewable Energy Progress Report, COM(2013) 
175 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013
:0175:FIN:EN:PDF. Accessed 30 January 2014.
33. Directive 2003/30/EC of 8 May 2003 on the promotion of the use of bio-
fuels or other renewable fuels for transport, including progress reporting. See 
also European Commission, The Renewable Energy Progress Report, Commu-
nication, COM(2009) 192 final, Brussels, 24.4.2009; European Commission, 
Biomass Action Plan, Communication, COM(2005)628.
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Environmental regulations relevant to transport are 
expected to influence modes and patterns of transport 
in the north.34 One example is the planned railway 
connecting Finnish Lapland with the Norwegian coast 
(Figure 8.1.), which would be used as the main bulk 
cargo transport route, replacing the marine route from 
the Baltic Sea (which is an Emission Control Area for 
sulphur under MARPOL35). According to the industry, 
due to the lower limit for sulphur content in marine 
fuels (after 2015, 0.1% compared to 1% currently and 
0.5% after 2015 outside of emission control areas, e.g. 
in the Barents Sea), transport will become too costly. 
The EU Directive 2012/33/EU36 implements MARPOL 
limits within the EU (Finland has declined to accept the 
MARPOL amendment but is bound by EU legislation).
8.6.5 Reindeer Husbandry
The concerns of the Sámi and reindeer herders highlight 
the need for the EU biodiversity and conservation 
framework to better take into account reindeer herding. 
Predators (protected within biodiversity frameworks) are 
perceived as one of the main threats to the sustainability 
of reindeer herding. 
In the timeframe since Finland became a member of 
the EU, the number of large predators has increased.37 
However, the outcomes depend largely on national 
legislation, as the management and policy regarding 
big predators is different in Sweden. Noticeably, some 
stakeholders (e.g. environmental non-governmental 
organisations driven by general environmental principles) 
are supportive of the EU biodiversity framework, 
including the protection of predators. 
Stakeholders representing reindeer herding or small 
fisheries emphasise that their livelihoods should be 
supported also within the EU framework (including 
indigenous rights). Several EU territorial co-operation 
projects already respond to this need. However, 
traditional livelihoods are not taken up strongly in 
environmental policies, transport frameworks or 
strategies referring to mining or forestry. 
8.6.6 Nature Conservation and Biodiversity
Changing land use and the cumulative impacts of various 
activities are among the main threats to biodiversity.38 
34. See: Joint Barents Transport Plan 2013 (September 2013). http://www.
barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Joint_Barents_Transport_Plan_2013.pdf. Accessed 4 
February 2014.
35. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and 
1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78), 1340 UNTS 184, 12 ILM 1319 (1973). Entry 
into force: 1982 (Annexes 1 and 2).
36. Directive 2012/33/EU of 21 November 2012 amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur content of marine fuels.
37. For example, a recent inventory of lynxes counted over 2500 individuals 
whereas in 1978 the number was about 100. RKTL. Finnish Game and Fisher-
ies Institute. http://www.rktl.fi/. Accessed 18 November 2013.
38. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/interna tional_is-
The European Commission has adopted the EU 
Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, aimed at halting the loss of 
biodiversity and improving the state of Europe’s species, 
habitats, ecosystems and the services they provide. A 
biodiversity strategy is being integrated into major EU 
policy frameworks.39  
So far the European Commission has had a limited 
presence in the Arctic Council’s biodiversity work 
(e.g. Arctic Biodiversity Assessment). Although the 
Commission is a full member of the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council, its representatives have not participated, for 
example, in the meetings of the Working Group on 
the Environment, which is in charge of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council’s projects related to biodiversity, 
such as the Barents Protected Areas Network (BPAN) 
and the Green Belt of Fennoscandia.40 However, both 
projects have been on the agenda of recent EU-Russia 
environmental dialogue meetings, which could lead to 
concrete outcomes if continued in the future.41,42  
The most important EU environmental regulations 
affecting Arctic land use are the Natura 2000 network 
of protected sites and associated Habitats and Birds 
Directives (Council Directive 92/43/EEC and Directive 
2009/147/EC).43 This framework is also relevant for the 
indigenous rights of the Sámi in the north of Sweden 
and Finland, as it provides additional protection for 
many habitats that are also used for traditionally 
practiced nature-based livelihoods, such as reindeer 
herding or fishing. As these areas are considered 
to be of importance for the whole EU, possible and 
actual significant damages to designated sites can be 
addressed by the European Commission and EU courts. 
Consequently, major industrial developments may be 
limited in these areas. On the other hand, the same 
legislative framework protects predators, the numbers of 
which have grown significantly in the past few decades, 
resulting in increased loss of reindeer. However, national 
regulations in Finland and Sweden are critical for these 
two dimensions of Sámi rights, as well as for other 
inhabitants practicing nature-based livelihoods. 
Regulations such as the Waste Framework Directive 
sues/relations_russia_en.htm. Accessed 7 February 2014.
39. EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, European Commission, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/2020.htm. Accessed 29 
January 2014.
40. Other relevant BEAC projects include: ecotourism and protected areas; 
conservation of the last pristine forests in the Barents Region; effects of climate 
change on biodiversity and ecosystem services in the Barents Region; and wet-
lands – conservation and ecosystem services, www.syke.fi.
41. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_is-
sues/relations_russia_en.htm. Accessed 7 February 2014.
42. See: Annual Report of the Working Group on Environment (Barents Eu-
ro-Arctic Council) (January 2014), http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/WGE_
Annual_Report_2012_2013.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2014.
43. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natu-
ral habitats and of wild fauna and flora; Directive 2009/147/EC of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of 
wild birds (the codified version of Directive 79/409/EEC as amended).
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(Directive 2008/98/EC) and the Water Framework 
Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC, WFD), which aim to 
improve the status of European water bodies by 2015, 
have direct implications for land use.44 In the course 
of implementing the WFD, EU/EEA member states 
have adopted river basin management plans. The 
adopted basin-based approach may contribute to good 
governance of activities within river basins also in the 
European Arctic.45
8.6.7 EU Frameworks Relevant for 
Managing Conflicting Activities
The EU framework for environmental and strategic 
impact assessment (Directive 85/337/EEC [2011/92/
EU] and Directive 2001/42/EC) creates an important 
framework for common standards, applicable throughout 
Fennoscandia, such as by ensuring that certain projects 
are obliged to undergo an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA). The EIA framework is currently being 
amended. Some stakeholders have expressed concerns 
that the scope of its applicability might be too broad and 
it would place a bureaucratic burden on private actors. At 
this stage, it is unclear if and how an amendment would 
contribute to addressing specific Arctic challenges and 
improving the assessment of cumulative impacts. The 
EU’s dialogue with Russia regarding Russian ratification 
of the Espoo Convention46 (and its Kiev SEA Protocol) is of 
significance for the Barents region, as it would create a 
common binding framework for trans-boundary impact 
assessments.
The EU does not have competence regarding spatial 
planning, but some initiatives exist, like the European 
Spatial Development Perspective (1999) promoting 
exchange of regional experiences. More practically, the 
INSPIRE Directive establishes an infrastructure for spatial 
information in Europe to support environmental policies 
and policies/activities having environmental impacts.47 
Although the European Union supports indigenous (and 
in particular Sámi) rights on a declaratory level, there 
are virtually no Arctic-relevant provisions addressing 
the issue of land rights in the above-listed EU policies 
affecting land use. For example, land-use rights within 
the framework for renewable energy and indigenous 
rights violations in forestry management are primarily 
applicable to biofuels and timber imported from 
developing states.48 
44. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_is-
sues/relations_russia_en.htm. Accessed 7 February 2014.
45. See European Commission Report at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/wa-
ter/water-framework/pdf/COM-2012-670_EN.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2014.
46. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context (Espoo, 1991) - the Espoo Convention.
47. More at http://inspire.ec.europa.eu/. Accessed 17 February 2014.
48. European Commission. Staff Working Document for Renewable Energy 
Progress Report. SWD(2013) 102 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0175:FIN:EN:PDF. Accessed 3 February 
8.7 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-making
The critical factors identified by stakeholders and 
developed by the report authors highlight the importance 
of taking into account the opinions of the local people 
and the socioeconomic impacts of various existing and 
planned activities. 
8.7.1 Human Well-being and Social 
Sustainability
The concept of human health and well-being is a 
combination of physical and mental health, in which 
efforts to sustain the culture, language and traditional 
way of life are indispensable elements. Therefore, any 
action that disrupts normal daily life can have effects 
on health and well-being. Food and water supplies are 
fundamental to life and can be altered by climate change 
or human activities (e.g. pollution, contaminants and 
access to food supplies).49 Land-use activities should not 
risk human health and well-being and therefore social 
sustainability should be taken into account in policy-
making. 
8.7.2 Public Participation
The role of stakeholders in the environmental planning 
process as well as their opportunities to influence 
decisions relevant to land use has expanded in recent 
years. Participatory management planning for national 
parks is a good example, with a greater role being 
played by local tourist enterprises and reindeer herders. 
Yet, critics question whether the existing participatory 
processes provide genuine possibilities for influencing 
decision-making. Various stakeholders emphasise 
different values: while non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) advocate for environmental values, locals 
underline the community’s economic development.50  
Addressing cumulative impacts and the possibility of 
social conflicts requires open, inclusive and democratic 
conflict- and problem-solving mechanisms and 
partnerships. Social and environmental assessments 
alone are not sufficient. Participation from the public, 
private and voluntary sectors based on mutual respect is 
necessary if ecologically balanced and economically and 
socially sustainable developments are to be achieved.
Challenges include: power relations between various 
2014; European Commission, Staff Working Document SWD (2013) 342 final.
49. Nilsson, L. M. & Evengård, B. (2013). Food and water security indicators 
in an Arctic health context. A report by the AHHEG/SDWG, and the AMAP/
HHAG during the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2011-2013. 
Publications from Arctic Research Centre no. 1. Umeå University.
50. Sarkki, S. (2011). The Site Strikes Back: Multi-level forest governance 
and participation in northern Finland. PhD thesis. Thule Institute & Discipline 
of Anthropology, University of Oulu, Finland. Acta Universitatis Ouluensis B 
102.
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stakeholders; the human and resource capacity of social 
actors to take part in the consultation process; the clarity 
of interconnection between consultation/participation 
and decision-making and the possible participation 
overload, as is sometimes the case with the Sámi 
parliaments in Fennoscandia).51 
8.7.3 Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Decision-makers need to acknowledge the indigenous 
people’s connection to traditional lands as activities 
affecting land use can have adverse effects on the culture 
and identity of indigenous people. Cultural pressures can 
bring about negative social impacts, such as rising rates 
of school drop-outs, substance abuse and suicide, all of 
which are major challenges among indigenous youth.52  
Finland and Sweden have not ratified the 1989 ILO 
Convention No. 16953 yet, as in both countries there is 
an ongoing discussion about Sámi rights to land. The 
issue of access to land and waters and land ownership 
is important for all traditional livelihoods, but it is 
perhaps most clearly evident in the case of reindeer 
herding. International indigenous legal instruments may 
be helpful in decisions on land rights and in setting up 
participatory processes.54 For example, the provisions of 
the ILO 169 put obligations on states in this regard.
8.8 Recommendations 
The recommendations have been developed by the 
report authors, taking the ideas proposed by stakeholders 
during the assessment process as a starting point.
8.8.1 Increase Knowledge Generation and 
Sharing
The EU plays a major policy role in the European Arctic 
with its degree of influence depending on the particular 
locality and issue. Therefore, both in general and in the 
context of EU policy-making, there is a need for more 
knowledge on local issues, culture and livelihoods. 
Facilitating knowledge exchange between regions, 
providing tools for collaborative research and developing 
formal and stakeholder engagement tools would 
increase knowledge sharing and the quality of decision-
51. Stepien, A., Koivurova, T., Gremsperger A. & Niemi, H. (2014). Arctic 
Indigenous Peoples and the Challenge of Climate Change, in E. Tedsen, S. 
Cavalieri & R. Kraemer, Arctic Marine Governance: Opportunities for Trans-
atlantic Cooperation. Dordrecht: Springer.
52. Arctic Council, SDWG Highlights Open Discussion Session in Gällivare, 
Sweden, 2012.
53. International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no 169 concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Geneva, 76th ILC 
session (27 Jun 1989); Entry into force: 5 Sep 1991).
54. Raitio, K. (2008). “You Can’t Please Everyone” - Conflict Management 
Practices, Frames and Institutions in Finnish State Forests. PhD thesis. Uni-
versity of Joensuu.
making, including cohesion between policies at different 
levels of governance. Without knowledge on how people 
use the land, including reindeer herding, subsistence 
use of forests, hunting and all aspects of daily life, it is 
impossible to assess the impacts of new initiatives. Thus, 
new governance structures should be developed and 
implemented for connecting stakeholders, European 
and national policy-makers, thereby allowing Arctic 
stakeholders to participate more effectively in the 
decision-making (and consultation) processes. The 
EU European Arctic Information Centre (EUAIC) is one 
option to facilitate such better participation.
8.8.2 Include Social Impact Assessment 
More Effectively in the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Process
In northern Finland a recent survey showed that 
local tourism entrepreneurs had little trust in the EIA 
conducted for planned mining activities in the region. 
The main reason for this mistrust is that the EIA is carried 
out by companies or by consultants hired by companies 
themselves.55 Social impact assessments are often not 
conducted or their role in the EIA process and reports 
is minor.56 Therefore, in order to carry out a reliable 
social impact assessment, international principles 
and guidelines should be followed in EIA processes 
throughout Europe. Here, the EU could take leadership, 
or, to a limited extent, a regulatory role. Internationally, 
the European Commission should continue to encourage 
Russian authorities to ratify the Espoo Convention.
Strategic environmental or integrated (including 
social and economic aspects) assessments are crucial 
governance tools. The EU is currently working on 
amending its EIA directive with the possibility of raising 
the importance of social impacts. This is important, 
especially for sparsely populated areas and to address 
the cumulative impacts of activities that require large 
land areas.
55. Jokinen, M. (2014), Hannukaisen kaivos ja matkailu (Hannukainen mine 
and tourism). http://www.metla.fi/hanke/7451/pdf/Matkai lun%20kehitysnaky-
mat_seminaari_17.2.2014.pdf. Accessed 26 February 2014.
56. Suopajärvi. L. (2013). Social impact assessment in mining projects in 
Northern Finland: Comparing practice to theory, Environmental Impact As-
sessment Review, 42, 25-30.
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SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL 
CHANGES IN 
THE EUROPEAN 
ARCTIC 
Adam Stępień (1), Karolina Banul (1), Annette Scheepstra (2), Kim van 
Dam (2), Kirsi Latola (3) and Timo Koivurova 
(1) Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland
(2) Arctic Centre, University of Groningen, the Netherlands 
(3) Thule Institute, University of Oulu, Finland; University of the Arctic Thematic 
Networks
Key Messages:
•	 Social development in the region is characterised by generally growing, often highly 
innovative Arctic cities and thinning-out rural areas that face demographic and resource 
challenges.
•	 Dependence on extractive/primary industries and support from national budgets to a 
great extent shapes socioeconomic development.
•	 Accessibility and connectivity, especially intra-regional and cross-border, are among the 
key concerns.
•	 Indigenous peoples experience the challenges faced by all Arctic inhabitants in a distinct 
manner. These challenges need to be addressed in the light of indigenous peoples’ 
rights.
•	 Various EU programmes in the North are well-aligned with the needs identified by 
regional actors, primarily because decision-making takes place at the local/regional 
level.
Recommendations to the EU:
•	 Give a voice to Arctic communities in policy developments that may affect them.
•	 Support entrepreneurship and innovation with sensitivity to indigenous youth and 
gender issues.
•	 Invest in intra-regional accessibility and connectivity.
•	 Consider the special needs of Arctic cities in relevant EU policies and programmes.
“In the Arctic and Northern regions people possess particular knowledge 
of the reciprocal relationship between humans and nature. The knowledge 
[regarding this relationship] could be one of the aspects to be protected and 
supported.”
Researcher, Finland
“Contemporary art and education [should be supported], not so much 
heritage and traditional forms of culture. I don’t want the north to be a 
museum.”
Culture entrepreneur, Sweden
“The EU could support cultures and societies in the Arctic by informing and 
enlightening European citizens about the cultural differences and way of 
living in the Arctic compared to other European cultures.”
Environmental NGO, Denmark
“As long as it is as expensive to set up a business in Jokkmokk as in Malmö, 
there will always be less reason to carry the extra costs of being in a remote 
area.”
Tourism researcher, Finland
Chapter cover image: Tromsø, Norway in winter.
Photo: GettyImages
The quotes come from respondents to the online questionnaire – an element of 
the consultation process within the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’
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9.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses selected social and cultural trends 
in the European Arctic. Arctic cultures are characterised 
by high resilience and adaptive capacity, but aspects 
of social change have been challenging.1 Peripherality 
is an important feature of the region. The presence of 
indigenous peoples distinguishes the North from the 
rest of Europe.
9.2 Key Sociocultural Trends 
in the European Arctic
9.2.1 Complex Demographic Trends and 
Urbanisation
Demographic trends in the European Arctic are 
significantly influenced by migration – north-to-south 
and rural-to-urban – and the influx of people seeking 
work in the resource extraction and services sectors. 
The patterns differ across the region – for instance, the 
population is growing in northern Norway and Iceland, 
and declining in Finnish Lapland and northwest Russia 
(Figure 9.2.).2 In most regions net out-migration from 
rural areas has been coupled with the growth of Arctic 
urban centres (Figure 9.3.).
Urbanisation is a global trend connected with 
modernisation. Urban areas offer economic opportunities, 
education, culture and social networks. In the Arctic, 
urbanisation has been driven by an increase in regional 
1. Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) 2004. Arctic Stefansson In-
stitute, Akureyri, Iceland; ArcticStat, 2010 Census for Russian Federation, at 
http://www.arcticstat.org. Accessed 10 January 2014.
2. Rasmussen, R. et al. (2011). Megatrends. Nordic Council of Ministers; 
AHDR (2004).
trade and administration centres, industrialisation, the 
expansion of the welfare state, resource extraction and 
military facilities.3 The emergence of knowledge-based 
economy may lead to further urbanisation. At the same 
time, conditions for viable economic and social activities 
are becoming limited in thinning-out rural areas.4
Urbanisation in the Arctic, understood as the changes 
in lifestyle, occurs in areas previously not considered 
“urban”.5 Indigenous people living in cities face particular 
challenges, as their connection to traditional livelihoods 
and access to language education may be limited.6
Young people, especially women, are increasingly moving 
to Arctic urban centres and cities in the south, attracted 
by economic and educational opportunities. This has 
raised the share of the elderly population in some areas, 
resulting in gender and age imbalances, and threatening 
the fabric of social services (e.g. workforce shortages in 
the health and elderly care sectors).7
3. Rasmussen et al. (2012); AHDR (2004); Berman, M. & How, L. (2013). Re-
moteness, Transportation Infrastructure, and Urban-Rural Population Move-
ments in the Arctic, in Hansen, K.G. et al. (eds.), Proceedings from the first 
international conference on urbanisation of the Arctic (pp. 109-121), Nordre-
gio, Stockholm; Dubois, A. & Roto, J. (2012). Making the best of Europe’s 
Sparsely Populated Areas. On making geographic specificity a driver for terri-
torial development in Europe. Nordregio Working Paper 2012:15, pp. 18-19.
4. Northern Periphery Programme (NPP) (2013). Programme Area Analysis 
(for consultation on the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme 2014-2020), 
www.northernperiphery.eu. Accessed 10 February 2014. See: e.g. Staalesen, A. 
(15 January 2014), Hi-Tech regions are Arctic population winners. BarentsOb-
server,http://barentsobserver.com/en/society/2014/01/hi-tech-regions-are-arc-
tic-population-winners-15-01. Accessed 15 February 2014.
5. Dybbroe, S., Dahl, J. & Müller-Wille, L. (eds.). (2010). Acta Borealia 27(2), 
Special Issue: History Matter: Dynamics of Arctic Urbanization.
6. In Finland, over 70% of Sámi children live outside of the Sámi Homeland 
Area in the north of Lapland, where the Sámi enjoy access to Sámi-language 
schooling.
7. Rasmussen et al. (2011); AHDR (2004); NPP (2013); Janson, M. (2012). 
Northern Sparsely Populated Areas. Working Uniquely Together. Presentation 
at the Committee of Regions, 19 January 2012.
Main implications of socio-cultural changes
Changes in social structure, culture and lifestyles; loss of human 
capital; pressure on public services; environmental impacts.
Social disruptions; changing family structure; physical and mental 
health issues; loss of traditional culture and language; rediscovery of 
identities.
Community vulnerability; pressure towards resource extraction and 
development; lack of autonomy; single industry communities.
Positive effect on Arctic human capital and development; additional 
resources and employment.
Empowerment of indigenous and local communities; stronger roles of 
private and non-govermental sectors.
Main trends
Demographic shifts and 
urbanisation.
Changes in livelihoods 
and lifestyles.
Economic dependence on 
primary sector and public 
transfers.
Increasing role of 
education and research.
Empowerment and 
increasing complexity of 
governance.
General drivers
• Globalisation and Use 
of Natural Resources.
• Accessibility.
• Global Cultural 
Change.
• Recognition of 
Indigenous Rights. So
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Figure 9.1: Main Socio-cultural Drivers and Trends and Their Implications for the European Arctic
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Figure 9.2: Arctic Population: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous.
Note: The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) (2004) estimated that there are four million people living in the Arctic, of 
whom 10% are indigenous, e.g. Inuit, Sámi and Nenets. 1.3 million people live in the Arctic regions of the Nordic countries (in-
cluding Greenland. According to the AHDR boundary: the three northernmost counties of Norway, Norrbotten county in Sweden, 
Lappi (Lapland) in Finland, whole territory of Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland). The Barents region (which extends south 
of the AHDR boundary) has a population of six million. Arctic areas in Russia, according to AHDR (2004) include: the Murmansk 
Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr, and Chukotka autonomus okrugs, Vorkuta City in the Komi Republic, Norilsk and Igarka 
in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic Circle. 
Source: Arctic Portal and Arctic Centre, 2014, based on data from: Statistics Sweden 2011, Tilastokeskus 2013, Statistics Norway 2013 and Sami 
Statistics 2014 (Statistics Norway), Statistics Iceland 2012, Faroe Statistics 2013, Statistics Greenland 2013 (for Greenland indigenous number 
refers to persons born in Greenland), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, US Census 2010, (Russian) Federal State Statistics Service 2013-2014, Census 
(Russian Federation) 2010, Statistics Canada 2006-2011, US Census Bureau 2010, Statistics Alaska 2012, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland 
estimates (data based on estimates with discrepancies between available sources). Numbers for Sakha Republic (municipalities on or above the 
Arctic Circle) based on estimates only. All numbers, although based on statistics, are illustrative, estimate and approximate, often due to difficulty 
of specifying exact number of indigenous peoples living in the particular region.
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Figure 9.3: Migration Intensity in the Nordic Region, 2010
Source: Johanna Roto, Nordregio, 2011.
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Historically, in-migration has significantly influenced the 
Arctic social landscape. People migrating to northern 
regions are often attracted by employment opportunities 
in extractive industries or the quality of life connected to 
landscape/nature values. Currently, the migration from 
new EU member states and countries such as Thailand 
is increasing.8 
Arctic gender issues have recently received more 
attention.9 Challenges include male-dominated rural 
areas and low female participation in traditional and 
resource-based industries. However, women have a 
comparatively strong position in Northern governance 
structures.10 There is a lack of gender-disaggregated data 
specific to the Arctic regions.
9.2.2 Changing Livelihoods and Lifestyles 
The Arctic economy is characterised by the co-existence 
and interdependence of a formal and informal economy.11 
The major components of the formal “cash” economy 
include tourism, fisheries, large-scale mineral and energy 
development, forestry and reindeer husbandry. The 
informal economy consists of small-scale subsistence 
use of forests (e.g. berry and mushroom picking), 
hunting, reindeer herding, fishing and trapping, and is 
also important for cultural practices and identities. In the 
European Arctic the relative role of traditional activities 
as a source of livelihood has been declining over the last 
century.
Changes in lifestyle bring about a cultural transformation, 
including alterations in family structure, values 
and cultural forms of expression. These can lead to 
positive developments, e.g. the increasing role of 
women in society, and negative ones, e.g. barriers to 
inter-generational knowledge transmission or loss of 
indigenous languages.12 
Lifestyle changes, combined with climate change, 
have had an impact on human health and well-being 
(although Fennoscandia has been less affected than 
other Arctic localities). Due to changes in climate, flora 
and fauna, humans in the North could be exposed to 
new micro-organisms, causing vector-borne infections. 
8. Rasmussen et al. (2011).
9. For example, the Arctic Council is currently implementing an action on gen-
der equality in the region, www.arctic-council.org. Accessed 5 February 2014.
10. Women account for 56% of the Swedish County of Västerbotten’s Council 
(compared to 43% in Finnmark and 35% in Finnish Lapland, with Russian 
regions falling significantly behind). The Sámi Parliament in Norway had 50-
50 gender composition after the 2005 elections and companies such as LKAB 
(a state-owned company operating, inter alia, the Kiruna iron mine) highlight 
the position of women in traditionally male-dominated extractive industries. 
See: e.g. Staalesen, A. (4 February 2014) “Best on Women and Democracy”, 
Barents Observer at http://barentsobserver.com/en/society/2014/02/best-wom-
en-and-democracy-04-02. Accessed 13 February 2014.
11. ACIA (2005). Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Cambridge University 
Press.
12. Aesaether, N. & Baerenholdt, J.O. (Eds.). (1998). Coping strategies in the 
North. Local Practices in the Content of Global Restructuring. Copenhagen: 
Nordic Council of Ministers.
Contaminants such as pollen, persistent organic 
pollutants or mercury are also a threat to health. Dietary 
changes have increased obesity rates, Type 2 diabetes 
and cardiovascular diseases.13 Many Arctic communities 
are also afflicted with domestic violence, substance 
abuse and high suicide rates.
9.2.3 Ongoing Dependence on the Primary 
Sector and Public Transfers14 
Substantial hydrocarbon and mineral resource 
developments in the Arctic region are important 
contributors to national economies, especially in Russia 
and Fennoscandia. In addition, fisheries and forestry 
remain vital industries. Primary industries and resource 
extraction strongly link Arctic regions to the global 
economy and provide resources for social development, 
but they also expose the regions to market and 
price fluctuations.15 Single-industry communities are 
particularly vulnerable to boom-and-bust cycles. Primary 
industries tend to often create islands of economic 
activity, rather than serving as engines of development 
for entire regions. 
The public sector and transfers include government 
employment, welfare payments, pensions, as well as 
development policies and infrastructure maintenance. 
The public sector is responsible for 20 to 50% of 
economic activity in most Arctic regions, and dominates 
the expanding service sector (e.g. education, health 
care and administration). The share of public sector 
employment in the European Arctic (30-55%) is higher 
than the average for developed states (5-28%) (Figure 
9.4).
As regional authorities in the European Arctic attempt 
to reduce dependence on government transfers, there 
is greater interest in developing natural resources. 
Simultaneously, governments are increasing support 
for activities that offer alternatives to resource-based 
economies, such as tourism, creative industries, research 
and innovation or aquaculture.
9.2.4 Rising Role of Education and Research
The education level in the European Arctic is generally 
high (it is comparatively lower in Greenland) and lays 
a solid foundation for enhancing Arctic human capital 
and empowering Arctic communities. On the other 
hand, centralised educational systems have often had 
adverse implications for indigenous cultures. Education 
and research also create jobs and bring resources into 
communities. International co-operation constitutes 
13. Parkinson, A. J., & Evengård, B. (2009). Climate change, its impact on 
human health in the Arctic and the public health response to threats of emerg-
ing infectious diseases. Global Health Action 2, doi:  10.3402/gha.v2i0.2075.
14. Rasmussen et al. (2011).
15. Dubois and Roto (2012); NPP (2013).
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an important element of Arctic research, based on 
organisations such as the International Arctic Science 
Committee and the University of the Arctic. 
Human capital is critical for economic and social 
development in the Arctic. Although human capital in 
the Arctic is seen as underdeveloped, this overlooks the 
diversity of creativity among Arctic residents, based on 
informal and traditional knowledge.16 Education allows 
people to both benefit from and develop alternatives 
to primary industries. At the same time, high levels of 
education may stimulate greater out-migration from 
rural areas (especially of women). 
9.2.5 Increasing Inclusiveness and 
Complexity of Governance 
Various intergovernmental and regional forms of co-
operation between Arctic nations and other stakeholders 
(especially indigenous organisations) have emerged over 
the last 20 years, such as the Arctic Council, the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Forum. 
Non-state actors have become increasingly active in 
advocating interests and values of various groups, 
including environmental organisations and industry 
16. Rasmussen et al. (2011).
associations. The role of indigenous peoples has 
changed throughout the Arctic, due to reasons such as 
the establishment of Sámi Parliaments in Fennoscandia 
and self-government in Greenland, coinciding with 
the evolution and adoption of international norms. In 
Russia, the indigenous influence on decision-making 
is comparatively minor. Most legal systems currently 
include safeguards for indigenous land rights. 
9.3 What Is Driving Social 
and Cultural Changes in the 
European Arctic?
9.3.1 Globalisation and Demand for Natural 
Resources
Global economic shifts shape social and cultural 
development around the world and the Arctic is 
no exception, especially in light of the privatisation 
and commercialisation of Arctic industries.17 Robust 
economic growth in emerging economies shapes 
17. UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (2010). Structural 
Change in Global Economy: Main Features and Trends. UNIDO website at 
www.unido.org/. Accessed 4 July 2013; AHDR (2004).
Figure 9.4: Public and Private Employment in the Arctic, 2010 
Source: Johanna Roto, Nordregio, 2010, modified.
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demand for Arctic natural resources and influences 
Arctic migration, urbanisation, politics, governance and 
global connections. Globalisation results in competition 
between regions for companies, skilled workers, tourists 
and public investments (also within the EU context).18 
Resource exploitation and resistance to certain large-
scale developments were key factors in the emergence 
of indigenous activism and indigenous rights.
9.3.2 Accessibility
The Nordic northern peripheries are among the least 
accessible regions in Europe (measured by ground 
accessibility). Insularity, one-directional linkages, 
proportionally high dependence on air and maritime 
transport, the dominance of north-south connections 
and high costs are features of all modes of Arctic 
transport. Initiatives to facilitate Arctic-Arctic (east-west) 
transport connections have so far had limited success.19 
In remote regions, information and communication 
technologies (ICT) provide crucial opportunities for 
people and services, including education, entertainment, 
health, administration, as well as social and political 
life or identity building. While coverage and digital 
18. Dubois and Roto (2012).
19. See: e.g. NPP 2013, Programme Area Analysis; Gløersen, E., Dubois, A., 
Copus., A. & Schürmann, C. (2005). Northern peripheral, sparsely populated 
regions in the European Union. Report. Nordregio; Dubois and Roto (2012), 
pp. 65-66.
competence appear to be strong in the European Arctic, 
the costs, quality and capacity of the networks may pose 
significant limitations in locations such as Greenland.
For northern companies, ICT allows access to global 
niche markets, although this primarily promotes the 
greater integration of local markets.20 Intra-regional 
connections are crucial, in terms of both infrastructure 
and spaces for co-operation, as actors functioning in the 
same economic, social and physical environment are 
better positioned to build networks necessary for the 
emergence of a knowledge-based economy. 
Although improved transport and ICT infrastructure is 
hoped to encourage people to remain in rural areas, 
better accessibility coupled with higher levels of 
education often facilitates migration to urban areas.212223 
9.3.3 Global Cultural Change
Arctic social and cultural changes reflect global, 
particularly western, cultural trends. At a general level, 
these include: declining respect for authority; increasing 
emphasis on freedom of expression and equality of 
opportunities; growing social and political tolerance; 
20. Dubois and Roto (2012), pp. 65-66.
21. Rasmussen et al. (2011).
22. See: Gløersen et al. (2005).
23. Dubois and Roto (2012); Copus, A. (2001). From core-periphery to poly-
centric development: concepts of spatial and aspatial peripherality, European 
Planning Studies 9, 4, 539-552, p. 540
Picture 9.1: Inuit Villagers Gathered on Sea Ice after Successful Whale Hunting. 
Photo: Paula Kankaanpää, Arctic Centre.
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emancipative orientation towards the role of women; 
wider political protests; and an increasing emphasis on 
democratic principles combined with dissatisfaction with 
the democratic process.24 These trends are coupled with 
the spread of popular culture, information technology, 
virtual networks and the culture of innovation. In 
the increasingly globalised world, notwithstanding 
developments within the region, Arctic societies will 
undergo a transformation that mirrors global cultural 
developments.
9.3.4 Indigenous Activism and Recognition 
of Indigenous Rights
Over the last four decades, indigenous peoples have 
become more active in international forums, with a 
focus on human rights. Their key demands include 
self-determination, land rights, cultural development, 
and participation in decision-making. The International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989),25 the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2007) and the establishment of the UN Permanent 
Forum for Indigenous Issues are the main achievements 
of the global movement. The influence of international 
indigenous law in the European Arctic varies: from 
major significance in Norway and Denmark/Greenland, 
moderate acknowledgment in Finland and Sweden (land 
rights issue being the most problematic) and a fairly 
complex situation in Russia.
24. Dalton, R. & Welzel, C. (2011). Mapping and Tracking Global Cultural 
Change, www.democracy.uci.edu/node/6151. Accessed 20 June 2013.
25. International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no 169 concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Geneva, 76th ILC 
session (27 Jun 1989); Entry into force: 5 Sep 1991).
9.4 Outlook to 2030
The Arctic regions will very likely remain highly dependent 
on resource extraction as well as public transfers from 
national budgets over the next twenty years. This 
socioeconomic dependence will continue to drive 
public policy and priorities as well as social attitudes. 
Communities and authorities will continue to attempt to 
attract more extractive industries and at the same time 
diversify local economies. The recent economic crisis 
(2008 onwards) has increased pressure on the public 
sector, and this is experienced more strongly in remote 
areas due to their financial and employment dependence 
on national budgets. Key uncertainties include volatile 
resource prices and the character of national regional 
development policies.
Economic and social life will likely increasingly 
concentrate in major urban centres, resulting in 
the increasing importance of Arctic cities.26 Current 
demographic challenges may be expected to remain a 
problem throughout the region (including implications 
for governance and service delivery) with population 
growth in major towns and resource extraction areas 
and decline/thinning-out in rural areas. The continued 
presence of academic and research institutions in 
the north will contribute to economic and social 
diversification. Nevertheless, the development of a 
knowledge-based economy will be limited to the major 
Arctic urban centres. Indigenous rights are likely to gain 
increasing attention, but land rights will probably remain 
a challenging issue throughout Northern Fennoscandia. 
26. Gløersen et al. (2005).
Remote and Peripheral – Northern Sparsely Populated Areas23
The northern peripheries of Nordic states have been recognised within the EU’s cohesion policy as “regions 
which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost 
regions with very low population density” (Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU, Art. 
174). Peripherality should be understood as a political, socioeconomic and cultural construct (e.g. meaning 
remote, rural, fragile or less-favoured), rather than only a demographic or geographic one. Limited access 
to advantages inherent to agglomerations has implications for social interactions, the availability of public 
services and economic activity (including the small size of the local economy, limited local demand, high 
transaction, transport and logistics costs, lack of specialised services, the dominance of traditional industries 
and dependence on extractive industries). Importantly, peripherality is dynamic, changing due to economic 
shifts or infrastructural investments (or degradation).24  
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9.5 Assessing EU Policies: 
How Does the EU Influence 
Social and Cultural Changes 
in the Arctic? 
The role of the European Union in shaping the direction 
of sociocultural changes in the region is limited, 
with the greatest influence in EU Arctic regions and 
through various cohesion and regional co-operation 
instruments. However, as all economic activities have 
a social dimension, a broad range of EU policies, e.g. 
environmental legislation, may contribute to changes 
in the sociocultural landscape. Policies designed for the 
development of the entire EU may not always be effective 
in the peripheral Arctic context.27 In many policies, that 
has been acknowledged; for example, the EU/EEA State 
Aid Guidelines allow for additional support for regions 
with special characteristics. 28
27. Dubois and Roto (2012), p. 11.
28. Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013. Official Journal C 54 
of 4.3.2006.
9.5.1 EU Funding for Regional Co-operation 
and Cohesion
The European Commission estimated that EUR 1.14 
billion has been dedicated to regional development in 
the EU and neighbouring Arctic regions in 2007-2013.29 
A number of EU programmes cover the European Arctic: 
cohesion funding in North Finland and Sweden, Bothnia-
Atlantica, InterregIVA/North, Kolarctic ENPI (European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) and the 
Northern Periphery Programme (NPP) 2007-2013. 
The NPP is part of a territorial co-operation objective 
within EU’s cohesion policy. The programme aims at 
developing the economic, social and environmental 
potential of peripheral and remote communities by 
promoting innovation and competitiveness as well as 
the sustainable development of natural and community 
resources. Stakeholders have a generally positive view 
of the NPP. The programme has had a visible impact 
in developing innovative solutions in public service 
provision (including ICT and self-organisation), creative 
industries and aquaculture. However, the major 
shortcoming of the NPP is the lack of involvement of the 
private sector (due to state aid constraints). 
29. EU (2012). Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Re-
gion: progress since 2008 and next steps, JOIN (2012) 19 final.
Picture 9.2: Sámi Parliament in Norway in session. Karasjok, Norway.  
Photo: Denis Caviglia, 2013.
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At the time of finalising this report, the design of 
programmes within the new 2014-2020 financial 
perspective is in the final stages, including the new 
Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme (NPA) (Figure 
9.5). The draft of the new programme builds on key 
priorities of the NPP, focusing on small and medium-
sized enterprises, innovation, and sustainable resource 
and energy developments.30 There is concern that the 
new structure of cohesion funding has limited the choice 
of priorities within the NPA and will lead to support for 
fewer themes, in ways that do not always fit the specific 
needs in the region. 
Programme objectives, owing to the strong involvement 
of regional actors, correspond generally to the key social 
and cultural challenges identified in this report. However, 
the NPA’s role is largely limited to promoting desirable 
developments and enhancing co-operation between 
actors who can facilitate such developments, as the 
NPP/NPA has the smallest budget among transnational 
programmes (approximately EUR 100 million), although 
the NPA budget is likely to be 20-30% higher than for the 
30. Currently, four priorities have been identified: innovation to maintain and 
develop robust and competitive communities, promoting entrepreneurship to 
realise the area’s competitive advantage, fostering energy-secure communities 
through promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency, protecting, pro-
moting and developing cultural and natural heritage, with a focus on transfer 
of knowledge and technology, sustainable use of resources and demographic 
development (NPA programme overview 2014).
NPP. Adding “Arctic” to the programme’s name has not 
changed the priorities, as the main problems are seen as 
shared with other European peripheral regions.31 The key 
challenges in the implementation of the NPA will likely 
include: involvement of the private sector; assessment 
of results based on the impact on the programme area; 
co-operation with Russian partners; and the limited 
scope of the programme in comparison to the NPP. A 
more substantial involvement of partners from outside 
of the European Arctic would have been desirable, but 
is limited by the EU funding schemes and lack of strong 
interest from other partners.
The priorities of currently negotiated cohesion 
programmes covering northern Sweden and Finland are 
also generally in line with the challenges identified in 
this chapter, including ICT developments in the north.32 
The notion of “smart specialisation” in the post-2013 
31. Based on available draft documents. See: Northern Periphery Programme, 
www.northernperiphery.eu. Accessed 14 February 2014.
32. Sparsely populated areas receive an extra allocation within the cohesion 
policy. Although it has been decreased (from EUR 35 to 30 per inhabitant, 
constituting, for instance, 38% of cohesion funding assigned for east and north 
Finland, thus representing a fairly significant component of the programmes’ 
budget), the overall funding in northern Sweden is similar to that in previous 
funding periods and 13% lower for east and north Finland (but only 2% low-
er for Lapland). Although there is currently one operational programme for 
mainland Finland, a separate implementation plan for east and north Finland 
has been drawn up (Personal communication with the Brussels offices of north 
Sweden and east and north Finland and with regional authorities.)
Figure 9.5: EU Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme Area 2014-2020 
Source: Arctic Portal, based on Northern Periphery Programme and Nordregio 2013.
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cohesion framework is generally commendable, but 
decision-makers must ensure that this does not mean 
that Arctic regions are limited to the role of a European 
resource base.
Overall, projects within the EU-funded programmes 
(see Annex 2) have promoted and encouraged the 
diversification of the northern economy through 
supporting youth entrepreneurship, creative industries 
and media, combining traditional livelihoods and 
business, including assistance for Sámi entrepreneurs, 
and developing tourism. Similarly, various projects 
address Arctic demographic challenges: promoting local 
development; strengthening urban and rural services; 
as well as promoting cultural heritage and projects 
dedicated to social well-being, including elderly and 
physically challenged people. Such projects are limited 
in scope and resources, but they have important 
inspirational leverage, e.g. by promoting the exchange 
of experience. 
Owing to the crucial role that local and regional actors 
play in deciding on the priorities of the cohesion and co-
operation programmes, the objectives of the EU funding 
schemes are in line with the key needs and they respond 
to the main challenges in the region. One shortcoming 
of the EU funding schemes is the lack of co-operation 
between programmes, the cohesion framework and EU 
policies covering sectors such as transport, agriculture 
or fisheries. The so-called “Bodø Process” (initiated 
by Norway), which brings together programmes and 
funding frameworks in the European Arctic (including 
Barents co-operation, the Nordic Council of Ministers 
and EU programmes), is a step in the right direction.
A major challenge connected with the programmes 
implemented in the region is co-operation with 
Russian partners. This co-operation is affected by the 
overall political situation as well as internal regulatory 
frameworks in Russia regarding, for example, the 
operation of non-governmental organisations. There is 
a concern among local stakeholders33 that funding for 
programmes such as Kolarctic ENPI would be limited in 
the future.
9.5.2 Accessibility
The long-standing criticism that trans-European transport 
networks neglect the special needs of remote regions to 
a certain extent can be upheld for the upcoming financial 
perspective.34 Until 2020, major support (80 to 85% of 
transport networks expenditure) will be dedicated to the 
core network linking key EU centres, which in Northern 
Fennoscandia includes only the “Bothnian corridor” 
33. Input from the EU office of East and North Finland. Personal communica-
tion, 24 March 2014.
34. See, e.g. Spiekermanfl, K. & Wegener, M. (1996). Trans-European net-
works and unequal accessibility in Europe. European Journal of Regional De-
velopment (EUREG), 35(4), 4196; Dubois and Roto (2012), p. 64.
and the corridor to Narvik in Norway.35 A broader 
“comprehensive network” is to allow all regions to 
access the core transport nodes. However, the social and 
economic development of peripheral regions depends 
greatly on intra-regional connectivity and the emergence 
of local clusters capable of generating critical mass, 
not only on core-periphery connections.36 Elements 
of the transport network such as the Midnordic Green 
Transport Corridor may play a vital role here.
Various projects within EU-funded cohesion and 
regional co-operation programmes are directed towards 
developing transport connections and mitigating the 
adverse effects of remoteness (through concrete 
investments, transport subsidies for ports in the Gulf of 
Bothnia, feasibility studies and innovations) (see Annex 
2). The impact of these projects is difficult to assess as 
the key challenges – deficit in east-west connections, 
high costs of transport and the disadvantaged position 
of certain localities – have remained largely unchanged 
over the last decade, or have even become more visible 
due to the thinning-out of the population in rural areas. 
Enhancing ICT services in remote communities, including 
e-medicine and e-learning, appears to have more 
tangible impacts.
Stakeholders from the private sector and local 
35. Railway connections encircling the Gulf of Bothnia.
36. Dubois and Roto (2012).
Picture 9.3: Social Housing from the 1970s in Nuuk, Greenland.
Photo: Adam Stepien, Arctic Centre.
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administration have underlined that various EU actions 
directed at lowering greenhouse gas emissions and air 
pollution, although commendable at the European level, 
may have a proportionally higher impact on transport 
costs in the northern periphery than in the lower latitudes. 
One example is the directive limiting the sulphur content 
in marine fuels (Directive 2012/33/EU, discussed in 
Chapter 8),37 as some companies are reconsidering their 
investment plans due to the expectations of higher 
transport costs.38 Another example is the possibility of 
future stricter standards for heavy-duty vehicles (trucks 
and buses, which constitute the basis for cargo and 
passenger transport in remote areas), as the European 
Commission is currently developing a strategy to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions from such vehicles.39 
9.5.3 Research, Education and Cross-border 
Co-operation
EU programmes for student and teacher exchanges 
and professional training have become an important 
element of the educational framework in the region. 
The European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
(2007-2013) funded Arctic research at about EUR 20 
million a year.40 Stakeholders clearly see Arctic research 
as an area where the EU’s role is most visible, although 
they note that there is a deficit in funding for Arctic social 
sciences. 
The EU-Greenland Agreement supports education, 
vocational training and the development of human 
resources. Progress in these areas since 2007 has 
been recorded.41 As still only 11% of the population in 
Greenland has a university degree and many educated 
Greenlanders live outside of the island, primarily in 
Denmark, the ongoing focus on education and training, 
in line with the priorities of the Greenlandic government, 
is vital.42 In 2007-2013, Greenland received EUR 175 
million, which will rise to over EUR 217 million in 2014-
37. Directive 2012/33/EU of 21 November 2012 amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur content of marine fuels.
38. There are estimates that peg the decrease in sea transport at 10-21%, mir-
rored by an increase of 5-11% in rail transport and 5-6% in road transport. (Per-
sonal communication, Mid Sweden EU Office (Jämtland and Västernorrland 
counties), 10 March 2014).
39. The European Commission is currently developing a strategy to reduce 
CO2 emissions from such vehicles. See: “Road transport: Reducing CO2 emis-
sions from vehicles”, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/in-
dex_en.htm. Accessed 10 January 2014.
40. European Union (2012). Developing a European Union Policy towards the 
Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps. Joint Communication of 
the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the 
Council. Brussels, 26.6.2012. JOIN(2012) 19 final.
41. Mid-term Review of the EU/Greenland Partnership 2007-2013 (2006/526/
EC), 8 May 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/octs_and_greenland/
documents/mtr_grl-eu_partnership_2007-2013_en.pdf. Accessed 20 February 
2014.
42. Particip (September 2013). Report: Study to evaluate the performance of 
higher education in Greenland. European Commission. http://naalakkersuisut.
gl/. Accessed 10 February 2014.
2020. In addition, Greenland may participate in other 
programmes funded from the EU budget, including 
research, education or innovation (e.g. within NPP/NPA 
programmes) as well as receives financial contributions 
(around EUR 18 million for 2013-2015) within the 
Fisheries Partnership Agreement.
Support for international co-operation in the Arctic is 
one of the EU’s Arctic policy objectives. EU funding for 
cross-border co-operation includes research platforms, 
co-operation between companies, non-governmental 
organisations (Arctic NGO Forum), joint public services 
and infrastructure and development of information 
channels.
9.5.4 Traditional Livelihoods and 
Indigenous Peoples
Exclusive Sámi rights to traditional livelihoods, primarily 
reindeer husbandry, are safeguarded in a Protocol 
to Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession Treaty (Protocol 
3). Also various EU environmental regulations are of 
relevance for indigenous livelihoods (see Chapter 8).
EU-funded programmes acknowledge the dynamic nature 
of indigenous culture and many projects aim to develop 
creative industries and facilitate cultural co-operation, 
events and network-building, rather than focusing on the 
protection of heritage. The sub-programme InterregIVA/
North/Sápmi focuses on developing Sámi languages and 
language resources.43 The existence of a separate Sápmi 
sub-programme is seen as a positive development. Its 
creation allowed many Sámi actors to conduct activities 
vital for cultural development and contributed to 
strengthening Sámi cross-border co-operation. There are 
concerns that Sámi objectives would be lost among other 
programme activities after 2014, as the draft Interreg 
programme for 2014-2020 does not include a separate 
Sápmi sub-programme, even if Sámi-specific objectives 
are evident throughout the new programme activities, 
including support for culture, language, livelihood and 
cross-border co-operation.44  
In a pan-Arctic context, EU policy statements support 
enhancing EU-indigenous dialogue in the Arctic. There 
are, however, problematic issues, as the Inuit in Greenland 
and Canada are concerned about the EU ban on placing 
seal products on the EU market.45 Despite an exemption 
granted to indigenous peoples, the Inuit argue that, due 
to the collapse in the global market for seal products, 
the ban adversely affects their traditional practices and 
culture.46 Beyond the European Arctic, commercial (or 
43. InterregIVA/North, http://www.interregnord.com/en/about-the-pro 
gramme/goals-and-strategies.aspx. Accessed 15 February 2014.
44. Draft document on Interreg IVA North 2014-2020 (in Finnish). Interre-
gIVA/North, http://www.interregnord.com/media/64197/program%204%20
0%20-%20fin.pdf. Accessed 10 February 2014.
45. Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal 
products, Official Journal 31 October 2009.
46. Cambou, D. (2013). The Impact of the Ban on Seal Products on the Rights 
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non-indigenous) seal hunters in Canada claim that the 
ban has been designed with the goal of extinguishing 
their sealing traditions dating back hundreds of years.47 
In addition, the EU position regarding the aboriginal 
quota within the International Whaling Commission is of 
relevance to Greenlandic whaling.48
9.6 Critical Factors for EU 
Decision-making
Issues identified by stakeholders in consultations as 
important and uncertain are clustered into four critical 
factors for decision-making.
9.6.1 Intra-regional and Core-periphery 
Accessibility and Connectivity 
Actions facilitating or jeopardising accessibility and 
connectivity should be carefully considered, as their 
consequences may be far-reaching. Physical accessibility, 
including transport networks and ICT-based connectivity, 
is of major importance in sparsely populated remote 
regions. Traditionally, the development of peripheries 
has been seen as dependent on connectivity with the 
main economic, social and political centres. However, 
intra-regional connectivity is equally important as it leads 
to inter-regional synergies and the critical mass needed 
for innovation, dynamism and competition within the 
global market.49  
9.6.2 Power Structures, Social Conflicts and 
Cultural Diversity
Despite being sparsely populated, the European Arctic is 
characterised by power structures within and between 
communities including urban-rural interactions and 
relations with the national and global political and 
economic centres. Many important decisions are taken at 
the global or national level, where the peripheral regions 
have little influence on decisions.50 Tensions between 
economic, social and environmental interests may occur, 
especially in light of new resource developments. The rich 
of Indigenous Peoples: A European Issue, Yearbook of Polar Law 5, 389–415. 
Hossain, K. (2012). The EU ban on the import of seal products and the WTO 
regulations: neglected human rights of the Arctic indigenous peoples? Polar 
Record, 49(2), 154-166; European Bureau for Conservation and Development 
(2012). The Impact of the EU Seal Ban on the Inuit Population in Greenland. 
Report from a seminar in the European Parliament. 7 February 2013. Brussels.
47. Sellheim, N. (2013). The Neglected Tradition? – The Genesis of the EU 
Seal Products Trade Ban and Commercial Sealing, Yearbook of Polar Law 5, 
417–450.
48. Koivurova, T., Kokko, K., Duyck, S., Sellheim, N., & Stepien, A. (2012), 
The present and future competence of the European Union in the Arctic. Polar 
Record 48 (4), 361-371.
49. See also Dubois and Roto (2012).
50. NPP (2013), p. 5.
cultural diversity of the European Arctic regions needs to 
be taken into account as a part of the social landscape 
of the region, as an element of the power networks and 
as background for social conflicts. Policy-makers need 
to understand these power-conflict-culture frameworks 
when considering actions affecting the region.
9.6.3 Human-nature Interactions
Each society and its natural environment are 
interconnected on a number of levels. This is particularly 
important for northern, including indigenous, 
communities, whose livelihood and economy depend 
directly on the natural environment, as well as culture, 
identity and leisure-time activities. The understanding 
of resilience is based on analysis of social-environmental 
interactions. Nature or “wilderness” is more often seen 
as a resource by the tourist industry and is part of the 
image of the Arctic.
9.6.4 Innovation, Entrepreneurship and 
Education
The level of innovation and entrepreneurship within 
Northern communities as well as the level of education 
provide an important frame of reference for policy-
making. This should be taken into account when 
making decisions concerning extractive industries or 
programmes aimed at supporting local development. 
Education, research, entrepreneurship and innovation 
are closely linked, forming a basis for a knowledge-based 
economy and driving bottom-up development. Arctic 
local knowledge and non-technological innovativeness 
are important elements of this framework. Although 
Nordic states have a high level of entrepreneurship and 
innovation, in peripheral, rural regions the levels are 
usually lower than the national average. 
9.7 Recommendations
The recommendations have been developed by experts 
taking ideas proposed by stakeholders as a starting point.
9.7.1 Give a Voice to Arctic Communities in 
Policy Developments that May Affect Them
The European Arctic is a very diverse region, with each 
area having unique challenges. Local specifics require 
locally designed strategies, which the EU could then 
support.51 EU policy priorities should be adjusted to 
changing circumstances, perceptions and social needs. 
That requires dialogue with Arctic stakeholders. Social 
issues should be taken into account in EU environmental 
policies, especially when the interests and values of 
vulnerable groups are at stake. 
51. Dubois and Roto (2012).
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Arctic stakeholders, especially indigenous peoples, often 
lack the capacity to engage in consultation processes or 
follow various policy or regulatory developments. The 
EU should be proactive in reaching out to these Arctic 
actors. Forums such as Arctic Dialogue (a format for, so 
far irregular, meetings between EU officials and Arctic 
indigenous organisations) or initiatives similar to this 
assessment are steps in the right direction. However, there 
is a clear need for institutional solutions supplementing 
existing EU structures (e.g. the Committee of Regions 
or consultations within impact assessments) and for 
incorporation of Arctic, including indigenous, actors from 
outside the EU. In the near future, a strong involvement 
of various stakeholders may be needed in regard to the 
EU Seal Regulation and the examination of its impacts, 
especially that the issue has been recently raised by the 
European Parliament.52 The EU may undertake more 
efforts to inform the European public on the Inuit seal 
hunt and facilitate marketing of seal products in line with 
the indigenous exemption.53 
9.7.2 Support Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation with Sensitivity to Indigenous 
Youth and Gender Issues
The EU should continue to focus on entrepreneurship 
and innovation (including social innovations54), which 
need to be aligned with northern values and lifestyles.55 
As external investments triggering the emergence of 
a knowledge-based economy are limited, long-term 
development can originate primarily from inside the 
region.56 Areas of innovation where EU support may 
have comparatively greater added value include creative 
industries, e-services, leisure-time activities, innovations 
in traditional industries or cold climate technologies. 
Youth (especially women) who are learning, living and 
52. European Parliament. (2014). Joint Motion for a Resolution on the EU strat-
egy for the Arctic (2013/2595(RSP)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get-
Doc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P7-RC-2014-0229+0+DOC+XM-
L+V0//EN. Accessed 15 March 2014.
53. See also the report by the WWF, Gerde, E. (December 2013) Seals in 
Greenland. The important component of culture and economy. The Last Ice 
Area Project. WWF.
54. Social innovations are new ideas (e.g. products, services and models) 
that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) 
and create new social relationships or collaborations. (Open Book of Social 
Innovation, Murray, R., Calulier-Grice, J. & Mulgan, G., March 2010). For 
the European Commission, “such solutions are both social in their ends and 
in their means. They can take the form of genuine innovations or improved 
solutions.” (European Commission Social Innovation, http://ec.europa.eu/en-
terprise/policies/innovation/policy/social-innovation/index_en.htm. Accessed 
10 December 2013.)
55. Focus on innovation, research and education is clearly supported for exam-
ple in the Kirkenes II Declaration (Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, Kirkenes, Norway, 3–4 June 2013).
56. Dubois and Roto (2012), p. 50; Simmie, J. & R. Martin (2010). The eco-
nomic resilience of regions: towards an evolutionary approach. Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 3, 27-43, p. 30; Lundmark, L. 
(2006). Restructuring and employment change in Sparsely Populated Areas: 
Examples from Northern Sweden and Finland, Doctoral dissertation, Umea 
University, GERUM 2, p. 10.
working in the Arctic should be seen as the cornerstone 
of local entrepreneurship and innovation.57 Moreover, 
programmes designed over the next 10 to 20 years 
could more actively engage migrants, who, if given 
an opportunity, may greatly contribute to regional 
development. 
Emphasis on indigenous entrepreneurship (including 
social entrepreneurship) should be continued. The 
potential of the young indigenous generation (which 
is very active socially and politically) could be better 
addressed in the EU programmes. Separate funding lines 
for projects addressing indigenous-specific challenges 
are needed, as these may be less visible within general 
funding schemes. 
The focus on innovations and entrepreneurship can 
be better incorporated in research funding, exchange 
programmes and regional programmes supporting 
educational or research institutions. The EU could also 
support the establishment of networks dedicated to 
research and innovation, which could promote co-
operation between various research programmes and 
funding schemes (e.g. EU/EEA  programmes, Barents co-
operation and even taskforces in the Arctic Council).
9.7.3 Invest in Intra-regional Accessibility 
and Connectivity
The EU can influence accessibility and connectivity 
in the Arctic. There is a need for a holistic and 
comprehensive approach to accessibility including 
transport infrastructure, information flows, ease of 
crossing borders, and opportunities/spaces for dialogue 
and interaction. Many experts consider intra-regional 
connectivity a “sounder alternative to upgrading the 
transport system than direct core-periphery linkages”.58  
In terms of physical infrastructure, a comprehensive 
network within the trans-European transport network 
should not be neglected. Cross-border co-operation 
and venues such as Barents co-operation may provide 
support in the planning phase, but over the longer 
term, after 2020, there is a need for more targeted and 
substantial support for intra-regional connections. 
Cross-border co-operation, especially between Nordic 
states and northwest Russia, is an area where the 
EU can play a major role. Additional projects that 
support economic connectivity and people-to-people 
connections are needed.59  
57. Dubois and Roto (2012).
58. Dubois and Roto (2012), p. 64.
59. In fact, some stakeholders point out that such programmes are currently 
less visible than in the 1990s and early 2000s (see Annex 1).
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9.7.4 Consider the Special Needs of 
Arctic Cities in Relevant EU Policies and 
Programmes
Arctic urban areas are small in comparison to large cities 
in southern latitudes but perform a variety of functions 
normally associated with larger centres. For Arctic 
cities, strategies and supportive tools that are tailor-
made to their needs may be more appropriate than 
policies designed for urban, rural or sparsely populated 
areas. Arctic cities and their unique challenges should 
be included to a greater degree in initiatives directed 
at urban development.60 An urgent issue is to support 
indigenous identities and cultures in urban environments.
The EU should take advantage of expertise existing in the 
North and facilitate production of knowledge regarding 
Arctic urban development. That includes the exchange 
of experiences, including with Greenland and Russia.61 
60. Examples include the EU’s Smart Cities and Communities Initiative, CON-
CERTO initiative or EIB’s JESSICA Urban Development Funds. Concerto, 
http://concerto.eu/; DG-Regio, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/
instruments/jessica_en.cfm. All accessed 18 February 2014.
61. See the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas  (NSPA) network position on 
the European Commission’s Smart Cities and Communities Initiative of the 
Horizon 2020 programme, http://www.nspa-network.eu/. Accessed 13 Febru-
ary 2014.
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Based on the findings and recommendations contained in the thematic chapters as well as the overall input from 
stakeholder consultations, this concluding chapter identifies key general messages regarding the development of the 
Arctic and proposes suggestions for the ongoing process of EU Arctic policy formulation.
10.1 Development of the 
Arctic: Key General Messages
10.1.1 The key drivers of Arctic 
transformation: global economy and 
climate change
This assessment shows that the global economy and 
climate change remain key drivers of changes in the 
European Arctic. Neither climate change impacts nor 
the implications of economic developments should be 
analysed independently; instead, they should always be 
examined in the light of existing governance frameworks. 
Globalisation in all its forms is the main driver of current 
economic trends in the European Arctic. Global prices 
of minerals and hydrocarbons are key determinants of 
extractive resource developments. Both the upsurge 
in Arctic mineral exploration and exploitation over the 
past five years, and current industry concerns regarding 
the profitability of many operating and planned mines 
reflect global markets and the outlook for demand 
in emerging economies (Chapter 7). Lower natural 
gas prices have put some investment decisions on 
hold (e.g. Shtokman project), while high oil prices 
have encouraged companies to invest in expensive 
exploration projects (e.g. off the coast of Greenland) 
(Chapter 6). As destinational shipping is expected to 
be the most important element of maritime transport, 
the transport needs of extractive industries are among 
the critical determinants of Arctic maritime traffic 
(Chapter 4). Demand for the products of fisheries and 
aquaculture, together with the management systems 
in place, significantly influence these industries and the 
communities that depend on them. 
The influence of markets and climate change impacts is 
often outweighed by the role of regulatory frameworks 
and administrative or political decisions. This is the case 
with the opening of new areas for oil and gas exploration 
and legislation pertaining to reindeer herding or 
nature protection. Furthermore, local dynamics, social 
challenges and conflicts, environmental concerns, 
indigenous rights, as well as local perceptions of needs, 
risks and opportunities may facilitate, enhance or hinder 
change in particular locations.
While economic developments and climate change play a 
role in social transformation (the latter to a lesser extent 
in the European Arctic), factors such as various elements 
of cultural globalisation or the IT revolution have a major 
imprint throughout the region (Chapter 9). 
10.1.2 Climate change: profound impacts 
on Arctic environment but limited on 
economic development 
As the Arctic warms two to three times faster than 
the global average,1 climate change presents a major 
challenge for the region, given the dependence of 
human-natural systems on the cryosphere and the 
fragility of Arctic ecosystems. The decrease in the sea ice 
extent and thickness in the Arctic Ocean as well as the 
melting of the Greenlandic ice sheet, thawing permafrost 
and coastal erosion are the clearest impacts. However, in 
Northern Fennoscandia, changes in snow cover or lake/
river ice conditions are the most pronounced effects. 
The resulting changes in Arctic biodiversity and landscape 
also affect human societies. Arctic communities are 
already affected by economic, social, cultural or political 
changes. Climate change is an additional pressure, 
testing the adaptive capacities and resilience of peoples 
and communities and augmenting existing uncertainties. 
The resilience and adaptive capacity of environmental-
social systems may not be sufficient to withstand the 
accumulation of the multiple pressures discussed in this 
report.2 Consequently, while mitigation of global change 
and ongoing knowledge-building are still seen as primary 
responses, the implementation of more concrete 
adaptation actions needs to be considered.
Climate change affects economic activities in the 
Arctic both positively and negatively. Yet, demand for 
Arctic resources and regulatory frameworks constitute 
the pivotal factors shaping the pace and direction of 
economic developments, both at present and by 2030. 
The current and future influence of different types of 
drivers cannot be thoroughly quantified, but the majority 
of the researchers and stakeholders involved in this 
assessment share the same general view of the limited 
role of climate change in socioeconomic development. 
This holds not only for extractive industries, but also for 
tourism, forestry, fisheries and even reindeer herding. 
Relative to other activities discussed in this report, Arctic 
maritime transport is likely to be the most affected by 
the consequences of climate change, even though a 
variety of constraints and uncertainties exist. 
1. IPCC (2013). Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribu-
tion of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, 
M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. & Midgley, P.M. 
(eds.)]; CAFF. (2013): Arctic Biodiversity Report. Synthesis. Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna. Arctic Council; ACIA (2005). Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment. Arctic Council.
2. Nilsson, A. E. (ed.), Stockholm Environment Institute and Stockholm Re-
silience Centre (2013). Arctic Resilience Interim Report 2013. Arctic Council. 
www.arctic-council.org. Accessed 10 January 2014.
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However, in the longer-term perspective climate change 
is likely to become an increasingly important factor 
in shaping the Arctic economic and social landscape 
through physical and environmental changes. Moreover, 
the recent IPCC Fifth Assessment Report highlights the 
severity of likely impacts around the globe.3 Global 
impacts have an indirect influence on the Arctic: 
via changes occurring in other regions and via the 
consequences of climate change mitigation policies, 
for example by shaping demand for Arctic resources 
or facilitating development of renewable energy in the 
region. 
There is a widespread belief that climate change itself 
will lead to increased economic opportunities in terms of 
Arctic maritime transport, fisheries or resource extraction, 
and that these opportunities might balance out or even 
outweigh the negative impacts of climate change in the 
Arctic. This is far from certain, as while climate change 
already adversely impacts Arctic ecosystems and nature-
based livelihoods, it has a limited role in triggering Arctic 
economic development, in particular in the European 
part of the region. 
10.1.3 Moderate pace of socioeconomic 
developments
While signs of change, especially environmental 
change, are visible throughout the Arctic, the pace of 
socioeconomic developments is in general moderate. 
This is in contradiction to the dominant media coverage 
portraying climate change as ushering in a race 
among states and businesses for the region’s plentiful 
hydrocarbon resources, minerals and navigational 
highways. This image of the region has been fuelled 
by events such as the 2007 and 2012 Arctic Ocean 
September sea ice minima, planting of the Russian flag 
at the North Pole, moderately increased number of 
Arctic transit voyages, and the interest of Asian states 
and companies. However, these dramatic narratives do 
not find support among expert circles or local actors.4 
In terms of international relations, the Arctic remains a 
zone of co-operation and no major tensions originating 
from within the region are expected. However, conflicts 
outside the Arctic may affect regional governance, even 
if likely to a comparatively lesser degree than other areas 
of international co-operation.
Economic developments and social changes will occur 
mostly gradually and unevenly across the Arctic. In the 
coming decades, there might be sectors (e.g. minerals 
3. See:  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014). Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Summary for Poli-
cy-makers. Fifth Assessment Report. See http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/
uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2014.
4. Koivurova, T. (2013), The Dialectic of Understanding Progress in Arctic 
Governance, Michigan State International Law Review, 22, 1-21; Arbo, P., 
Iversen, A., Knool, M., Ringholm, T. & Sander, G. (2013). Arctic Futures. 
Conceptualisations and images of a changing Arctic. Polar Geography, 36(3), 
163-182.
mining, Chapter 7) that might stagnate or even bust. 
Therefore, it is not guaranteed that economic affluence 
will resolve the social challenges troubling many remote 
Arctic locations. The Arctic Ocean proper (compared to 
adjacent waters such as the Barents or Beaufort seas) is 
an area that receives particularly much attention from 
environmental NGOs, media, policy-makers and the 
public. However, the developments in fisheries, shipping 
and hydrocarbon extraction in this area are predicted to 
be either very limited or decades away (Chapters 4, 5 
and 6). 
Consequently, policies and strategies risk being 
misguided if they are based on such notions as “Arctic 
boom”. This does not mean that current and expected 
economic and social developments do not require 
enhancement of policies and governance systems as well 
as investments in research and infrastructure. Owing to 
the characteristics of the Arctic environmental and social 
landscape, even activities that are moderate in scale 
may be connected with major impacts. There is a need 
to monitor change and adapt policies to shifting social, 
economic and environmental conditions. Involvement 
of regional actors is necessary to understand actual 
challenges and develop effective, tailor-made responses. 
Furthermore, it is always possible that unexpected 
political and economic events (e.g. energy or political 
crises) will trigger or restrict economic developments.
10.1.4 Arctic developments are closely 
interconnected
All changes and developments discussed in this report 
are interconnected, and thus often result in cumulative, 
often adverse, impacts, especially for Arctic biodiversity 
and current means of livelihood. In decision-making 
the interplay between various drivers, activities and 
their impacts should be always taken into account. No 
development should be analysed separately. Some 
issues recur across the chapters and could be taken up 
in greater detail in further assessment work in regard 
to the relationship between the EU and the Arctic, 
including: biodiversity, community viability, indigenous 
peoples’ rights, participation, research, and short-lived 
climate forcers.
Industries may complement one another to contribute 
to a more diversified economic structure, but conflicts 
are also possible. If fisheries and hydrocarbon extraction 
or tourism and mining are developed in the same region, 
tensions or local conflicts could occur (Chapters 5, 6 
and 8). The impacts are particularly pronounced when 
multiple activities result in cumulative impacts. Arctic 
maritime traffic is highly dependent on renewable and 
non-renewable resource extraction. Some livelihoods, 
like reindeer herding, are more vulnerable to pressures 
and there may be limits to the cumulative impacts they 
can withstand. In addition, Arctic hydrocarbon extraction 
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in the long term involves a dilemma: climate change that 
plays a role in opening the Arctic to offshore hydrocarbon 
extraction is partly caused by the combustion of fossil 
fuels, and bringing a new hydrocarbon province into 
production will exacerbate the effects (Chapters 3, 6). 
At the same time, infrastructures created for one activity 
may beneficially serve other industries. The availability 
of viable Arctic transport may serve as an enabler of 
various activities (Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8) and may in the 
long run serve economic development outside the Arctic 
as well. 
10.1.5 The European Union is affected by 
the changes in the Arctic
The EU not only influences the Arctic via its environmental 
and economic footprint,5 but is itself also affected by 
changes in the region. Of critical consequence for Europe 
are Arctic amplification effects within the changing 
global climate, including the rise in the sea level, and the 
significance of the Arctic for shaping Europe’s weather 
patterns (Chapter 3). Gradual opening of Arctic sea 
routes will be important for European transport. Arctic 
shipping will require construction of ice-classed vessels, 
many of them likely to be designed and constructed in 
the EU (Chapter 4). Arctic fisheries are an important 
source of food for Europe (Chapter 5). The EU is a major 
importer of Arctic oil and gas (Chapter 6). Northern 
Fennoscandia is one of the main regions for EU domestic 
minerals production (Chapter 7). European tourists 
increasingly take advantage of the North’s recreational 
potential and its rich biodiversity (Chapter 8). Northern 
cities are innovation centres of importance at the 
European level. Arctic cultures – including the culture of 
the Sámi, the EU’s only recognised indigenous people – 
are an indispensable part of Europe’s cultural diversity 
(Chapter 9). 
10.2 Suggestions for the 
Further Formulation of EU 
Arctic Policy 
Over the last decade, the European Union has made 
much progress in clarifying its approach to the Arctic, 
moving towards more nuanced and cautious approaches. 
The EU has been formulating its strategic approach to 
the Arctic region since 2008. The aim is to ensure that 
it is responsible, based on knowledge and engagement 
(as specified in the 2012 Joint Communication6). Future 
5. See Ecologic Institute, Cavalieri, S. et al. (2010). EU Arctic Footprint and 
Policy Assessment Report, 2010. http://arctic-footprint.eu/. Accessed 10 Jan-
uary 2014.
6. European Commission (2012). Developing a European Union Policy to-
wards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps. Joint Commu-
policy should also be realistic, focused on areas where 
the EU has the greatest influence, aligned with Arctic 
governance frameworks, and aimed at addressing 
genuine environmental, social and economic challenges 
faced by the region.
10.2.1 Investing in better understanding of 
Arctic change
Numerous uncertainties and the dynamic nature of 
Arctic change require an in-depth understanding of the 
physical, biological and social processes. The EU is an 
important sponsor of Arctic research, and plays a key 
role in the development of technologies and innovations 
necessary to address Arctic challenges. 
The findings of EU-funded research could be better 
communicated to EU decision-makers, Arctic stakeholders 
and the EU public at large in formats adjusted to the 
needs and capacities of particular audiences. The role 
of science communication is indispensable. Moreover, 
other forms of knowledge need to be taken into account 
in decision-making. 
One of the key elements of a more comprehensive 
understanding of Arctic change is assessment work. 
Assessments are particularly important as tools bridging 
science and policy in the Arctic context, where a number 
of actors external to the region are present and where 
some local actors lack capacities to conduct their own 
knowledge-building activities. Assessments bring 
together available knowledge and information in formats 
that could contribute to a common understanding 
among researchers, sectors of the public and policy-
makers of the developments at hand. Thus, assessments 
enhance knowledge- and participation-based decision-
making.7 There is a particular need for integrated 
assessments, which should be characterised by greater 
attention to social and socioeconomic issues than is 
currently paid. Such integration should occur at all 
levels of assessment work: from environmental impact 
assessments and strategic integrated assessments to 
regional environmental assessments. 
10.2.2 Enhanced communication and 
participation of Arctic actors in EU decision-
making
More effective and meaningful participation of Arctic 
stakeholders in decision-making processes is a vital 
component of a response to social and environmental 
nication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Brussels, 26.6.2012. 
JOIN(2012) 19 final.
7. See also, Kankaanpää, Paula and Malgorzata Smieszek (Eds.) (2014), As-
sessments in Policy Making: Case studies from the Arctic Coucnil. Preparatory 
Action, Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of development of the 
Arctic, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. [Report for the European Com-
mission]. Available: www.arcticinfo.eu
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changes and to the rising complexity of Arctic governance. 
Two-way communication between Arctic stakeholders 
and EU decision-makers and involving stakeholders in 
dialogue with each other are crucial. Arctic inhabitants, 
communities, businesses, local governments and 
organisations lack information on the EU’s role, interests 
and relevant activities in the region.
Enhanced participation enables understanding of 
values and livelihoods that might be neglected from the 
perspective of densely populated European economic 
centres, where the human-environment relation (e.g. 
subsistence use of forests) may not be as vital for culture 
and identity as in the North (Chapters 8 and 9). 
EU policies designed for a broad European constituency 
may also need to be assessed in the context of Arctic-
specific challenges. That is because particular measures 
may entail outcomes in the North that diverge from 
those anticipated in Europe’s more southern latitudes, 
including environmental and transport regulations 
(Chapters 7, 8, 9). Where relevant, the European 
Commission’s impact assessments of proposed policies 
or regulations could incorporate a special focus on how 
such new policy or legislative proposals influence the 
region.8 Due to the complexity of both Arctic realities and 
EU policy frameworks, identification of policies that have 
consequences in the Arctic constitutes a major challenge 
and requires stakeholder engagement. EU cohesion and 
co-operation programmes in the North are an example 
of the added value provided by stakeholder involvement. 
There, the key role of local actors in setting objectives has 
resulted in the alignment of local perceptions of needs 
and challenges and the goals of EU-funded programmes.
Indigenous peoples underline that they are also rights-
holders. The participation of indigenous peoples (in 
particular the Sámi) in decision-making should be 
addressed in the light of evolving international indigenous 
rights (including land rights and the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent), primarily the UN Declaration of 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Responsible decision-
making with regard to EU policies that may affect Arctic 
indigenous communities requires their meaningful 
participation. The concept of establishing a more 
permanent presence of the Arctic indigenous peoples or 
the Sámi in Brussels remains relevant.9
10.2.3 Accounting for diversity within the 
Arctic
The Arctic is composed of diverse sub-regions 
characterised by dissimilar dynamics. Policy-making 
8. As was already partly suggested (regarding environmental impacts) in 
the Commission’s 2008 Arctic Communication. See European Commission 
(2008). Communication COM/2008/0763 from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council – The European Union and the Arctic Region.
9. Already suggested at the 2010 ‘Arctic Dialogue’ meeting. See the website 
of the European Commission’s DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries at https://
webgate.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum/content/1831. Accessed 4 March 2014.
processes addressing Arctic issues or affecting Arctic 
regions have to take this diversity into account. 
Stakeholder engagement may help to understand 
specific local concerns. EU policy-makers and other EU 
stakeholders need to acknowledge Arctic diversity and 
act with care when discussing “the Arctic” in an abstract 
manner. Statements true for the European Arctic or 
for the EU Arctic may lead to misunderstandings when 
applied to other parts of the circumpolar North. 
There are many commonalities between Arctic regions, 
including: a cold climate, vulnerability of ecosystems, 
sparse human population, unique landscape value, 
dependence on primary industries, or the presence 
of indigenous cultures. However, even common 
characteristics are manifested differently across the 
circumpolar North. There are numerous examples: the 
Barents Sea involves less or different risks connected 
with shipping, tourism or hydrocarbon extraction in 
comparison to other, heavily ice-infested Arctic waters 
(Chapters 4 and 6); mining in Northern Fennoscandia 
involves a different set of problems than in Greenland 
(Chapter 7); and the implementation of international 
indigenous rights depends greatly on the specific local 
context (Chapters 8 and 9). 
Competences and influence of the EU regarding 
particular parts of the region are another element of 
this diversity. The EU’s role differs depending on the 
sector and geographically: in the EU Arctic, EEA, broader 
European Arctic, whole circumpolar North and the Arctic 
Ocean proper. 
10.2.4 Paying special attention to the 
European Arctic
The changes in the Arctic are manifested also in the EU’s 
northernmost regions. It is important that EU policy-
makers and other European actors (such as media, NGOs, 
national decision-makers) perceive the European Arctic’s 
biological and cultural diversity, social and economic 
development and the rights of its indigenous peoples as 
a “European issue”, just as is the case with any other EU 
region. 
Future EU Arctic policy should accentuate the EU’s role 
and priorities in the European Arctic (not necessarily 
only the EU Arctic). In this way the EU would not only 
focus on areas where it can make the greatest positive 
difference, but would also improve its image in the region 
and underline its status as an Arctic actor. Although 
the main global trends and pan-Arctic environmental 
priorities should not be overlooked, such a more focused 
approach could result in EU institutions gaining Europe-
specific Arctic expertise, leading also to greater influence 
at the circumpolar level.
Recent EU policy documents highlight EU actions in the 
European North. However, challenges particular to the 
European Arctic – as a region distinct within the broader, 
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circumpolar context – as well as clear goals and priorities 
specific for that region are not elaborated. The policy 
documents should state very clearly which aims and 
actions refer to the circumpolar Arctic, and which to its 
European and EU part.
Various EU cohesion and regional co-operation funding 
instruments are among the most important tools at the 
EU’s disposal. It could prove advantageous to bring a 
variety of EU programmes, initiatives and actions in the 
European Arctic under a common framework. That may 
be beneficial both for long-term policy performance and 
for enhancing perception of the EU within the region.
10.2.5 Policy framework: coherent but 
adapted to the complexity of Arctic 
governance
The EU has been criticised for not fulfilling its own 
objective of developing a “structured and co-ordinated 
approach” towards the Arctic.10 However, taking such 
a comprehensive approach too far may be undesirable 
and even impossible. There is a need to acknowledge 
the complexity of Arctic governance11 and to adjust EU 
actions to the Arctic landscape rather than to pursue in 
the future an artificially unified EU policy framework. 
Complexity and fragmentation do not have to be seen 
as disadvantages of Arctic governance. Possibilities 
for enhancing governance frameworks exist and are 
highlighted in this report’s thematic recommendations. 
The EU can positively contribute to gradual integration 
and enhancement within some sectors of Arctic 
governance, such as shipping or biodiversity. This can 
be achieved primarily owing to the EU’s influence on the 
relevant international frameworks and participation in 
the venues of Arctic regional governance. 
It may be advantageous for the EU to focus on areas where 
it has the greatest influence and where its credibility 
as a policy actor is the highest. That certainly includes 
climate change, research, technological expertise, and 
high safety and environmental standards. 
Effective co-ordination within the European Commission 
and the European External Action Service as well as the 
identification of principles to guide various EU actions in 
Arctic matters are highly commendable. The Arctic policy 
framework could play a role in addressing potentially 
diverging policy objectives, for example simultaneously 
10. European Commission (2008). Communication COM/2008/0763 from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The Europe-
an Union and the Arctic Region; see, e.g., Keil, K. & Raspotnik, A. (5 July 
2012). Further Steps Towards a Comprehensive EU Arctic Policy: Is the EU 
Getting There? The Arctic Institute. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/07/
further-steps-towards-comprehensive-eu.html. Accessed 10 February 2014; 
Keil, K. (14 December 2011). EU Arctic Policy: Caught between Energy Se-
curity and Climate Change. The Arctic Institute. http://www.thearcticinstitute.
org/2011/12/4598-eu-arctic-policy-caught-between.html. Accessed 10 Febru-
ary 2014.
11. See, e.g., Young, O. R. (2011). “If an Arctic Ocean Treaty is Not the Solu-
tion, What is the Alternative?”, Polar Record 47, 327-334.
pursuing climate change goals and energy security or, 
in the context of land use conflicts, facilitating domestic 
extraction of minerals while at the same time supporting 
local and traditional livelihoods and cultures. In the 
first case, however, long-term strategic actions related 
to climate and energy are needed, with Arctic-specific 
policy playing a secondary role.
  
10.2.6 Co-operation with Arctic partners 
despite challenges
In order to enhance its legitimacy, presence and influence 
in the region, the EU has to co-operate closely with 
Arctic states and local actors.12 That includes substantial 
contributions to the work of the Arctic Council in the 
EU’s capacity as an observer in principle (see Chapter 
2). While the EU needs to continue working on resolving 
differences with Canada connected to the ban on the 
placing of seal products on the EU market and addressing 
the concerns of some Arctic states regarding the EU’s 
role in the region, these issues should not constrain the 
EU’s active engagement in Arctic co-operation. 
Support for and participation in Arctic Council 
knowledge-building and standard-setting activities 
regarding maritime shipping, climate change adaptation, 
black carbon, oil spills, and biodiversity are particularly 
relevant. Emphasis should be given to the developments 
at the level of the Arctic Council’s working groups.
Furthermore, within the area of greatest EU influence 
– the European Arctic – the European Commission 
should engage in more active and substance-oriented 
participation in Barents co-operation, including 
encouraging and supporting long-term actions and 
coming forth with its own proposals. As strongly 
highlighted by stakeholders, although very challenging 
(especially after March 2014), collaboration with Russian 
partners in the region is a necessary element of EU Arctic 
policy and regional governance in the European Arctic.
12. As has been clearly acknowledged in consequent EU Arctic policy docu-
ments.
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Annex 1.1 Stakeholder Consultations Report (Meetings and 
Workshops in Rovaniemi and Tromsø)
Tina Schoolmeester and Lawrence Hislop, GRID-Arendal, Norway
Workshop rapporteurs: Tina Schoolmeester, Lawrence Hislop, John Crump (GRID-Arendal), Outi Padaar, Mika Aromäki 
(Sámi Educational Institute), Nathalie van Isacker (International Polar Foundation) and Adam Stępień (Arctic Centre, 
University of Lapland)
A1.1.1 Background and Rationale
The main purpose of engaging stakeholders and the public 
in the impact assessment (IA) process is to maintain an 
open and transparent dialogue with relevant stakeholders 
and to help provide clarity and accountability throughout 
the IA process (UNEP 20091). Public involvement is 
an effective way to integrate environmental, cultural, 
social, economic and technological considerations. 
Consultations are a forum for expression, discussion, 
analysis and evaluation of issues, information, values, 
perspectives and interests. The European Commission’s 
Impact Assessment Guidelines identify consultations as 
“an essential tool for producing high quality and credible 
policy proposals” (EC 20092). 
The consultation process is one of the most important 
elements of the ‘Strategic Assessment of Development 
of the Arctic’ (SADA), and its main goal is to create 
channels for exchange of information between EU 
decision-makers and Arctic stakeholders and to build 
long-term participatory partnerships. 
The focus of the Preparatory Action Impact Assessment 
was to complement scientific information with input 
from Arctic stakeholders in order to give EU decision-
makers a perspective on Arctic trends and how EU 
policies influence or may influence these trends. 
Specifically, stakeholders’ input provided the SADA team 
with information on:
• Key sustainability issues relevant to Arctic trends 
and the importance of particular issues for various 
groups of stakeholders;
• Critical factors for EU decision-makers in the Arctic 
(from the perspective of various stakeholders, based 
on the ranking of sustainability issues);
• Trends and their implications for the Arctic 
environment, economy and society/politics – 
identifying gaps in assessment work (as presented 
in factsheets), testing the expert-led choices and 
description of trends and their drivers;
• The role of EU policies in shaping Arctic trends;
1. UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2009). Integrated As-
sessment: Mainstreaming Sustainability Into Policymaking. A guidance man-
ual. UNEP, August 2009.
2. European Commission (19 January 2009). Impact Assessment Guidelines. 
SEC(2009)92.
• Ideas for recommendations and policy options for 
EU policies and actions (brainstorming); and
• Identifying other, overlooked, stakeholders.
Consultations were a critical part of the IA but will not 
replace the assessments conducted by experts. 
A1.1.2 General Aspects of the Consultations
Direct face-to-face interaction with stakeholders is 
the most typical and often most productive form of 
consultations. 
Approximately 160 stakeholders, representing business, 
academia, state agencies or regulators from around 
the European Arctic and beyond, participated in two 
stakeholder consultations that were organised in 
Rovaniemi and Tromsø, on 3 October 2013 and 22 
January 2014, respectively. 
Due to the expected knowledge base of participants and 
the location and timing of the workshops, the trends 
discussed in the consultation meetings in Rovaniemi 
were linked to terrestrial issues (Mining, Land Use and 
Social and Cultural Changes), while the Tromsø meeting 
focused on marine topics (Offshore Oil and Gas, Shipping, 
and Fisheries). A Climate Change workshop was held at 
both places. In Rovaniemi, a general workshop discussing 
all topics was conducted in Finnish. All other workshops 
were conducted in English.
Before the consultations, much work was put into the 
proper identification of relevant stakeholders thanks to 
the combined efforts of the network partners and in 
particular the authors of the chapters. The subsequent 
stakeholder mapping exercise resulted in the compilation 
of 1100 documented stakeholders. All of these individuals 
were then invited personally to participate in a first and 
a second call, which were conducted with ample time 
before the meetings. Taking into account that some 
email addresses failed, but that others were forwarded 
to colleagues of the addressed stakeholder, and that 
some stakeholders were also invited orally, it is safe to say 
that between 1100 and 1200 relevant stakeholders were 
approached to take part in the consultation meetings. 
This stakeholder mapping exercise reached out to a very 
broad range of stakeholders representing varied local 
actors in the Arctic region, indigenous Arctic peoples, 
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those with influence on Arctic affairs or having a major 
stake in Arctic development (business, tourism, oil 
and gas, etc.), policymakers, academics and NGOs and 
environmental advocates. 
The place and timing of the workshops were well thought 
through: in Rovaniemi, the aim was to reach out to local 
actors in particular, while in Tromsø, the workshop was 
organised back-to-back with the annual Arctic Frontiers 
conference in order to also reach out to the wider Arctic 
and international community. 
In order to acquire useful and relevant inputs and 
recommendations, the participatory process had to 
be based on clear, concise documents, adjusted to the 
audience’s capacities, knowledge and culture. In the 
SADA, this was facilitated by the use of factsheets. Each 
factsheet discussed one Arctic trend, related Arctic 
developments and the influence of the EU on these. 
The information presented in the factsheets constituted 
a non-expert presentation and was based on available 
reports and studies. 
The factsheets, which were prepared by several 
researchers, served as background documents for 
the consultation meetings in Rovaniemi and Tromsø. 
Whenever these factsheets were ready at the time 
when the invitations were sent, they were included with 
the invitations. They were also sent separately and well 
in advance to all the participants of both workshops. 
Factsheets of all the trends can be downloaded from 
http://www.arcticinfo.eu/en/the-u-arctic-impact-
assessment-factsheets. 
Both consultations consisted of a general plenary 
meeting of two to two-and-a-half hours, followed by 
four-to-five-hour parallel workshop sessions for the 
actual stakeholder consultations. Both days ended 
with a short half-an-hour wrap up session, providing all 
participants with a quick summary of the workshop’s 
findings. A small reception for promoting further co-
operation and networking closed both meetings. 
During the thematic working groups, the stakeholders 
were asked to carry out three main tasks:
1. To reflect on one’s own values and to choose key 
sustainability issues in regard to the given trend
2. To assess the accuracy and focus of information in 
the factsheets
3. To develop recommendations 
‘Key sustainability issues’ constitute a set of issues 
of concern that are tangible, relevant and important 
for stakeholders. The stakeholders participating in 
workshops were asked to individually rank these 
sustainability issues by choosing the five most important 
ones. The three-to-four top-ranked key sustainability 
issues would be treated as critical factors for decision-
making3,4. 
Critical factors for decision-making within the SADA are 
issues that the EU should take primarily into account 
when designing its actions that may have impacts in 
the Arctic. Stakeholder-chosen critical factors for Arctic 
decision-making comprised one of the main outcomes 
of the consultations. 
In the second phase of the workshops, the stakeholders 
were asked to comment on the factsheets, suggest any 
gaps in information, propose additions, and discuss which 
issues have in their view been described inaccurately. 
They were also asked to provide their assessment of the 
influence of EU policies on the trend discussed. 
After elaborating on their own key values and discussing 
the information presented in the factsheets, the 
stakeholders were invited to a brainstorming session 
to propose ideas for recommendations – or areas of 
recommendations – for EU policies. All ideas were 
recorded in the reports, and a ranking of the top ideas for 
recommendations for the EU policy-makers concluded 
the workshop. 
The thematic workshops were very structured and 
moderators guided the discussions to ensure the success 
of the SADA consultations. Rapporteurs supported 
moderators during the workshops and prepared 
individual reports of each workshop afterwards. These 
reports were circulated to the participants for feedback. 
They formed the basis of this stakeholder consultation 
report and their contents contributed substantially to the 
other chapters. The main outcomes are summarised in a 
matrix in point 2 as critical factors for EU decision-making 
and recommendations. More detailed information 
on key sustainability issues and recommendations, 
disaggregated in terms of stakeholder groups, is 
presented in the form of matrices in point 3. 
The comments on the factsheets are only recorded in 
the individual reports of the consultation workshops 
because they are too diverse, very specific and lengthy; 
that said, they are all equally important. The experts have 
incorporated all comments directly into the assessment 
chapters of this report (Chapters 3 to 9). 
The project team working on the assessment has received 
a great amount of diverse input from stakeholders, and 
the method has proven to be very valuable in terms of 
gathering input from stakeholders. 
3. Partidário, M. do R., (2007). Strategic Environmental Assessment Good 
Practices Guide. Methodological Guidance. Amador: Portuguese Environment 
Agency.
4. Partidário, M. do R. (2008), “Strategic-based model for SEA based on Crit-
ical Factors for Decision Making”. Paper presented at the 28th Annual Con-
ference of the International Association for Impact Assessment, Perth, 3-10 
May 2008.
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Rovaniemi Meeting
About 60 participants, in addition to many network 
partners, attended the workshop on 3 October 2013.
The plenary session in the morning was opened with 
welcoming words from Paula Kankaanpää, the SADA 
project leader, and Jamie Reynolds from the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for the Environment. 
Mr. Reynolds underlined the importance of input from 
stakeholders, business and civil society for EU policy-
making. Timo Koivurova from the Arctic Centre, Seija 
Tuulentie from the Finnish Forest Research Institute 
(Metla), and Ulla Aikio-Puoskari from the Giellagas 
Institute gave keynote presentations on the main trends 
and the EU’s role in the Arctic. 
Adam Stępień, the project’s IA expert, gave a presentation 
on the SADA process and its purpose, including an 
overview of the methodology, structure and the role of 
the stakeholder consultations. 
The speeches by experts constituted only an introduction 
to the substantive dialogue, which took place between 
the stakeholders during afternoon sessions. Five parallel 
workshops were held. Four of them were in English, each 
dedicated to an important trend in the European Arctic, 
including mining, land use change, climate change and 
sociocultural changes. A fifth workshop, discussing all 
topics, proceeded in Finnish.
The stakeholders were asked to identify the most critical 
issues for EU decision-making and the problems on 
which the experts are to focus in the further assessment 
work. The participants commented on the factsheets and 
suggested improvements and possible ways forward. 
Eventually, the workshop groups brainstormed on ideas 
that will aid the experts in developing recommendations 
for EU Policies. 
The rapporteurs of the five workshops reported on 
the main outcomes of the workshop session during a 
30-minute plenary wrap-up session.
Tromsø Meeting
On 22 January 2014, back-to-back with the Arctic 
Frontiers Conference, the project team organised the 
second stakeholder consultation meeting, a critical 
element of the Strategic Assessment of Development of 
the Arctic process.
More than 50 Arctic stakeholders and about 30 project 
network partners attended the consultations. The 
meeting, similarly to the one organised in Rovaniemi in 
October 2013, was divided into a plenary meeting and 
structured thematic workshops.
Paula Kankaanpää (Arctic Centre and project lead), 
Øyvind Hilmarsen (Tromsø City Council) and Jamie 
Reynolds (DG Environment, European Commission) 
welcomed the participants and opened the plenary.
Jamie Reynolds (European Commission’s DG 
Environment) and the senior expert in the project, Prof. 
Timo Koivurova (Arctic Centre, University of Lapland), 
gave an overview of the European Union’s competences 
and role in the Arctic and informed the participants of 
the process of shaping the EU’s Arctic policy. Prof. Oran 
Young (Bren School, University of California), the day’s 
keynote speaker, provided an overview of changing 
perceptions of the Arctic over the last decades and 
challenged the notions regarding Arctic boom and the 
scramble for Arctic resources. Martin Sommerkorn (WWF 
Global Arctic Programme) presented recent assessment 
activities of the Arctic Council and underlined the 
importance of stakeholder engagement in two emerging 
Arctic Council assessments: the Arctic Resilience Report 
and the Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic 
Assessment (AACA), showing how the SADA process fits 
into the current forefront of bridging science and policy 
in the Arctic.
Adam Stępień (IA, Arctic Centre) discussed the project’s 
objectives and process, the methodology of the 
assessment work and the role of consultations in the 
Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic 
report. 
Picture A1.1.1: Mining workshop in Rovaniemi in October 
2013.
Photo: J.-H. Kukko, Arctic Centre.
Picture A1.1.2: Workshop on Arctic maritime transport during 
the SADA stakeholder consultations in Tromsø.
Photo: Ilona Mettiäinen, Arctic Centre.
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From their experience in Rovaniemi, the project team 
decided to make the plenary session shorter and start 
the parallel, thematic workshops already in the morning 
to allow for more time for direct stakeholder input. 
There were four parallel workshops in Tromsø focused 
on Maritime Transport, Oil and Gas, Fisheries – and on 
Climate Change.
Here too, the workshops had been designed to allow 
stakeholders to comment on the accuracy of factsheets 
and the direction of assessment work as well as to help 
the assessment team identify critical issues and develop 
recommendations for EU policy-makers. 
The rapporteurs of the four workshops reported on 
the main outcomes of the workshop session during a 
30-minute plenary wrap-up session.
Workshop 
Trend
# 
Participants
Most Important Critical Factors
Most Important Ideas for Recommendations for 
EU Policies
Mining in the 
European Arctic 
(Rovaniemi)
21
1. Land use (including reindeer herding, 
transport, indigenous people’s rights … this 
is a very broad topic that can include many 
other issues, too)
2. Global demand for resources (driver)
3. A combination of multiple environment-
related factors, e.g. ecosystem services, 
pollution & related technological solutions 
1. Create favourable conditions for mining
• need for regulations and impacts of regulations
• consider social impacts 
• liability of mining industry
2. Improve implementation of environmental regulations
3. Increase/improve research and technology
In general: 
Consider the specificities of the Arctic when developing policies 
and maintain dialogue and good communication mechanisms 
between the mining sector, other land users, indigenous peoples 
and general public
Climate Change 
in the Arctic 
(Rovaniemi)
12
1. Cryosphere (sea ice + snow cover + glaciers 
+ permafrost)
2. Land and sea use changes
3. Biodiversity
Many critical factors are linked; two clusters 
of factors are highlighted 
Cluster 1: Sea ice – maritime transport – oil 
and gas – emergency response
Cluster 2: Permafrost – methane – adaptation 
for infrastructure
1. Support regional adaptation for regional (Arctic-specific) needs 
2. Tightly link monitoring/observations with research (e.g. in 
Horizon 2020)
3. Increase local involvement in EU policy
4. Support education
5. Support communication & dialogue
6. Play active role in international climate negotiations 
The EU could, for example, take action with regard to short-lived 
climate pollutants: this is easy to do and buys time with regards 
to climate change.
Increasing Land-
Use Pressures 
in the European 
Arctic (Rov.)
10
1. Human well-being and social sustainability
2. Public participation
3. Indigenous rights
1. Increase knowledge and improve efficiency, fill gaps in 
knowledge (including knowledge exchange, research and 
monitoring)
2. Inclusion of northern areas of the European Arctic into the 
trans-European network (TEN) (re. roads & transport)
3. Closer co-operation needed with Russia and the Barents region 
(e.g. shipping, visa facilitation)
Social and 
C u l t u r a l 
Changes in the 
European Arctic 
(Rovaniemi)
11
1. Research, entrepreneurship (incl. 
partnership) and innovation
2. Accessibility & connectivity
3.  a. Power structures & conflict management
   b. Human-nature interaction (human Arctic
     biome)
   c. Cultural diversity
1. Incorporate to a greater extent entrepreneurship into research 
co-operation, education and exchange programmes
2. Increase East-West connectivity through infrastructure and 
communications but also through project co-operation and 
provide instruments to support this cross-border co-operation,
3. Increase communication skills in all sectors towards better 
conflict resolution skills/impact of power structures on Arctic 
populations and regions.
 4a. Ensure that revenue from Arctic resources also reaches Arctic 
communities (community benefits)
4b. Increase focus on youth leadership to encourage young people 
to stay/move into Arctic areas and reduce population aging
4c. Security in terms of the human biome in the Arctic (e.g. 
surveillance of climate-sensitive infections)
5. Improve the health of the elderly 
1. Summary of Results of the Stakeholder Consultation Workshops #1 and #2
A
.
- 151 -
Workshop 
Trend
# 
Participants
Most Important Critical Factors
Most Important Ideas for Recommendations for 
EU Policies
F i n n i s h 
W o r k s h o p 
- All Topics 
(Rovaniemi)
5
1. Improvement of Environmental Impact 
Assessment (e.g. information availability, also 
social & cumulative IA)
2. Understanding the specificities of the Arctic
3. Climate change policies (especially 
mitigation) adjusted to Arctic extreme 
conditions
4. Providing safety and security
1. Increase participation and ownership from Arctic communities 
regarding policy and regulations that have an impact in the Arctic 
(listen to Northerners)
2. Environmental Impact Assessment Directive to be amended to 
match Arctic assessment needs
3. The EU to consider the security implications of opening the 
Finnish-Russian border with regards to tourism
4. Increased screening of mining companies’ track record 
regarding the social and environmental impact of their activities 
in the past
Climate Change 
in the Arctic 
(Tromsø)
12
1. Energy (availability and use)
2. Communication/broader participation
3. Feedback to the EU
4. Data/knowledge production and 
management
5. Search for sustainability and sustainability 
systems = holistic governance (e.g. EBM, 
green economy)
6. Ocean acidification (and other marine 
changes)
7. Livelihoods and people
1. More research on Arctic climate change
2. Co-operation with Russia in all climate change-relevant policy 
sectors
3. Integration, communication and outreach towards more 
effective science-public-policy bridging
4.Building up the sustainability framework, including bases for 
green economy and governance tools (MSP, EBM, etc.) 
Changes in 
Arctic Maritime 
T r a n s p o r t 
(Tromsø)
18
1. Minimise risk: security, safety and 
preparedness (oil spills, accidents), mapping, 
forecasting
2. Governance (regulations and governance 
schemes) 
3. More research/science data
1. Research and technology (hull design and engines but also 
issues such as the impact of black carbon)
2. International regulations for Arctic transport (e.g. Polar Code 
process)
3. Safety and environmental performance (access to satellite 
systems)
4. Co-operation with Russia and northern countries
D e v e l o p i n g 
Oil and Gas 
Resources in 
Arctic Waters 
(Tromsø)
9
1. Local benefits – capacity building, social 
licence, technology/research
2. Adequacy of existing regulations and 
possibility of creating cross-boundary 
regulations
3. Research in the wider context and not just 
sectorial (oil and gas)
1. Increase research and education – contribute to development 
of creative critical thinking amongst youth and ensure research 
infrastructure and long-term focused research 
2. Create and contribute to an Arctic Fund leading to strengthened 
relationships at the political and commercial level (improving 
buyer/seller relationships, securing stable hydrocarbon supply to 
the EU, competence building, infrastructure development)
3. Increase capacity building and energy dialogues with Arctic 
partners
C h a n g i n g 
Nature of 
Arctic Fisheries 
(Tromsø)
12
1. Governance and management
2. Climate change and species distribution 
and composition
3. Global demand for fish (driver)
1. Abolish fishing subsidies
2. Improve management and quota setting; ensure sustainable 
management of fish stocks
3. Effectively combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing 
The full list of key sustainability issues and ideas for recommendations for EU policies is recorded in the reports 
of each workshop. The authors have assessed all of these when they prepared their most feasible and important 
recommendations, which are presented in Chapters 3 to 9 of this report.
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A1.1.3 Disaggregation in Terms of 
Stakeholders Regarding the Key 
Sustainability Issues and Stakeholder 
Composition of the Workshops 
During the workshops, the participants were given 
report cards on which they were asked to fill in their own 
personal ranking of key sustainability issues and their 
top three ideas for recommendations for EU Policies. 
This provided the rapporteurs – in most cases – with a 
way to verify if the outcome of the group exercise was in 
line with the individual results of the stakeholders. 
It also proved to be a tool to check whether some 
stakeholders were missing as a group/sector or whether 
a certain stakeholder group had over-participated, which 
in turn could bias the results of the group sessions. 
Unfortunately, not all report cards were collected at the 
end of the workshop. Only in the workshops where all 
report cards were collected was it possible to obtain 
a good overview of how the key sustainability issues 
disaggregated in terms of stakeholder groups. For these 
cases, the results are summarised in matrices.
As a general comment, several stakeholders emphasised 
that even if some of the preferred themes were given 
more weight because they were seen as the most crucial, 
it did not mean that the other themes are uninteresting 
or unimportant. 
Mining, Rovaniemi
The participants of the mining workshop did not fill in 
the individual report cards, so it is not possible to make a 
proper analysis of the stakeholder distribution. However, 
it is known from the participant list that this was a very 
balanced workshop in terms of stakeholder distribution:
• five from research and consulting,
• six from governments or public authorities,
• five representing environmental groups and 
indigenous peoples,
• six directly related to mining and other economies.
We therefore dare to assume that the results presented 
in point 2 are very reliable and represent an even 
distribution of stakeholders.
Climate Change, Rovaniemi 
Disaggregation of the key sustainability issues in terms 
of stakeholder groups is very much in line with the 
results that the groups proposed. However, this is 
maybe not surprising since the majority of the workshop 
participants had a research background, so the group 
was rather homogeneous. 
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Key sustainability issues
Research Sea ice/maritime transport, permafrost/methane, gas and oil extraction, predictive skill
Geo-observations, research and 
services
1. Sea ice, permafrost, snow cover, glacier = cryosphere
2. Long-term monitoring, research and services related to the weather, climate and water including the cryosphere
3. Energy
Forest sector/ecology Permafrost/snow cover, biodiversity, gas and oil extraction
Atlantic salmon/business Sci-
ence communication/education
1. Sea temperature in the Barents Sea, changes in currents, fish production and quotas
2. Sea ice
3. Energy
Science communication/edu-
cation
Sea ice, maritime transport, gas and oil extraction
Research
Cryosphere (glaciers/sea ice/permafrost/snow cover), transport emissions, energy/gas and oil extraction, floods/sea 
level
Possible clusters:
• Sea ice – maritime transport – gas/oil extraction – emergency response
• Permafrost – methane – adaptation for infrastructure
Research
Land use changes, water resources and scarcity in the future, localised knowledge about the impacts of climate change 
for policy-making (vs. overly large geographical scale)
Environmental protection and 
nature conservation
Snow cover: impact on local species (changes in level), take into consideration changes in distribution, biodiversity: spe-
cies conservation (give more consideration to Lapland species and subarctic areas), energy: increase use of renewable 
energy
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Land Use, Rovaniemi
The individual report cards were not collected and no 
analysis of the importance of key issues per stakeholder 
group was possible. 
The workshop’s general outcome should be quite 
balanced thanks to the fact that many different 
stakeholder groups were present, each of them in similar 
numbers.
Social and Cultural Changes, Rovaniemi
The results of the individual votes are very much in 
line with the group result and were quite independent 
from the sector represented by the stakeholder: the 
two most important key issues were the same, but 
some more diversity was seen after this. Research and 
Entrepreneurship received the highest amount of votes, 
followed by Accessibility and Connectivity (provided that 
we include communications). Migration was third and 
besides Power Structure & Conflict Management and 
Cultural Diversity, Employment and Community Viability 
and Resilience also scored rather high. 
As for stakeholder representation, several different 
sectors were present in a fairly well balanced way: 
research/academic (3), public health, public and private 
sector, community, arts, media and entrepreneur/
partnership (2). Missing relevant stakeholders were 
the indigenous stakeholders and environmental/
conservation sector.
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Key sustainability issues
Weather service provider
Land use changes, emergency response, influence of climate change in the Arctic on other areas (weather extremes in 
Europe), “It doesn’t stay in the Arctic”.
Research
1. Arctic: Sea ice / permafrost / snow cover
2. Global: maritime transport, energy, emission trading
3. Arctic safety and security, including: geospace environment, space weather and space climate, solar variability (diffi-
cult to forecast)
Integrated environmental as-
sessment
1. Sea ice / maritime transport / gas and oil extraction / emergency response
2. Permafrost / methane / adaptation for infrastructure
3. Human health
4. Biodiversity / sea temperature impacts on fish stocks
5. Globalisation – small-scale changes – localised knowledge about impacts for policy making / services, research
State authority, environment Permafrost, energy, floods/sea level rise
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Distribution of points for key issues
Research (public health) Research – Health – Accessibility and Connectivity
Entrepreneur/foreigners Entrepreneurship of Foreigners/Integration – Cultural Diversity – Conflict Management
Research Research – Entrepreneurship – Cultural Diversity
Culture & art Culture and Art – Migration – Comprehensive Security
Community
Perception 2 – Migration 2 – Research 2 – Community Viability and Resilience 1 – Environmental Sustainability (i.e. 
life-sustaining systems and resources) 1 – Power Structures 1 – Arctic Human Biome 1
Innovation economy Research – Participation – Employment – Entrepreneurship
Academic libraries Research – Migration – Accessibility and Connectivity – Communications – Free Access to All Information
Research Research – Community Viability and Resilience – Governance
Mining Industry Extractive Industries – Employment – Accessibility and Connectivity
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Finnish workshop, covering all trends, 
Rovaniemi
The Finnish workshop had, with only five participants, 
stakeholders representing the tourism sector, reindeer 
herders, the nature conservation association and two 
researchers. The fact that the reindeer herders and the 
environmental players were present partly covers for 
these stakeholders not being present in the workshop 
on Social and Cultural Changes.
Climate Change, Tromsø
Though slightly more focused on marine-related climate 
change issues, the disaggregation of the key sustainability 
issues in terms of stakeholder groups is very much 
in line with the results that the groups proposed and 
very similar to the overall results of the climate change 
workshop in Rovaniemi. Even though the stakeholder 
groups attending the Tromsø meeting were slightly more 
diverse, the majority of the workshop participants still 
had a research background. 
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Distribution of key issues
Research Sea ice; Permafrost; Snowcover
Government/public policy Sea ice; Permafrost; Snowcover
Research Human health; Biodiversity; Energy; Public participation; Gas and oil extraction
NGO Energy; Gas and oil extraction; Other players and their perspectives
Public sector Marine spatial planning; Emissions trading; Ocean acidification
Government Additional: Feedback for the EU; Public opinion: Opportunities for low-carbon economy
Research innovations Human health; Maritime transport; Public participation; Enterprises as players; Public opinion; 
Research
Black carbon; Transport emissions; Maritime transport; Energy; Public participation; Gas and oil extraction; Renewables; 
Research
Information management
Additional: Forecasting; Shale gas extraction; Knowledge exchange and information flow; Observations/data; Sustain-
able development; Marine spatial planning
Climate research
Emissions regulations; Gas and oil extraction, energy, fracking; Ocean acidification; Glacier melt/freshwater; Interchange 
knowledge and communication with the public
Research
Land use changes; Human health and well-being; Biodiversity and ecosystem changes; Maritime transport and infra-
structure; Public participation; Gas and oil extraction; Fishing and aquaculture; Education (part of knowledge produc-
tion)
Environmental NGOs
Additional: Searching for sustainability; Marine spatial planning; Projections/forecasting/system understanding; Ecosys-
tem-based management; Broad public participation; Fracking; Knowledge exchange
Climate research Sea ice; Public participation; Gas and oil extraction
Social science Additional issues: Ocean acidification; Public awareness/education; Public policies; Policentric governance
Indigenous peoples Land use changes; Public participation; Gas and oil extraction
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Shipping, Tromsø
The shipping workshop was very well attended both 
quantitatively and in terms of diversity. The only relevant 
stakeholder groups really missing could be fishermen 
and indigenous people.
Analysis of the individual votes of the participants 
resulted in the same three key issues, in the same 
order. However, while after the group voting, the results 
showed only small differences in weight between the 
three key issues, the results obtained from the individual 
report cards showed bigger variances: Minimising risk 
was about twice as important as Governance issues. The 
difference between Governance and Research issues 
was also bigger, and two or even three more critical 
issues showed up: Importance of the environment and 
Local people (can be seen as one or two separate critical 
issues), and Economy-related issues. 
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Distribution of points for key issues
Industry International regulations 3 – Search and rescue infrastructure 2 – Training 1
Industry Search and rescue infrastructure 3 – Int. & coastal regulations 2 – competition with other sea routes 1
Environment/transport
Conditions 1 – Extraction of Arctic resources 1 – Emissions 1 – Noise 1 – Accidents and oil spills 1 – Search and rescue 
infrastructure 1 
Local/municipality
Rules for EU business and commerce 1 - Search & rescue 1 – Accidents & oil spills 1 – Training of seafarers 1 – Mapping 
1 – Local people 1
Coastal admin Coastal and int. regulations 3 – Ice conditions 2 – Competition with other sea routes 1 
Local/research Accidents and oil spills 2 – Mapping 2 – Training for seafarers 2
Cruise operator
Research co-operation 1 – Mapping 1 – Search and rescue/safety 1 – Local people (cultural) 1 – Environment 1 – 
Multi-lateral co-ordination 1 
Government Int. regulations 2 – Coastal state regulations 1 – Technology 1 – Nexus of policy making and business 1 – Tourism 1 
Government
Accidents and oil spills 2 – Int. regulations 1 – Ice conditions 1 – Competition with other sea routes 1 – Ecosystem-based 
management 1 
Industry Contribution of black carbon to shipping 2 – Emissions 2 – Accidents and oil spills 2 
Local/municipality Security (search & rescue, accident, environment) 3 – Local people (inc. co-operation) 2 – Mapping 1
Mapping Mapping (surveying) 3 – Search and rescue 1 – Ice conditions 1 – Int. regulations 1
Government Security 2 – Coastal & international regulations 2 – Technology 2 
Government/research Coastal & int. regulations 2 – Security 2 – Technology 1 – Tourism 1 
Local/municipality Security 1 – Local 1 – Business 1 – Mapping 1 – Training of seafarers 1 – Business rules 1
Insurance Preparedness 3 – Int. regulations 2 – Ice & weather 1
Environment Accidents & oil spills 2 – Technology 2 – Emissions 2
Industry Search & rescue 2 – International regulations 2 – Extraction of Arctic resources 2
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Fisheries, Tromsø
No fishermen, no indigenous peoples and no industry 
(aquaculture) stakeholders were present, so the 
workshop was dominated by research and environmental 
groups in addition to a couple of stakeholders from the 
public administration sector.
The ranking of critical factors based on the individual 
report cards gave quite a different ranking:
1. Global demand for fish
2. Climate change and species distribution 
3. Governance and management (including inadequate 
management)
4.  a. overfishing 
     b. development of agriculture
Oil and Gas, Tromsø
Here too, the indigenous and environmental stakeholders 
as well as local actors were underrepresented. 
Stakeholders from research, industry and public 
administration dominated the workshop. Still, the 
individual ranking of the key issues gave a very different 
ranking of the critical factors: 
1. Economic reasons (e.g. employment, global energy 
demand, security)
2. Climate change and biodiversity 
3. Safety- and security-related (oil spills and emergency 
response, monitoring)
4. Technology and research
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Distribution of points for key issues
Public administration Climate change, oil spills, energy security
University Oil spills, local development, demand and price of resources
University Climate change, technology, research
Government Climate change, technology, research, monitoring
Industry Climate change, oil spills, local development, indigenous rights, approaches, best practices
Security/knowledge 
development Climate change, monitoring, energy security, transport
Industry Climate change, technology, emergency response, pipelines, energy security, local development, employment 
Insurance industry Technology, oil spills, emergency response
Government
Investment in climate change and energy price fluctuations, regulations, taxation structure, revenue sharing, perfor-
mance history, identification of special areas/reserves to be set aside
Sector represented 
by stakeholder
Distribution of points for key issues
Research Global demand for fish products, development of aquaculture, governance and management
NGO Climate change, global demand for fish products, governance and management
EU Overfishing, inadequacy of management and regulations, governance and management
Research Climate change, changes in species distribution/composition, global demand for fish products
Research Climate change, global demand for fish products, inadequacy of management and regulations
NGO Inadequacy of management and regulations, climate change, global demand for fish products
Government Governance and management, climate change, global demand for fish products 
NGO Climate change, global demand for fish products, governance and management
Government Changes in species distribution and composition, global demand for fish products, inadequacy of management and regulations
Research Changes in species distribution and composition, climate change, global demand for fish products
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A1.1.4 Conclusion 
Both workshops were very successful and the input from 
the Arctic stakeholders has been a crucial element for 
the Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: 
Assessment Conducted for the European Union Report. 
The contributions of the stakeholders will provide EU 
decision-makers with an assessment of the current 
trends in the European Arctic and will help to identify 
recommendations that are to guide future EU Arctic 
policies.
Many participants gave positive feedback on both the 
format and the content of the consultation meetings. 
They highly appreciated being given the chance to hear 
the opinions of other stakeholders and actively express 
their own views. Some stakeholders found the workshops 
too short and not thorough enough. There is a time-
limiting factor of course, but overall the consultations 
have proven to be very useful and interesting and a good 
way to communicate between stakeholders.
Besides the specific characteristics of the Arctic trends, a 
common driver for many of these trends seems to be the 
global demand for resources and a natural physical driver, 
namely climate change. Common factors identified by 
stakeholders across various themes included the need 
for
• Broad public participation, especially of the local 
Arctic communities
• Supporting targeted research, education and 
technological development
• International co-operation, in particular with Russia
• Good governance and regulations
• Respecting the local Arctic communities and ensuring 
that revenues from resources in the Arctic also reach 
the local communities
• Safety, security and preparedness measures taken by 
industries.
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Annex 1.2 SADA Online Questionnaire Results – Summary 
Report
Summary compiled by Irina Zhilina (1), Joseph Cheek (2), Outi Paadar (3) and Adam Stepien (1) 
(1) Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland
(2) International Polar Foundation, Belgium 
(3) Sami Educational Institute, Inari, Finland
Introduction
The online questionnaire followed steps similar to those 
designed for the workshops:
• Choosing main uncertainties and most important 
issues (in order to propose critical factors for 
decision-making1 and to understand respondents’ 
values).
• Commenting on factsheets (see www.arcticinfo.eu), 
pointing to issues that were described inaccurately or 
missing, suggesting the direction of further research.
• Answering questions posed by experts conducting 
the assessment.
• Pointing to EU policies/actions that are beneficial or 
that are seen as somehow problematic.
• Proposing ideas for recommendations.
The questionnaire aimed at concrete, individual 
inputs for assessment work rather than responses 
that can be generalised and quantified. Therefore, the 
1. Critical factors for decision-making (CFDs) represent key critical uncertain-
ties that matter for decisions and require the inclusion of views and engage-
ment of various stakeholders. In the EUAIA report, the concept has been sim-
plified in order to fit the broad scope of the study and the needs of stakeholder 
engagement. See more in section 0.2.3 of the EUAIA Report.
respondents could freely choose which questions they 
were interested in answering. While the workshops 
were intended to generate inputs based on interaction 
between stakeholders, the questionnaire aimed at 
collecting individual insights. 
The invitation to take part in the questionnaire was sent 
to around 1800 stakeholders from Europe and the Arctic 
(in particular the European Arctic), including requests 
to forward the invitation to other persons who may be 
interested.
The questionnaire received 260 responses, around half 
of which are fairly substantial or extensive. The authors 
of the SADA report have worked on the individual 
inputs and integrated them into the final report, while 
this summary report is intended to provide a concise 
overview of the results.
Geographic distribution of respondents:
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Distribution of respondents’ background:
Respondents by gender (the question was not obligatory):
Distribution of responses to the assessment themes:
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A1.2.1 Climate Change in the Arctic – Online Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.1.1 General information
A total of 45 respondents chose to take part in the survey 
on climate change. Academics made up the largest 
proportion of respondents, with representatives from 
environmental NGOs and international organisations 
being the second-largest groups represented by sector. 
Also represented were state agencies, both large and 
small-scale fisheries, nature/conservation management 
organisations, EU decision-makers, local government 
representatives, a reindeer herder, and a member of the 
UK military.
Respondents hailed from all eight Arctic Council member 
states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States – although it 
should be mentioned that there were no respondents 
specifically from Greenland, the Faroe Islands or Alaska. 
Many also came from non-Arctic states both inside and 
outside the EU. The largest number of respondents came 
from northern Norway, possibly due to the fact that the 
second stakeholder workshop was held in Tromsø. The 
majority of those participating from northern Norway 
were academics.
The second-highest group of contributors to the survey 
by region came from non-Arctic EU member states. All 
representatives from this group were from international 
organisations.
Of the 36 respondents who chose to disclose their 
gender, males were represented more than females by a 
ratio of nearly 2:1 (male 61%; female 39%)
Respondents’ country/region:
Represented background/organisation/interest group:
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A1.2.1.2 Critical Factors – Uncertainties and 
Important Issues
Main uncertainties related to climate change amongst 
respondents, top responses (33 out of 45 responding):
• Snow, ice and permafrost 
• CO2 emissions 
• Increase in gas and oil extraction (as an outcome of 
climate change) 
• Biodiversity 
Most important issues for decision-making, top 
responses (28 out of 45 responding):
• CO2 emissions 
• Snow, ice and permafrost 
• Increase in gas and oil extraction (as an outcome of 
climate change)
• International negotiations 
It was primarily academics (as well as some respondents 
from international organisations) who believed that snow, 
ice and permafrost are primary issues of uncertainty as 
well as parts of the environment that decision-makers 
should pay attention to. The sole indigenous participant 
who contributed to survey responses on climate change, 
a Swedish reindeer herder, also saw these issues as 
both a primary source of uncertainty and important for 
decision-makers to consider. These results suggest that 
there is support for snow, ice and permafrost monitoring 
programmes.
A broad mix of respondents believe that CO2 emissions 
represent an issue of uncertainty. A majority of those who 
believe it is an important issue for decision-makers are 
academics and members of international organisations.
The majority of those who find an increase in gas and oil 
extraction both an issue of uncertainty related to climate 
change and an important issue for decision-makers were 
academics or representatives of environmental NGOs 
and international organisations.
A1.2.1.3 Factsheets
Issues missing from the factsheets and further focus
Only three participants offered their opinions on 
information they considered to be missing from the 
factsheets. The comments came from Norway (Svalbard), 
Finland (Lapland) and the UK. The first two worked in 
academia while the latter worked for the UK military.
Respondents argued that greater emphasis should be 
placed on the impacts of methane release from Arctic 
permafrost (land and subsea) as it thaws, as well as on 
impacts on biodiversity (loss in biodiversity, invasive 
species from further south). There should also be more 
information on the impacts that melting Arctic sea ice will 
have on agriculture in the mid-latitudes (likely meaning 
how the melting sea ice is affecting the Jet Stream, which 
in turn has an effect on weather patterns in the Northern 
Hemisphere).
Trends until 2030
Here, the same respondents as above contributed, plus 
one additional respondent (a Danish representative 
from an international environmental NGO). Two (the 
Norwegian and the Finn) merely answered in the 
affirmative, agreeing that the trends identified in the 
factsheet will still be relevant over the next few decades. 
The environmental military advisor from the UK went 
further, arguing that the trends will be even more 
relevant in 2030 than the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report 
suggests, while the representative from an international 
ENGO commented that global efforts to reduce black 
carbon emissions might be able to slow the identified 
trends.
A1.2.1.4 Questions
A smaller number of respondents (no more than 20) 
took the time to answer some of the more detailed 
questions. Very few answered all questions. The majority 
of respondents were academics, with environmental 
NGOs and international organisations being the second 
largest group. One reindeer herder from Northern 
Sweden and one environmental advisor from the UK 
military participated.
1. Have you experienced environmental change 
in the Arctic? Specifically, have you experienced 
changes in wildlife, flora, nutrition, landscape 
or in snow and ice, or impacts on society and 
culture?
Changes that have been observed included change in sea 
ice extent, change in landscape (treeline moving north), 
change in amounts of freshwater runoff, species loss 
or decline, change in the migration patterns of certain 
animals, and encroachment of alien species (more 
southern species heading north as the climate warms). 
A few respondents also observed greater variation in 
snow and ice conditions. Changes in weather patterns 
that impact the livelihood of reindeer herders came up 
several times from different organisations, both in and 
outside the Arctic. The environmental advisor from the 
UK military commented that these changes will have an 
impact on military security.
2. What are the main threats, challenges and 
opportunities related to Arctic climate change, 
from the perspective of your organisation, in-
dustry or community?
Responses focused mostly on threats and challenges. 
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Greenhouse gas emissions, loss of biodiversity and 
invasive species, difficulty of species to adapt to rapid 
changes, the need for more long-term observation in 
the Arctic, contaminants, and less predictable weather 
patterns were mentioned as threats and challenges 
to overcome. A few respondents mentioned resource 
extraction and shipping as issues of concern, with 
some citing a lack of adequate regulation governing 
resource extraction. The only opportunity resulting from 
the changes in the Arctic that was mentioned was the 
prospect of increased tourism in the region.
3. What local adaptation measures are you 
investing in (or would be willing to in the near 
future)?
The most common answer to this question was “not 
taking any adaptation measures,” indicating that this is 
not something many may have thought about.
Other responses included developing better monitoring 
systems to see what one needs to adapt to and reducing 
one’s environmental footprint (using greener sources of 
energy and recycling).
4. What EU climate change-related legislation 
affects you and how?
The largest proportion of respondents answered either 
“don’t know” or “EU legislation doesn’t affect me”, 
indicating that the EU could perhaps communicate better 
its efforts regarding climate change. Other responses 
criticised the EU for not going far enough in combating 
climate change, and one respondent criticised the 
effectiveness of carbon-trading schemes. One person 
suggested more monitoring so the EU can monitor how 
effective its policies are in combating climate change.
5. Are you satisfied with EU support to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in the Arctic? 
What could the EU do to better support climate 
change adaptation?
Several people said the EU is not doing enough, although 
very few of them offered specific recommendations. The 
only specific recommendations came from academics, 
who favoured increasing long-term monitoring in the 
Arctic to keep track of the ongoing changes, with (one 
would assume) the aim of using this information to 
develop better adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
As for the rest who did offer specific criticisms, one 
advocated more public participation in climate-related 
decision-making, while a few were in favour of finding 
ways to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
A1.2.1.4 Assessing EU policies and proposing 
ideas for recommendations
Which EU policies and actions relevant to climate change 
are beneficial for sustainable development of the Arctic 
(from the perspective of your community / industry 
/ interest group / organisation)? You may specify your 
choice in the box below.
Mostly academics answered this question, with 
environmental NGOs and international organisations 
making up the majority of the remainder of the 
responses. One reindeer herder and one member of 
the UK military also responded. Respondents gave 
several answers from the multiple-choice list of answers; 
therefore the percentages reflect the percentage of all 
respondents who considered a particular policy to be 
important. The top responses were:
• Influence on Arctic developments driven (partly) 
by climate change (maritime transport, oil and gas 
extraction) – 65%
• Active involvement in international negotiations, 
especially within the global climate regime – 60%
• Research and Earth observation – 60%
• Climate and energy policy within the framework 
of 20-20-20 goals, including, e.g. emissions trading 
scheme – 45%
• Creating a supportive framework for adaptation in 
the European Arctic – 40 %
Are there any gaps, inconsistencies or prob-
lems related to the EU policies regarding Arctic 
climate change? In which policy areas is the per-
formance of the EU below your expectations? 
What could be done better?
Only five respondents answered this question. Notable 
responses included a call for further monitoring to better 
understand the changes going on, a call for states to 
better educate their population, and a response from a 
researcher from northern Finland who felt that the EU 
was “invisible” in Arctic research.
How could the EU improve its policy perfor-
mance?
Four people responded to this question. 
Recommendations included calls for more Arctic research 
calls for funding under Horizon 2020, the establishment 
of the EU Arctic Information Centre, improving impact 
assessments, and aligning EU Arctic Policy with EU sector 
policies.
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A1.2.2 Changes in Arctic Maritime Transport – Online Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.2.1 General Information
The maritime transport section of the questionnaire was 
filled out by 33 respondents, most of whom come from 
Arctic States (especially Norway). Thirteen respondents 
provided substantial comments. The majority of the 
respondents represent the perspective of the Nordic 
countries; also a big fraction of responses originate 
from non-Arctic EU member states. The affiliation of 
the participants is diverse. Most of them represent 
the shipping industry (33%) and state agencies, coastal 
administrations, meteorological institutes, and local 
government offices (21%) as well as the NGO sector, 
including community activists (15%).
Respondents’ country/region:
Represented background/organisation/interest group:
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A1.2.2.2 Critical Factors – Uncertainties and 
Important Issues
Main uncertainties regarding Arctic maritime transport:
• International regulations (incl. Polar Code)
• Ice conditions
• Coastal states’ regulations
• Extraction of Arctic resources
According to the individual comments, the Polar Code 
constitutes the main uncertainty because generally 
its implementation and enforcement procedures are 
unclear. Moreover, the way how environmental issues 
are addressed in the Polar Code is characterised as weak 
and inadequate, as no provisions related to heavy fuel 
oil (HFO) use or carriage regulation, mandatory ballast 
water, hull fouling requirements and black carbon 
restrictions were included in Polar Code provisions. 
Apart from the Polar Code, one respondent stated that 
there is a need for health, safety, environment and 
quality (HSEQ) standards for Arctic shipping operations 
related to hydrocarbon exploitation.
From the perspective of the shipping industry there is a 
lack of infrastructure not only for Search and Rescue (SAR) 
operations but also for communication. There is little 
meteorological information, including data on drifting 
ice and icing conditions. It is stressed that the amount 
of port infrastructure, maintenance and supply bases is 
insufficient. In addition, one respondent describes the 
SAR organisation in the Russian sector as “uncertain”, 
especially in terms of what parties will be assigned and/
or admitted to participation in SAR operations.
Today, Arctic shipping is driven by natural resource 
development whose economic viability is still in 
question. Academic researchers who responded to the 
questionnaire pointed out the fact that natural resource 
development is subjected to the influence of the 
changing geopolitical environment.
Moreover, one respondent from the shipping industry 
highlighted that authorisation from Russian authorities 
and assignment of icebreaker support might be time-
consuming and eventually affect the commercial 
feasibility of NSR.
The respondent from the Russian environmental NGO 
paid attention to the lack of research on the impact of 
noise, invasive species, risk modelling of cumulative 
impacts of human activities, which considerably limits 
ecosystem-based management of maritime shipping 
and offshore extraction facilities.
Most important issues for EU policy-making regarding 
Arctic maritime transport:
• International regulations (incl. Polar Code)
• Search and rescue infrastructure
• Coastal states’ regulations
• Extraction of Arctic resources
• Accidents and oil spills
Representatives from the shipping industry call for the 
earliest possible adoption of the Polar Code among 
EU member states. What is more, it is proposed that 
the EU should push for further implementation of the 
Polar Code among other countries, which would help to 
establish a harmonised shipping regulatory framework 
for the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and North West 
Passage (NWP).
At the same time, it was mentioned that adoption of the 
Polar Code might in fact put at risk the actual utilisation 
of Arctic routes. The new rules would reveal the need for 
substantial investments in new vessels, which in present 
economic conditions would be difficult. 
Additionally, shipping industry stakeholders pointed out 
the environmental hazards posed by Arctic maritime 
transport such as emissions, including both atmospheric 
emissions (CO2, NOx, SOx, black carbon) and emissions 
of heavy metals, poisonous antifouling chemicals, 
silicone oils and other toxic substances from ship hulls.
A1.2.2.3 Factsheets
There are several points suggested by the respondents 
that could be added in the course of the development of 
the report chapter on maritime transport.
First of all, most of the respondents from the shipping 
industry indicated that there was no reference to shipping 
as a truly global industry. Their responses further stressed 
that regulations on safety and environmental matters in 
the Arctic region can only be implemented within the 
framework of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). 
Secondly, the responses advised the inclusion of the 
impact of toxic, biocide, antifouling and toxic foul-release 
coatings used on ship hull surfaces.
Thirdly, it was suggested that the definition of NSR 
transits be altered, as in the factsheet it is characterised 
by transit traffic rather than destinational traffic. 
Academic researchers who responded to the 
questionnaire underlined that the focus of the factsheet 
prioritises destination voyages over container ship traffic 
in the Arctic and ocean-to-ocean navigation as the latter 
two are missing in the paper. Moreover, they mentioned 
that the factsheet does not take into consideration 
political drivers and the changing geopolitical 
environment. 
Finally, it was mentioned that the implications of cruise 
tourism are underrepresented in the factsheet. 
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Further Focus
For further study, the stakeholders pointed out 
environmental issues such as different types of emissions 
and discharges (i.e. oil pollution).
It was also suggested that technology for improving fuel 
efficiency through better ship hull protection, which is 
already in place, should be publicised and make available.
Further, it was proposed to continue research on SAR 
scenarios in the Arctic Ocean, focusing on the Russian 
sector.
A1.2.2.4 Questions
1. What are the main opportunities and chal-
lenges for maritime transport in the European 
Arctic?
For the respondents, the main opportunity lies in 
connecting the European market and other continents 
with less financial costs and environmental impact (i.e. 
through reducing carbon emissions). However, at the 
same time traffic increases other environmental risks and 
generates various negative impacts on the Arctic marine 
ecosystem. On the other hand, a lot of experience has 
been accumulated from other sea regions characterised 
by intense maritime traffic, which should be studied 
and utilised for developing effective ecosystem-based 
management in the Arctic waters.
Another major challenge identified by the stakeholders 
refers to the implementation of strong international 
and national policies. It should be understood that even 
the adoption of the Polar Code will not constitute an 
exhaustive regulatory structure for Arctic commercial 
navigation. Therefore, the EU and European States 
could undertake efforts at the IMO, Arctic Council or 
other appropriate bodies to build up the regulatory 
“superstructure”, develop best practices, institute 
guidelines, etc. regarding Arctic shipping.
2. In what way will the European Union and its 
Member States be affected by changes in ship-
ping in the Arctic?
According to the responses, commercial navigation 
in the Arctic Ocean will have broad implications in the 
environmental, economic and political sectors.
3. What are the most important ways that the 
EU influences Arctic maritime transport and 
what actions should the EU take? 
The responses indicate that the EU needs to demonstrate 
its leadership in the implementation of international 
regulations such as the Polar Code. The respondents 
called for co-operation with the coastal states, such as 
through the Arctic Council platform. Particularly, the EU 
should collaborate with Russian partners in infrastructure 
development on the Arctic islands and coastline along 
the NSR.
Moreover, stakeholders suggested that the European 
maritime cluster can play a key role in the development 
of ship design and construction by promoting the best 
hull protection and performance technology available. 
In this respect it should be mentioned that due to the 
high costs and limited amount of ice-class vessels on 
the one hand, and more favourable ice conditions, 
on the other hand, ships with low or no ice class (e.g. 
cruise ships, bulkers, tankers) might attempt to navigate 
in Arctic waters to reduce the financial costs. Thus, it 
was proposed that companies operating in the Arctic 
waters should consider purchasing low and no ice class 
vessels. Furthermore, EU should enhance funding to 
support scientific research contributing to sustainable 
development in the Arctic.
The respondents stressed that it is very important to 
implement the recommendations before maritime traffic 
becomes more intensive in Arctic waters.
A1.2.2.5 Assessing EU policies and proposing 
ideas for recommendations
EU policies and actions relevant to maritime trans-
port beneficial for the sustainable development of 
the Arctic
• Influence on international developments relevant 
for Arctic transport (e.g. Polar Code)
• Support for improved infrastructure and services for 
Arctic maritime transport
• Research (ship technology, navigation and mapping)
• EU regulations on safety and environmental 
performance
Many of the stakeholders argued that it is too early to 
comment on the effects of the EU’s policies and actions 
in achieving sustainable development in the Arctic. One 
response even suggested that EU policies may have 
a negative effect in the longer term. Therefore, as a 
recommendation for future policy-making, respondents 
urged that there should be more effective advocacy for 
environmental provisions in Polar Code deliberations. 
Moreover, international co-operation, particularly with 
the Arctic coastal states, needs to be strengthened, 
for example, in the form of salvage agreements with 
Russian partners. Furthermore, it was proposed that the 
industry-best navigation practices used in other regions 
should be researched. Finally, it was suggested that 
more attention should be focused on the growing cruise 
tourism industry.
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A1.2.3 Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries – Online Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.3.1 GENERAL INFORMATION
There were 19 respondents taking part in the 
questionnaire, mainly representing Arctic fishing nations. 
Seven responses provided a substantial contribution.
The professional background of the respondents is 
diverse, with the majority coming from academia, 
environmental NGOs and large-scale commercial 
fisheries. Almost half of the respondents came from 
Norway and Iceland.
Respondents’ country/region:
Respondents’ background/organisation/interest group:
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A1.2.3.2 CRITICAL FACTORS – UNCERTAINTIES 
AND IMPORTANT ISSUES
Main uncertainties regarding the changing nature of 
Arctic fisheries:
• Changes in species distribution
• Climate change
• Inadequacy of management and regulations 
• Research on fisheries 
• Conflicts with other economic sectors
Separately, one of the respondents highlighted 
overfishing as a major problem in this context. At the 
same time no attention was given to such factors as 
biodiversity and IUU (illegal, unreported, unregulated) 
fishing.
Most important issues for EU policy-making:
• Inadequacy of management and regulations
• Changes in species distribution
• Overfishing
• Governance and management
• Research on fisheries
Apart from the issues selected above, cohesion policies, 
regional development including social and economic 
development, and internal market regulation were added 
by one respondent. In this context, the stakeholders did 
not consider factors such as development of aquaculture 
and biodiversity.
A1.2.3.3 Factsheets
Issues missing from the factsheets 
There was a clarification that the issue raised in the 
factsheet regarding the establishment of a regional 
fisheries management organisation (RFMO) – intended 
to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the high 
seas of the Central Arctic Ocean at the current stage – is 
merely a matter of “informal discussions” in the form of 
a “brief proposal.” Given the fact that commercial fishing 
is unlikely to occur in this area in the near future, the 
establishment of an RFMO in that area is of long-term 
relevance. 
Trends until 2030?
There were very few responses on whether the trends 
identified in the factsheet would continue until 2030 
or not. Nevertheless, one respondent drew particular 
attention to the future intensification of aquaculture 
industry in the sub-Arctic region as a result of increasing 
sea temperatures.
A1.2.3.4 Questions
1. What are your concerns about the environ-
mental, economic and social impacts of fishing 
activities and aquaculture?
Generally, it was agreed that unsustainable fishing 
practices, on the one hand, and changes in the sea water 
temperatures, on the other, may lead to fish depletion 
and shifts in fish stock migration patterns outside of 
current regulatory areas. Respondents associated it 
with disagreements or even conflicts over economic 
sectors with other industries as well as conflicts on 
fish stock management practices at the international 
level. Consequently, this scenario could undermine 
international co-operation initiatives in the region.
The survey results indicate concern over the possible 
decrease in regional development, negative social 
impacts and overall recession of the economies heavily 
dependent on large-scale fisheries such as in Iceland and 
Greenland as well as in US and Russian northern regions. 
In Canada and Norway, there is commonly a positive 
vision of future aquaculture development. However, 
awareness of the negative environmental impact of this 
industry on the Arctic marine ecosystem (e.g. biological 
and the chemical pollution) was mentioned.
2. What changes do you see and experience in 
fishing activities, both commercial and tradition-
al, and their impacts on people, communities 
and the environment?
Respondents identified that, due to the lack of research, 
the overall changes in the existing marine ecosystem are 
unclear. However, there are precedents for unregulated 
fishing activities in international waters that eventually 
caused the collapse of fish stocks. The example of 
overexploited pollock stocks in the Bering Sea “Donut 
Hole” reveals significant economic impacts among 
Russian and US fishermen as the fishery industry in the 
respective EEZs was undermined. The stock in the Bering 
Sea “Donut Hole” area has still not recovered.
Moreover, stakeholders specified that in the case of 
Iceland and Greenland, fishing opportunities may move 
out of reach of large-scale fishing fleets, which will 
significantly affect local communities.
3. What is the most important message regard-
ing the changing nature of Arctic fisheries that 
you would like to be sure is heard?
The responses demonstrated that the international 
community needs to understand that poorly managed 
fishing activities combined with environmental pressures 
could be disastrous for the marine ecosystem and 
societies depending on the fishing industry.
At the same time the stakeholders argued that it is 
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possible to adjust to changing environmental conditions 
by enforcing good fishing practices in line with scientific 
advice, by eliminating discards, illegal landings and 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fisheries in 
general.
Respondents’ answers mentioned that a new 
international fisheries agreement has to be brought to 
the negotiating table. In particular, such an agreement 
could address commercial fishing in the Central Arctic 
Ocean, taking into consideration a precautionary 
international fisheries management accord, starting 
with a catch level of zero until sufficient research can 
assess the impacts on the ecosystem and setting up a 
robust management, monitoring, and enforcement 
system before commercial fishing begins. Therefore, 
the respondents called for enhancing research on fish 
biology and fisheries management.
4. How can the EU influence the development 
of environmental policy on sustainable use of 
fish stocks in the Arctic?
Respondents mentioned that the fact that EU member 
states do not have coastline on the Arctic Ocean 
limits the scope for influence. Nevertheless, there are 
opportunities to improve the work of existing RFMOs as 
well as contribute to establishing a new RFMO for the 
Central Arctic Ocean area.
On a more practical level, stakeholders pointed out 
the EU’s capacity to ensure that no illegal landings or 
transshipments of fish can occur in EU harbours. 
The majority of stakeholders agreed that the EU could 
stimulate long-term monitoring of marine ecosystems, 
including different fish species, marine mammals and 
birds, by initiating new research programmes and 
securing funding opportunities.
5. How can the EU play a role in the harmonisa-
tion of international regulations on commercial 
fishing in international waters of the Central 
Arctic Ocean?
Respondents recognised that substantial fisheries in the 
Arctic Ocean are unlikely in the short to medium term. 
Therefore, the EU can have a role in active participation 
in international agreements and improving quota-setting 
procedures. As the Arctic coastal states are moving 
from informal discussions on establishment of RFMOs, 
it will be important for the EU and other major fishing 
nations interested in Arctic policy to participate in these 
discussions.
A1.2.3.5 EU policies and recommendations
EU policies and actions relevant to Arctic fisheries 
beneficial for the sustainable development of the Arctic 
• Support for scientific research relevant to Arctic 
fisheries 
• International fisheries management
• Combating illegal fishing
As a recommendation, stakeholders generally advised 
the improvement of the EU’s involvement in international 
co-operation on fishing activities and enhancing quota 
setting. 
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A1.2.4 Developing Oil and Gas Resources in Arctic Waters – Online Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.4.1 General information
A total of 50 respondents (one responding twice) chose 
to take part in the survey on oil and gas.
Participants from all eight Arctic Council member 
states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States) responded, 
with participation from the northern regions of these 
countries. The largest number of respondents hailed 
from non-Arctic EU countries, with respondents from 
southern Norway and Northern Norway making up the 
second- and third-largest groups, respectively.
Representatives from the hydrocarbon industry made 
up the largest percentage of respondents and had the 
most to say, particularly with regards to the factsheet. 
Academics were the second largest group represented. 
Environmental NGOs and respondents who identified 
themselves as coming from “other” backgrounds were 
also significantly represented (many of these turned out 
to be an organisation with an environmental interest or 
a consultant).
Of the 27 respondents who chose to disclose their 
gender, males far out-represented females by a ratio of 
nearly 3:1 (male 74%; female 26%).
Respondents’ country/region:
Represented background/organisation/interest group:
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A1.2.4.2 Critical Factors – Uncertainties and 
Important Issues
Main uncertainties related to primary offshore oil and 
gas developments amongst respondents, top responses 
(33 out of 50 responding, given the option of choosing 
more than one response):
• Oil spills 
• Emergency response 
• Climate change 
The top three responses were popular with environmental 
NGOs and academics.
A number of respondents chose to add their own 
response on this, especially those from industry, as 
they felt the multiple choice responses didn’t accurately 
reflect their concerns.
A representative of oil industry remarked that the 
greatest uncertainties for the Arctic are estimates of 
resources and the economic viability of projects in the 
region. Other hydrocarbon industry representatives 
and academics mentioned regulatory frameworks and 
financial liability in the event of an accident and insurance 
as key uncertainties. The shipping industry representative 
mentioned the ability to build oil production facilities.
The representative of a US research organisation 
cited balancing risks and rewards as an uncertainty. 
The Norwegian Senior Arctic Official stated that it is 
difficult to classify what is an uncertainty, as all factors 
mentioned in the question go into decision-making. An 
academic from North Norway added environmental and 
human security as additional uncertainties, and a Danish 
consultant cited the development of Arctic communities 
as an uncertainty.
Most important issues for decision-making, top 
responses (35 out of 50 responding, given the option of 
choosing more than one response):
• Emergency response 
• Oil spills 
• Energy security 
• Climate change 
• Technology 
It is worth noting that many from different sectors – 
but especially representatives from the hydrocarbon 
industry – consider energy security and technology as 
important issues for EU decision-makers.
A1.2.4.3 Factsheets
Issues missing from the factsheet and further focus
A total of 11 participants offered opinions on the factsheet 
from a variety of different backgrounds. The longest and 
most detailed critiques came from respondents working 
in the hydrocarbon industry. Also contributing were a 
few academics and self-described consultants, members 
of environmental/international organisations, a member 
of an indigenous organisation, and a member of the 
shipping industry. Respondents were relatively well 
distributed across the target survey regions.
Criticism on the factsheets diverged significantly 
depending on which sector respondents worked in, 
especially between respondents from the hydrocarbon 
industry and environmental NGOs.
Those from environmental NGOs believed that it 
was essential to mention that developing oil and gas 
resources further will not make it possible to reach the 
target of keeping average global warming under 2°C.
The majority of those from the hydrocarbons industry 
provided the longest and most detailed criticisms of 
the factsheets of any survey participant. They raised 
a number of issues with the data presented in the 
factsheets (incomplete or inaccurate) and how certain 
issues were presented. Only one representative from 
the hydrocarbon industry coming from a non-Arctic EU 
state commented that the factsheets were “balanced,” 
but gave no further input.
A representative from the hydrocarbon industry from 
Canada found the factsheet to be “anti-development,” 
arguing that it puts too much focus on the negative 
potential impacts of hydrocarbon extraction and not 
enough on the positive impacts, including carbon 
sequestration opportunities, advances in technology that 
further reduce the risk of incidents, and socioeconomic 
benefits for local Arctic residents. This person also 
questioned the accuracy of climate change science.
Some industry representatives also felt the economic 
and social benefits that the extractive industries give to 
the local communities should have been mentioned. One 
respondent didn’t like the “us versus them” approach 
that the factsheets seemed to have, and pointed out the 
contributions of oil and gas industry groups to scientific 
research (especially marine research), and how scientific 
research can in turn help the extractive industry make 
improvements in safeguarding personnel and the 
environment.
Both operators highlighted the fact that the Arctic is 
not uniform, but rather varies in terms of ice cover, 
weather, ecosystems, and the socioeconomic situation 
of local inhabitants. One respondent declared that they 
would only make investments when risks are understood 
and mitigated, a point Statoil echoed as it highlighted 
the “stepwise approach” it has taken to expanding 
development in the Arctic.
Additionally, an industry representative argued that 
limiting hydrocarbon extraction (especially in the Arctic) 
is not the only way to reduce CO2 emissions, and use of 
the oil and gas extracted from the region does not make 
up the bulk of the greenhouse gas emissions on the 
planet. They also highlighted the importance of energy 
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security, and took issue with the notion mentioned in 
the factsheet that regulatory frameworks in the Arctic 
states aren’t adequate.
An academic from North Norway found the idea that 
Iceland is interested in developing hydrocarbons due 
to China’s interest as “misleading.” Another academic 
critiqued that the reality of the complex nature and 
interconnections between issue areas related to 
resource extraction was not clear in the factsheets. 
The respondent from the shipping industry believed 
that the information on climate change in the oil and 
gas factsheet was misrepresented, and questioned the 
validity of climate models in predicting future climate. 
The representative from the indigenous organisation 
felt that governance and the impacts of oil and gas 
development were topics missing from the factsheets.
Trends until 2030
Only eight respondents chose to comment on future 
trends, seven of whom commented on whether these 
trends will still be relevant in the coming decades. Four 
gave additional comments.
The environmental organisations predicted that climate 
change will happen faster and be more severe in the 
coming decades, and that the impacts of climate change 
will likely be a larger economic driver than demand 
for fossil fuel energy sources. They advocated greater 
development of renewable energy sources and further 
research into climate change impacts, health and 
environmental issues.
An academic argued that the ultimate drivers 
are economic and environmental security at the 
international, national and local levels, as well as the 
tensions between these different levels. The consultant 
and indigenous representative felt that the current 
trends will still be relevant to one extent or another. 
The indigenous representative also called for further 
research, while the representative from shipping asked 
for more groundtruthing of satellite sea ice observations, 
as icebreakers travelling through the Arctic can encounter 
more ice than observed by satellites.
Representatives from the hydrocarbon industry pointed 
out that energy usage will only increase as the planet’s 
population continues to grow; the oil and gas industry will 
need to meet a large part of this growing demand, and 
as a consequence, the hydrocarbon extraction industry 
will likely gradually move further and further north. 
One of the proposed focuses for further study included 
developing technologies to meet new challenges, 
European energy security, and improving infrastructure 
in the Arctic.
A1.2.4.4 Questions
A smaller number of respondents (about 16 on average) 
took the time to answer some of the more detailed 
questions. Respondents came from a wide range of 
backgrounds; representatives of the hydrocarbon 
industry were the most numerous, followed by 
academics.
1. What is your outlook about environmental, 
economic and social impacts concerning off-
shore oil and gas developments in the Arctic?
Those from the hydrocarbon industry focused on 
the benefits of oil and gas extraction, arguing that a 
good balance between environmental protection and 
developing economic opportunities for Northerners 
must be found. The shipping representative felt that 
the long-term economic prospects for the region 
were good. One oil industry representative stated that 
new technology will be key to further development in 
the region. Another mentioned that developing the 
Arctic will be a way to maintain energy security, while 
another argued that the EU should promote oil and gas 
development in the Arctic.
The environmental NGOs and two academics believed 
that the environmental risk will be too high, that in the 
long run the benefits will not be worth the risks, and 
that sustainable solutions must be found. One ENGO 
respondent found continued oil and gas development in 
the Arctic “irrational.” 
One academic called for greater attention to oil 
spill response planning, as well as an evaluation of 
regional economic benefits and social impacts of oil 
and gas extraction over the long term. The indigenous 
representative echoed this second point, feeling that 
there is a need for more risk assessments. Another 
academic felt that the conflict between environmental 
and economic priorities in the Arctic wasn’t being 
sufficiently addressed.
The representative of an American research organisation 
advocated a cautious approach involving careful planning 
and international co-operation. A consultant working in 
the Arctic commented that policymaking decisions could 
be based more on facts and research rather than on 
sentiment.
2. What do you think the benefits and the risks 
are for oil and gas exploration and develop-
ment in the Arctic?
Many of the risks that the respondents identified included 
extreme and changing conditions, lack of infrastructure 
and emergency response capabilities in case of accidents 
or oil spills (locals will be the losers if an oil spill happens), 
risks to indigenous lifestyles (stated by an academic), 
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and making renewable energy solutions a lower priority 
(stated by academic). An industry respondent separated 
risks into industrial (higher cost of operating in remote 
areas) and operational (dealing with a challenging 
environment). The environmental NGOs repeated their 
argument that the risks outweigh the benefits, especially 
over the long term.
Benefits mentioned included jobs and economic growth 
for local Arctic residents, energy security (the Arctic 
becoming a more politically stable region + accessibility 
of oil and gas), helping to meet growing global energy 
demand, spurring local economic growth that leads 
to better living standards and better infrastructure, 
maintaining current living standards in the developed 
world, opening trade routes to other parts of the world, 
profits for the hydrocarbon industry (stated by an 
academic), and attaining national objectives. 
One consultant argued that it would be less risky if 
the oil majors extracted in the Arctic, due to their 
experience, rather than letting smaller, less-experienced 
organisations go in.
3. How will local communities be affected by 
offshore resource development?
Hydrocarbon industry representatives and consultants 
tended to focus on the positives of development 
(increased employment, economic benefits and 
improved infrastructure for local populations in 
the Arctic) while environmental NGOs and the lone 
indigenous representative focused on negative impacts 
(potential harm from pollution and disruption of 
indigenous livelihoods). Academics tended to look at 
both positives and negatives more critically, although 
some academics focused more on the negatives, joining 
with some of the NGOs in questioning to what extent local 
communities might actually benefit from development 
of oil and gas resources, sceptical that the majority 
of the benefits would go directly to the hydrocarbon 
companies themselves. The indigenous representative 
worried about benefits sharing. The representative of 
an American Arctic research organisation said there is no 
single answer for the entire Arctic.
4. Will Arctic oil and gas become/remain import-
ant energy sources for the European Union in 
the next twenty years?
The representatives of environmental NGOs hoped that 
Arctic oil and gas will not become important energy 
sources in the next few decades. One respondent said 
the EU can determine whether Arctic oil and gas will be 
important based on the choices it makes in the coming 
years. An academic lamented that it will be because the 
EU is not making enough renewable energy choices.
The shipping industry representative, indigenous 
representative, consultants, academics, and some 
hydrocarbon industry representatives said “yes” in 
some form or another. One industry respondent added 
extensive comments on the continuing importance of oil 
and gas in the coming decades, citing IEA WEO estimates 
that 76% of the world energy’s will come from oil and 
gas. This respondent also cited the EU Commission 
Trends 2050 report, which says that the EU will get about 
a quarter of its energy from oil and gas in the coming 
years. In developing new technologies, it will be possible 
to continue to move north. They argued in favour of 
continuing to exploit oil and gas for energy security 
reasons, especially since current sources are “reaching 
maturity”.
The representative of the American Arctic research 
organisation was a bit more cautious, responding only 
“probably”. One hydrocarbon industry representative 
said that it will only be the case if exploitation is safe and 
profitable. An academic argued that for both Norway 
and Russia, it will be important, as they get most of their 
revenue from oil and gas. But its overall importance 
will depend on the future of fracking in the EU and 
US, and tar sands in Canada. In Alaska, Shell’s fate will 
decide whether other majors will try to exploit there. 
While it will remain important, its importance shouldn’t 
be “exaggerated.” Another academic was concerned 
that the hydrocarbon industry will turn its attention to 
Antarctica as well.
Two respondents questioned what the EU’s role is in 
Arctic oil and gas development.
5. Do you think that the European Union has a 
role in Arctic oil and gas development? What 
kind of role?
Environmental NGOs focused on the importance of the 
EU in helping to protect the Arctic from environmental 
disaster; some called on the EU to stop encouraging oil 
and gas development in the Arctic. Academics suggested 
that the EU should find ways to foster the development 
of renewable technologies in the Arctic, as it could be an 
indirect way to influence to what extent Arctic Oil and 
gas development unfolds.
Other respondents, such as the shipping and hydrocarbon 
industry representatives and a consultant, saw the EU 
as having an important regulatory role and being an 
example-setter and promoting best practices when 
it comes to the Arctic (given that three of its member 
states are also members of the Arctic Council). Fostering 
technological development was mentioned not only 
by members of the hydrocarbon industry, but also by 
academics and the indigenous representative. 
A few academics saw the EU’s primary role as a consumer 
of Arctic oil and gas, as did some representatives from 
the hydrocarbon industry. A few representatives from 
the hydrocarbon industry also seemed to prefer that the 
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EU would not interfere with oil and gas development 
in the Arctic, arguing that policymaking in this domain 
should stay with the sovereign Arctic states. One said 
that policymaking decisions in the EU should be based 
on peer-reviewed research.
The indigenous representative argued that the EU 
should promote human rights, protect intellectual 
property, promote sustainable development of tourism 
and fisheries, and focus on educating about the region 
and its issues.
A1.2.4.5 Assessing EU policies and proposing 
ideas for recommendations
Which EU policies and actions relevant to oil and gas 
development are beneficial for sustainable development 
of the Arctic (from the perspective of your community / 
industry / interest group / organisation)?
• Energy dialogues with Arctic partners (Russia, 
Norway, Greenland, Canada) – 67%
• Research – environment and technology – 62%
• EU’s international efforts to address climate change 
– 33% 
• Policies promoting renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency – 33% 
A total of 21 people took the time to answer this question 
and were given the choice of giving multiple answers.
The desire for energy dialogues with different partners cut 
across many different sectors of respondents, including 
the hydrocarbon industry, academics, consultants 
and NGOs. Those in the hydrocarbon industry were 
especially keen on the EU placing priority on research 
into the environment and technology. A Norwegian 
academic said the EU should find ways of promoting 
energy, environmental and economic security.
Some additional comments include: A shipping industry 
representative added that the EU should promote a clear 
regulatory regime, and a clear and transparent permitting 
process, as it allows operators to invest in training and 
technology. A Danish consultant recommended that the 
EU should foster interaction between business and other 
stakeholders. An academic said the EU should focus 
on internal climate change policy to combat climate 
change and an environmental representative advocated 
developing a strategic framework on regulating 
underwater noise.
Are there any gaps, inconsistencies or problems 
related to the EU policies regarding Arctic oil 
and gas developments? In which policy areas is 
the performance of the EU below your expecta-
tions? What could be done better?
11 people responded to this question.
A hydrocarbon industry representative supported the 
EU’s efforts to update its Arctic policy. As an observer in 
the Arctic Council, this allows the EU to better engage 
with Arctic countries. The respondent warned the EU not 
to underestimate the issue of energy security. Another 
person from the industry felt that some decisions, 
particularly those related to the OSPAR convention, are 
driven more by emotion and “grey literature” rather than 
by scientific research. They argued that the EU needs to 
set higher, unbiased standards for decision-making.
The environmental NGOs that responded felt that 
the EU wasn’t doing enough to protect the Arctic. 
One respondent said that the EU does not impose 
strict enough requirements on EU-based oil and gas 
companies to ensure they clean up oil spills. Another 
NGO representative criticised that EU policies are “too 
sectoral” and don’t integrate environmental concerns (for 
example, energy and transport legislation doesn’t reflect 
the precautionary principle, managing ecosystems or 
climate resilience). An academic from Northern Finland 
criticised that the EU’s energy strategy relies too heavily 
on fossil fuels.
The topic of more EU engagement and information-
sharing also came up. The indigenous representative 
and an academic from Russia both advised the EU 
to have greater dialogue with Russia on oil and gas 
issues. A Danish consultant urged the EU to have more 
engagement with those involved in developing the Arctic. 
An academic from northern Norway encouraged the EU 
to better educate members of the EU institutions and 
its citizens about the Arctic and dispel misconceptions 
about the region.
How could the EU improve its policy perfor-
mance?
A total of 9 people answered this question.
Members of the hydrocarbon industry felt that decision-
making could be “less biased”, and that the EU should be 
in favour of developing energy resources in the Arctic. 
Environmental NGOs criticised maintaining government 
subsidies to the oil and gas industry, and encouraged a 
move towards more renewable energy.
A consultant commented that the EU’s role and intention 
in the Arctic seem unclear, and suggested that the EU 
should find new ways to become engaged in the Arctic 
debate.
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A1.2.5 Mining in the European Arctic – Online Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.5.1 General information
The mining section of the questionnaire was filled 
out by 77 respondents, most of whom came from the 
Nordic States (primary Finland). Over 30 respondents, 
most notably from the Northern provinces of Finland 
and Sweden, provided a substantial contribution to 
the questionnaire. The professional background of the 
respondents is dominated by the mining industry (40%), 
although other sectors such as academic research (18%), 
state agencies, including local government and national/
regional decision-makers (17%) as well as indigenous 
peoples’ organisations (2.5%) and reindeer herders 
(2.5%) are also represented, although at a considerably 
smaller scale.
Respondents’ country/region:
Represented background/organisation/interest group:
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A1.2.5.2 Critical factors – uncertainties and 
important issues
Main uncertainties regarding mining in the European 
Arctic:
• Global demand for resources
• Land use
• Pollution esp. waste
• Employment
• Technological advancement
Very little attention was given to such issues as 
emergency response, diversification of supply, health 
and safety matters.
It has been underlined that climate change and the 
development of maritime shipping make the exploitation 
of mineral resources financially and strategically 
attractive.
Among individual comments the raised issues included 
the impact of mining activities on reindeer husbandry 
and indigenous peoples’ rights and matters that 
concern mining law and regulations. Another issue 
often mentioned was the importance of the proper 
understanding and adequate image of the mining industry 
in public discussions within the Arctic context. Some 
stakeholders perceive that the current predominant 
image of the industry is a misinterpretation. 
In addition, representatives of the mining industry point 
to risks associated with exploration as crucially important 
for the mining industry.
A1.2.5.3 Factsheets
Issues missing from the factsheets 
All the responses contained specific, individual 
comments. Respondents pointed out that particular 
numbers and facts are misinterpretations. All in all, 
stakeholders characterised the current factsheet content 
as fragmented; they confirmed that there is demand for 
a more exhaustive report on mining in the European 
Arctic.
Further focus
Several respondents from the mining industry, as well as 
decision-makers, indicated that the factsheet provides a 
pessimistic vision on the industry, focusing on negative 
impacts rather than action-oriented proposals. For 
this reason, it is suggested to closely co-operate with 
professional associations’ representatives (i.e. European 
Association of Mining Industries, Metal Ores & Industrial 
Minerals (EuroMines) at the early stages of drafting.
The respondents suggested that future studies should 
focus on the overall consequences of mining in the long 
term (e.g. case studies of closed mines and the impact 
on the local communities). It is further proposed that 
attention should be paid to possible ways of ensuring 
high operating standards including sustainable logistics 
and infrastructure investments. Moreover, research on 
more comprehensive utilisation of the processed ore is 
needed for increasing the sustainability of production. 
Another particular question that could be investigated 
is seabed mineralisation, as in the case of Kara Sea bed 
nodules, and its possible applications. 
A1.2.5.4 Questions
1. What are your concerns about the environ-
mental and social impacts of mining activities? 
Are these adequately considered in environ-
mental assessments? Are environmental protec-
tion and social/cultural measures adequately 
adhered to?
Almost one third of those who commented on this 
question, mostly representatives of the mining industry 
and state agencies, emphasised that the environmental 
and social impacts of mining activities are adequately 
considered in environmental impact assessments 
(EIA). One comment highlighted that sometimes an 
EIA constitutes an obstacle for the implementation of 
best available technologies due to its long and costly 
procedures.
The need to develop social impact assessments and 
obtain social licences was expressed by respondents 
representing different affiliations (i.e. mining industry, 
state agencies, academic research, reindeer herders 
and other). In this regard it is very important to assess 
social impacts in a whole life-cycle model, with specific 
attention to a closure phase and change of operators. 
Also, it was mentioned that there is a small benefit 
for the local community besides employment during 
the mine’s lifetime. At the same time local/regional 
employment is commonly prioritised over the traditional 
indigenous economy. Several of the stakeholders from 
state agencies and national/regional decision-makers 
referred to the ousting of reindeer husbandry by other 
forms of land use as a major concern.
Other major concerns identified by the respondents are:
• non-harmonised, changing legislation and regulatory 
requirements and absence of common EIA 
methodology across the European Arctic countries;
• waste water management;
• risk of environmental accidents.
2. Does climate change influence mining activi-
ties in the European Arctic/in your region?
Over two-thirds of respondents did not see any direct 
impact of climate change on mining activities in 
Fennoscandia, as it is geology that dictates where mining 
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can be done. However, it was agreed that climate change 
will affect the development of maritime transportation 
of the mineral resources (i.e. ores and concentrates) to 
North-East Asia. Moreover, heavy rainfalls may contribute 
to challenges in water balance management at the mine 
site, although it should be noted that responsible mining 
companies take this factor into account at the early 
stages of planning. 
In Greenland, climate change implications are expected 
to have a beneficial effect on new mineral discoveries. 
3. Do you expect local communities affected by 
mining developments to change (for instance 
due to new people moving in)? Which changes 
are positive and which negative? How can the 
negative changes be mitigated?
The stakeholders largely agreed that the face of a 
community will change as the mining sector develops. 
Most commonly the respondents were referring to 
general economic and demographic growth and labour 
market diversification with the arrival of a new employer. 
The questionnaire results show that the lowering of the 
unemployment rate is a major argument raised by the 
representatives of the mining industry. In comparison 
with seasonal tourism employment, mines can offer 
year-round occupation for workers as up to 70% of 
employees are hired locally. Respondents representing 
different affiliations often mention that new industry 
will contribute to the private sector and SMEs working in 
trade and service business, which will bring more income 
and attract new investments to the area. Additionally, it 
is expected to trigger higher incomes and subsequent 
increases in tax payments, which will be a major boon to 
public services (i.e. schools and hospitals). 
At the same time, there are certain questions that need 
to be solved as the industry develops in the region. First 
of all, it is crucial to prepare an adequate infrastructure 
including sufficient accommodation for the new 
incoming workforce. Municipalities should participate in 
planning policy to mitigate negative impacts of the rising 
prices of housing.
An integration policy for the newcomers should be 
organised. However, it should be oriented towards the 
local population as well in the form of training for new 
cultures, languages and new jobs. 
Stakeholders suggested that wherever there are direct 
negative impacts the mining company should actively 
negotiate the means of mitigation, for example, by 
investing in new recreational facilities or benefit sharing.
The responses show that engaging local people and 
stakeholders in public discussions is crucial. One of the 
most serious concerns expressed by the respondents 
was the limited role of indigenous peoples in decision-
making processes. It was stated that preservation of 
their traditional ways of life is essential, and providing 
the resources as well as appropriate space for conducting 
traditional or land-based activities should ensure that 
mining activities can be carried out in a non-obstructive 
manner in line with best practices.
Another concern mentioned was the short lifetime of 
mining projects and low sustainability of benefits that 
only have a temporary effect and fade away as the mine 
closes. Therefore, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
critical to mitigate these risks.
4. Will European Arctic regions remain/become 
important sources of raw materials for Europe-
an Union economies in the next twenty years?
Almost all respondents confirm that the European Arctic 
regions will remain or become important sources of raw 
materials for the European Union and even the global 
economy in the next twenty years. However, it should be 
remembered that the market is mainly influenced by price 
fluctuations and changing demand for raw materials. It 
was also highlighted that mining is a high-risk business 
and sudden changes in mining and/or environmental 
laws can slow down industry development.
Some responses mentioned the development of deep 
exploration techniques that could generate some 
discoveries in Central/Southern Europe, yet their 
potential is very small. Besides, restarting mining 
activities can be even more difficult than in remote 
European areas. 
5. Do you see any EU influence on Arctic mining 
developments? 
Some of the respondents were of the opinion that the 
EU’s role in decision-making on the mining industry is 
decreasing, while the powers of national and local actors 
are becoming predominant. However, the majority of 
comments were devoted to several dimensions where 
stakeholders expect the EU to act.
First of all, the support for investments in regional 
logistics including new transportation corridors and 
infrastructure development has the highest visibility 
among the respondents. Specifically, the railroad from 
the Arctic Ocean coast to Southern EU countries through 
Finnish Lapland was mentioned. 
Stakeholders from the academic research sector and 
mining industry are convinced that the EU needs to take 
a step towards the harmonisation of legislation. For 
example, the common mining waste directive and other 
directives are good in setting common management 
standards. Moreover, respondents urge the EU to support 
long-term sustainable development, such as by requiring 
establishment of local production. It was also proposed 
that long-term funds should be established using income 
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from the mines, following the Norwegian model of oil 
funds. One respondent proposed introduction of EU 
subsidies for the mining sector.
It was underlined that the EU should actively promote 
research in order to develop new equipment and 
processes, for example in waste management and water 
purification techniques to mitigate the environmental 
impacts of the industry.
Moreover, there is a need for an updated EU policy 
on indigenous peoples according to the standards 
articulated in the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.
A1.2.5.5 Assessing EU policies and proposing 
ideas for recommendations
Which EU policies and actions relevant to min-
ing are beneficial for the sustainable develop-
ment of the Arctic?
• Raw Materials Initiative (e.g. ensuring security of 
supply and European production)
• Research on mining technology and sustainability
• Sector-specific regulations (Mining Waste Directive 
and Mineral-Extracting Industries Directive)
• Environmental regulations (Natura2000/Habitat and 
Birds Directive, Water Framework Directive)
• Transport policy (e.g. trans-European transport 
corridors, sulphur limits for ship fuel)
• Relations with Greenland
Responses from the academic research sector 
highlighted the importance of the EU indigenous policy 
and relevance of EU-Russia relations. Also, security of 
raw material supplies to the EU was mentioned as an 
increasingly acute problem.
How to improve EU policy performance?
Most commonly the respondents referred to 
engagement of local stakeholders in policy making. 
According to the responses, it is important to analyse 
all possible implications of new regulations before their 
implementation. Respondents also highlighted that EU 
regulations could have room for local interpretations. 
At the same time a global perspective should also be 
in place, in particular such opportunities as a transport 
corridor via the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which was 
mentioned as a great opportunity that should not be 
neglected.
Furthermore, the respondents highlighted the need 
for an updated indigenous policy and its subsequent 
integration in all other relevant regulations. The EU 
should improve the public understanding of the mining 
industry through research projects (i.e. the EUAIC). 
Finally, it was indicated that accountability at all levels 
would allow improving policy performance in general.
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A1.2.6 Climate Change in the Arctic – Online Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.6.1 General information
The survey on land use piqued the interest of 18 
respondents, most of whom came from Northern 
Finland, Sweden and Norway with a smaller number of 
responses also coming from Denmark, Russia and the 
EU (non-Arctic). Many of the respondents identified 
themselves as having a state or local government or 
research background. Some represented NGOs or 
decision-makers. Only one each were in tourism, forestry 
and management. 
Respondents’ country/region:
Represented background / interest group / organisation:
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A1.2.6.2 Critical factors – uncertainties and 
important issues
Main uncertainties regarding land use in the Arctic:
• Habitat fragmentation 
• Traditional livelihoods 
• Nature conservation 
• Mining 
Most important issues for decision-making:
• Transport 
• Conflict resolution 
• Forestry 
The respondents felt that the main uncertainties 
regarding land use in the Arctic are habitat fragmentation, 
traditional livelihoods, nature conservation and mining. 
The most important issues for decision-making are 
transport, conflict resolution and forestry. 
A1.2.6.3 Factsheets
Issues missing from the factsheets and further focus
Respondents pointed out that the report should include 
a human rights-based approach to land use, particularly 
focusing on the rights of indigenous peoples. Due to 
the effects of climate change, sustainable development 
should be also in the focus when discussing land use 
changes. Also new technologies are seen to challenge 
traditional land use and management. The development 
of natural resources should be based on Arctic cultures 
and environment. For further study, stakeholders 
pointed to the need for a more holistic approach to 
the livelihoods of the European Arctic and promoting 
sustainable business opportunities. 
Trends until 2030?
The respondents generally agreed that the trends 
identified in the factsheet would continue until 2030. 
Trends highlighted by one of the respondents included 
mining, indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural 
resources, tourism and primary production.
A1.2.6.4 Questions
1. Which activities affecting land use (tourism, 
mining, forestry, traditional livelihoods, ener-
gy) can be considered sustainable and provide 
long-term development for the Arctic and its 
people?
The traditional livelihoods – forestry and tourism – are 
believed to be in the long term the main engines of 
the Northern economy. Some respondents felt that all 
activities can be considered sustainable and provide 
long-term development depending on where and how 
different interests can be taken care of if adequate 
planning and decision-making are in place. Activities 
should not be labelled bad or good, but rather evaluated 
on the basis of how the social, environmental and 
economic factors are taken into account. There should be 
a focus on finding synergies between various activities. 
2. What are the best ways to avoid or resolve 
conflicts between competing land uses? How 
should the balance between economic, environ-
mental, social and cultural values be weighed?
Stakeholders mentioned that the best way to avoid 
or resolve conflicts between competing land uses is 
to use good planning procedures. Importance of full 
and effective participation of indigenous peoples in 
decision-making was also highlighted. Stakeholders 
mentioned that the balance between economic, 
environmental, social and cultural values should be 
weighed by “ecologically-defined frames for sustainable 
development”. Environmental factors set limits to natural 
resource use. Inside these limitations, the economy can 
develop in a social process that takes cultural values into 
consideration.
3. What are your suggestions for how to en-
hance accessibility while minimising the impacts 
of transport infrastructure?
The stakeholders highlighted that good and careful 
sustainable planning is the way to enhance accessibility 
while minimising the impacts of transport infrastructure. 
In addition to existing transport infrastructure the 
respondents support developing railroads and sea 
transportation, as well as enhancing innovations 
in transport. The protected areas, areas of high 
conservation value and unexploited areas are important 
and serve as ecological buffers. In those kinds of spaces 
environmental sustainability should be taken into special 
consideration during any development.
4. Does the EU have a role in supporting tradi-
tional livelihoods?
According to many of the respondents, the EU has a role 
in supporting traditional livelihoods. It was suggested 
that in the areas of harsh climate only traditional 
livelihoods have proven to be sustainable in the long 
term, while activities such as mining, industrial forestry 
and hydro-electrical exploitation have proved to end 
up having very limited lifespans. It was emphasised 
that the EU should adhere to the 2007 UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in all its policies 
and decision-making. This would support traditional 
livelihoods and could be the baseline for any policy and 
programme development.
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5. Can the Arctic region benefit from an ex-
change of best practices in land-use manage-
ment and conflict mitigation with other Europe-
an regions?
The respondents described the Arctic region as having 
a special character and stated that there are possible 
benefits from studying good examples and from 
benchmarking. On the other hand, other respondents 
stated that there have been good land-use management 
systems in use in the North for decades and importing 
new solutions is not seen as necessary. One respondent 
mentioned the Finnmark Act in Norway as a good 
example of how land management issues can be resolved 
between indigenous people or minority groups and the 
ethnic/cultural majority in the region.
A1.2.6.5 Assess EU policies and proposing 
ideas for recommendations
Respondents mentioned as beneficial those EU policies 
that foster ecological, sustainable and economic matters 
and promote research. It was emphasised that there is a 
need to adopt a serious approach to the climate policy 
objective of ensuring that global warming does not 
exceed 1.5 degrees Centigrade. Moreover, there should 
be a policy prioritising ecological sustainability before 
economic growth. The common agricultural policy 
should be reformulated towards a policy that enhances 
ecologically sustainable agriculture and pastoralism. 
One respondent suggested that the funding for EU 
Arctic programmes should promote best practices in 
sustainable development (e.g. cold technology). One 
respondent underlined that there should be a policy 
promoting indigenous peoples’ human rights while at 
the same time promoting sustainable development and 
renewable energy solutions.
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A1.2.7 Social and cultural changes – Online 
Questionnaire: Summary
A1.2.7.1 General information
The survey on social and cultural changes piqued 
the interest of 18 respondents, most of whom came 
from Northern Finland, with a significant number of 
responses also from Russia and Norway. One-third of the 
respondents had an academic background, but a broad 
spectrum of interest groups were represented, including 
media, entrepreneurs, environmental and community 
NGOs, indigenous peoples’ organisations as well as local 
and governmental agency officials. Particular questions 
received from two to ten responses.
Respondents’ country/region:
Represented background/organisation/interest group:
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A1.2.7.2 Critical factors – uncertainties and 
important issues
Main uncertainties regarding social and cultural change 
in the North:
• Extractive industries
• Traditional livelihoods
• Community viability and resilience
• Accessibility and connectivity
• Employment
Most important issues for decision-making:
• Education
• Extractive industries
• Accessibility and connectivity
Respondents from Fennoscandia focused more on 
accessibility and connectivity and employment, with 
accessibility seen as the key uncertainty. Researchers 
highlighted community viability and resilience as a major 
uncertainty and pointed to education as the critical issue 
for sociocultural development in the North. Education was 
mentioned as a way to bridge sustainable development 
and the economic, social and environmental changes 
but governmental policies and funding are crucial 
factors if that is to happen. Stakeholders have in addition 
mentioned the important role played by the arts and 
the question of ethics in extractive activities. Aspects of 
local sustainability and local communities were clearly 
highlighted.
A1.2.7.3 Factsheets
Issues missing from the factsheets and further focus
The respondents indicated that greater attention 
should be given to in-migration as well as cultural 
change seen as part of broader globalisation trends. 
For further study, stakeholders pointed to the issue 
of young people in governance, the consequences of 
increased communication and information flow, or the 
socialisation of space. The problem of the implications 
of new economic realities including consumerism, 
environmental degradation and the spiritual condition 
of the communities, especially in urban areas, was 
highlighted.
Trends until 2030?
The respondents in general agreed that the trends 
identified in the factsheet would continue until 2030. 
There were, however, very few responses. An idea was 
raised that trends should be prioritised in the light of 
futures-thinking based on their significance and impact.
A1.2.7.4 Questions
1. Is the European Arctic bound to be “Europe’s 
resource region”? Can the European Arctic 
diversify from its dependence on natural re-
sources and public transfers? Will Arctic regions 
move towards knowledge-based economy? 
What might be the EU’s role in such a shift?
The extraction of raw materials and tourism are 
believed to be in the long term the main engines of the 
Northern economy, at least in Fennoscandia, although 
connected with the anxiety that resource exploitation 
would primarily benefit actors from outside the region. 
Knowledge-based economy and economic diversification 
are seen as the key developments towards a sustainable 
North, with researchers pointing to research as an 
important factor in this change and doubting whether 
the transition is truly possible. Respondents raised the 
issue of local taxation and preferential tax treatment 
as vital for the establishment of a knowledge-based 
economy. One highlighted challenge is the dominance 
of middle-aged men in the political elite, while greater 
participation of young people in governance may be a 
driver of change to a sustainable and knowledge-based 
economy.
The EU could contribute to the social turn towards a 
knowledge-based economy by investing in research 
and education, supporting institutions and companies 
that are the basis for a knowledge-based economy and 
economic diversification, as well as helping to promote, 
in various ways, ethical, good governance and how 
activities can benefit local communities.
2. In what ways can education, research and in-
formation and communication technologies in 
the European Arctic evolve to expand opportu-
nities for its people? How could the EU enhance 
this role?
Stakeholders mentioned that it is important to develop 
East-West networks and more robust technological 
infrastructures. Research and ICT should be utilised for 
culture and strengthening local identities, mitigating 
the North-towards-South brain-drain and enhancing 
stakeholder participation. 
3. What specific aspects of the Northern cul-
tures should be protected or supported in light 
of general cultural change?
Respondents highlighted that culture is dynamic 
and, rather than protecting it, the focus should be on 
developing culture, with a focus (as emphasised by a 
cultural entrepreneur from Sweden) on contemporary 
art and education rather than traditional forms of 
culture if these are understood as being static and 
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protection is taken to mean putting the cultural heritage 
in a museum. Another important issue was knowledge 
on and the value of the relationship between humans 
and their environment, including environmentally-sound 
management of change and the use of living resources. 
The right to continue seal hunting was mentioned in 
particular by a Danish respondent in this context.
4. How can the European Union support Sámi 
culture and Sámi trans-border co-operation? 
How could the EU support the cultures and 
societies of other Arctic indigenous and non-in-
digenous peoples?
A number of ways to support indigenous culture, 
rights and co-operation were mentioned: supporting 
living culture, acknowledging the existence of multiple 
identities, avoiding building barriers between different 
groups, ensuring cross-border educational connections 
and the existence of dynamic educational institutions 
in the North. The EU was also encouraged to facilitate 
disseminating information to Europeans about Arctic 
cultures and ways of living compared to European 
cultures. Whaling and sealing were mentioned in this 
context.
5. What would be the most effective ways for 
the EU to support Northern Europe in its 2020 
financial perspective?
Mentioned issues include support for logistics and 
accessibility/mobility, as well as mitigating the high costs 
of establishing and running business in the North. There 
is a need for flexible policies and solutions for different 
regions and communities in the Arctic, avoiding a singular 
approach to the North.
A1.2.7.5 Assessing EU policies and proposing 
ideas for recommendations
Stakeholders mentioned that such EU policies that 
foster economic diversification, support accessibility 
and connectivity, promote education and research in 
the North, and facilitate cross-border co-operation 
are beneficial (and thus, desirable). It was highlighted 
that research and research co-operation are still not 
sufficiently supported within the European Arctic. 
One stakeholder mentioned that the regulation of 
the activities of multinational corporations is a major 
concern, with the EU playing either a positive or negative 
role in this respect.
A
.
- 184 -
Annex 2: Chosen examples of EU projects relevant for 
EUAIA themes: Excerpt from the European Arctic Initiatives 
Compendium
Authors of the European Arctic Initiatives Compendium: Björn Dahlbäck (1), Lize-Marié van der Watt (1), Kamil 
Jagodziński (2), Paula Kankaanpää (2) 
(1) Swedish Polar Research Secretariat 
(2) Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
European Arctic Initiatives Compendium Team
Roberto Azzolini, European Polar Board, European Science Foundation
Nicole Biebow, Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research
Georgina Cronin, Scott Polar Research Institute
Heather Lane, Scott Polar Research Institute
Anastasia Leonenko, Tromsø Centre for Remote Sensing
Irina Zhilina, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland 
Authors of the EU Arctic Impact Assessment report contributed to the complilation of the list of relevant project.
The European Arctic Initiatives compendium presents flagship initiatives undertaken by the European Union in Arctic 
regions, as well as initiatives undertaken by member states and actors operating within states belonging to the 
European Union (EU). Furthermore, it includes initiatives by European states such as Norway and Iceland, as well 
as territories such as Greenland, which are highly relevant in the context of the European Arctic, and in many cases 
strongly linked to the EU, for example, the European Research Area (ERA).  The compendium has been compiled as part 
of the Preparatory Action for a Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of the Arctic. 
The European Arctic Initiatives Compendium and all projects chosen for presentation in the Compendium can be found 
from the www.arcticinfo.eu
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Clim-ATIC 
Climate Change — Adapting to The Impacts, by Communities in Northern Peripheral Regions
http://www.clim-atic.org/
Main aim Supporting rural peripheral communities to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
Geographical scope Scotland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Svalbard, Greenland
Disciplines involved Environmental protection, climate change, pollution (soil, water, air), waste 
management.
Output Community climate change vulnerability assessments; community climate change 
adaptation strategies; climate change impact visualizations and communication tools; 
real adaptations made by communities; international information, training, and advice 
service.
Relevance Clim-ATIC Establishes a sustainable, self-financing service to disseminate, knowledge 
to support the sustainability of rural communities, enabling them to adapt to socio-
economic impacts of climate change with the focus on such areas as risk and response 
management, transport, tourism and energy. 
Period 01/2008 - 02/2011
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
 2 348 139  EUR / 1 317 143 EUR
Funding source Northern Periphery Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: UHI Millennium Institute, Scotland
Lycksele Municipality, Sweden
Arctic Technology Centre, Greenland
Western Norway Research Institute, Norway
The Lapland Regional Environment Centre, Finland
Umeå University, Sweden
Åre municipality, Sweden
Finnish Forest Research Institute, Rovaniemi Research Unit, Finland
Thule Institute at University of Oulu, Finland
Finnish Environment Institute, Finland
University of Lapland Arctic Centre, Finland
University of Lapland, Finland
Sogn og Fjordane County Governor, Norway 
Contacts Clive Bowman
clive.bowman@perth.uhi.ac.uk 
Climate Change in the Arctic
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CryoLand 
CryoLand - Copernicus Service Snow and Land Ice
http://cryoland.eu/
Main aim Develop, implement and validate an operational sustainable service for monitoring 
snow and land ice.
Geographical scope Pan-European
Disciplines involved Snow monitoring, land ice monitoring, cross-disciplinary (Earth observation).
Output Services for snow and land ice monitoring, academic publications.
Relevance Building up operational snow and glacier services. Operational processing lines and 
service infrastructure for various product types will be developed on top of existing web 
service environments supporting the publication, provision and chaining of geospatial 
data services. Observing and monitoring of glacier growth and shrinkage, and changes 
in snow cover and sea-ice. 
Period 02/2011 - 02/2015
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
 2 829 000 € / n.k.
Funding source Copernicus,  7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner ENVEO IT GmbH, Austria
EOX IT Services,  Austria
Finnish Environment Institute, Finland
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland
Kongsberg Satellite Services, Norway
Northern Research Institute, Norway
Norwegian Computing Center, Norway
National Meteorological Administration, Romania
GAMMA Remote Sensing, Switzerland
Swedish Meteorological & Hydrological Institute, Sweden
Contacts Thomas Nagler
thomas.nagler@enveo.at 
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CoreClimax 
Coordinating earth observation data validation for RE-analysis for climate services
http://www.coreclimax.eu/ 
Main aim Coordination the identification of essential climate change variables and the creation 
of long term climate data records
Geographical scope Pan-European
Disciplines involved Climate system monitoring 
Output Tools and datasets developed for assessing the European capability to provide Global 
Climate Observing System (GCOS) Essential Climate Variables (ECV), such as air 
temperature, precipitation, carbon dioxide, sea level, sea surface temperature, snow 
cover data records.
Relevance In response to environmental and societal challenges associated with climate changes, 
the Copernicus Climate Change Service is helping to support climate adaptation and 
mitigation measures by providing access to several climate indicators (e.g. temperature 
increase, sea level rise, ice sheet melting and ocean warming) and climate indices 
(e.g. based on records of temperature, precipitation and drought event) for both 
the identified climate drivers and the expected climate impacts. In conjunction with 
its partners CORE-CLIMAX is coordinating the identification of available physical 
measurements that can be reconciled with previously existing data records to form 
long-term climate data records. 
Period 01/2013 - 06/2015 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
 1 997 635 EUR / n.k. 
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Faculty of Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, University of 
Twente, The Netherlands
The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, Germany
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, United Kingdom
Deutscher Wetterdienst, Germany
Flemish institute for technological research, Belgium
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland
MeteoFrance, France
Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
Cold and Arid Regions Environmental and Engineering Research Institute, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, China
Contacts Professor Bob Su
z.su@utwente.nl
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Arctic Tipping Points 
http://www.eu-atp.org
Main aim Identifying the elements of the Arctic marine ecosystem likely to show abrupt changes 
in response to climate change, and establish the levels of the corresponding climate 
drivers inducing regime shift in those tipping elements. In addition, determine the 
effect of crossing those thresholds for the Arctic marine ecosystems, and the associated 
risks and opportunities for economic activities dependent on the marine ecosystem of 
the European Arctic.
Geographical scope Arctic
Disciplines involved Climate change, marine ecosystems 
Output Investigating tipping points in the European Arctic: 
Academic publications. Exhibitions. PhD summer school. Modeled future trajectories, 
tipping points and regime shifts. Evaluation of expected changes in relationships 
between a) climate forcing and biological responses and b) ecosystem components 
and their inter-relationships during regime shifts. Assessments of the implications of 
changes in the Arctic for socioeconomic activities and governance of arctic resources. 
White paper evaluating different policy options in avoiding exceeding tipping points for 
Arctic ecosystems. 
Relevance Enhanced knowledge on Arctic climate change and options for adaptation. 
Period 01/02/2009 - 31/01/2012 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
6 545 776 EUR / 4 998 098 EUR 
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: University of Tromsø, Norway
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Spain
Akvaplan-niva AS, Norway
SINTEF Fiskeri og havbruk AS
Aarhus Universitet, Denmark
Institute of Oceanology Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
Center of Marine Sciences, Portugal
Université de Pierre et Marie Curie, France
Greenland Institute of Natural Resources, Greenland
Shirshov Institute of Oceanology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
Max-Planck Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., Max-Planck-Institut für 
Meteorologie, Germany
The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Sweden
Contacts Elisabeth Halvorsen 
elisabeth.halvorsen@uit.no
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EPOCA
European Project on OCean Acidification 
http://www.epoca-project.eu/index.php/who-are-we.html
Main aim Advancing the understanding of the biological, ecological, biogeochemical, and societal 
implications of ocean acidification.
Geographical scope Arctic, North Atlantic, North Pacific
Disciplines involved Ocean acidification 
Output EPOCA improved our understanding of past and present spatio-temporal changes 
of ocean acidification; of the impacts of ocean acidification on marine biota; and of 
future changes in ocean chemistry and biogeochemical feedbacks in terms of hotspots, 
uncertainties, thresholds. It shed light on tipping points. 
Relevance Enhancing knowledge and understanding of ocean acidification 
Period 01/05/2008 – 30/+04/2012 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
9 766 950 EUR/ 6 548 995 EUR 
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France
Leibniz-Institut Fuer Meereswissenschaften An Der Universitaet Kiel, Germany
Max Planck Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung Der Wissenschaften E.v., Germany 
Natural Environment Research Council, United Kingdom
Universitaet Bern, Switzerland 
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Switzerland
University Of Cambridge, United Kingdom
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Universitetet I Bergen, Norway
Universite Libre De Bruxelles, Belgium
University Of Bristol, United Kingdom
Sir Alister Hardy Foundation For Ocean Science, United Kingdom
Philippe Saugier International Educational Projects, France
University Of Southampton. United Kingdom
Plymouth Marine Laboratory, United Kingdom
Marine Biological Association Of The United Kingdom, United Kingdom
The Scottish Association For Marine Science, United Kingdom
Alfred-Wegener-Institut Fuer Polar- Und Meeresforschung, Germany
Goeteborgs Universitet, Sweden
Hafrannsoknastofnunin, Iceland
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie Van Wetenschappen - Knaw
The Netherlands
Vereniging Voor Christelijk Hoger Onderwijs Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek En 
Patientenzorg, The Netherlands
University Of Plymouth - Higher Education Corporation, United Kingdom
Helmholtz Zentrum Fur Ozeanforschung Kiel, Germany
Commissariat A L Energie Atomique Et Aux Energies Alternatives, France
United Nations Educational, Scientific And Cultural Organization –Unesco, France
Stichting Koninklijk Nederlands Instituut Voor Zeeonderzoek (Nioz), The Netherlands
Helmholtz-Zentrum Geesthacht Zentrum Fur Material- Und Kustenforschung Gmbh, 
Germany
Contacts Elisabeth Halvorsen 
elisabeth.halvorsen@uit.no
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DAMOCLES
Developing Arctic Modelling and Observing Capabilities for Long-term Environmental Studies 
http://www.damocles-eu.org/about_damocles/index.shtml
Main aim The project was an integrated ice-atmosphere-ocean monitoring and forecasting 
system designed for observing, understanding and quantifying climate changes in the 
Arctic.
Geographical scope Arctic Region
Disciplines involved Sea-ice, atmosphere and ocean
Output Publications, contribution to International Polar Year 2007 – 2008. 
Relevance DAMOCLES shed light on the changes in sea-ice, atmosphere and ocean of the Arctic 
and sub-Arctic domain. It improved modelling and identified appropriate adaptation 
strategies.
Period 12/2005 - 05/2008 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
24 817 021 EUR / 16 099 700 EUR
Funding source 6th framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Université Pierre et Marie Curie, France
48 institutions in 11 European countries + the Russian Federation and Belarus.
Contacts Jean-Claude Gascard
jga@locean-ipsl.upmc.fr 
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PAGE21
Changing Permafrost in the Arctic and its Global Effects in the 21st Century
http://page21.org
Main aim Understand and quantify the vulnerability of permafrost environments to a changing 
global climate, and to investigate the feedback mechanisms associated with increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions from permafrost zones
Geographical scope Arctic Region
Disciplines involved Permafrost, arctic, climate change, carbon
Output Field sites, academic publications 
Relevance Enhancing Observing and Understandingo f Arctic Climate Change
Period 11/2011 - 11/2015 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
9 269 927  EUR /  6 951 895 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Germany 
The University Centre in Svalbard Norway, Norway
Stockholms Universitet, Sweden
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Technische Universität Wien, Austria
Université Joseph Fourier, France
University of Exeter, United Kingdom
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., Germany 
Lund University, Sweden
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
University of Hamburg, Germany
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energies alternatives, France
Met Office, for and on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Defence of
the United Kingdom, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Kingdom
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland
University of Eastern Finland, Finland
Institute for Biological Problems of Cryolithozone Russian Federation, Russia 
Arctic Portal, Iceland
Moscow State University Russian Federation, Russia
Contacts Leena - Kaisa Viitanen
http://page21.org/component/contact/contact/60-coordination-team/4-leena-
viitanen 
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PAGE21
Changing Permafrost in the Arctic and its Global Effects in the 21st Century
http://page21.org
Main aim Understand and quantify the vulnerability of permafrost environments to a changing 
global climate, and to investigate the feedback mechanisms associated with increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions from permafrost zones
Geographical scope Arctic Region
Disciplines involved Permafrost, arctic, climate change, carbon
Output Field sites, academic publications 
Relevance Enhancing Observing and Understandingo f Arctic Climate Change
Period 11/2011 - 11/2015 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
9 269 927  EUR /  6 951 895 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Germany 
The University Centre in Svalbard Norway, Norway
Stockholms Universitet, Sweden
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Technische Universität Wien, Austria
Université Joseph Fourier, France
University of Exeter, United Kingdom
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., Germany 
Lund University, Sweden
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
University of Hamburg, Germany
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energies alternatives, France
Met Office, for and on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Defence of
the United Kingdom, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Kingdom
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland
University of Eastern Finland, Finland
Institute for Biological Problems of Cryolithozone Russian Federation, Russia 
Arctic Portal, Iceland
Moscow State University Russian Federation, Russia
Contacts Leena - Kaisa Viitanen
http://page21.org/component/contact/contact/60-coordination-team/4-leena-
viitanen 
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INTERACT
International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic 
http://www.eu-interact.org/transnational-access/
Main aim To build capacity for identifying, understanding, predicting and responding to  diverse 
environmental changes throughout the wide environmental and land-use
Geographical scope Arctic and adjacent northern territories
Disciplines involved Terrestrial research
Output Station Managers forum (platform for exchange of information between research station 
managers and between managers and other partners and stakeholders); Joint Research 
Activities; Transnational Access (access to 20 research stations in Northernmost Europe 
and Russia); Outreach (inform and interact with the public, stakeholders and primary, 
secondary and tertiary students). 
Relevance Research facilitation and capacity building to conduct research on Arctic climate change
Period 01/2011-12/2014 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
9 362 620 EUR / 7 300 000 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: KUNGLIGA VETENSKAPSAKADEMIEN, Sweden 
Agricultural University of Iceland, Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, 
Arctic Institute of North America, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
Secretariat, ATHENA research and Innovation Centre in Information Communication 
& knowledge Technologies, Barrow Arctic Science Consortium, Centre for Northern 
Studies, CLU srl, Faroe Islands Nature Investigation, Finnish Forest Research Institute, 
Greenland Institute of Natural Resources, IT University of Copenhagen, The Institute for 
Biological Problems of Cryolithozone SB RAS, Lund University, National Environmental 
Research Institute, Natural Environmental Research Council, Norwegian Institute for 
Agricultural and Environmental Research, Norwegian Polar Institute, The Royal Swedish 
Academy of Sciences, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Stockholm University, 
Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
University of Alaska Fairbanks, University of Copenhagen, University of Helsinki, 
University of Oslo, University of Oulu, University of Turku, Uppsala University, World 
Wide Fund for Nature, Yugra State University
Contacts Terry V. Callaghan
terry_callaghan@btinternet.com
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SIOS
Svalbard Integrated Earth Observing System 
http://www.sios-svalbard.org/prognett-sios/Home_page/1234130481072
Main aim Creation of an optimized observational infrastructure which can match advanced Earth 
System models with observational evidence and provide near-real-time information on 
Arctic change to relevant stakeholders 
Geographical scope Svalbard
Disciplines involved Infrastructure
Output Scientific coordination and integration strategy
Concept paper for the Knowledge Centre, Knowledge Centre implementation plan 
SIOS interactive web-portal
SIOS Educational programme 
Relevance Enhancing Observing and Understandingo f Arctic Climate Change. Coordination and 
Facilitation of Research.
Period 2010 -2013
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
6 688 418 EUR / 4 455 627 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: The Research Council of Norway, Norway
Partners:
The Norwegian Polar Institute, Norway
The University Centre in Svalbard, Norway
Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Germany 
Institute of Geophysics - Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
National Research Council of Italy, Italy
Natural Environment Research Council, United Kingdom
Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry - Norwegian Space Centre, Norway
National Environmental Research Institute - Aarhus University, Denmark
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Polar Research Institute of China, China
French Polar Research Institute, France
Korea Ocean Research & Development Institute - Korea Polar Research Institute, Korea
Polar Geophysical Institute - Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
Institute of Oceanology - Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
Stockholm University, Sweden
University of Bergen, Norway
University of Tromsø, Norway
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Institutions and partners 
involved
Norwegian Meteorological Institute, Norway
Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center, Norway
Institute of Marine Research, Norway
Norwegian Institute for Air Research, Norway
Andøya Rocket Range, Norway
Research Organization of Information and Systems - National Institute for Polar 
Research, Japan
Associated partners:
National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research, India
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Spain
Institute of Botany - Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic
Scottish Association for Marine Science, United Kingdom
University of Leicester, United Kingdom
EISCAT Scientific Association, Sweden
Kola Science Centre - Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
Geophysical Survey - Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
Arctic Centre - University of Lapland, Finland
National Science Foundation, USA
Norwegian Institute of Water Research, Norway
University of Oslo, Norway
Kings Bay AS, Norway
NORSAR, Norway
Akvaplan-niva AS. , Norway
Norwegian Institute of Nature Research, Norway
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway
Kongsberg Satellite Services AS, Norway
Northern Research Institute Tromso AS, Norway
Norwegian Directorate of Energy and Water Resources, Norway
Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, Norway
The Governor of Svalbard, Norway
Contacts Jon Børre Ørbæk
bo@forskningsradet.no
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Main aim Increasing Road, Rail and Waterborne Safety and Avoiding Traffic Congestion
Geographical scope Baltic Sea, Okhostk Sea, Canadian waters
Disciplines involved Water transport (sea & inland), Security and Safety, Assessment & decision support 
methodologies
Output Database on ice loads and ice pressures 
Relevance The main purposes in the SAFEICE project were to develop semi-empirical methods 
based on measurements to determine the ice loads on ship hull, to find relationship 
between operational conditions and ice load, to develop ship-ice interaction models 
to assess the design ice loads on ship hull, to develop methods to estimate ultimate 
strength of shell plating and frames and to develop methods to analyze ice damages. 
The target was to decrease the risk involved in winter navigation. Baltic Sea, Okhostk 
Sea and Canadian waters were used as validation for ice load predictions.
Period 09/2004 - 09/2007 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
2 175 226 EUR/ 1 050 000 EUR
Funding source 6th RTD Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden
Finnish Maritime Administration, Finland
Germanischer Lloyd AG, Germany
Hamburgische Schiffbau-Versuchsanstalt GmbH, Germany
National Maritime Research Institute, Japan
National Research Council Canada, Canada
Swedish Maritime Administration, Sweden
Tallinn Technical University, Estonia
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, Russia
Contacts Prof. Kujala Pentti
pentti.kujala@tkk.fi
SAFEICE 
Increasing the Safety of Icebound Shipping
http://www.tkk.fi/Units/Ship/Research/SafeIce/Public/
Changes in Arctic Maritime Transport
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JOULES
Joint Operation for Ultra Low Emission Shipping
http://www.joules-project.eu/Joules/index.xhtml
Main aim Significantly reducing the gas emissions of European built ships
Scope of application European built ships
Disciplines involved Shipping, gas emissions
Period 05/2013 - 05/2017 
Total budget /EU funding 
granted
14 250 109 EUR/ 8 500 000 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
9 362 620 EUR / 7 300 000 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Germany
Damen Shipyards Group, Denmark
MEYER WERFT GmbH, Germany
Navantia S.A., Spain
STX France SA, France
STX Finland OY, Finland
Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA, Italy
MAN Diesel & Turbo, Germany
WAERTSILA NETHERLANDS B.V., The Netherlands
Center of Maritime Technologies e. V., Germany
BALance Technology Consulting GmbH, Germany
Universite de Liege, Belgium
Det Norske Veritas AS, Norway
SSPA Sweden AB, Sweden
VTT Technical Research Center of Finland, Finland
Institut fuer Energie- und Umweltforschung, Germany
Imtech Marine Netherlands, The Netherlands
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET HAMBURG-HARBURG, Germany
Technical University of Delft, The Netherlands
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, The Netherlands
BUREAU VERITAS, France
Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd, United Kingdom
HyGear Fuel Cell Systems B.V., The Netherlands
Stichting Maritiem Research Instituut Nederland, The Netherlands
Couple Systems GmbH, Germany
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Institutions and partners 
involved
CETENA, Italy
Centre for Concepts in Mechatronic, The Netherlands
SAFT S.A., France
AKER ARCTIC TECHNOLOGY OY, Finland
Balearia Eurolineas Maritimas SA, Spain
AALTO-KORKEAKOULUSÄÄTIÖ, Finland
Compagnia Generale Trattori SpA, Italy
Yachtglass GmbH & Co. KG, Germany
NEXANS France, France
University of Strathclyde, United Kingdom
UNIVERSIDAD POLITECNICA DE MADRID, Spain
MTI Holland B.V., The Netherlands
Rolls-Royce plc, United Kingdom
WARTSILA FINLAND OY, Finland
Contacts http://www.joules-project.eu/Joules/contact.xhtml
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Main aim As satellites have become necessary tools for the monitoring of the environment, 
meteorology, communication and navigation, amongst other applications. Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) allow users worldwide to pinpoint their locations or 
the locations of objects, other people and goods at any given moment. The system will 
be applicable in public and private sectors i.e. in transport and logistics, communication 
applications, land surveying, agriculture, fisheries, environmental protection, scientific 
research, tourism and leisure, and others.
Geographical scope Global
Disciplines involved Aerodynamics, remote sensing, engineering, physics, propulsion, materials science, IT. 
Output EU own Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) programme applicable in open 
access navigation, commercial navigation, search and rescue. 
Relevance Search and rescue for maritime transport
Period 1999-2020 
Budget The EU contribution to the Galileo and EGNOS programmes for 2007-2013 amounts to 
€ 3.4 billion, in addition to which there is, inter alia, a contribution from Norway. 
This budget has been split across the three main activities, namely completion of 
the Galileo development phase (accounting for around € 600 million), the Galileo 
deployment phase (€ 2.4 billion), and the operation of EGNOS (around € 400 million). 
The estimates made to date point to a requirement for around € 1 900 million in funding 
over the period 2014-2019 to complete the infrastructure associated with the Galileo 
programme. Added to this will be the operating costs of  the system once it has become 
operational, i.e. as from 2014-2015 €  590 millions
Funding source European Commission , European Space Agency 
Galileo  
European Global Satellite-Based Navigation System
http://www.gsa.europa.eu/galileo-0
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Northcharr 
Sustainable Aquaculture of Arctic charr
http://www.northcharr.eu
Main aim Developing farming of Arctic charr
Geographical scope Iceland, Norway, Sweden
Disciplines involved Aquaculture
Output Secured and expanded national breeding programs; coordination of the farming 
industry in all participating countries initiated; input to the governmental inquest 
“Sweden, an Aquaculture nation in the making”; advice services and help to farmers.; 
establishment of the Aquaculture Centre North.
Relevance Farming this species requires access to cold fresh or brackish water. For this reason, 
the possibility to farm this species in Europe is largely restricted to rural areas in the 
northern periphery. Northern periphery fish farms therefore have the opportunity to 
provide EU markets with a unique, high quality product while creating important job 
opportunities in rural areas. The project took a holistic approach to using expertise 
and provided stakeholders in the Northern periphery with tools to strongly improve 
the development of Arctic charr production. The project focussed on using sustainable 
ingredients in the fish feed for Arctic charr and developing welfare criteria for faring 
conditions and slaughter. The project was thus relevant to environmental sustainability 
in aquaculture. 
Period 06/2008 -09/2011
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1 132 792 EUR / 478 683 EUR
Funding source Northern Periphery Programme  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: SLU, Wildlife, Fish and Environmental Studies, Sweden
Nofima Marine, Norway
Holar University Collage, Iceland 
Contacts Eva Brännäs
Eva.Brannas@vfm.slu.se 
Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries
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Kolarctic Salmon 
http://www2.fylkesmannen.no/hoved.aspx?m=67246
Main aim Merging modern science with traditional knowledge to improve the future management 
of the Atlantic salmon
Geographical scope Barents Region
Disciplines involved Fisheries management
Output Genetic map of the wild salmon stocks on the region, knowledge on the development 
and migration patterns of the different stocks
Relevance Kolarctic Salmon will generate recommendations on how to provide a more sustainable, 
knowledge-based management of salmon stocks in the Barents region. It also leaves 
a legacy of active cooperation and dialogue among management, various research 
disciplines, sea salmon fishing organizations and local fishermen.
Period 01/2011-12/2013
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
3 100 000 EUR/ 1 500 000 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Finnmark County Governor´s office, Norway
Game and Fisheries Research Institute, Finland
Turku University, Finland
Knipovitch Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography, Russia 
Norwegian Institute of Nature Research, Norway
Institute of Marine Research, Norway 
Contacts Bente Christiansen
fmfibch@fylkesmannen.no
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ACCESS 
Arctic Climate Change, Economy and Society / Fisheries WG
http://www.access-eu.org/
Main aim Evaluation of the Arctic climate change scenarios and their impact on specific economic 
sectors and human activities over the next decades.
Geographical scope Arctic Region
Disciplines involved Climate Change, Transport & Tourism, Resource Extraction, Arctic Governance
Output Reports on:
• Economic settings, societal and cultural priorities in the fishery and aquaculture 
sectors Past and present impact of biophysical changes on fisheries 
• Economic impacts of global warming on fisheries
• Climate change and Arctic aquaculture
• Climate change impacts, and human responses, affecting traditional whaling
• Indicators for sustainable development in the Arctic fisheries sector
• Market responses to climate change
• International and national fishery management, adaptation practices and strategies 
to climate-related changes in fisheries
• Results from field experiments in the Arctic
Relevance ACCESS is of relevance to fisheries questions in that it looks more broadly into the 
sensitivity of the ecosystems and their response to essential climate variables. Another 
major task is the analysis of how Arctic climate changes affect socio-economic aspects 
of the fisheries and aquaculture industry, and its effect on marine mammals.
Period 2011-2015
EU funding granted 10 978 468 EUR
Funding source 7th Framework Programme, Ocean of Tomorrow  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: University Pierre et Marie Curie, France
 
LOCEAN, France
LATMOS, France
LOV, France
O.A. Sys-Ocean Atmosphere Systems GmbH, Germany
Natural Environment Research Council, United Kingdom
Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Germany
University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
Alfred-Wegener-Institut, Germany
Dr-Ing. Joachim Schwarz, Independent consulting entity for Polar and Maritime 
Technology, Germany
Nofima Marin AS, Norway
Hamburgische Schiffbau-Versuchsanstalt, Germany
Norsk Polarinstitutt, Norway
Meteorologisk Institutt, Norway
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Institutions and partners 
involved
Fastopt GmbH, Germany
The Scottish Association for Marine Science, United Kingdom
Kungliga Vetenskapsakademien, The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Sweden
P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
IMPAC Offshore Engineering GmbH, Germany
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Spain
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft und Raumfahrt EV, Germany
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute of Roshydromet, Russia
Economic and Social Research Institute, Ireland
Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, Finland
Sintef Fiskeri og Havbruk AS, Norway
Cicero Senter for Klimaforskning, Norway
Stiftelsen Sintef, Norway
Energiewirtschaftliche Institut an der Universität zu Köln (EWI), Germany
Association Le cercle polaire, France
Nordic Bulk Carriers A/S, Danemark
Contacts Jean-Claude Gascard
jean-claude.gascard@locean-ipsl.upmc.fr
A
.
- 204 -
MARIES 
Monitoring Arctic land and sea ice using Russian and European satellites 
http://maires.nersc.no/
Main aim Development of methodologies for satellite monitoring of Arctic glaciers, sea ice and 
icebergs.
Geographical scope Barents and Kara Sea region 
Disciplines involved Arctic and Marine Remote Sensing Studies, Climate Processes, Variability and Change
Output Data, models, maps and reports on  Arctic glaciers, sea ice and icebergs
Relevance Projects help to develop research capabilities which support Arctic offshore economic 
activities. Improved monitoring of sea ice and icebergs in the Barents and Kara Seas is of 
importance for shipping, offshore operations and other human activities in the Arctic. 
MARIES strengthens knowledge about processes taking place in the Arctic relevant for 
the oil and gas exploration and exploitation.
Period 06/2011 - 06/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
500 000 EUR
Funding source Copernicus,  7th Framework Programme  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center, Norway 
Institute of Information and Communication Technology, Austria
Scientific foundation Nansen International Environmental and Remote Sensing Centre, 
Russia
Research Center for Earth Operative Monitoring, Russia
State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education Moscow State University 
of Geodesy and Cartography, Russia
Contacts Stein Sandven
stein.sandven@nersc.no 
Developing Oil and Gas Resources in Arctic Waters
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MarCoast / MarCoast 2  
Marine & Coastal Environmental Information Service
http://www.marcoast.eu/
Main aim Delivers downstream services for the operational monitoring of marine water quality
Geographical scope Norwegian Sea, North Sea, Baltic Sea, Bay of Biscay, Mediterranean sea, Black sea
Disciplines involved Oil Spill and Water Quality monitoring
Output Oil spill surveillance and customized information
Relevance Knowledge gained in this monitoring initiative can later be applied in oil and gas 
exploration in Arctic seas.
Period 11/2005 - 11/2008, 2010 - 03/2013
Budget / EU funding 
granted
11.5 M€ in total (over 6 years)
Funding source European space agency ESA-ESRIN  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner THALES ALENIA SPACE - France
The MarCoast consortium is composed of 32 partners from 10 European countries
Contacts contact@marcoast.eu
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SIDARUS  
Sea Ice Downstream Services for Arctic and Antarctic Users and Stakeholders
http://sidarus.nersc.no 
Main aim Development and implementation of a set of sea ice downstream services in the area 
of climate research, marine safety and environmental monitoring
Geographical scope Arctic Region, Antarctic
Disciplines involved Sea ice monitoring, Marine safety
Output Sea ice forecasting in the Barents and Kara Seas; Animal ARGOS tracking - Polar Bears, 
Sea ice thickness from satellite radar altimeter , Sea ice drift on regional scale
Relevance Positive effects on strengthening knowledge about processes taking place in the Arctic 
which are relevant for the oil and gas exploration and exploitation. It is also relevant for 
navigation in the Arctic Ocean.
Period 01/2011- 01/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
3 475 000 EUR / 2 498 507 EUR
Funding source European Earth Observation Programme Copernicus, 7th Framework Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center, Norway
Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Germany
Collecte Localisation Satellites SA (CLS), France
University of Bremen, Institute of Environmental Physics, Germany
University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, 
United Kingdom
Norwegian Meteorological Institute, Norway
Nansen International Environmental and Remote Sensing Center, Russia
B.I. Stepanov Institute of Physics, Belarus
Contacts Stein Sandven
stein.sandven@nersc.no
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Project’s 
name
Programme Main scope 
Duration 
and 
coverage
Relevance 
(Which trend, 
issue, driver, 
impact?)
Assessment of the 
impact (qualitative)
Blue Growth: 
Unlocking the 
potential of Seas and 
Oceans: 
New offshore 
challenges: 
BG-5-2014: Preparing 
for the future 
innovative offshore 
economy 
HORIZON 2020 – 
WORK PROGRAMME 
2014 - 2015
Societal Challenge 
2: Food security, 
sustainable 
agriculture and 
forestry, marine and 
maritime and inland 
water research and 
the bio-economy
Analyse and 
identify the social 
and economic 
developments 
in the offshore 
economy and the 
most promising, 
environmentally 
sustainable and 
economically feasible 
business models.
From 2014 
Legal entities 
established in the 
countries which 
are eligible to 
receive funding in 
Horizon 2020
Providing basis for 
sustainable and 
innovative developments, 
especially for feasible 
business models in the 
offshore economy, both 
in social and economic 
dimension will strengthen 
EU position and expertize 
in this area
Positive impact on development of 
offshore activates, including oil and 
gas exploitation
Blue Growth: 
Unlocking the 
potential of Seas and 
Oceans: 
New offshore 
challenges: 
BG-06-2014 
Delivering the sub-
sea technologies for 
new services at sea
HORIZON 2020 – 
WORK PROGRAMME 
2014 - 2015
Societal Challenge 
2: Food security, 
sustainable 
agriculture and 
forestry, marine and 
maritime and inland 
water research and 
the bio-economy
Research focused 
on innovative design 
and prototypes of 
new underwater 
vehicles and robots 
and/or their main 
components required 
to work undersea.
From 2014
Legal entities 
established in the 
countries which 
are eligible to 
receive funding in 
Horizon 2020
Supporting innovative 
technologies offers EU 
companies advantages 
in development of the 
exploitation in the Arctic 
offshore
Positive effects for development of 
safety and effective technologies 
based on  European standards 
which could be helpful in harsh 
Arctic conditions. Additionally, it can 
Improve the scientific capacity to 
observe and understand the water 
column, the deep sea environment 
and their resources.
Enable sustainable and safe offshore 
operations by European industries in 
extreme and Arctic conditions
Increase cost-effectiveness and 
competitiveness of the existing and 
new European offshore economy.
Blue Growth: 
Unlocking the 
potential of Seas and 
Oceans: 
New offshore 
challenges: 
BG-7-2015: Response 
capacities to oil 
spills and marine 
pollutions 
HORIZON 2020 – 
WORK PROGRAMME 
2014 - 2015
Societal Challenge 
2: Food security, 
sustainable 
agriculture and 
forestry, marine and 
maritime and inland 
water research and 
the bio-economy
Providing 
development 
of  an integrated 
operational response 
capacity to major 
offshore and/or 
coastal pollution 
events (particularly 
oil & gas), including 
in extreme oceanic 
conditions. 
From 2015 
Legal entities 
established in the 
countries which 
are eligible to 
receive funding in 
Horizon 2020
Improvement of the 
European operational 
response capacity to 
oil spills and marine 
pollutions, within 
particular integrated 
models and tools that 
can be tested for a 
better preparedness and 
support decision making 
in the management of 
such events. 
Setting recommendations 
for infrastructure works 
to help protect sensitive 
ecosystems in high risk 
areas.
Positive effect on: 
- development an integrated capacity 
to optimally respond to major marine 
pollution events (particularly oil & 
gas);
- mitigation of negative impacts 
of marine pollution on marine 
environment, coastal economies and 
communities;
- improvement  the integration 
between the scientific community 
and relevant government agencies 
charged with dealing with pollution, 
including cross-border and trans-
boundary co-operation; 
- contributing  to the implementation 
of the Directive 2013/30/EU on safety 
of offshore oil and gas prospection, 
exploration and production activities 
and to the Offshore Protocol of 
the Barcelona Convention in the 
Mediterranean; 
- effectiveness of EMSA’s operational 
capacity to respond to pollution from 
oil and gas installations
- for societal acceptance of offshore 
activities; 
- growth of competitiveness of 
European industry including SMEs 
within the marine industrial sector;
- development international 
cooperation in research and 
innovation, in particular the US and 
Canada, given their high potential for 
knowledge sharing in this field.
In Horizon 2020 framework, a number of calls potentially of relevance to trends in the development of oil and gas 
resources in Arctic waters and elsewhere. This is illustrated by the following table:
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Project’s 
name
Programme Main scope
Duration 
and 
coverage
Relevance 
(Which trend, 
issue, driver, 
impact?)
Assessment of the 
impact (qualitative)
Blue Growth: 
Unlocking the 
potential of Seas and 
Oceans: 
New offshore 
challenges:
BG-15-2014: 
European polar 
research cooperation
HORIZON 2020 – 
WORK PROGRAMME 
2014 - 2015
Societal Challenge 2: 
Food security, 
sustainable 
agriculture and 
forestry, marine and 
maritime and inland 
water research and 
the bio-economy
Project aims at 
coordination of polar 
research in Europe 
and development a 
comprehensive 
European Polar 
Research Programme. 
By setting up 
a continuous 
stakeholder dialogue 
the 
action should 
communicate 
user needs to the 
appropriate scientific 
community and/or 
research programme 
managers. 
Since 2014 
Legal entities 
established in the 
countries which 
are eligible to 
receive funding in 
Horizon 2020
Project will substantially 
increase the scale 
and ambition of polar 
research cooperation 
in Europe and increase 
the coherent and 
efficient use of European 
resources. 
It may also improve 
global cooperation and 
induce a step change in 
the domain of open data 
access, quality control 
and interoperability. 
Project will additionally 
contribute to policy 
advice at national and 
EU level and support to 
the EU’s international 
commitments with 
respect to the Arctic 
Council, the Montreal 
protocol, and UNFCCC 
and others related to 
polar sciences.
Positive effect on significance of 
the European polar research and 
development of objectives of the 
EU strategy for international 
cooperation in research and 
innovation, especially with partners 
from the US and Canada , Russia, 
Japan, China, India.
European 
Commission Joint 
Research Centre 
Institute for Energy 
and Transport
Safety of offshore oil 
and gas operations: 
Lessons from past 
accident analysis
Ensuring EU 
hydrocarbon 
supply through 
better control of 
major hazards
The JRC, through 
a Memorandum 
of Understanding 
with DG ENERGY 
and through its 
institutional work 
programme supports 
the development and 
implementation of 
the offshore safety 
legislation. One 
activity contributing 
to this support 
is the analysis of 
past accidents in 
the sector in order 
to identify the 
existing conditions 
related to sharing 
of information, 
transparency and 
lessons learning. It 
is also useful to get 
statistical information 
on the frequency and 
severity of accidents
2012
Joint Research 
Centre Institute 
for Energy and 
Transport
This project support 
growth of expertise of 
the EU institutions and 
member states about  
safety of offshore oil and 
gas operations
Positive effect on expertise of the 
EU institutions and member states 
about  safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations, including the Arctic areas.
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DILACOMI 
Different Land Use Activities and Local Communities in Mining Projects 
http://www.ulapland.fi/InEnglish/Units/Faculty-of-Law/Research/Research-Projects/DILACOMI
Main aim The subject of research is mining and mines, and how they affect and are able to 
function in the local communities.
Geographical scope Finnish Lapland 
Disciplines involved mining, social and cultural sustainability
Output Handbook - best practices guidebook for mining in North 
Master’s thesis, articles and reports
Relevance Analysis of environmental law regarding land use, evaluation of changes caused by 
mining project to the local communities, contribution towards participation for the 
stake-holders in the mining projects in relation to land use planning, EIA and SEA 
processes and interrelationship between ecological, economic and social aspects of 
community life. The processes and practices of land use planning concerning mining 
activities. Integration of nature-based economies and mining projects located close to 
tourist destinations in Lapland.
Period 2011-2013
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
Funding source European Regional Development Fund  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: The Finnish Forest Research Institute, Finland
University of Lapland, Finland
University of Oulu, Finland
Contacts Mikko Jokinen,
mikko.jokinen@metla.fi 
Main Land Use Activities in the European Arctic
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LSP Reconstruction of the road “Kandalaksha - Alakurtti – Checkpoint Salla”
http://lsp.act4region.ru/
Main aim Contributing to the development of the transport infrastructure and  social-economic 
development of the Barents region. Project purpose is to reconstruct the section 100-
130km of the road Salla-Alakurtti.
Geographical scope Murmansk Region, Russia 
Disciplines involved
Output Reconstruction of the road sectors, reducing the barriers for development of the cross-
border and international business and mobility of residents, increasing the cargo and 
passenger traffics across the border.
Relevance The project contributes to increasingly barrier-free and mutually beneficial crossing of 
the border between Northern Russia and the Finland
Period 06/2012 - 12/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
2 230 000 EUR / 2 000 000 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC, Large Scale Project 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Murmansk Road Administration, Russia
Municipality of Salla, Finland
Lapland development Centre for Economic, Transport and Environment, Finland
Contacts Olga Buch 
olgabuch@yandex.ru 
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LSP Polar Wind 
http://www.polarwind.ru/
Main aim Creating stable and environmentally clean energy supply for the villages 
Geographical scope Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Russia
Disciplines involved Engineering works and surveys
Output Modernization of the municipal power systems 
Development of environmentally friendly wind-diesel power installations
Relevance The project facilitates renewable energy development and research in the Arctic, which 
can benefit the Arctic communities economically, given that changes in land-use can 
put pressures on local economies.
Period 08/2012 – 11/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
2 300 000  EUR / 2 000 000 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC, Large Scale Project 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Construction, Housing and Communal Services Department, Russia
OOO North West United Generating Company, Russia
The Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland
Not-for-profit Partnership North-West Funding Service Centre, Russia
MUE Severzhilkomservice, Russia
Contacts Andrey Reznichok 
e-mail: reznichok@mail.ru 
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ABCG Heritage 
Arctic Biological, Cultural and Geological Heritage
http://www.metsa.fi/sivustot/metsa/en/Projects/NeighbourhoodProjects/ABCGheritage/Sivut/default.aspx
Main aim To increase regional knowledge, particularly where schoolchildren are concerned, but 
also for tourists, local residents and nature tourism operators 
To increase the sustainable use of protected and recreational areas create new, 
innovative co-operative networks along the Green Belt of Fennoscandia, which do 
long-term nature conservation work and establish sustainable nature tourism. 
Geographical scope East-Lapland, Kola Peninsula and Northern Norway
Disciplines involved Education, tourism, nature conservation
Output Nature guiding (incl. mobile applications) and services for cultural and geological sights 
in Urho Kekkonen and Pyhä-Luosto National Parks. Travelling exhibition of Green Belt of 
Fennoscandia. Educational material for schools, teachers, personnel working in nature 
protection and environmental education and tourism operators. Nature trails and 
information boards. Development plan for the Green Belt of Fennoscandia. “Lapland 
Tour for Geotourists” guidebook
Relevance The project is contributing to conservation and tourism. Development of plans and 
specific services address issues of land use planning and management and provide 
the genuine opportunity for the local and regional participation. Educational materials 
create positive knowledge impact and contribute to sustainable ecotourism and nature 
conservation.
Period 03/2011-12/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1 800 000 EUR / approx. 700 000 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner : Metsähallitus, Natural Heritage Services, Finland
Geological Survey of Finland, Finland
Lapland Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment, Finland 
Bioforsk Svanhovd, Norway 
County Governor of Finnmark, Norway 
Finnmark County Authority Norway 
Nordland Research Institute, Norway
Geological Institute of the Kola Science Centre, Russia 
Lapland State Natural Biosphere Reserve and Pasvik State Nature Reserve, Russia
Contacts Riina Tervo
riina.tervo@metsa.fi
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MineHealth
http://minehealth.eu/
Main aim Providing long-term sustainability of well-being, health and work ability among workers 
in the mining industry by increased knowledge on how to cope with the environment 
and to adopt preventive measures for working in the mining industry within the Barents 
region.
Geographical scope Barents Region 
Disciplines involved Environmental sciences, education and training. 
Output Learning material and education plans/programs as well as technical and administrative 
actions. Optimization of arctic miner’s clothing and personal protective equipment. 
Promote well-being, work ability and health.
Relevance The project is relevant also outside the Barents region; as in other mining communities 
in the circumpolar region. The outcome can lead to lower costs for the enterprises and 
society, and increase productivity and profitability in the mining industry in the Barents 
region.
Period 03/2012 - 12/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
2 979 670 EUR / 955 075 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Umeå University Department of Public Health & Clinical Medicine 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Sweden
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Finland
Lapland University of Applied Sciences, Finland
Northwest Public Health Research Center, Russia
University Hospital North Norway, Norway
Norut Alta As, Norway
SINTEF, Norway
Contacts Lage Burström
lage.burstrom@envmed.umu.se
Mining in the European Arctic
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SUMILCERE 
Sustainable Mining, local communities and environmental regulation in Kolarctic area
http://www.ulapland.fi/InEnglish/Units/Faculty-of-Law/Research/Research-Projects/SUMILCERE
Main aim Support public-private collaboration for achieving the sustainable development; 
enhance the using of developed practices and recommendations for sustainable social 
licensing, environmental regulation; contribute to the diminishing risks in global mining 
investments; sustain research network collaboration. 
Geographical scope Barents Region
Disciplines involved Mining, sustainable development
Output Recommendations to improve the socio-economic development of territories and local 
communities. Indicators of socio-economic development in the target area. Suggested 
procedures and methodology for management of social and environmental impacts of 
the planned mining enterprises.
Relevance The project contributes to management of social and environmental impacts of the 
planned mining enterprises.
Period 1/2013-12/2014
Budget 1 093 704 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: University of Lapland, Finland
Luleå University of Technology, Norrbotten, Sweden, 
Northern Research Institute, Tromsø, Norway 
Institute of the Industrial Ecology Problems of the North of the Kola, Russia Science 
Center, Murmansk, Russia 
Contacts Kai Kokko
kai.kokko@ulapland.fi
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ENVIMINE
Developing environmental and geodynamical safety related to mine closure in the Barents region
http://projects.gtk.fi/envimine/news/
Main aim Developing innovative and environmentally safe methods for mine closure in the Barents 
region, and cooperation in mining environmental studies between the participating 
countries will be developed as well. 
Geographical scope Barents Region
Disciplines involved Mining, environmental impact assessment
Output Data and information on environmental impacts of mines
Coordination practices of mine closure between mineral industry and environmental 
administration
Updated database from Finland, Sweden and Russia in selected study areas
Relevance
Period 04/2012  -  02/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
635 318 EUR / 314 292 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Geological Survey of Finland, Finland
Luleå University of Technology, Sweden
Kola Mining Institute of the Academy of Science, Russia
Contacts Kimmo Pietikäinen
kimmo.pietikainen@gtk.fi
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ProMine
Nano-particle products from new mineral resources in Europe
http://promine.gtk.fi/ 
Main aim to stimulate the extractive industry to deliver new products to manufacturing industry 
Geographical scope Whole EU
Disciplines involved
Selected outputs To develop the first pan-European GIS-based database containing the known and 
predicted metalliferous and non-metalliferous resources, which together define the 
strategic reserves (including secondary resources) of the EU; To calculate the volumes 
of potentially strategic metals; To establish a new, cross-platform information group 
between the European Technology Platform on Sustainable Mineral Resources (ETP-
SMR)
Relevance
Period 05/2009  -  04/2013
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
17 mln / 11 mln
Funding source Seventh Framework Programme, Nanosciences, Nanotechnologies, Materials and New 
Prodcution Technologies 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Geological Survey of Finland, Finland
 
Boliden Mineral AB, Sweden; KGHM Cuprum, Poland; AGC Minas de Portugal; 
Hellas Gold, Greece; Pyhasalimi Mine Oy, Finland; Calduran Kalkzandsteen B.V., the 
Netherlands; WOLA, Germany; KGHM Ecoren, Poland; SELOR eeig, the Netherlands; 
Kematka Konsult AB, Sweden; Integrated Resource Maangeemtn Co.Ltd. Malta; 
G.E.O.S, Germany; IMN, Poland; BRGM, Francep;  IGME ES, Spain; IGME GR, Greece; 
LNEG, Portugal; VTT, Finland; LTU, Sweden; TU/e the Netherlandss; Institute National 
Polytechnique de Lorraine, France; UN WRA, UK; Bangor University, UK;  UFREU, 
Germany; KWH-Mirka, Finland; Grecian Magne site, Greece
Supported by the European Technology Platform on Sustainable Mineral Resources 
(ETP-SMR)
Contacts Juha Kaija; Gabor Gaál
juha.kaija@gtk.fi ; ggaal@telia.com
A
.
- 217 -
Barents Mediasphere
Improving Cross-Border Communications
http://www.barentsinfo.org/mediasphere#.UwBtSfmSySp
Main aim To improve cross-border communication and information flow within the Barents region. 
The Barents Mediasphere project aims to create flexible cooperation mechanisms for 
media in the Barents region, and increases its visibility in media both inside and outside 
the region.
Geographical scope Barents Region 
Disciplines involved Journalism, communication 
Output Increased Barents region visibility (needs of information on Barents region identifies, 
Barents guide for European media, Barents information and Circumpolar Arctic 
information integrated, Barents information briefings, region visibility in Nordic 
countries monitored); Barents editors forum establishing training programs and 
professional courses on Barents related expertise for journalists working in the region; 
news and human interest material available; existing websites such as Barentsinfo.
org with Barents-related content developed. The “Mixed marriages” documentary; 
practical help for journalists by offering exchange of desks and assistance for media in 
cooperation.
Relevance The project contributes to supporting cross-border cooperation by improving 
communication and information flow within the Barents region, thus development and 
strengthening of information channels. The project also contributes as a general support 
for the media in the North. Therefore, the project addresses need for cross-border 
cooperation, especially with Russia and creation of regional networks for exchanging 
knowledge, practices and information. The project also supports local media, which is 
a vital component in governance of social changes.
Period 08/2012 – 12/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
899 730 EUR / 344 096 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland, Finland
GTRK Murman, Russia
BarentsObserver, Norway
Barents Press International
Contacts Virpi Komulainen
virpi.komulainen@ulapland.fi 
Social and Cultural Changes in the European Arctic
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Young Innovative Entrepreneurs
http://yie.act4region.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=3&lang=en
Main aim Creation of a region wide support system that will enhance the development and 
implementation of innovative business ideas across the borders by young entrepreneurs 
Geographical scope Barents Region
Disciplines involved Entrepreneurship, education and training.
Output Mentoring programme, matchmaking conferences
Relevance The project provides support for young entrepreneurship, and thus, encourages young 
people to work and live in the North, tackling the key challenges faced by rural societies 
in peripheral Northern regions.
Period 03/2012 - 12/014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1 365 940 EUR /  485 523 EUR
Funding source Kolarctic ENPI CBC  
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Kemi-Tornionlaakso Municipal Education and Training Consortium Lappia, 
Finland
Barentssekretariatet, Norway 
Non-commercial partnership “Education, Innovation, and Scientific-Research Union 
Socium+”, Russia
Rovaniemi Municipal Federation of Education/RUAS, Finland
Murmansk State Humanities University, Russia
Murmansk State Technical University, Russia
The North Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Murmansk, Russia
Länsipohjan yrittäjät, Finland
Association of Higher Education in Eastern Norrbotten, Haparanda, Sweden
Contacts Saila Vaara  
saila.vaara@tokem.fi  
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Indigee 2
http://indigee.org/
Main aim The project aims to encourage successful business based on indigenous values. Follow-
up to Indigenous entrepeneurship. 
Geographical scope Barents Region
Disciplines involved Entrepreneurship
Output Conferences
Group work in workshops
Participants also are offered ongoing business advice throughout the project
Relevance The project contributes to building of entrepreneurship culture in the North, supports 
indigenous identities and Sami cultural developments. Focusing on young people and 
encouraging them to build businesses based on indigenous industries tackles the 
problem of youth out-migration. Project supports also Sami cross-border cooperation, 
contributing to strengthening of pan-Sami identity among young people.
Period 10/2012 - 06/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1 770 849 EUR/ 379 597 EUR 
Funding source InterregIVANorth/Sapmi 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Swedish Sami National Association (SSR)
SOGSAKK
Norske samers Rikförbund
International Barents Secretariat
Public Association of Nenets people in Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Yasavey
Contacts Lars Miguel Utsi  
lmu@indigee.org  
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DARRA 
Digital Age in Rural and Remote Areas
http://www.darraproject.eu
Main aim Closing the digital divide between sparsely populated / rural areas and urban areas 
Geographical scope Northern Periphery Area
Disciplines involved Information and communications technology
Output Electronic Invoicing and e-Invoicing Calculator
Level of ICT maturity have been indicated with an e-ladder (measurement tool 
developed in DARRA-project) tool to bring up the real development needs of each 
company.
Relevance The project supported ICT connectivity in the sparsely populated and rural areas, 
developing effective solutions for public sector and for small and medium enterprises 
contributing to local entrepreneurship and local interconnectedness
Period 01/2008 - 12/2010
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1 423 789 EUR/ 833 024 EUR  
Funding source Northern Periphery Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Kemi-Tornio University of Applied Sciences, Finland
Joint Authority of Kainuu Region, Finland
Kainuun Etu Oy, Finland
The Association of Local Authorities in Västernorrland, Sweden
Mid Sweden University, Sweden
Federation of Private Enterprises Västernorrland, Sweden
European Regions Network for the Application of Communications Technology, ERNACT, 
Ireland
Shannon Development, Ireland
Sogn og Fjordane County Governor, Norway
Western Norway Research Institute, Norway
Rovaniemi Regional Development Agency, Finland
University of Limerick, Ireland
Contacts Janne Hirvonen  
janne.hirvonen@tokem.fi  
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NoCry and NoCry2 
Northern Creative Youth
http://www.creativeyouth.eu
Main aim Improving and supporting the entrepreneurial competence among young artists in the 
NPP area and to provide better understanding of the business potential that lies in the 
creative industry
Geographical scope Northern Periphery Area
Disciplines involved Creative industries, visual and performing arts, design, media
Output The first version of the www.incubiz.eu online platform 
An experimental international cultural management education programme, the Road 
Tour, as well as the experimental film training with co-production over distances have 
been finalised and the results and experinces are being assessed
Regional creative incubator pilots
Relevance Support for creative industries, economic diversification, combating social problems, 
especially of the young people. Supporting youth entrepreneurship and activism, this 
way encouraging youth to live and be active in the North
Period 01/2008 - 06/2010
(NoCry2: 01/2011 - 12/2013)
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1 807 643 EUR/ 1 035 107 EUR
(NoCry2: 992 907.93 EUR/ 575 480.39 EUR)  
Funding source Northern Periphery Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: Kemi-Tornio University of Applied Sciences, Finland (also NoCry2)
Entrepreneurship Training Centre Intotalo, Finland
Faroe Islands Enterprise (Samvit), Faroe Islands
Luleå University of Technology, Department for Music and Media, Sweden
MediaEnter - Study Centre, Municipality of Kramfors, Sweden
Moray College, Scotland
Norut Tromsø AS, Norway
PowerHouse, Municipality of Kramfors, Sweden (also NoCry2 - leader)
Rovaniemi University of Applied Sciences, Finland
The Nerve Centre, Northern Ireland (also NoCry2)
(Troms County in NoCry2)
Contacts Mr. Kaj Kostiander
kaj.kostiander@tokem.fi  
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Recruit and Retain 
Recruitment and Retention of Health Care Providers and Public Sector Workers in Remote Rural Areas
http://www.recruitandretain.eu
Main aim To put in place mechanisms whereby front line health care providers can be identified, 
encouraged, trained and supported to work in a remote rural community
Geographical scope Northern Periphery Area
Disciplines involved Human resources, education, employment, capacity building
Output
Relevance The project supports service-delivery in remote areas, one of the key challenges 
connected with quality of life, demographics and social development in the rural 
northern peripheries
Period 06/2011 - 06/2014
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
2 997 271.68 EUR/ 1 976 409.23 EUR  
Funding source Northern Periphery Programme 
Institutions and partners 
involved
Lead partner: NHS Western Isles, Scotland
The Agency of Health and Protection, Greenland
FSA University Hospital, Iceland
Helse Finnmark Health Trust, Norway
County council of Västerbotten, Emergency & Disaster Medical Centre + Storuman 
Health Care Center, Sweden
The University Court of the University of Aberdeen, Centre for Rural Health, Scotland
Northern Ontario School of Medicine, Canada
Cooperation and Working Together (CAWT), Northern Ireland
Contacts Deanne Gilbert
deannegilbert@nhs.net  
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Barents Logistics 2 
Main aim To develop logistics competencies and deepen educational co-operation between the 
universities and educational institutions together with public and business organizations
Geographical scope Barents Region
Disciplines involved Logistics, research and training
Output Publications, Master thesis,
Practice-related courses for expertise in logistics 
Vocational education, seminars 
Relevance The project is to develop local competence in the area of logistics, which is expected to 
become increasingly important due to the growth in industries and activities requiring 
management of logistics, thereby allowing the Northern regions to benefit more 
from the developments, especially in the case of extractive industries, where lack of 
local expertise creates a risk that region will not benefit as expected from resource 
developments
Period 2011-2013
Total budget / EU funding 
granted
1.7 M€  
Funding source The Kolarctic ENPI CBC 
Institutions and partners 
involved
University of Oulu, Oulu Business School, Finland (lead partner)
Luleå University of Technology, Industrial Logistics, Sweden
Association of Suppliers for Oil and Gas Industry “Murmanshelf´, Russia
Non-commercial organization “Arctic Centre for Training of Oil and Gas Specialists´, 
Russia
Non-commercial partnership “Education, Innovation, and Scientific-Research Union 
Socium+´, Russia
Port of Oulu, Finland
Port of Kemi, Finland
The Ministry of Economic Development of the Murmansk region, Russia
Contacts Ulla Lehtinen 
ulla.lehtinen[at]oulu.fi  
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